Plan Colombia - National Consolidation
In January 2007, Colombian leaders presented a new strategy to consolidate gains under Plan Colombia, which eventually became known as the National Consolidation Plan (Plan Nacional de Consolidacion, or PNC). The new strategy, a civilian-led whole-of-government approach, builds upon successful Plan Colombia programs to establish state presence in traditionally ungoverned spaces. By improving access to social services--including justice, education, housing, and health--strengthening democracy, and supporting economic development through sustainable growth and trade, the Colombian Government seeks to permanently recover Colombia's historically marginalized rural areas from illegal armed groups and break the cycle of violence.
On 30 October 2009, the United States and Colombian governments signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The DCA will facilitate effective bilateral cooperation on security matters in Colombia, including narcotics production and trafficking, terrorism, illicit smuggling of all types, and humanitarian and natural disasters. The DCA facilitates U.S. access for these purposes to three Colombian air force bases, located at Palanquero, Apiay, and Malambo. The agreement also permits access to two naval bases and two army installations, and other Colombian military facilities if mutually agreed. All these military installations are, and will remain, under Colombian control. Command and control, administration, and security will continue to be handled by the Colombian armed forces. All activities conducted at or from these Colombian bases by the United States will take place only with the express prior approval of the Colombian government. The presence of U.S. personnel at these facilities would be on an as needed, and as mutually agreed upon, basis.
By 2009 Plan Colombia had achieved significant advances. Its greatest accomplishment was the dramatic improvements in security in the country and the suppression of illegally armed groups, including the FARC, ELN, and paramilitary groups. Achieving widespread security is a vital step toward the success of CN policies. Another important accomplishment has been the reduction of opium poppy cultivation, meeting the Plan Colombia target of a 50% reduction. However, it has not met its goal for a similar reduction of coca cultivation and cocaine production.
Plan Colombia had localized successes in eliminating coca cultivation. The area of coca production during the first half of the current decade was reduced, However, since 2004 the area cultivated has partially rebounded although there has been a 24% reduction in the estimated production of cocaine over the period 2001-2007, according to USG estimates. Coca farmers have sought to mitigate the effects of spraying and interdiction by various means, including replanting and a shift to cultivating in smaller plots.
The cooperation of the USG allowed the GOC to modernize its security and justice systems, and to augment their alternative development and humanitarian assistance programs. The implementation of Plan Colombia required a major fiscal effort on the part of the GOC in the budget categories of Defense and Security, Justice, Alternative Development (AD) and Victims of Conflict. The GOC significantly increased its spending in these categories, representing the GOC's great political will to implement Plan Colombia. With U.S. assistance, Colombia was able to reduce the indices of crime nationally, augment the regional presence of the state, and repel illegally armed groups.
The role of state presence throughout Colombia is crucial for the success of CN efforts. The lack of strong government has been a leading cause of Colombia's difficulties because illegal activities flourish in areas outside state control. While overall security has improved greatly nationally, it nonetheless remains tenuous in many parts of the country, especially in rural areas. Unlike in the 1990's and early part of this decade, these areas are more and more isolated pockets, rather than contiguous swaths of territory; Nonetheless, they are still widespread.
Economic reforms achieved under Plan Colombia greatly improved the business climate, allowing the domestic economy to take advantage of the expansion of the global economy, increasing international commerce and attracting greater foreign investment. Nonetheless, the dramatic macroeconomic improvements have not been translated into significant reductions in the deep and persisting poverty of the rural areas or into reductions in substantial inequality. Plan Colombia has become increasingly better at promoting sustainable alternative development. Significant applied learning has occurred since the initial projects launched under Plan Colombia.
The inflexible application of the "zero illicit crops" policy of the Colombian government (no delivery of socio-economic benefits to a community where any coca is cultivated), is an obstacle to economic development in the coca-afflicted areas. Although the policy is designed to enforce a culture of legality, in practice it prevents Colombian government institutions and the USG from providing the necessary assistance for coca farmers to switch to and remain in legal livelihoods. There are exceptions to the policy's implementation. The Macarena case demonstrates the willingness of GOC agencies under some circumstances to suspend its application to facilitate securing a region militarily.
Increasing each one of the individual CN programs - interdiction, eradication, and alternative development - would reduce coca production. However, the greatest reduction occurs if all programs are increased cumulatively, showing that an integrated program creates synergies that contribute to controlling illegal crops. The positive effect of these synergies is lost when the focus is on a single program. with the implementation of a strategy that includes all of the different programs, the area devoted to coca could shrink by more than 80 percent.
