Pakistan, Russia and the Threat to the Afghan War

Pakistan, Russia and the Threat to the Afghan War

Days after the Pakistanis suspended the NATO supply line from Karachi to Afghanistan, the Russians, for very different reasons, threatened to cut the alternative Russia-controlled Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The dual threats, even if they don’t materialize are significant. If both routes are cut, it becomes impossible to supply forces operating in Afghanistan. Simply by raising the possibility of cutting supply lines, NATO and the United States must recalculate its position in Afghanistan. The possibility that there will not be sufficient supply deliveries not only places NATO success WC – when was the last time we characterized there being ANY chance for ‘success’? in Afghanistan in greater jeopardy than it already is, but also increases the potential vulnerability of troops to Taliban action. It is likely that the supply lines remain open, but there is a vast difference between likely and certain, and the degree of likelihood is open to question under any circumstances.

The Pakistani decision to close the border crossings at both Chaman and the Khyber Pass followed a NATO attack on a Pakistani position inside Pakistan that killed more than 20 Pakistani soldiers. The Pakistanis have been increasingly opposed to NATO operations inside of Pakistan against Taliban forces cut this specificity – they’re targeting Taliban, aQ, probably some Pakistani Taliban on behalf of Islamabad, etc., but the attack on the base last week triggered an extreme response. The precise circumstances of the attack were unclear, with some reports that Pakistani troops opened fire, but the Pakistanis insisted it was an unprovoked attack and a violation of their sovereign territory. The ordered the United States out of an air base in Pakistan used by the Central Intelligence Agency and halted resupply.

The underlying reason for this suspension is relatively simple. It is the view of the Pakistani government that NATO, and the United States in particular, will fail to bring the war in Afghanistan to a successful conclusion. It follows from that the United States and other NATO countries will, at some point, withdraw. Some in Afghanistan have claimed that the United States has been defeated. That is not the case. The United States may have failed to win the war, but it has not been defeated in the sense that it is compelled to leave by superior force. It can remain there indefinitely, particular as the American public is not hostile to the war and is not generating substantial pressure to end operations. Nevertheless, at some point, if the war cannot be bought to some sort of conclusion, either the calculation in Washington or public pressure, or both will shift and the U.S. will leave, along with other NATO powers.

Given that eventual outcome, Pakistan is not interested in waging a domestic war against Taliban and its supporters. Such a war would potentially trigger not only a counter-strike but also a civil war, and the Pakistanis have no interest in such an outcome even if the United States were to remain forever. In addition, given that a U.S. withdrawal at some future point is inevitable, and victory implausible, Pakistan’s western border is with Afghanistan, and it will have to live with and possibly manage the consequences of the reemergence of a Taliban government.

Under these circumstances, it makes little sense for Pakistan to collaborate excessively with the United States as it raises domestic dangers and dangers with the Taliban. Pakistan was prepared to cooperate with the United States and NATO while the U.S. was in an aggressive and unpredictable phase. The Pakistanis could not risk American attacks at that point, and feared a U.S.-Indian entente. But the U.S., while not leaving Afghanistan, has lost its appetite for a wider war, and lacks the resources for it. Therefore it is in Pakistan’s interest to reduce its collaboration with the United States in preparation for what it sees as the inevitable outcome, in order to strengthen its relations with the victor and minimize the threat of internal conflict.

The attack by NATO, which NATO commanders apologized for, provided the Pakistanis the opportunity—and in their mind the necessity—of an exceptional response. The suspension of the supply line without any commitment to reopening it, along with the closure of the U.S. air base from which UAV operations were carried out (though Pakistani airspace reportedly remains open to operations), was useful to Pakistan, repositioning itself as hostile to the United States because of American actions. This played well with Islamst groups, particularly because it involved concrete actions harming American military actions. At the same time it made the Americans the cause.

It isn’t clear whether the supply line will be re-opened. It might be. But having already been closed multiple times – including for ten days straight at one point in 2010 -- it is subject to closure again. Moreover, it sets a precedent for the consequences of aggressive operations along the Pakistani border. The danger of closure of the supply lines would necessarily inhibit U.S. operations against Taliban sanctuaries, unless there were another supply line available.

Let’s include our map of the NDN

The alternative supply line passes through Russia, then through several Caucus and Central Asian countries. But the bulk of these supply routes pass through Russia. This is the alternative to the Pakistani line, and it is a viable alternative that would allow sufficient supplies to flow to support NATO operations. Indeed, over recent months it has actually become the primary line of supply with the objective of carrying 75% of supplies by year-end (though this may be a bit ambitious, given that right now it is closer to half).

