Aristotleonchoosingvirtuousactionforitsownsake
Yannig Luthra
1Introduction
Aristotle claimsthatethically virtuous action istobechosenforitsownsake.1
But Aristotle also acknowledges thatat least some ethically virtuous action isto bechosenasameans to further ends. Heclaims thatpolitical activity, whichmanifestspracticalvirtue, aimsatsecuringeudaimoniaforoneself andfor others.2 Andheclaimsthatjustactionsaimatproducinganequaldistribution ofgoods,3 andgenerousactionsaimatbenefittingothers.4 Indeed,thearcofthe Nicomachean Ethics suggeststhat,forAristotle, contemplationischoiceworthyforitsownsakeandnotforthesakeoffurther ends,whereaspracticallyvirtuous action ischoiceworthy bothforitsownsakeandforthesakeoffurther ends.
Much ethically virtuous action really does seem to aim at further ends. Moreover,thechoiceworthiness ofmanysuchactionsseemstodependessentially ontheir reasonably perceivedpotentialtoservefurther ends—likemedicalcare ornourishmentforrecipients of charitablegiving. Itwouldbeamistaketogive charity ifitwerenotreasonable tothink ithadachanceofbeinguseful.
Itisnaturaltoassume thatanaction istobechosenforitsownsakeonly whenitistobechosenindependentlyofwhether itservesfurther ends. Aris- totle mightseemto express aviewalong these linesincharacterizingthings choiceworthy fortheir ownsakesasthings thatwepursue apartfromfurther ends.5 Asaresult, itseemsthatanaction canbechosenasameanstofurther ends and forits ownsakeonlyifits choiceworthiness isoverdetermined,like amealthatisdeliciousand nutritious. Giventhatthe choiceworthiness ofan actiondependsessentially onitsservingfurther ends,itseemsthat, asamatter ofdefinition, the action isnot choiceworthy foritsownsake. Itishard tosee, then, howvirtuous actions couldbechoiceworthy both fortheir ownsakes,and asmeanstofurther ends.6
The interest ofthis difficulty goesbeyond Aristotle interpretation. There
issomething attractive-yet-elusiveabout the idea thatmany virtuous actions essentially servefurther ends,but arealsochoiceworthy fortheir ownsakes.
Usuallythisproblemisapproachedbytrying toshowthatvirtuous actionin factdoesnotdependforitschoiceworthiness onitsservingfurther valuedends. Thisapproach isunderstandable,sinceitseemstobeamatterofdefinitionthat actions choiceworthy fortheir ownsakesare not to bechosenforthe sakeof further ends. Inwhat follows,Icriticize twosuchaccounts ofwhat Aristotle meanswhenhesaysthatvirtuous actions aretobechosenfortheir ownsakes, duetoJohnAckrillandJennifer Whiting,respectively. Then, asanalternative, Iproposeaninterpretationofwhat itmeans foranaction tobechoiceworthy forits own sake, according to which such an action can also depend forits choiceworthiness onitservingfurther valued ends.
Isuggest thatchoosinganaction foritsownsakeshould beunderstoodin awaythatcontrastsprimarily with choosinganaction asanecessary evil. A necessary evil,likeundergoing painful treatmentforaninjury, isamisfortune fortheagent. Somerightly chosenactions constitutemisfortunes fortheagent, whereas others are actions the agentisglad to have the chance to do. Such actions areappropriatesourcesoffulfillment,gratification,andpleasureforthe agent. Suchactionsarerightlyvaluedbytheagentinawaythatnecessaryevils arenot. Myproposal isthatforanaction tobechoiceworthy foritsownsake isfortheaction toberightly valued inthisway. Iarguethat,followingPlato, Aristotle hasthisconception ofanaction’sbeingchoiceworthyforitsownsake. This interpretationprovides awayofunderstandinghowvirtuous actions can bechoiceworthy both fortheir ownsakes,and asmeans to further ends. An action canbeanappropriatesourceoffulfillmentorgratificationfortheagent, evenifitistobeundertakenasameanstofurther ends.
