SI2: Social Informatics & Symbolic Interactionism:
A Conceptual Exploration
Submission for 2007 Social Informatics Research Symposium
Shannon M. Oltmann
Doctoral Student
SLIS, Indiana University
Introduction
This conceptual essay explores how symbolic interactionism can inform social informatics, particularly in the study of socially constructed concepts such as privacy. In the several decades since Herbert Blumer first articulated the principles of symbolic interactionism, it has become one of the dominant approaches of sociology (Lynch & McConatha, 2006; see also Snow, 2001, who implies the dominance and significance of symbolic interactionism). This lens strengthens the theoretical and methodological aspects of social informatics research. Examining how physical and virtual objects are defined and constructed can be, and often is, a significant component of social informatics investigations (Kling, 2000; Kling, Rosenbaum, & Sawyer, 2005). Perhaps this is particularly important in domains were those constructions are still emerging, or are in the process of changing, as in Web 2.0. Thus, this essay suggests that social informatics can use symbolic interactionism as a theoretical underpinning to analyzing various aspects of Web 2.0. In the following sections, I review symbolic interactionism, demonstrate how it complements social informatics perspectives, and illustrate how it could inform social informatics research by examining privacy in the context of Web 2.0.
Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical approach developed by Herbert Blumer which emphasizes the constructed nature of human interaction. His reasoning flows through three fairly simple premises: Humans act toward things on the basis of the meaning of those things. That meaning is derived from social interaction. Meanings are always interpreted (Blumer, 1969, p. 2).
The things toward which human act are objects; an object is anything that can be designated or referred to. Blumer (1969) divides objects into physical (such as chair, tree), social (i.e., parent, Red Cross), and abstract (including freedom, truth) categories (p. 10). All objects “are human constructs and not self-existing entities” (p. 68). By this, Blumer means that the nature of an object consists entirely of the meanings ascribed to it by individuals. Hence, objects vary in meaning, according to the individual designating the object; a shoe, for example, means different things to a cobbler, a salesperson, a shopper, and a basketball player. Following Mead, Blumer notes that each individual has a self, meaning that “the human being is an object to himself” (p. 62), with which he can interact. This process of self-interaction can include, for example, talking to oneself.
The meaning of objects should be seen as “social products, as creations that are formed in and through the defining activities of people” (Blumer, 1969, p. 5). Meaning, then, arises from an individual who is indicating an object and from the other individuals with whom he or she interacts. The same holds true for one’s self: since it is an object toward which an individual can act, “the self-object emerges from a process of social interaction in which other people are defining a person to himself [sic]” (p. 12). One of the primary ways individuals indicate objects to themselves and others is through language, through interactive communication. In this sense, then, language “becomes a dynamic reality that is shaped by events which it, in turn, helps shape. It is not independent of the spatial and temporal context in which it is produced” (Cossette, 1998, p. 1367).
Finally, Blumer (1969) emphasized human groups, or collections of individual actions and interpretations. He viewed social actions as a concatenation of individuals. Athens (2005) adds that symbolic interactionists perceive society “as institutionalized social action per se rather than general social action” (p. 307, emphasis in original).
Recently, the theorist and symbolic interactionist David Snow (2001) revisited Blumer’s three “canonical” propositions and suggested four “orienting principles that Blumer’s conceptualization implies but does not fully articulate” (p. 368). These four principles provide a fresh way to conceptualize symbolic interaction, taking into account the philosophical, theoretical, and empirical work done since Blumer’s writing. The first, the principle of interactive determination, states that objects do not have an intrinsic meaning. Rather, the meaning of objects (including selves) must be determined interactively. Snow (2001) states that “neither individual or society nor self or other are ontologically prior but exist only in relation to each other; thus one can fully understand them only through their interaction, whether actual, virtual, or imagined” (p. 369). The nature of objects—of reality itself—is dynamic, always capable of change (though not always changing).