Potential cocaleros are willing to engage in livelihoods with more modest incomes, provided that there is greater security, adequate technical support for alternative crops, and access to financial services. Many coca farmers are eager to abandon coca cultivation: they desire to escape the insecurity that coca brings, such as the attraction of brutal armed groups and criminal organizations. They face significantly negative economic repercussions due to aerial and manual eradication.
Colombian actors charged with implementing alternative livelihoods policies believe that their programs reach less than 10% of families cultivating coca. This percentage is even smaller if one includes the numbers of families vulnerable to coca cultivation because of the insecurity of the area where they live and their attendant difficulties in cultivating and selling legal crops. This extremely limited coverage of the in-need population is a function of the zero-coca policy of the Colombian government (no delivery of socio-economic benefits to a community where any coca is cultivated), the limited amount of resources available through USG and GOC, and the need for enhanced security to precede alternative development programs.
Provision of basic public goods and services also continues to be lacking in vast areas of the country. The state has been slow to supplement the advances in security with comparable investments in the social and economic spheres. The lack of resources and the slow delivery of essential socioeconomic development have plagued even designated high priority areas. The civilian follow-up to military clearing and holding operations is frequently slow, uncoordinated, lacking resources, and suffers from a lack of commitment and ownership at the highest levels of the Colombian government. Furthermore, corruption at the local levels among local government bodies and within the security apparatus appears to be relatively more pervasive and difficult to control.
In the future, a strategy based on a more comprehensive, coordinated, and mutually supportive set of programs could eventually reduce coca cultivation in Colombia to the much smaller scale of the 1980's. However, a persistent increase of global demand without regional coordination of policies and programs could still make coca producing countries vulnerable to rebounds in production. Eventually, this could reverse the spreading that resulted from the initial successes of Peru and Bolivia, but with unwanted consequences such as social and economic destabilization in those two countries.
Rural development can and has played a significant role in helping at least one country reduce and eventually eliminate opium production and marketing. Thailand successfully transitioned its entire hill tribe population out of poppy production, primarily through a 30-year process involving investments in roads, communications, health, education, and improvement of social services. This ultimately made the hill tribe population an integral part of Thai society. Over a much larger geographic area, Colombia must engage in a comparable process of comprehensive investment in rural areas if it wishes to emulate Thailand's success.
On April 15, 2010 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates offered high praise to Colombia today as an "exporter of security" that, by sharing lessons learned in its crackdown against a leftist insurgency and drug-trafficking cartels, provides a model for the region. Gates offered congratulations to President Alvaro Uribe and Defense Minister Gabriel Silva Luján during his meetings with them, calling their leadership in Colombia's offensive against the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, known as FARC, and other paramilitary groups "heroic." "In just a few years, Colombia has achieved a remarkable, indeed historic, transformation in the security arena that few would have thought possible," Gates said during a joint news conference with Silva, during which Uribe offered opening remarks. Gates praised progress in taking Colombia "from a nation under siege from drug trafficking organizations and military groups to a country quickly becoming a lynchpin of security and prosperity in South America." He also recognized the skill and bravery Colombia's military and security forces have demonstrated in this effort.
But Colombia (and the U.S) still has much work to do. Military forces have succeeded in "clearing" much of the insurgent-held regions but have been less successful at "holding" these areas and have been unable to guarantee the safety of civilians in the effort to "build" institutions and infrastructure. The whole of government approach lacks focus and support. While the murder rate has dropped, it is still very high. Yes, leftist groups are on the decline but rightist paramilitary groups are on the rise in much of the country-so much so that several urban areas have seen a noticeable increase in the murder rate in the last eighteen months. Government credibility has been hurt by corruption and proven ties of rightist paramilitary groups to various government officials. Lastly, while Colombia has experienced a drop in poverty rates in recent years, it is the only major nation in Latin America that has actually seen an increase in the gulf between rich and poor.
Linda Panetta
"Plan Colombia... Plan of Death"
I recently returned from a delegation to Colombia sponsored by the Colombia Support Network. The purpose of this trip was two-fold. First, to better understand and to see first-hand the effects of fumigation in the Putumayo region; second, to bear witness to the violence perpetrated by the Colombian military--of which more than 10,000 soldiers have been trained at the School of the Americas--and the paramilitary forces, which have been responsible for more than 70% of the massacres in Colombia over the past two years. The fumigations are part of the "anti-drug" campaign called "Plan Colombia," which is a multibillion dollar program purportedly developed by the government of Colombia to deal with the many conflicts of its country. To date, the US has pledged $1.3 billion in aid (which will primarily be paid to US weapons and chemical corporations) in the form of military training, helicopters, and fumigation related expenses. Additional funding has already been proposed.
