The Ethics of Gene Doping

Ethics of Gene Doping 2

The Ethics of Gene Doping

by Jonathan Gittins

Lee Sweeney keeps getting emails…emails from coaches that are trying to get a hold of the “magical” solution that would increase strength and stamina in their players without the ability to test for enhancement. While this solution isn’t exactly ready for human use, many different organizations and governments have already started worrying about the consequences of Sweeney’s and other researchers’ work into gene therapy. While the research was meant to help those with debilitating diseases, it could be used by athletes to increase performance. In its July 2004 issue, Discover Magazine asks, “Will Gene Doping Destroy Sports” (Behar 2004)? The article indicates that gene doping, introducing synthetic genes for non-therapeutic uses is “cheating and a misuse of genetics.” The media, government, and organizations have all demonized it without explaining why gene doping is considered unethical and immoral. The intent of this research is to discover the ethical objections to gene doping, effectively trying to gauge the strength or weakness of each argument.

The first argument against gene doping is that of cheating and unfairness and is voiced by many (Lavin 1987). In some instances, gene doping would be “cheating” as it would break the contractual obligation of an athlete, for example if the NFL explicitly prohibited it. Many other athletes, though, are not under any specific contract. People indicate that for these athletes, it would be “unfair” for the athlete to obtain an advantage over their competitors, giving them the edge in strength and stamina. It would also be “disrespectful” to others (Lavin 1987).

The argument above tends to tug on society’s belief that everyone should have equal opportunities. The problem is that some athletes already have an innate genetic advantage above their competitors. For example, the Finnish cross-country skier, Eero Mäntyranta, was found to have a genetic mutation that lead to increased erythropoietin levels and higher numbers of oxygen-carrying red blood cells (Sweeney 2004). There are other examples of athletes having increased levels of certain proteins. Sports have not prevented these people from competing, even though they have an advantage. We apparently consider these to be fair advantages.

Gene doping could be used to increase protein levels in all athletes, thereby removing the advantage held by a few. The competition would then be based on equality. One problem with this idea is based on the economic disparity between societal classes and various countries. The wealthy would be able to purchase the genetic therapy much more easily than the poor, with a similar dilemma with developed and developing countries. Even now, not all athletes have the ability to obtain performance-enhancing technology, so the argument could be made that gene doping should be banned based on unfairness arising from economic disparity. It is optimistic to believe that gene doping could make everyone equal, but it would be unrealistic from an implementation standpoint, as not everyone would be able to afford the technology.

“Gene doping is harmful.” This is the second argument presented against gene doping, and it comes in a variety of shades and colors. Gene doping could essentially harm the athlete, other athletes, the sporting community, society, and the nature of sports. Some of these arguments are solely sports-oriented, while others expand to concerns of social division.

Gene therapy is a relative newcomer to science, and its abilities and benefits have been unproven up to now (Holowchak 2000). Most research has been done solely on animals, and trials that have been done on human beings have not been accepted well by society. In 1999, Jesse Gelsinger died after an extreme immune reaction occurred while on gene therapy (Beardsley 2000). Many are unsure what this therapy will to do the body. It could cause unexpected problems and therefore many believe it should not be allowed, especially for athletes that do not require it for therapeutic use (Miah 2004).

With this argument, though, the idea of harm appears to be relative for athletes. Some sports, such as boxing and football, are harmful by nature. Should we ban these sports just because they are harmful to the body? These sports are still extremely popular, so there is no way they would be banned. The physiological and anatomical effects of gene doping may be more or less damaging that the brutal blows of boxing. Until more trials and research have been done, the possible harm to the athlete will be unknown, so this argument could either gain support or be unwarranted.

Professional sports and the Olympics wouldn’t be nearly as popular if it weren’t for the spectators. Gene doping could harm the sporting community, affecting how they enjoy the sport. Spectators have expectations for their teams, and when these expectations are unmet, there can be a great amount of backlash. When the NHL went under strike talks, the attendance at games greatly decreased (Strachan 2004). If gene doping was allowed and it didn’t live up to all it was made to be, the sporting community could be annoyed. Other spectators may feel that sport may lose some of its entertainment value as the athletes would all be genetically enhanced, making them less unique, and removing some of the advantages that lead to exciting plays. Essentially, if every athlete had the talent of a Tiger Woods or Michael Jordan, it would be less competitive. Andy Miah, though, suggests that gene doping could lead to “greater levels of excellence in performance, reducing the risk of unsafe drug enhancements, allowing athletes to express their authenticity through their relationship with technology” (Miah, 2004). With greater levels of excellence, the game could become more stimulating. The 100-yard dash would be more competitive. The use of steroids may decrease, and this could be beneficial, as many steroids have been shown to be extremely harmful.

In society, there is often an unstated assumption that athletes should be role models. The question must be answered whether gene doping is a deviant practice in society. Frequently, disease and deviance is a social construct. While unique, masturbation was one example of supposed deviancy based upon society’s beliefs. As Engelhardt points out, “Medicine turns to what has been judged to be naturally ugly or deviant, and then develops etiological accounts to explain and treat in a coherent fashion a manifold of displeasing signs and symptoms” (Engelhardt, 1999). Is the same thing happening to gene doping? Could the medical and scientific community be saying it is bad because society considers it to be deviant? The use of steroids is illegal, but will the use of genetic enhancement be equally defined?

These fears go far beyond role models. If society allows genetic therapy to be used for non-therapeutic uses, such as bettering athletic performance, anybody will be able to obtain these genes. This could lead to the creation of a genetic super-class, whether a super-class of athletes or a super-class of wealth (Fukuyama 2002). The technology could be too expensive for some, so those that are wealthy would be able to become genetically enhanced. These fears are expressed in science fiction and could become reality.

