Defending America
The US Military Readiness Problem: Confronting the Problems and Finding the Solutions
Ruben Duran
Political Science 460 Section 4
Due: 12/4/02
Prof. Huth
Throughout the annals of history, military philosophers have concluded that peace is assured only through a strong military presence. Vegetius was one of the first, stating, “Qui desiderat pacem, preparet bellum[1];” “he who desires peace should prepare for war.” George Washington, eons later, would echo this sentiment, claiming that "To be prepared for War is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.[2]" Over the course of his tenure, then-President Ronald Reagan promoted a military philosophy of “Peace Through Strength,” a policy the led to the end of the Cold War. All of these philosophies stem from historical experience, in that the best prevention against attack is to make one’s force so overwhelming, that other states are averse to attack.
In this way, it is vitally important for the United States to maintain a strong and viable conventional and nuclear military force to both counter threats abroad, and defend or deter against threats at home. America is already at risk due to its shrinking military being committed to far too many engagements, and a recent history of spotty leadership. This is not to say that the forces must be massive numerically; but technological prowess, limited worldwide deployment, a strong core policy plan, and a maintained budget are all necessary in establishing and maintaining peace. The ultimate solution to the military readiness problem is three-fold: Decrease the number of non-war “police actions”, increase comparative compensation for military personnel, and fund technological advancements responsibly.
This paper is divided into two parts, and will proceed as follows: the first half will seek to outline why military readiness should be the primary concern for US foreign policy, and its effects on US security; the second half will address the policies the US should adopt to address the issue of military readiness.
In order to address this issue in its entirety, a brief historical background is necessary to assess why military readiness is a pertinent issue, requiring immediate attention. It should be noted that the most recent studies and publications regarding military readiness are dated 2000 and before. Further, the military failings cited in this paper took place before the beginning of the year 2000.
The Cold War ended in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and dissolution of Soviet Communism. This left the United States standing alone as the sole “superpower” in the world, with a military prepared to fight a large-scale conventional war and/or nuclear battle in several theaters. With a massive budget, no nemesis to fight, and a brewing economic slump back home, the Department of Defense (DoD) prepared to suffer cutbacks. The decisive victory of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 proved that US military technology was as good as advertised; the question now, was how large a force would be required to keep America and its interests secure.
In his book, While America Sleeps, Yale University Professor Donald Kagan outlines a principle in defense policy hereafter referred to as “The Base Force.”
“The Base Force explicitly rejected the Soviet threat as the principal yardstick against which to judge America’s new role as the sole surviving superpower. It also came to be known as a regional defense strategy because of its decision to determine the size of forces required by their need to respond to major regional threats.”[3]
The Base Force theory would enable the United States military to respond to, at most, two large engagements (what Kagan refers to as “Major Regional Conflicts,” or MRCs), in a Win-Win scenario. That is, both conflicts could be fought, and won, completely independent of one another. The idea of Win-Win was unofficially practiced over the course of the Cold War, the main threats being Russia and China/Korea. This plan stayed in effect over the course of the Bush (41) administration, but died early in the Clinton administration if favor of what is now known as “The Aspin Plan.”[4]
The Aspin Plan, formulated by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, rearranged the Base Force idea by introducing the new “win-hold-win” strategy. This plan called for a sweeping reduction in military forces numerically, replacing the loss through dependence on technological prowess and a détente of sorts through the mentality that “no other nation would seek war with us.”[5] By its very definition, the “win-hold-win” strategy would allow for a similar two-theater scenario, except that in this case, one theater would fight to victory while the other would fight to contain. After the first theater’s battle was won, the resources from it are moved to the scene of the second, held operation, which is presumably fought to victory.
This strategy had the theoretical goal of reducing the standing military to a still-operational capacity, while reducing the budgetary cost of running the largest armed force in the world. Campaign promises made during the quest to the White House forced the Clinton Defense Department to conform to a reduced budget. It was the view of the Administration that these reductions would not be a detriment, but that the void would be filled by superior technology and strategy. This view was not without its critics, however; Dov S. Zakhiem, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, railed against this policy, stating,
“The Administration appears prepared to jettison the doctrine of overwhelming force, which proved its mettle in operations as small as Grenada and as large as the Persian Gulf. In its place, win-hold-win would depend upon the highly suspect operations analysis that governed strategy during the Vietnam War era and was discredited by the Carter Administration's failed effort to free the hostages held by Iran.”[6]
In this way, Zakhiem foresees difficulty in maintaining a high level of control in key areas of the world, as the United States would now be seen as weak, hesitant and lacking in military resolve. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration felt that this “Bottom Up” reform would be a two-fold success: the military would now be streamlined to handle low-intensity conflicts, and the armed forces budget would be reduced, allowing these monies to be used in other projects.[7]
Win-hold-win strategy operates on the assumption that the United States government will not over-extend the military forces at hand, not using the resources (manpower, money and equipment) in long-term operations. This assumption was violated, however, when the Clinton Administration chose to pursue multiple “police action” operations at once, many of which had already been initiated by the Bush (41) Administration. As Steven Metz, a Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute states,
“[The Clinton Strategy] stressed that war fighting remained the primary mission of the American military but, under certain conditions, multilateral peacekeeping or peace enforcement under the aegis of the United Nations can serve U.S. national interests.”[8]
Operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and elsewhere are ready examples of this caveat to the Clinton defense policies. Unfortunately, they would stretch the armed services to their absolute limit.[9] Severe budget cuts, delays and even cancellations of technology advances, and reductions in forces, personnel and equipment all led to a ragged military, low in morale and new recruits. It seems, thus, that Zakhiem’s prediction was sadly becoming true.