During our time in Colombia, we met with community leaders, including tribal representatives from the indigenous people of the Putumayo region, religious leaders, Colombian officials, military leaders, the director of the UN High Commission on Human Rights, and the US Ambassador to Colombia. Throughout our meetings and visits to the Putumayo it became vividly evident that due to the indiscriminate nature of the fumigation campaign not only were coca (the raw material of cocaine) crops being targeted, but food crops and medicinal plants were being eradicated, and water supplies were being contaminated. The herbicide, glyphosate (more commonly known as "Round-up"), is produced and manufactured by the US chemical corporation, Monsanto. In Colombia, this herbicide is used in a highly concentrated form and can obliterate a food crop with a single aerial application. The negligence associated with the fumigation campaign has not only had disastrous ecological and health consequences for the region, but it also has significantly increased the expansion of coca crops throughout Colombia.
Paradoxically, as coca was being eradicated in regions such as Peru and Bolivia, there was a nearly instantaneous surge in production and control in Colombia by the newly formed Medellin Cartel. Basic economics, and our own history, tell us that where there is a demand, especially of an illicit drug, there will always be those who find a way of not only providing the product, but of making a tremendous profit on it. Between 1994 and 1998 approximately 45,500 hectares of coca were cultivated. In an attempt to eradicate these crops, more than 140,800 hectares of (food and coca) fields, and rainforests were fumigated. The US anti-narcotics department cited a mere 15% effective rate against the illicit crop, but repercussions extended well beyond their failure to destroy the coca. Not only did ecological devastation ensue, but the fumigations actually spurred the coca industry in Colombia at a rate of over 100%. By 1999 there were more than 101,000 hectares of coca being cultivated in Colombia. As the US spent millions of dollars collapsing the Medellin Cartel, what emerged was a redistribution of power among drug traffickers in Colombia. To build their ranks, influence, and assets, the paramilitary groups, taking full advantage of the collapse of the cartel, jumped directly into the drug trafficking market. By forging ties and collaborating with other drug traffickers, and receiving the support of the Colombian military, their numbers grew from 4,000 in 1995 to over 8,000 in 2001.
Coca is big business for many players. In addition to the paramilitary forces, who receive the majority of their funding from the coca industry, the various guerilla groups have also greatly profited from marketing coca. But, whereas many of the guerrilla groups work to promote social reforms which benefit the poor and marginalized (80% of the Colombian people live in near or absolute poverty), the paramilitaries support a system controlled by a wealthy minority whose interests are promoted, along with those of US and multinationals, in order to exploit and control the poor and the country's natural resources.
With millions of dollars being generated annually by the drug trade, drug traffickers are able to launder their money by buying up large expanses of territory which were primarily occupied by indigenous groups throughout the Amazon. Some of the resources are diverted to the lumber, cattle and oil industry, while other areas are simply plowed over to give birth to fledgling coca crops. This not only secures the flow of money, but it also serves to expand the network and power of the regional armed forces. Ultimately, it empowers them to intensify the violence against the poor, resulting in thousands of people being tortured, killed and otherwise driven from their land. Annually, approximately 300,000 people are forced to emigrate from their homes because of the violence.
Not only is the coca industry big business for in-country profiteers, it also provides US and multinational corporations the opportunity to make millions of dollars by exploiting the "War on Drugs." For example, of the $27 million spent on the 1994-‘98 eradication campaign, $20 million went directly to Monsanto. And because the campaign was so ineffective--the U.S. blamed the problem on the excessive rains in the regions--increased applications of glyphosate were introduced. Additionally, new research emerged into a more effective solution, such as biological agents (for example--a mutating fungus), which would have greater adherence to the vegetation. The effects of this new agent could potentially have a catastrophic impact on the overall ecology of the rainforests -- aquatic life, animals, and the people--who are already being bombarded with chemical toxins on a continuous basis. The ultimate result of the failed eradication campaign: a $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia, of which it is estimated, 70% will remain in the hands of US weapons and chemical corporations, as well as the US military. A mere 1% is earmarked for the peace process.
Corporations such as United Tech and Sikorsky will receive millions from the sale of Hueys and Blackhawk helicopters. Other companies, such as Rockwell will benefit from the sale of surveillance systems, and MPRI will send their mercenaries--the list goes on. These corporations, in collaboration with the US military, are vying to wage a biological and civilian-targeted warfare which will bring Colombia to its knees. They will continue bullying them into abject adversity until they scream out "Uncle." And there Sam will be to further exploit and decimate the people and the natural resources until, like so many other countries, there is no hope of restoring a balance--of acquiring peace.