There are a few people who are even more worried with the possibility of allowing gene therapy in general. Humans are essentially interfering with the natural course of evolution, trying to “play God.” With this, we would be interrupting natural selection, and this could unexpectedly be detrimental to the human race and the earth as a whole. Do these more fearful outlooks on society and the human race warrant our preventing gene doping? These outlooks may be more fiction than reality.

The third argument is a difficult one to analyze, as it indicates that gene doping could pervert the nature of sport, just as steroids and other performance enhancing drugs have done (Schneider and Butcher 1994). Essentially, there is an internal good of sport, such as a touchdown or a tennis rally, which would be compromised with genetic enhancement. For example, more home runs could be hit that expected, and this might be considered a perversion of our natural ability that defines sport. With baseball or sprinting, a clear advantage could be gained. In other instances, though, no advantage is gained. Tennis players may not be able to rally any better after genetic enhancement. In these instances, gene doping could be allowed as it will not give any advantage, but it could be argued just as easily that since there is no gain, the therapy is unnecessary.

The most complex objection to the prospects of gene doping is that it is unnatural and dehumanizes the athlete. Gene doping would unnaturally alter the human body, with athletes now having a different genetic makeup than they were born with. So many questions arise when the idea of dehumanization is considered. How exactly do we define humanity? If we define being human as having a specific genetic code that stays the same from birth, then gene doping would be considered dehumanizing. On the other hand, we could also say that humans are unique in that we have a moral compass. With genetic enhancement, our moral compass does not change, so it is more difficult to define humanity.

The question of humanity is complicated even more when we consider autonomy. The philosopher Kant states that dignity is defined by our ability to morally reason as autonomous individuals. If governments and organizations ban gene doping, they essentially take away the autonomy of the athlete. The competition between governments and organizations and athletes assaults our notion of humanity.

Sports would not be very interesting without humans. Both the athletes and the spectators are essential to the success of sports. It seems odd to suggest that changing genes makes us less human, causing sports to be different than they were before genetic change. The change will not be enough to turn baseball players into something fully different, and society will most likely not reject genetically-modified athletes as something abnormal. Even so, society should question its dependence upon technology for enhancement. “What are the ends of human existence and the degree to which humans should strive continually for enhancement through technology” (Hoberman, 1992)? It may even be human nature to try to enhance ourselves through technology.

The ability to test for genetically doped athletes creates another ethical and practical dilemma. The International Olympic Committee has already begun the search for a viable test for gene doping that does not involve muscle biopsies. If a test is found, we must consider the ethics associated with privacy, as genetic information could be given to third parties, leading to genetic discrimination. The testing could also incur great costs and time, being so big that it would be difficult for sports to bear (McCrory 2001). Others believe that a test may never be found, and we therefore may never be able to find whether an athlete has gene doped (Wadler 1998). The overall ethical dilemma may not have a solution, as there would be no feasible way to test. Athletes could gene dope without consequence.

Why should we be asking all of these ethical questions? Unlike other instances of doping and athletic performance enhancement, we have the ability to make the ethical decisions before the technology is in place and wreaking havoc. Also, genetic modification is very different from other forms of doping because it has important uses in medicine and society. Where do we draw the line between therapy and enhancement? As a final thought, this threat of gene doping as a form of genetic therapy gone bad may be an unwarranted threat. As Monsignor Michael Sharkey says, our society “seems to proceed in the fatalistic thought that whatever is scientifically possible will one day be scientifically realized.” (Sharkey 1989) Many people are sure gene doping is inevitable, but maybe we are making mountains out of mole hills.

References

Beardsley, T. (February 2004) “Gene Therapy Setback.” Scientific American, 282, pp. 36-37.

Behar, M. (July 2004) “Will Genetics Destroy Sports?” Discover, 25 (7), pp. 41-45.

Fukuyama, F. (2002) Our posthuman future: Consequences of the biotechnology revolution, London: Profile Books.

Hoberman, J.M. (1992) Mortal engines: The science of performance and the dehumanization of sport. New York: The Free Press,

Holowchak, M.A. (2000) “Aretism and Pharmacological Erogenic Aids in Sport: Taking a Shot at the Use of Steroids,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 27, pp. 35-50.

Lavin, M. (1987) “Are The Current Bans Justified?” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 14, pp. 34-43.

Miah, A. (2004) Genetically modified athletes: Biomedical ethics, gene doping, and sport. Routledge: London.

McCrory, P. (2001) “Ethics, molecular biology and sports medicine,” British Journal of Sports Medicine, 35, pp. 142-143.

Sweeney, H.L. (July 2004) “Gene Doping.” Scientific American, pp. 63-69.

Schneider, A.J. and Butcher, R.B. (1994) “Why Olympic Athletes Should Avoid the Use and Seek the Elimination of Performance Enhancing Substances and Practices from the Olympic Games,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 21, pp. 64-81.

Sharkey, M.M. “When sport oversteps the moral mark,” The Times (London) (July 1, 1989), p. 54.

Strachan. A. (2004) “Labour chill strikes NHL” Toronto Sun, http://slam.canoe.ca/Slam030623/col_strachan-sun.html, Accessed 12/15/05.

Wadler, G.I. (1998) “Doping in Sport: From Strychnine to Genetic Enhancement, It’s a Moving Target,” The Duke Conference on Doping in Sport, R. David Thomas Executive Conference Center, http://www.law.duke.edu/sportscenter/wadler.pdf, Accessed 2005.