2Two attemptstoresolvethedifficulty
2.1Ackrill’sproposal
Iwanttobeginbyconsidering Akrill’sremarks about choosingvirtuous action foritsownsake.7 Ackrill’sdiscussionofchoosingactionforitsownsakeispartof adiscussionofthedifferencebetweenpraxisandpoiesis. AccordingtoAristotle,praxis isaction thatischosen forits ownsake, whereas poiesis (production, roughly) isnot. Itwouldseemthatinstances ofpraxis—likevirtuous actions— often are productive acts. Ackrill offersthe example ofa person who acts justly inmending aneighbor’sfence. Ackrill’saimstoexplain howAristotle’s distinctionappliestoexamples likethat.Ismending the fenceacaseofpraxisorpoiesis?8
Ackrill suggests thatthe action isameans to further ends under the de-
scription “mending the fence.” And the action isdoneforitsownsakeunder thedescription “acting justly.” Ackrillsays,“whenitisaskedwhether thedoer choseto do it foritself the questionisofcourse whetherhe choseto do it because it wasjust, not whether hechoseto doit because it wasmending a neighbour’s fence.” According toAckrill,the agentactsjustly foritsownsake inthatsheperforms herjust action becausetheaction isjust. Moregenerally, tocarryoutavirtuous actionforitsownsakeistocarryoutthatactionbecause itisvirtuous.9
Ackrill’sproposal seemstobethatanagent φsforitsownsakewhenshe
wouldjustify herφingbypointing out thatheraction isaninstance ofφing. Simlarly, anaction ischoiceworthy foritsownsakewhenitisright tojustify the action inthis way. This proposal isinitially plausible. Ifan action isto bechosenforthe sakeoffurther ends, it wouldseemthatonewouldhaveto adduce thosefurther endsasreasonsforφing,instead ofjust pointing outthat one’saction isaninstance ofφing.
Whenanactionis describedasvirtuous, onedoesnotneedtoadducefurther endsservedbytheaction toestablish that theaction ischoiceworthy. Ifweare giventhatanaction isaninstance ofacting justly,courageously, orgenerously, thatsufficestoestablish thattheaction ischoiceworthy.10
However,thischaracteristicofvirtuous actions doesnotmeanthatvirtuous actions are choiceworthy fortheir ownsakes. Every choiceworthy action falls under a descriptionsuch that,given thatit fallsunder that description,no further endsneedtobeadduced tojustifytheaction.11 Thefactthatanaction fallsunder suchadescriptiondoesnotrevealittobechoiceworthy foritsown sake.
If anactionischoiceworthy asameanstofurther ends,onecandescribethe action inawaythatbuilds initsinstrumentalprofile. For example, injecting insulin to help with diabetes can be described as maintaining one’shealth. Describedthat way,further endsdonothavetobeadduced toexplainwhythe action ischoiceworthy. Butthat isbecausetheaction’sservingthevaluedends isalready capturedinthe descriptionofthe action. Ashortcutwould beto describeanaction undertakenasameanstofurther endsasameans tovalued further ends. Ifanindividual taking hermedicinesays“Iamacting prudently” or“Iamtaking appropriatemeanstovalued further ends,” itwouldnotmake senseto ask her “what use isthat?” But thatdoesnot mean the action is choiceworthy forits own sake. The usefulness ofthe action isalready built intothedescriptionoftheaction. Totellwhether anaction ofacertain typeis choiceworthyforitsownsakeitisnotenoughjusttoconsiderwhetherdescribing theactionasbeingofthattypesufficestoestablish thatitischoiceworthy. One mustseekafullexplanationofwhyactions ofthattypearechoiceworthy.
Itis truethatifonedescribesanactionasgenerous,orbeneficent,orhelpful, onedoesnotneedtoadduce further endstoestablish that theaction ischoice- worthy. But to tell whether such an action ischoiceworthy forits ownsake, onemust seekafullexplanationofwhyactions ofthatsort arechoiceworthy. Itseemsthatthe choiceworthiness ofsuchactions depends essentially ontheir serving further ends, likenutritionand medicine forpeopleinneed. The fact thatdescribing anaction asgenerousmakesitunnecessary tomention further endstojustify the action providesnoreason todoubt that.Indeed, describing anactionasgenerousseemstobuildinthattheactionisworthdoingasameans tofurther ends,inroughlythewaythatdescribing anaction asprudentbuilds inthat theaction isworth doingasameanstofurther ends. Ifanaction isnot undertakenasameans toproviding something ofvalue toothers, thatwould undermine itsclaimtocounting asagenerousaction.
