Graduate Political Economy of International Security

Graduate Political Economy of International Security

Fall 2017

Logistics:

Course Number:

Day/Time: W,12:30 to 3:15PM

Location: PSY G117

Instructor: PaulPoastOffice: 426 Pick Hall

E-mail:

Overview:

Thisclass offers an introduction to the scholarly literature on thepolitical economy of international security, a subject that lies at the intersection of international security and international political economy.

Organization:

Each session will spend ~50 minutes on a paper. The session will begin with a student giving a ~10-15 minute presentation of the paper as if it is her/his own work. We will then discuss the paper. Discussion will be organized by first dividing the class into several small groups. Each small group will work for 15-20 minutes to create a “referee report”. In other words, each group will determine what they view as a conceptual/framing critique, a theoretical/argument critique, and an empirical/data critique. The group must also specify one positive contribution made by the paper. We will then spend the final portion of the 50 minutes discussing the answers provided by each group.When the paper is one by me (Poast), the 50 minutes will be spent by me discussing how I conducted the research.

Assignments:

In addition to completing all required readings, attending class weekly, and participating in

weekly discussions, the students must complete the following assignments:

-Presentations (contingent on number of students)

-2 replication projects

-1 extension project

Replications: For two of the papers, you will conduct a replication. This means obtaining the data and replicating the empiricalresults from the paper. One of the replications must come from weeks 2-5, and the other must come from weeks 6-10. You may not choose one of the papers by me (Poast), since I will be replicating the results in class. If you find a paper related to a topic covered in one of the weekly periods (either 2-5 or 6-10), you may also replicate that study (with permission by me).

Extension: For one of the two papers that you replicated, you will choose one to extend. Thismeans making alterations to the paper such as 1) Changing an assumption to a model to seehow this alters the results, or 2) adding a variable to the empirical model, or 3) changing theestimation method of an empirical study. More details to follow.

CourseOutline:

Session1 (9/27):What is The Political Economy of Security?

Paper 1: Poast, Paul. “Economics of War” Chapter in Forthcoming book Understanding War and Politics. Dan Reiter(ed).

Part I: Economic Basis of Military Power

Session 2 (10/4): War and Debt

Paper 1: Shultz, Kenneth and Barry Weingast. (2003). “The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition” InternationalOrganization, Vol.57, No.1: 3-42.

Paper 2: Shea, Patrick. (2014). “Financing Victory: Sovereign Credit, Democracy, and War” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.58, No. 5: 771-795.

Paper 3:Shea, Patrick and Paul Poast. Forthcoming. “War and Default”. Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Session 3 (10/11): War and Taxation

Paper 1: Flores-Macias, Gustavo A., and Sarah E. Kreps. "Political parties at war: A study of American war finance, 1789–2010." American Political Science Review 107.04 (2013): 833-848.

Paper 2: McDonald, Patrick. “The Purse Strings of Peace.” 2007. American Journal of Political Science 51(3): 569-582. ORMcDonald, Patrick. 2011. “Complicating Commitment: Free Resources, Power Shifts, and the Fiscal Politics of Preventive War.” 2011. International Studies Quarterly 55(4): 1095-1120.

Paper 3:Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. "Democracy, war, and wealth: lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation." American Political Science Review 106.1 (2012): 81-102.

Part II: Political Economy of Alliances

Session 4 (10/18): Arms versus Allies

Paper 1: Morrow, James D. 1993. "Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security." International Organization 47.02: 207-233.

Paper 2: Allen, Michael A., and Matthew DiGiuseppe. "Tightening the Belt: Sovereign Debt and Alliance Formation." International Studies Quarterly 57.4 (2013): 647-659.

Paper 3: Horowitz, Michael C., Paul Poast, and Allan C. Stam. ``Domestic Signaling of Commitment Credibility.'' Journal of Conflict Resolution. September 2017: 1682-1710.

Session 5 (10/25):Allies and Trade

Paper 1: Gowa, Joanne, and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. "Power politics and international trade." American Political Science Review 87.02 (1993): 408-420.

Paper 2: Long, Andrew G., and Brett Ashley Leeds. "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements." Journal of Peace Research 43.4 (2006): 433-451.

Paper 3: Poast, Paul. "Can Issue Linkage Improve Treaty Credibility? Buffer State Alliances as a “Hard Case”." Journal of Conflict Resolution 57.5 (2013): 739-764.

Part III: The Commercial Peace

Session 6 (11/1):Trade and War I

Paper 1: Oneal, John and Bruce Russet. 1997. "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-85" International Studies Quarterly 41:2: 267-93. See also Hegre, Håvard, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett. "Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict." Journal of Peace Research 47.6 (2010): 763-774.

Paper 2: McDonald, Patrick “Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?” 2004. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(4): 547-572.

Paper 3: Lupu, Yonatan, and Vincent A. Traag. "Trading Communities, the Networked Structure of International Relations." Journal of Conflict Resolution 57.6 (2012): 1011-1042. OR Gartzke, Erik, and Oliver Westerwinter. "The complex structure of commercial peace contrasting trade interdependence, asymmetry, and multipolarity." Journal of Peace Research 53.3 (2016): 325-343.

Session 7 (11/8): Trade and War II

Paper 1: Copeland, Dale C. 1996. ``Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations’’ International Security, 20(4): 5-41.

Paper 2: Barbieri, Katherine, and Jack S. Levy. "Sleeping with the enemy: The impact of war on trade." Journal of Peace Research 36.4 (1999): 463-479.

Paper 3:Mousseau, Michael, HavardHegre, and John R Oneal (2003). “How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace.” European Journal of International Relations. 9(4): 277-324.

Session 8 (11/15): Capital and War

Paper 1: Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. ``Investing in Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.’’ International Organization 55(2): 391-438.

Paper 2: Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The capitalist peace." American journal of political science 51.1: 166-191. Also Read: Allan Dafoe. 2011. "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor."American Journal of Political Science. 55(2): 247-262.

Paper 3: Allan Dafoe & Nina Kelsey. 2014. "Observing the Capitalist Peace:Examining Market-Mediated Signaling and Other Mechanisms." Journal of Peace Research. 51(5): 619-633.

Part IV: Other Dimensions of Globalization and Security

Session 9 (11/29): Labor Mobility and Security

Paper 1: Adamson, Fiona B. "Crossing borders: international migration and national security." International security 31.1 (2006): 165-199.

Paper 2: Salehyan, Idean. "The externalities of civil strife: Refugees as a source of international conflict." American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 4 (2008): 787-801.

Paper 3: Carter, David B., and Paul Poast. "Why do states build walls? Political economy, security, and border stability."Journal of conflict resolution 61.2 (2017): 239-270.OR Avdan, Nazli, and Christopher Gelpi. 2017. “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence.”International Studies Quarterly. 61(1): 14-27. OR Hassner, Ron E., and Jason Wittenberg. "Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?." International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 157-190.