Hon104B, Assignment Schedule #2
Assignment 6.
HW: Read Gyekye and Rowe. Respond to the following.
1. In discussion of the G.E. Moore shift, Rowe says, “it is a truth of logic that if I is valid, II must be valid as well.” (i) Using our account of validity, explain why this is so. (ii) Apply the G. E. Moore shift to the following argument to show that (3) is false.
1. There is evil
2. If a being is G, then it prevents evil unless it has morally sufficient reasons to allow it
3. There are no morally sufficient reasons for an OO being to allow evil
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4. There is no OOG being
Do you find this “shift” to be an effective response? Why or why not?
2. Having seen this basic exposure to the issues from Gyekye and Rowe, what do you think about the problem of evil? That is: (i) What do you think is the most promising line of reply to the problem, and how is it supposed to work? (ii) Do you think this line succeeds? Explain.
EX: How do Akan thinkers explain evil? Is there any reason why Western believers might not offer similar explanations? Explain.
Assignment 7.
HW: Read Snyder and Maitzen (handout). Respond to the following.
1. What is the skeptical theist response to the problem of evil? That is, suppose someone supports (3) of the argument from A6.1 as follows:
1. If there are morally sufficient reasons for an OO being to allow evil, then we will have found some
2. We have not found any morally sufficient reasons for an OO being to allow evil
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3. There are no morally sufficient reasons for an OO being to allow evil
How does the skeptical theist undercut this argument? (i) Show that the argument above is valid. (ii) Given this, explain how the skeptical theist means to undercut it. (iii) In light of lecture and reading, do you find this response adequate to rebut the atheist’s reasoning? Explain.
2. Compare the skeptical theist response with the G. E. Moore shift. That is (i) do either of the responses offer positive m.s. reasons for an OO being to allow evil? Explain in each case. (ii) Do either of the responses remove the “weight” on the scale pushing against theism? Explain in each case.
EX: Explain Rowe’s example of the fawn. What happens to the fawn? What is the example meant to show? Do you think Rowe is right about this? Explain.
Assignment 8.
HW: Read Mackie pp. 60-62 and review Rowe 53-56. Respond to the following.
1. Rowe describes Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy (and Mackie briefly mentions it in note 2 on p. 62). From Rowe’s account, (i) Explain the sense in which Hick treats evil as an instrument or means for good. Then (ii) in your own words, say how this defense is supposed to work – especially be clear which premise of the argument from A6.1 is under attack.
2. Rowe and Mackie make different responses against a view like Hick’s. (i) Say how Rowe uses the example of the fawn and child to respond against Hick. And (ii) say how Mackie responds against a view like Hick’s.
EX: Contrast Rowe’s response to the “causal means” defense with Mackie’s. Do you think one is more effective than the other? Explain.
Assignment 9.
HW: Read Mackie pp. 62-66 and Plantinga 70-73. Respond to the following.
1. These readings discuss the free will defense against the problem of evil. This argument has the following basic structure.
1. Even an OO being cannot get the goods of freedom without evil
2. If an OO being cannot get the goods of freedom without evil, then there are m.s. reasons for an OO being to allow evil
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3. There are m.s. reasons for an OO being to allow evil
In your own words, explain how this argument is supposed to work. That is, (i) what are the goods of freedom? And (ii) why is it supposed to be that god cannot get them without evil? Which premise of the argument from A6.1 does the freewill defense attack? Do you think this attack is successful? Explain.
2. Mackie asserts, from the account of freedom, that it is possible for people to be such that they always freely choose the good. Explain this. That is, (i) what account of freedom have we offered? (ii) Explain how Mackie’s claim follows from this account. It is crucial that you grasp this! To clarify, (iii) consider the following response: “If men always choose the good then they are not free”; how is this false on the proposed account? Hint: set aside what god can bring about; the questions are entirely about the nature of freedom.
EX: Consider the claim, “god’s goodness is not ours” (as discussed by Mackie). This response is meant to attack (3) of the argument from A6.1 by showing that there are morally sufficient reasons for an OO being to allow (what we see as) evil. (i) Why does Mackie reject this response? (ii) Evaluate: do you think the response works? Explain.
Assignment 10.
HW: Read Plantinga pp. 73-79, and Mackie 67-69. Respond to the following.
1. Consider the following argument (suggested by Mackie),
1. There is a possible world where (an OO being exists and) everyone always freely goes right.
2. An OO being can actualize every possible world (in which it exists).
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3. An OO being can actualize a possible world where everyone always freely goes right.
(i) Explain why Mackie thinks the theist must accept these premises. (ii) Why is this important? that is, if it is right, how does this matter for the argument of A9.1 and so for the argument of A6.1? Explain.
2. Plantinga attacks the second premise of the above argument. Consider the following argument, (suggested by Plantinga),
1. An OO being can actualize only accessible possible worlds.
2. Not every possible world (in which an OO being exists) is accessible.
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3. An OO being cannot actualize every possible world (in which it exists)
(i) What (from lecture) makes a world accessible to an OO being? And (ii) explain the basis on which Plantinga thinks not every possible world (in which god exists) is accessible.
Assignment 11.
HW: Read Plantinga pp. 79-82 and review Mackie 67-69. Respond to the following:
1. Mackie appears to concede that the argument from A10.1 is unsound (“So far so good and this disposes...”), but to maintain that its conclusion is still true. That is, he seems to argue,
1. There is an accessible world where everyone always freely goes right.
2. An OO being can actualize every accessible world.
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3. An OO being can actualize a world where everyone always freely goes right.
Explain how this version of the argument is supposed to survive Plantinga’s attack from A10.2. That is, (i) what was the problem with the previous argument? And (ii) why does Mackie think we should accept the premises of this new argument?
2. Now how does Plantinga attack? That is, (i) what is transworld depravity? and how does Plantinga use it to undercut Mackie’s “pick and choose” picture? (ii) Do you find Plantinga’s attack successful? that is, do you agree that every possible being has transworld depravity? Explain.
Assignment 12.
HW: Roy offers a “modest” version of the freewill defense as a response to Mackie’s final argument different from Plantinga’s version. This argument has the following structure,
1. Even an OO being cannot get the goods of human freedom without evil.
2. If a an OO being cannot get the goods of human freedom without evil, then there are m.s. reasons for an OO being to allow evil.
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3. There are m.s. reasons for OO being to allow evil.
1. How might Plantinga’s approach establish this (1), though it fails to establish the first premise of A9.1?
2. Suppose an OO being cannot get human freedom without evil, but can get the freedom of some other beings without evil. (i) On a consequentialist moral theory, does the OO being have morally sufficient reason for allowing evil? (i) On an act-based theory, does the OO being have morally sufficient reason for allowing evil? Explain.