In fact, Zakhiem would go on to state that,
“Instead of forcing the Pentagon to fall back on a highly problematical strategy, the Administration should accept fiscal reality. The cost of conducting two regional campaigns simultaneously is closer to the fiscal 1994 budget of $263.4 billion than to the progressively smaller budgets forecast through 1997.
The Administration can realize further savings, notably through cuts in heavy armored units and the size of our submarine force. It could reduce such infrastructure elements as bases and support personnel, and upgrade current types of aircraft rather than replace them with entirely new models. Yet these changes would not reduce budgets significantly below the $260 billion level. And other efficiencies, however desirable, are no more likely to be fully carried out now than under George Bush and his post-World War II predecessors.”[10]
Ever-shrinking budgets and simultaneous calls for faster and more effective whiz-bang technology would lead to even more budget crunches; as newer technology was introduced, upkeep costs doubled, as now both new and old equipment required parts, maintenance, training and other intangible expenses.
This downward spiral of budgetary problems, combined with the desire of the President to become more heavily involved in worldwide police actions, would plague the Clinton Defense department to the breaking point. Defense Secretary Les Aspin would eventually resign, citing his failures to deploy large-scale forces to theaters such as Bosnia and Somalia (where 19 servicemen were killed, three helicopters were shot down and a pilot was taken hostage; this came soon after Aspin had denied the movement of heavy armor units to the theater, which arguably would have prevented the disaster).[11] In the end, US forces would pull out of Somalia, leaving the rouge government still in place, and the people of Somalia continuing to starve.
In the place of the Base Forces concept of his predecessor, Aspin left a shell of the Cold War active military units: “ten active Army divisions, fifteen National Guard enhanced readiness brigades, three marine active divisions, twenty air force tactical wings, eleven active and one reserve navy carrier. The armed forces were smaller, both in terms of the number of units and the percentage of gross national product represented by the defense budget, than at any time since before World War II.”[12] This was coupled with the “death of strategic vision,” (a cohesive view of what American military foreign policy was) due to Aspin dealing with only matters that were “immediately recognizable,” and made for a Defense Department that was left leaderless and in shambles.[13]
Without a firm policy on when and where the military will take action, the Defense Department was left to exist as a force without a leader, and no sense of direction. It was shown through action that The Aspin Plan did not work; indeed, Aspin’s resignation left a large vacuum in the Defense Department. While the Base Force plan called for a reduction in forces, it kept a primary goal, which the numerical forces would have to meet.[14] Aspin’s successor, William J. Perry, was left to fill the gap, and spent most of his short term begging Congress for more funding. Under Perry’s watch, Defense budgets were so strapped, that “Shortly before he introduced his FY 1997 budget request in March 1996, Perry warned that the United States might have to give up the strategy of preparing for two major regional conflicts if the armed forces suffered further reductions.”[15]
Strategic failures and military cutbacks add up; America at this point was seen as a sort of paper tiger, one that could be provoked, insulted, even attacked, and little retribution would come. With a shrinking offensive force (and hardly any defensive forces), America was seen as vulnerable and weak, an economic powerhouse with a technologically strong, but physically and resolutely weak military force.[16] It was for precisely this reason that the decade of the 1990s saw numerous attacks against it, and is proof-positive for why military readiness and resolve should top the list of national security concerns.
More specific than theories about aggressor mentality, however, are the raw numbers in the reductions made throughout the 1990s. Disturbing trends in military readiness were noticed as recently as 1999, by Michael O’Hanlon and Jerre Wilson of the Brookings Institute. They indicate a massive reduction in the number of recruits entering the Navy, where it fell 7,000 sailors short of its recruitment quota for the 1998 fiscal year. Other instances include a shortage of pilots in the Air Force, to the tune of 1,000 pilots needed; a large exodus from the services (specifically, the Air Force) to seek higher pay, greater respect and less dangerous jobs in the private sector (35% of servicemen are departing before completing their first three years of service, as opposed to 28% in the 1980’s); aging and irreplaceable equipment, as well as parts and supplies shortages, leaving forces at less-than-operational strength (e.g. the rate of mission-capable aircraft in the Air Force has fallen to 75%, compared to 85% in the early 1990s); and finally, training and education money is being funneled away to maintain aging and crippled bases and operating locations (for example, tank training time in the Army has been reduced by 20%);. All of these problems, if left unchecked, could leave massive holes in leadership and equipment in the next few years.[17] This deterioration, both from within the military and through the government, has left a military that is but a shell of its former self. Without the strength to counter, preempt or prevent attacks, the United States will cease to be a superpower. This translates into a decrease in diplomatic persuasive power and a lowering in the status of America in relation to the rest of the world. Thus, these are rather large issues in the realm of national security, the area charged with defending these powers.
Physical readiness is not the only factor in assessing an opposing force. Resolution to do so should be considered nearly as important. A state may have all the military might in the world, but if it is not prepared to use this military force to defend, or respond in defense of, its interests, then military might simply does not matter.[18] Perhaps the most ready example of military how resolve is crucial to national security is the wide range of action taken against American interests.