Meeting Notes - February 2012
‘Andrew Mullen spoke about Keith Murdoch: the Gallipoli letter and British policy. Andrew is a consultant on global security and stressed how political, military, intelligence and media were increasingly interacting. The subject of his talk shows how these worlds collided even back in 1915…
In November 1914 the British War Council meets to discuss the Eastern Mediterranean, and in December 1914 Hankey presents a proposal to the War Council to attack Turkey. There was a need to devise a way of disabling the forts on each side of the Dardanelles Strait, and his plan was for a naval attack, sweeping for mines and destroying the forts by bombardment from ships. This, however, failed.
The decision was then taken for a combined operation, which had been Admiral Jackie Fisher’s preference from the start.
News correspondents were based on Imbros, consisting of:
Henry Nevinson, British provincial press; Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, Fleet Street, who arrived in April 1915; Phillip Schuler, who represented ‘The Melbourne Age’; and Charles Bean, the official Australian correspondent (who also arrived in April 1915).
First reports on the landings were published on 7 May in the UK, 8 May in Australia, and spoke of a ‘Glorious Entry into War,’ ‘Historic Charge’ and ‘Brilliant Feat at Gaba Tepe.’ Reading the headlines was the first the Australian public knew of the plans!
With a new recruitment campaign in Australia in May/June 1915, Keith Murdoch, father of Rupert, was in a dilemma – join up or seek a reporting role.
Prime Minister Fisher needed decent information on the campaign and so Murdoch was asked to go to Gallipoli. Ostensibly he was to look at mail and medical supply issues, but ‘while you’re there, find out what’s going on…’
On 2 July George Pearce sends a letter that officially outlined Murdoch’s role. The August offensives fail, but no reports are forthcoming. Ashmead-Bartlett’s reports back to London are very heavily censored.
Permission is sought from Gen Hamilton for Murdoch to travel to Gallipoli. En route he visits the huge hospital wards in Egypt and, from talking to the wounded, starts to get an impression of what is actually going on…
After reaching Imbros on 24 August, by 3 September Murdoch is on site, and spends four days on the peninsular. On 7 September he meets Ashmead-Bartlett back on Imbros and they agree he reports everything to London. Ashmead-Bartlett writes a letter to Asquith, which Murdoch takes with him, but Murdoch also decides to write his own letter direct to PM Fisher. An eight thousand word letter!!
However, Hamilton finds out and stops Murdoch at Marseille, confiscating the letter for Asquith. The letter is sent to the War Office and, conveniently, gets lost somewhere in Whitehall.
Murdoch, however, keeps his letter, and when back in London, cables it to PM Fisher. Fisher talks to Lloyd George who then persuades Murdoch to let Asquith see it…
The Letter
‘I now write of the unfortunate Dardanelles expedition.
The first two efforts failed miserably, as London expected far too much from floating artillery. [British] troops sent were inadequate. Armoured cars hidden helpless in trenches. A strong advance inland from Anzac has never been attempted.’
Murdoch thought ANZAC could be astride the peninsular in a few days had the landing been at Gaba Tepe. He was ‘immensely proud of little progress’ on Lone Pine plateau and waxes lyrical about the Australian Light Horse at The Nek (dramatised in the Peter Weir film).
But he criticises the arrangements for the Suvla Bay landing, for which The Nek battle was a diversion. The landing was unopposed, with the Turks taken by surprise, but the New Army and Territorials had problems getting ashore, there was no orientation, no experience and often no orders. They were given only a limited amount of water, which was quickly consumed in the heat, yet top brass were surprised when the soldiers were weakened by the time they actually got orders to move inland.
It was curiously appropriate that this landing was managed by General.Stopford and Captain Sitwell…
Murdoch suggested it was a waste of the fine Australian troops to use them in a feint instead of in the Suvla Bay attack itself. It ‘left us holding as position which is nothing more than an embarrassment.’
Further actions commented on included the attack on Scimitar Hill by the Queens Own Dorset Yeomanry on 21 August, which was a success but ‘never had any chance of holding these positions.’
By the winter of 1915, with Suvla and Anzac now joined up, ‘nowhere are we protected from Turkish shells,’ and ‘we are so exposed that one wonders why the Turks do not drive us out with artillery fire.’ He questions the theory of the Turkish shell shortage and suggests the Turks were actually just waiting for winter to drive us out.
Murdoch also claims the ANZACs would never be driven from their positions, which had been developed into a ‘fortress’. Photographs show somewhat more temporary defensive systems, with canvas and netting covers.
Murdoch states sickness is laying low 600 men a day, and estimates by spring there will be 30,000 fewer troops, but still insists the Aussies would cover whatever is needed.
‘Hamilton has led a series of armies into a series of cul-de-sacs. Perhaps some efforts could have been made to provide them with cinemas.’ (!)
‘How wonderfully generous is the Australian soldier’s view of life.’
On Hamilton, he writes:
‘I admire him as a journalist, but as a strategist he has completely failed. I cannot see any solution which does not begin with the recall of Hamilton. The French call him ‘the General who lives on an island.’
On Sir John Maxwell:
‘He has a poor brain for his big position. Make every effort to secure the recall of Sir James Maxwell.’
To conclude, Murdoch writes:
‘I hope I have not made the picture too gloomy, but this unfortunate expedition has never been given a chance.’
In a letter to Dawnay, Asquith wrote:
‘I think it better not to trouble Hamilton with the text of the Australian letter…!
On 13 October Hamilton does see a copy of the letter, and repudiates Murdoch’s claims. However on 15 October he is recalled to London and on 16 is replaced by Munro who, within six hours, recommends evacuation.
Ashmead-Bartlett gives an interview in the Sunday Times on 17 October, giving a real account of the campaign.
On 27 October Fisher resigns as Australian PM.
In early December 1915, with blizzards and heavy flooding on the peninsular, the evacuation begins, and is completed by 9 January 1916.’