Secondly, the principle of symbolization is the crux of symbolic interactionism; this precept states that objects, people, and so on, take on symbolic meaning. Snow explains that some symbolic meanings become routinized and structured, though there are “numerous direct and indirect ambiguities, concepts, and situations calling for a more interpretive approach to frames and framing” (p. 371). Snow’s third principle is of emergence, focusing on the non-habitual, fluid nature of relationship, meanings, and interactions. Finally, the principle of human agency suggests that
human beings are viewed neither as hard-wired robots responding in a lockstep fashion to internal directives or codes nor as passive social actors behaving merely in accord with extant structural and cultural directives and constraints. Yet biological, structural, and cultural factors are not dismissed in the determination and explanation of behavior. Rather, symbolic interactionism views these factors as predispositions or constraints on action without automatically or necessarily determining the character of that action (p. 373).
Symbolic interactionism, then, could be summarized with Blumer’s (1969) three precepts and Snow’s (2001) four principles. These seven statements provide the foundations of symbolic interactionism, as it is discussed in this paper.
Social Informatics and Symbolic Interactionism
As can be seen from the brief overview of symbolic interactionism above, it shares many foundational principles with social informatics. Social informatics focuses on “the interdisciplinary study of the design, uses, and consequences of information technologies that takes into account their interaction with institutional and cultural contexts” (Kling, Rosenbaum, & Sawyer, 2005, p. 16; emphasis added). Both perspectives emphasize the interactive, recursive nature of objects and their relation with one another. Kling (2000) called for researchers to understand technology as shaping, and shaped by, interactions with people. This interaction between objects (e.g., a computer and a person) is the central tenet of symbolic interactionism.
Likewise, the principle of emergence, as articulated by Snow (2001), is as important for social informatics as for symbolic interactionism. According to this principle, meanings develop and come into being through interaction. Thus, a particular computer application used in a company, for example, does not have a fixed, rigid meaning; rather, its significance emerges as people use and interact with the system. The meaning of objects is always interpreted, according to both symbolic interactionism and social informatics.
Social informatics adds nuance and complexity to the understanding of how technology works within social settings. Examinations of the use of technology informed by social informatics should integrate social behavior into the study. A more thorough depiction of technology should “consider an array of relevant factors, including social, cultural, organizational, and other contextual components” (Kling, 2000, p. 229). These factors are the focus of symbolic interactionist studies. As Blumer (1969) explained, people interpret and defined objects based on other people’s interpretations. Thus, the social, cultural, and organizational factors must be considered as affecting how individuals define, and then relate to, objects.
Social informatics and symbolic interactionism focus on many of the same aspects, though sometimes with different terminology. Symbolic interactionism, however, has an advantage in that it is a widely recognized theory, with extensive testing and refinement, particularly in sociology, but also in library and information science (see, e.g., Fernback, 2005; Zhao, 2005; Oksman & Turtiainen, 2004; and Fidishun, 2003; ). Symbolic interactionism, them, can lend the theoretical depth that social informatics may be lacking. In addition, symbolic interactionism instructs researchers to pay particular attention to how individuals define and relate to objects, a topic that is sometimes left implicit in social informatics studies. For its part, social informatics provides a way to study and understand technology and its implications in people’s daily lives. Social informatics’ focus on the “design, implementation, and use” of technology, utterly lacking in symbolic interactionism, can be seen as a way to update Blumer’s theory and make it more applicable to the contemporary world.[1]
In Practice: Web 2.0
To illustrate how symbolic interactionism can inform social informatics research, I will briefly explore privacy and its changing conceptualization in the context of Web 2.0. According to a 1997 survey, 99% of Americans believed privacy was either an essential or an important right (Best, Krueger, & Ladewig, 2006, p. 376). However, privacy is an amorphous term that is not easily defined (Kasper, 2005).
Many definitions of privacy involve some sort of control over one’s self or one’s information. For example, privacy has been conceptualized as:
· “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determines for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967).
· “the control we have over information about ourselves” (Fried, 1968).