3Whiting’sproposal
In outline, Whiting’s account isthatchoosingvirtuous actions fortheir own sakesischoosing the actions “simply forbeing actions ofacertain sort and insofaraseachisjust theaction itis.”12 Thecoreclaimofheraccountisthat, “Aristotle’s notionofvirtuous actionisexpansive,andsotakesin,asitwere,the external results at whichitaims.” Forexample, the effectsofgenerous action, likebenefitstoothers, are“included within myvirtuous action itself.”13
The endsofvirtuous action are included within the action inthatthe re- alization ofthose ends“completes” the actions.14 According toAristotle, the activity of teachingiscompleted bylearninginthestudent.15 Whiting suggests that,inasimilar way, the improved well-beingofabeneficiary ofcharitable givingcompletesthatvirtuous act. Shesuggeststhat,inthisway,theimproved well-beingispart ofthevirtuous agent’sactivity ofgiving.
So,inaiming at endslikethe well-beingofothers, virtuous agents aimat anaspectofthevirtuous actionitself. Virtuous agentsvaluethesesortsofends fortheir ownsakes,andnotforthesakeofsomething further. Sotheir actions are not chosenforthe sakeofanyend external to the action itself. Virtuous actions are chosen forthe sakeofends thatare contained within the actions themselves, andnotforthesakeoffurther endsbeyondtheaction itself.16
3.1Concernsaboutwhiting’sproposal
Iwantto quickly sketch three concerns about Whiting’s proposal. First, it seemsthatanaction canbechoosenasameans toafurther end,evenifthat endcompletestheaction. Forexample,considerareluctantteacher, whovalues herstudents’ learning foritsownsake,but wishesitwasnot herwhohad to teachthem. Evenifitistrue thatthe students’ learning completes heraction ofteaching, stillshechoosestoteachasameans tothatfurther end,and not foritsownsake. Ifthere weresomewayforthem tolearn other than byher teaching, shewouldmuchpreferthat theylearnthat way. Ifthere isasensein whichthe endofteaching iscontained within the action, onemust claimthat choosinganaction forthe sakeofanendcontained within the action doesnot alwaysamounttochoosingthe action foritsownsake. The proposal thatthe “further”ends ofvirtuous actions complete those actions doesnot showthat they arechosenfortheir ownsakes.17
ThesecondworryisthatAristotle specificallyclaimsthattheendsofsome
virtuous actionsaredifferent fromtheactionsthemselves. InNE10.7,Aristotle arguesforthesuperiority ofcontemplationovervirtuous politicalactivity partly onthegroundsthatpoliticalactivity aimsatfurther ends—namely eudaimonia foroneselfandforfellowcitizens. Aristotle specifiesthattheseendsaredifferent frompoliticalactivity itself,andthatweseekthem asbeingdifferent. This passage suggeststhattheendsofvirtuous political activity arenotincluded within the activity itself. Still,political activity ischoiceworthy foritsownsake.
Thethird worryisthatWhiting’sproposalcannot succeedinexplaininghow virtuous actions aretobechosenbothasmeans tofurther endsand fortheir ownsakes. Whiting’s proposalisthattheendsofvirtuous actions areincluded within the actions themselves, sochoosingthe virtuous actions forthe sakeofthoseendsischoosingtheactions fortheir ownsakes. But ifthatisright, then therearenoendsbeyondtheactions themselves forthesakeofwhichvirtuous actions aretobechosen. Sovirtous actions arenottobechosenforthesakeof further ends.18
4An alternative proposal
Itisnaturalthink anaction ischoiceworthy foritsownsakeonlyifitisworth doingindependentlyofitsreasonably perceivedpotentialtoservefurther ends. Ifoneaccepts this view,then either virtuous actions areworth doingindepen- dently oftheir potentialtoservefurther ends,orthey arenottobechosenfor theirownsakes. IwanttosuggestthatAristotle hasaconception ofanaction’s beingchoiceworthyforitsownsakewhichdoesnotrequirethatsuchactionsbe choiceworthy independentlyofitspotentialtoservefurther ends.
Myproposalisthat,forAristotle, anactionischoiceworthyforitsownsake iftheaction isrightly valuedbytheagentinacertain way. Anactivity’s being valuedinthiswaycontrastswithanactivity’sbeingregardedasanecessaryevil, likeundergoing anamputation (oranecessarywasteoftime,likebrushing one’s teeth). There isafamilyofideaswhichcontrastwith beingamerenecessity. These include, forexample, being fulfilling, gratifying, rewarding, enjoyable, satisfying, meaningful, and soon. Anaction ischoiceworthy foritsownsake whenthereis something goodabouttheactionwhichmakesideasinthisfamily apply totheaction.19
Beforearguingthat thisviewisAristotle’s, letmeexplainhowithelpswith
thepuzzleunder discussion. Anaction canberightlyvaluedinthiswayevenif itistobechosenasameansofsecuringfurther ends. Servingatasoupkitchen canbegratifying, andawonderfulthing tohavethechancetodo. There isno conflictbetweenitsbeinggratifying, anditsbeingchoiceworthy becauseitisa meanstohelpingpeople.
Consider Middlemarch’s Dorothea, who,feelingheridlelifeempty and un- fulfilling, wants the chance to spend her time doing useful things. Her lack ofusefulness toothers isnot onlyamisfortune tothe peoplewhomight ben- efitfrom her help, but amisfortune and legitimatesource ofunhappiness to Dorothea herself. When sheembraces opportunitiestohelpothers, heruseful helping actions are asource offulfilmmentand meaning inher life. Helping others inthe community has avalue inDorothea’s lifethatmere necessities lack. Helpingtofoundahospital forthe poorisrightly valued asmeaningful andfulfilling,whereasundergoing anamputationisnot.
Onemaywellaskwhyitisthatsomemeans toendsarerightlyvalued as fulfilling,gratifying, and soon, whileothers are mere necessities. It may be relevantthat somemeanstofurther endsinvolveanexerciseofone’stalents, or appreciationfromothers forone’sefforts, oranatmosphereoffellowshipand common purpose with others. But Ihavenogeneral account ofwhat makes somemeans toendsappropriatelyvalued inthese ways. The importantpoint forpresentpurposes isthatthey can bevalued inthese ways. Anaction that istobechosenasameanstofurther endscanalsobeanappropriate sourceof fulfillment,enjoyment, meaning, andsoonfortheagent. Iwanttosuggestthat, forAristotle, suchactionsarechoiceworthyfortheirownsakes.If so,avirtuous action thatistobechosenasameanstofurther endscanalsobechoiceworthy foritsownsake.
Somesupport forthisinterpretationisprovidedbyconsidering what thecon- trastissupposed to bebetween actions thatare choiceworthy fortheir own sakesand actions thatarenot choiceworthy fortheir ownsakes. Someindica- tionofhowAristotle mightthink ofthecontrastcanbefoundinthewayPlato characterizesthings thataregoodmerelyasmeans, incontrasttothings that are goodfortheir ownsakes, orthings thatare goodboth asmeans and for their ownsakes. When Plato discusses these three kinds ofgoodsinthe Re- public,20 hegivesexamples ofactivities thataregoodmerelyasmeans. They includephysicaltraining,medicaltreatment,andwaysof makingmoney. What theseactivities haveincommonisthattheyare“toilsome but beneficial.” The characteristicofactionsthatcontrastswiththeirbeinggoodfortheirownsakes isbeingtoilsome. Roughly,theideaseemstobethattheseactionsarenotgood fortheir ownsakesbecause there isakindofmisfortune inhavingtodothem inordertosecurethebenefitsthey promise.
Aristotle seemstothink inasimilarwayabout thecontrastbetweenactiv- itiesthatarechoiceworthy fortheir ownsakesandactivities thatarenot. This comesthroughinhisdiscussionof“mixed actions,” whicharecalledforinbad circumstances.21 InNE3.1Aristotle discussesactions whicharedonebecause the agent fearsaworsealternative,likethrowing cargooverboard tosavethe livesofthoseaboard aship. Aristotle claimsthatsuchactions arechosen,but thatnoonewouldchoosesuchactions fortheir ownsakes. These actions are recognizedbytheagentastherightthing todointhecircumstances,but they are nonetheless not chosen fortheir ownsakes. It isnaturalto suppose that suchactions arenottobechosenfortheir ownsakesbecauseitisamisfortune fortheagenttohavetocarry outthoseactions.22
Aristotle’s viewthattheproductive activity ofcraftsmen isignoble,andto
beavoided,alsoillustrateshiscontrastbetween actions choiceworthy fortheir own sakes, and actions thatare a kind ofmisfortune forthe agent to have to do. Aristotle describes the lifeofcraftsmen and merchants as “ignoble,” and contraryto virtue.”23 The activity ofthe productive classes isamere necessity, and to beavoided ifpossible. Productive craft activities
are not to bechosen fortheir ownsake. Those productive activities are not merenecessities just invirtue oftheir beingmeans tofurther ends. They are merenecessity,andnotchoiceworthyfortheir ownsakes,because(according to Aristotle)those activities are servileand undignified. It seemslikelythatfor Aristotle these productive activities are not to bechosen fortheir ownsakes because having to dothose activities constitutesakind ofmisfortune forthe agent.24
Inseekingwhat Aristotle thinks it isforan action to bechoiceworthy for
its own sake, weshould lookfora characteristicthat contrastswith an ac- tion’sbeingamisfortune.Anaction’sbeingalegitimatesourceof fulfillmentor gratification,contrastsinanaturalwaywith anaction’s beingamisfortune. Aristotle’s discussionoftherelation betweenvirtuous action andpleasure sug- geststhatanaction’sbeingchoiceworthy foritsownsakecontrastswithbeing amisfortune inthissortofway.
Aristotle claimsthatvirtuous activity is“objectively”pleasant.This char- acteristicofvirtuous action contrastswith theregrettable characterofmixed actions. Aristotle claims thatvirtuous people rightly find virtuous actions pleasant. Virtuous agents experience virtuous actions aspleasant,and there issomething about the actions themselves—whereinthe actions areobjectively pleasant—thatmakesitcorrect toexperiencethem aspleasant.25
Manyvirtuous actions doinfactseemtobeobjectivelypleasantintheway
Aristotle suggests. Helpingafriend,givingcharity, orservingone’scommunity asapolitician, seemtobelegitimatesourcesofacertain kindofpleasure. These areactivities theagent couldrightlybegladtodo.Concepts likefulfillment and gratification areusefulforcharacterizingthewayinwhichactionsliketheseare legitimatesourcesofaseriouskindofpleasure. Virtuous actionsliketheseseem tobeproperobjectsofpleasure inthatthey areproperobjectsofsatisfaction,
gratification,fulfillment, orother formsofappreciationalongtheselines.
Aristotle’s claim thatvirtuous actions are pleasantsuggests thatvirtuous action hasadimension ofgoodnesswhichmixedactions lack,eventhough they are rightly chosen as appropriatemeans to worthwhile ends. Whereas it is amisfortune to the agentto haveto perform a“mixed” action likethrowing goodsoverboard, virtuous actions are rightly found pleasant by their agents. So, for Aristotle, there seems to be something good about virtuous actions thatgoesbeyond their beingappropriatemeans toworthwhile further ends.26
Inasmuch asvirtuous actions haveakind ofgoodness thatgoesbeyond their
being appropriatemeans to further ends, there seemsto beasenseinwhich theyare good fortheir ownsakes. This kind ofgoodness ismarked by the correctness offindingvirtuous activity pleasant,meaningful, orfulfilling.
Now, one might doubt Aristotle’s view thatit isalways correct to take any kind ofpleasure invirtuous actions. It makes senseto findpleasure or gratificationinhelping afriend, because that’s awonderful thing tohavethe chancetodo. Incontrast,itdoesnotmakesensetofindpleasure inturning in one’schildtothepolice,becausethatisahorriblethingtohavetodo,evenifit istherightthing todo. Turninginone’schildmightbeavirtuous,just action eventhough itisanecessary evil,and notsomething oneshouldtakepleasure indoing.
But it isindeed Aristotle’s viewisthatvirtuous actions are rightlyfound pleasant. To address this worry, he could claim thatturningin one’sown child is not in fact a case ofvirtuous action. A lifefull ofactions ofthis kind would belikePriam’s. While possessing acertain dignity, it would not beaeudaimon life. Ifso,such alifewould not bealifeofpracticalvirtue, since such a lifeiseudaimon, at least to a secondary degree. Alternatively, Aristotle couldclaimthatitiscorrect totakeacertain kind ofpleasure even
intragic virtuous actions—perhapsakindofpride indoingthe rightthing in difficultcircumstances,akintothegratificationthatanidealwarriorcouldfind insacrificingherlifeforagoodcause.
Ifindeedvirtuous actionsarerightlyfoundpleasant, meaningful,orfulfilling— asAristotle claimsthey are—thenthey haveadimension ofgoodnessbeyond their beinginstrumentsforachievingfurther ends. Virtuous actions arechoice- worthyfortheirownsakesinthattheyarerightlyvaluedaswonderful,fulfilling, gratifying, and soon. Aristotle’s claimthatvirtuous actions arechoiceworthy fortheirownsakesmaybeinterpretedtomeanthatvirtuous actionsarerightly valued inthisway. Whenanaction isvalued inthisway,itisvalued ashaving
adimension ofgoodnessthatgoesbeyond itsusefulnessasameans tofurther ends.
Anaction canberightly valued asfulfillingormeaningful evenifitistobe chosen asameans to further ends. One can rightly findfulfillmentingiving charity even ifthe charitableact isaimed at benefits forothers. Indeed, it makessensetofindfulfillmentingivingcharity largelybecause doingsoserves worthwhile further ends. Thus, virtuous actions canbechoiceworthy both for their ownsakesandasmeanstofurther ends.
Notes
1NE 1105a35, 1140b7, 1144b20
2Pol1103b5, NE 1094b5, 1099b38, 1177b3
3NE 1132b31-1133a2
4NE 1120a21
5NE 1096b8
6Thereisanotherpuzzle aboutAristotle’sclaim thatwechoosevirtuousactionforitsownsake, besides the one atissue in thispaper. Aristotle claims thatvirtuousactionischosen bothforitsownsake,and forthe sakeofeudaimonia(NE 1097b2-4).Krautplausiblysuggeststhatthese claimsarenot incompatible becausevirtuousactionmaybechosen asconstitutive of eudaimonia,ratherthanbeing chosen as an instrumentalmeansto eudaimonia. Kraut’ssuggestionleavesunaddressedthe presentissue: howcan virtuousactionbechoiceworthyforits own sake ifits choiceworthinessdependson its being an instrumental meansto further ends, likehealthand nutritionforpeople inneed?
7The remarksare from “AristotleonAction,”Mind 87(1978) pp. 595-601.
8The proposalinthis paper abouthowtounderstandwhatitistochoosevirtuousactionforitsownsakecan beadaptedtoshed lightonthedifference betweenpraxis and poiesis.In myview, praxis isactionthatisvaluedinthe way sketchedabove, and poiesisisproductiveactionthat isnot valuedinthatway. Idonot develop this suggestionhere.
9David Charles’sviewissimilar.See”Aristotle: Ontologyand Moral Reasoning,”Oxford
StudiesinAncientPhilosophy4(1986) pp. 119-144. Toact generously foritsownsakemeansthatonecarriesout the generousactionbecauseitisgenerous.Charlesclaims thatwhateveritisspecifically that onedoessoastoact generously—makingacharitabledonation,say—isdone asameanstofurtherends inthatitisdone asameanstoactinggenerously.
10This claim may need qualification. Perhapsan actionthatisgenerouscould fail to be
choiceworthybecauseitisunjust.Onthe otherhand,maybe astrongversionofthethesisofthe unityofvirtueistrue. Thesecomplexitiesdonotaffect the main lineofargumenthere.
11Thereisa sense in which any choiceworthyactionisgood to do apart from whetherit
bringsaboutfurtherends. Whetheroneacts wellingiving charitydoesnotdependonwhateffects the act actuallyturnsout to have. I assumethat the goodness ofvirtuousactionsis not consequentialistin this sense. But the resilienceofthe choiceworthinessofvirtuousactiontovicissitudesofcause-and-effectdoesnot showthatvirtuousactionsaretobechosen accordingtothemselves.Anactionrightlyundertakenjust asameanstofurtherendsremainswell-chosenand goodtohave done, evenifitsexpectedeffects donot materialize.
12Whiting,Op. Cit.p. 276
13Ibid pp. 290-291
14Ibid p. 288
15Physics 202b5-22
16Note thatthis proposaltries to explainhow virtuousactionis choiceworthyfor its own sake by makingclaims aboutthe metaphysics of virtuousaction—wherean actionends and its resultsbegin. The proposalIsuggestbelowlets the metaphysicsofvirtuousactionsturnout astheymay.
17One might also worry thatthe ends ofvirtuousactionsdo not completethose actions
in the way that learning completesan act ofteaching. One may have carriedout an act of charitablegiving withouthaving improvedthingsforanyone,if,say,the funds weremisused. In contrast,accordingtoAristotle,onecannothave carriedout an act ofteachingunless the studenthas learned. Soone mightdoubtthatthe realizationofthe ends ofvirtuousactionareincludedwithintheactions themselves.(Notethat this point is compatiblewith the thought thatitis partofthe natureofcharitableactions,so described,that theybeundertakenforthe sakeofcertainfurtherends.)
18A possiblereply here isto bite the bullet,and to insist thatAristotle’sreal viewisthat
ethicallyvirtuousactionisnot chosen forthe sakeoffurtherends. (CompareNE 1176b6.)
19This proposalbears some similarityto Korsgaard’s“Two distinctions inGoodness”(inThePhilosophicalReview 92(1983) pp. 169-195). Korsgaarddistinguishesbetweenintrinsicgoods and final goods. Final goods are good ends thatare not to be pursuedas meansto further ends, and intrinsicgoods are good ends thatdo not get theirgoodness from anexternalsource.Korsgaardarguesthatanendmaybeafinalgoodwithoutbeing intrinsicallygood. (In particular,shearguesthatanend canbeafinalgoodpartlybecauseofthe interestsomeonetakes inthatend.) The proposalhere isa“distinctioningoodness”betweenmeanstoendsthatare merely instrumentallygood,and meanstoends thatare valuedintheirownright.
20Republic2.357c
21Itisalso worthnotingAristotlecontrastspleasuresthat are to be chosen for theirownsakeswith necessarypleasures(NE 7.4and 7.7). This contrastsuggeststhat,to understandhowvirtuesactionscanbechoiceworthyfortheirownsakesweshouldtry tounderstandhow an actioncan bechoiceworthyasameanstofurtherends withoutbeing amerenecessity.
22Aristotle’sviewthattheproductiveactivityofcraftsmenisignoble,and tobeavoided,also
illustrates Aristotle’scontrast betweenactionschoiceworthyfor theirown sake, and actionsthatare akind ofmisfortuneforthe agent to have to do. (See Pol.1328b39. Also compareNE 1329a1-5.)Idonottry todevelop this pointhere.
23Pol.1328b39-1329a2.AlsocompareNE 1329a1-5.
24Unless, asAristotlechillinglysuggests,the defectsinthe agent’snaturematchthe defectsinthe activity.
25See1.8.1099a3-15.Alsocompare3.1onthe relationofpleasuretovirtue,anddiscussion
ofencraticagentsinbook7. 2.1.3
26Aristotle’sviewthatvirtuousactionsarekalon providesanotherwayintoseeing howthevalue ofvirtuousactionsgoesbeyondtheirbeing meanstofurtherends. Viewing avirtuousactionisfine,ornoble, isawayofvaluingthe actionassomething more thanamerenecessity,which iscompatible with choosing the actionas a meansto furtherends. Ido not develop this pointhere.