Therefore, Dmitri Rogozin’s threat that Russia might suspend these supply lines threatens the viability of all operations in Afghanistan. Rogozin is the Russian representative to NATO, and he has been know to make extreme statements. But when he makes those statements, he makes it with the full knowledge and authorization of the Russian leadership, and he is used to make statements that the leadership might want to back away from. But it is not unusual that he signals new directions in Russian policy. Therefore the United States and NATO can’t afford to dismiss the threat. No matter how small the probability, it places over one hundred thousand U.S. and allied troops in a dangerous position if it does happen.

For the Russians, the issue is the development and deployment of American ballistic missile defenses in Europe. The Russians oppose the deployment, claiming that it represents a threat to the Russian nuclear deterrent system, and threatens to destabilize the nuclear balance. This was certainly the reason the Soviets opposed the initial Strategic Defense Initiative back in the 1980s, but in carrying it forward to the 2010s, the reasoning appears faulty. First, there is no nuclear balance at the moment as there is no political foundation for nuclear war. Second, the BMD is not designed to stop a massive launch of nuclear missiles, such as the Russians could execute, but only the threat posed by a very small number of missiles, such as might be launched from Iran. Finally, it is not clear that the system will work very well, though it has < proven far more capable than even the turn-of-the-century predecessor systems>.

Nevertheless, the Russians have been vehement in opposing the system, threatening to deploy ballistic missiles and hinted at tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and other locations in response. The Russian concern is obviously real, but it is difficult to believe it is the nuclear balance they are concerned about. Rather, it is the geopolitical implication of the weapons.

Elements of the weapons, particularly radars, are being deployed around the periphery of Russia—Poland, Romania, Turkey and Israel. From the Russian point of view, the deployment of radars and other systems is a precursor to the deployment of other military capabilities. The radars are extremely valuable installations. They must be protected. Therefore troops will be deployed, air defenses, etc. and so on. In other words, the deployment of the BMD radars may pose no practical impact on the Soviet Union directly, but the indirect consequences would be to set the stage for a return to containment, the principle that the U.S. used during the Cold War to limit Soviet power.

The Russians see the location of the missile deployment—when extended to other military forces—as creating a belt of nations designed to contain Russia. Given the uncertain future of Europe, the increasing relative power of Russia in the region, the United States has an interest in making certain that an disruption in Europe doesn’t give the Russians opportunities to extend its political influence. But it isn’t clear the extent to which American planners chose the sites with the containment of Russia in mind. From the Russian point of view the motive doesn’t matter. Whatever the subjective intent of the United States, objectively it opens the door for containment if and when U.S. policy planners to notice the opportunity. Planning is done based on capability and not intent.

The Russians have been threatening actions for years, and in the past few weeks they have become increasingly vocal on the subject and on threats. Rogozin was obviously ordered to seize on the vulnerability created by the Pakistan move on supplies, to introduce the now indispensible Russian supply line as a point where the Russians might choose to bring pressure, knowing that this is the one move the United States could not tolerate at the moment. Whether they intend to shut down the supply line is questionable. It would cause a huge breach with the United States and to this point the Russians have been relatively cautious in challenging fundamental American interests. But it should also be noted that the Russians are serious about not permitting a new containment line to be created, and therefore, may be shifting their own calculations.

It is a rule of war that secure strategic supply lines are the basis of warfare. If you cannot be certain of supplying your troops, it is necessary to redeploy to more favorable positions. The loss of supply lines will, at some point, create a vulnerability that in military history leads to the annihilation of forces. It is something that can be risked when major strategic interests require it, but it is a dangerous maneuver. What the Russians are doing is raising the possibility that U.S. forces could be isolated in Afghanistan. The most important point is that supply lines into Afghanistan have never been under U.S. or NATO control. Afghanistan is a landlocked country, lacking any ports. All supplies must come in through third countries(less than a third of American supplies come by air, and those mostly through Russian airspace), and their willingness to permit transit is the foundation of U.S. strategy. In the space of a few days both the Pakistanis and Russians raised the possibility of closing those lines of supply.

The most important point is that it lays open the fact that the United States and NATO do not control the strategic lines of supply into Afghanistan. It has been waging a war that depended on the willingness of first Pakistan and increasingly Russia to permit the movement of supplies through their territory. Were they both to suspend that right, the United States would be faced with the choice of going to war to seize supply lines—something well beyond U.S. conventional capacity at this time—or to concede the war. Any time when a force is dependent on the cooperation of parties not under its control to sustain its force it is in danger. Once both Pakistan and Russia have threatened to close those lines of supply (Pakistan already having done so) the risks pyramid.

The issue is not whether or not the threats are carried out. The issue is whether the strategic interest the United States has in Afghanistan justifies the risk that the Russians may not be bluffing and the Pakistanis will become more reliable in allowing passage. In the event of strategic necessity, such risks can be taken. But the lower the strategic necessity, the less risk is tolerable. This does not change the strategic reality in Afghanistan. It simply makes that reality much clearer and the threats to that reality more serious. Washington of course hopes that the Pakistanis will reconsider and that the Russians are simply blowing off steam. Hope, however, is not a strategy.