· “the ability of the individual to control the circulation of information relating to him or her” (Bennett, 1991).
· “the ability to avoid the collection and circulation of such powerful information in one’s life without having any say in the process” (Solove, 2001).
· “ability to control information about [oneself, and ability to] exercise that control consistent with [one’s] values” (Senicar, Jerman-Blazic, & Klobucar, 2003).
Yet control over one’s information is illusive and illusionary, particularly with Web 2.0 features. For example, individuals may post photographs of friends at social networking sites; the photos could result in embarrassment or even criminal investigations. The current Miss New Jersey nearly lost her crown when photographs of her partying and drinking, taken from her old Facebook site, where anonymously mailed to pageant authorities (see Chicago Sun-Times, 7/10.2007). She now gives lectures on college campuses about internet safety and protecting one’s identity online. Photographs from Facebook and other networking sites have been used to target underage drinking (Chalfant, 2005) and other offenses. In another case, a man was arrested when he posted naked pictures of his teenage ex-girlfriend to MySpace; the photos also included evidence of underage sexual acts (Scarcella, 2007). These examples illustrate the reduced amount of control individuals have due to changing technology and Web 2.0 applications. From a social informatics perspective, researchers might investigate how the meanings and uses of these social networking sites have developed. From a symbolic interactionist standpoint, one could study how individuals define these sites, the information (such as photographs) that they share, and so on. Both perspectives could shed new light on the ways that privacy is now being conceptualized, and how those definitions are changing due to interactions with technology and other individuals.
The evolving interpretation of privacy has been institutionalized by the U.S. Supreme Court, which developed a two-prong test to determine the reasonability of privacy: “First, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” (Katz v. United States, 361). In the case in question, for example, Katz had placed phone calls from a phone booth, where he shut the glass doors, thus demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Katz decision, which depends upon individuals’ expectations of privacy, has been problematic in its application (Kasper, 2005). Nesson (2001) explained:
The idea of expectation turns out to be an insecure footing for privacy, like sand slipping out from underfoot as one climbs a dune. Where new technology allows the capture of information that was previously not subject to capture, expectations of privacy are likely to be considered naïve and uninformed, grounded in immature technology rather than in law… Effectively, the courts seem to say that, as far as the Constitution is concerned, people’s expectations of privacy must change to adjust to the capabilities of new technologies (p. 110).
This quotation illustrates the problems inherent in conceptualizing privacy, and the need for a combined symbolic interactionism and social informatics approach. As people interact with technology, others, and their digital selves, these interactions become reflected in their new understandings of related objects, such as privacy. For example, blogging about one’s personal life can affect how one perceives strangers’ access to one’s information. Facts that once were considered personal and private now may be freely shared on the internet. Social informatics provides insights into how technology affects people, their decisions, and their interactions with one another (and, recursively, with the technology). Symbolic interactionism focuses attention on the process of constructing and acting upon understandings of these different components. Together, both perspectives contribute to a better understanding of the changing definitions of privacy.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have explored how social informatics and symbolic interactionism could both benefit from a dialogue. These two approaches have much in common, but combining the symbolic interactionism theoretical framework with the social informatics perspective can overcome some deficiencies in each. In particular, combining these two approaches could further illuminate how (and if) Web 2.0 is changing individuals’ interactions with technology and each other. This essay explored evolving conceptions of privacy, as illustrated through social networking sites, to demonstrate how social informatics and symbolic interactionism could be joined for fruitful research. Further work should involve actual empirical studies, such as interviews or ethnomethodology, to uncover the actual meanings and interactions central to individuals.
References
Bennett, C.J. (1991). Computers, personal data, and theories of technology: Comparative approaches to privacy protection in the 1990s. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 16(1), 51-69.
Best, S.J., Krueger, B.S., & Ladewig, J. (2006). The polls—trends: Privacy in the information age. Public Opinion Quarterly, 70(3), 375-401.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall.