Sample Text: Nuclear and Radiological Incident

  1. Introduction

Nuclear terrorism remains a real and urgent danger. Despite the post-9/11 disruptions it has faced, the evidence suggests that al Qaeda continues to seek nuclear weapons and the materials and expertise to make them. In his memoir, former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet provides frightening new information on al Qaeda’s nuclear efforts – including a report from a senior al Qaeda operative that the group’s nuclear weapons program had advanced to the point of conventional explosive testing. The removal of al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Taliban-led Afghanistan and the disruption of al Qaeda’s central command reduced, but did not eliminate, the risk of such complex attacks. Unfortunately, al Qaeda’s central leadership appears to be reconstituting itself, primarily in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, and “retains the ability to organize complex, mass-casualty attacks,” according to Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.[1]

  1. Purpose, Scope, Situation, Assumptions
  2. Purpose

The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex provides an organized and integrated capability for a timely, coordinated response by Federal agencies to terrorist incidents involving nuclear or radioactive materials (Incidents of National Significance), and accidents or incidents involving such material that may or may not rise to the level of an Incident of National Significance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for overall coordination of all actual and potential Incidents of National Significance, including terrorist incidents involving nuclear materials.

This annex describes how the coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies support DHS’s overall coordination of the response to a nuclear/ radiological Incident of National Significance. In addition, this annex describes how the coordinating agencies lead the response to incidents of lesser severity. 1

The actions described in this annex may be implemented: (1) concurrently with, and as an integral part of, the National Response Plan (NRP) for all nuclear/radiological incidents or accidents considered to be Incidents of National Significance; or (2) independently for all other nuclear/ radiological accidents or incidents considered to be below the threshold of an Incident of National Significance and, therefore, not requiring overall Federal coordination by DHS.

  1. Scope

This annex applies to nuclear/radiological incidents, including sabotage and terrorist incidents, involving the release or potential release of radioactive material that poses an actual or perceived hazard to public health, safety, national security, and/or the environment. This includes terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or improvised nuclear devices (INDs) as well as reactor plant accidents (commercial or weapons production facilities), lost radioactive material sources, transportation accidents involving nuclear/ radioactive material, and foreign accidents involving nuclear or radioactive material.

The level of Federal response to a specific incident is based on numerous factors, including the ability of State, local, and tribal officials to respond; the type and/or amount of radioactive material involved; the extent of the impact or potential impact on the public and environment; and the size of the affected area.

In situations where threat analysis includes indications that a terrorist incident involving radiological materials could occur, actions are coordinated in accordance with the pre-incident prevention protocols set forth in the NRP Base Plan.

This annex:

  1. Provides planning guidance and outlines operational concepts for the Federal response to any nuclear/radiological incident, including a terrorist incident, that has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences within the United States or its territories, possessions, or territorial waters, and that requires a response by the Federal Government. This includes both Incidents of National Significance and incidents of lesser severity;
  2. Acknowledges the unique nature of a variety of nuclear/radiological incidents and the responsibilities of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to respond to them;
  3. Describes Federal policies and planning considerations on which this annex and Federal agency-specific nuclear/radiological response plans are based;
  4. Specifies the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from nuclear/radiological incidents;
  5. Includes guidelines for notification, coordination, and leadership of Federal activities, and coordination of public information, congressional relations, and international activities; and
  6. . Provides protocols for coordinating Federal Government capabilities to respond to radiological incidents. These capabilities include, but are not limited to:
  7. . The Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), which is responsible for production, coordination, and dissemination of consequence predictions for an airborne hazardous material release;
  8. . The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), established at or near the scene of an incident to coordinate radiological assessment and monitoring; and
  9. . The Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health (known as “the Advisory Team”), which provides expert recommendations on protective action guidance.
  10. More information on these capabilities is included in subsequent sections of this annex.

Source: The National Response Framework, January, 2008

  1. Situation and Assumptions
  2. There are several types of incidents involving radioactive material that may occur in (______) County/ City, the most common being transportation accidents.
  3. Radioactive isotopes, primarily for medical use, are frequently shipped via the state’s commercial highways, railways, barges and airport facilities. A spill or release is possible from a transportation accident.
  4. Accidents on industrial field sites involving density gauges, well-logging equipment or industrial radiographic units can be extremely dangerous.
  5. Accidents at a laboratory, research or storage facility where radioactive material is processed could involve fire, explosion, spillage and/ or leakage, resulting in contamination of accident victims and/ or emergency response personnel, the ingestion/ inhalation of radioactive material, and/ or external radiation exposure to those involved.
  6. Nuclear terrorism is a very real possibility, in the form of a threat or the actual detonation of weapon. The threat by a terrorist group may or may not involve an actual weapon. All incidents, however, must be treated as a real threat until a search has proven otherwise.
  7. A military aircraft carrying nuclear weapons could crash, scattering nuclear materials in the vicinity of the crash.
  8. Inthe event of a nuclear weapons accident, the Radiation Health and Toxic Agent Branch (RH&TAB), Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC), and KyEM personnel will assist the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE). KyEM will coordinate state and local activities, but DOD will have absolute direction and control authority within the established national defense area (See Appendix Q-1, Radiological Accident Procedures, of the KyEOP).
  9. Following a nuclear detonation, instruments and trained monitors currently available are insufficient for adequate population protection and decontamination. Neither the military nor other federal agencies can initially be relied upon for post-incident radiological assistance.
  10. No nuclear power plant exists within the state or within 50 miles of the border. Kentucky is not considered to be in a radioactive material “ingestion pathway”. Therefore, there is minimal potential of a radiological accident from a nuclear power plant
  11. The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) is a uranium processing facility operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation. Some substances used or stored at PGDP pose a potential radioactive hazard should a release occur. An accident could occur while transporting radioactive materials into the plant or as they are transported to other facilities.
  12. The RH&TAB of the H&FSC is the primary state agency for responding to a peacetime radiological incident. They will direct response activities upon arrival on scene.
  13. Federal support will be provided under ESF #10 (Hazardous Materials) of the National Response Plan.

Source: The Kentucky County Emergency Operations PlanTemplate that Counties can use to develop their County EOPs

  1. Concept of Operations
  2. General
  3. 1. A basic local Radiation Protection Program (RPP) consists of the EOC.
  4. 2. To conduct an effective RPP, we will:
  5. Maintain information on radiological monitoring instruments.
  6. Establish procedures for initial emergency response to radiological accidents. Seethe Radiological Incident Response Checklist in Appendix 2.
  7. Establish a radiological incident reporting system. See Appendix 3.
  8. B. Radiological Accidents
  9. Discovery. The public may discover radiological accidents, by businesses that use ortransport such materials, or by local responders who are summoned to an accident site.
    Local personnel are likely to be the first emergency responders on the scene of aradiological accident. The first local official at the scene will take charge, initiate theIncident Command System (ICS), and serve as the Incident Commander until relieved by amore senior or more qualified individual.
  10. Local Notification. The Incident Commander will provide information on the incident tolocal officials through the County Warning Point using the Hazardous Materials IncidentReport provided in Appendix 3. The Incident Commander shall make an initial assessmentof the situation, to include an estimate of the likelihood of a release of radiologicalmaterials. If it appears that radiological materials have been released into the environmentor such a release appears likely, the EOC will be activated to support the incident response.
  11. Response Actions. The Incident Commander should identify response resourcesrequired and direct the on-scene response to contain or mitigate the incident. The initialresponse should be accomplished in accordance with established hazardous materialsresponse criteria and the general checklist in Appendix 2
  12. Protective Actions.
  13. Short Term.
  1. If it appears that a release of radiological materials has occurred or is possible,the Incident Commander is responsible for determining and implementingappropriate protective actions for the public in the immediate area of the incident.
  2. The Incident Commander is also responsible for advising personnel respondingto the incident of the threat and determining requirements for personal protectiveequipment. Responders who lack hazardous materials training and appropriatepersonal protective equipment (PPE) should not be committed to radiologicalincidents.
  3. 2) If it appears that a radiological release has or may affect areas beyond theincident site, the incident commander should coordinate with the EOC to agreeupon a division of responsibilities for warning the public, making requirednotifications, implementing protective actions for the public in areas beyond theincident site, and obtaining additional resources and technical assistance.
  4. 3) Suitable initial public protective actions for a radiological incident may includeevacuation and sheltering in place. Hazardous Materials, ESF-10, providesadditional information on selecting public protective measures.
  5. Long-term Protective Measures. Laboratory and Radiation Service Division ofDepartment of Public Health and Environment (LRSDC) will normallyconduct a detailed incident assessment, identify affected areas through radiologicalmonitoring, recommend follow-on protective measures to protect public health, andoversee recovery operations. Long-term protective measures may be implementedby LRSDC or other state regulatory agencies and may include controls on the movement and use of foodstuffs, milk, and feed from contaminated areas and on theuse of drinking water from contaminated sources.
  1. State and Federal Notifications. The County Warning Point or the EOC, if activated,shall be responsible for making required emergency notifications to state and federalagencies. radiological releases should be reported to:
  2. a. The State Patrol and or local DERA will relay information to state andfederal agencies.
  3. b. If incident involves a deliberate release of radiological materials, the FBI office in
  4. xxxxxx and the CBI office will benotified as well as the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in xxxxxxx.
  5. c. See Appendix 3, Radiological Incident Reporting System and Hazardous
  6. Materials Incident Report, for additional information.
  7. State & Federal Assistance. The EOC is responsible for coordinating with state andfederal agencies to obtain technical advice and assistance regarding radiological issues.
    The state or federal agency may formulate requests by the Governor for radiologicalmonitoring and assessment assistance from the federal government or from other states,if required. The County may request other types of state assistance.
  8. Situation Updates. The Incident Commander shall provide situation updates to theEOC; the EOC should prepare and transmit situation reports to Division of Emergency Management (DEM).
  9. Monitoring of Emergency Workers. Exposure records and medical follow-up will beprovided for responders who have entered contaminated areas.
  10. US Government Nuclear Materials. In the event of a radiological accident involvingnuclear weapons, special nuclear material, or classified components, the federal agencywhich owns that material may declare a National Defense Area (NDA) or NationalSecurity Area (NSA) around the site and take exclusive control within that area. NDAsand NSAs are established to safeguard classified information or restricted data,equipment, or material.
  11. US Department of Energy (DOE) Shipments. US DOE has jurisdiction on accidentsinvolving DOE transuranic waste shipments. Information on these shipments andguidance on dealing with incidents involving such shipments is provided in Appendix 5.
  1. Deliberate Acts
  2. The deliberate release of radioactive materials is a crime under a number of state andfederal laws. Any incident of this type must be promptly reported to local and state lawenforcement agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead federalagency for crisis management of malevolent acts involving weapons of massdestruction, including nuclear devices; the Department of Public Safety (DPS) is thelead state agency.
  3. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead federal agency forconsequence management of a deliberate radiological release; the Division ofEmergency Management is the lead state agency. If a release of radiation is believed tobe an act of terrorism, we will ensure the incident is reported to both to the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the FBI. More information on dealing withterrorist events is provided in Annex R, Terrorist Incident Response.
  4. Activities by Phases of Emergency Management
  5. 1. Mitigation
  6. Maintain an effective public warning system.

Establish/maintain a hazardous cargo route.

  1. 2. Preparedness
  2. Establish a RPP system.
  3. Ensure responders have data available on local facilities that are licensed to use orstore radiological materials.
  4. Educate the public about radiological hazards and protective actions.
  5. Provide available training to local responders.
  6. 3. Response
  7. Activate the RPP system
  8. Respond in accordance with the guidelines in Appendix 2.
  9. Provide information and instructions to the public.
  10. 4. Recovery
  11. Ensure radiation source is removed and ensure access to contaminated areas iscontrolled until the area is cleaned up. A contractor supervised by state or federalagencies and paid for by the responsible party, if one can be located, will normallyperform cleanup.
  12. Work with state and federal agencies to assess damage, if any.
  13. Work with state and federal agencies to continue area radiation monitoring, ifrequired.
  14. Work with state and federal agencies to determine the cause of the incident anddetermine liability.
  15. Keep the public informed about the status of the incident

Source: Baca County, (CO),Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan –
ANNEX DRADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE

  1. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
  2. Organization
  3. The EMD is in charge of the Radiological Protection Program on a day-to-day basis.Once a radiological accident occurs, responsibility for managing and directing theresponse is assigned to the Incident Commander and responsibility for coordinatingexternal support is assigned to the EOC staff.
  4. Effective response to a radiological incident requires a coordinated response by localdepartments, agencies, and officials, together with representatives of the facility orcompany responsible for the incident, augmented, in certain circumstances, by state andfederal agencies with responsibilities for radiological incidents. Technical assistance fora radiological incident may be provided by the facility, by state and federal agencies, orindustry
  5. Assignment of Responsibilities
  6. The EMD will designate one or more Radiological Officers to coordinate all radiologicalprotection program activities.
  7. 2. The Incident Commander will:
  8. Manage emergency response resources and operations at the incident site to controlthe incident.
  9. Determine and implement protective actions for emergency responders and thepublic in the vicinity of the incident site.
  10. Fire Service(s) will:
  11. Provide personnel and equipment to deny entry and cordon off area affected byradiological incidents.
  12. Carry out initial radiological assessment of the situation and determine protectiveactions. State or federal agencies may provide follow-on radiological monitoringassistance.
  13. Large-scale decontamination, if needed, may be coordinated by state or federalagencies.
  14. Assist in evacuation, if necessary.
  15. The Radiological Officer/EMD will:
  16. a. In January of each year, obtain a current listing of local licensed users of radiologicalmaterials from SARA Title III, maintain a copy of that list, and provide copies toemergency response elements for use in operational planning.
  17. b. Schedule and conduct a review of this annex every odd year and coordinate updateof the annex, if needed.
  18. Law Enforcement will:
  19. Restrict access to incident sites and contaminated areas to protect public health andsafety.
  20. Organize and conduct evacuations and provide traffic control as needed, if necessary.
  21. Assist in warning the public, if necessary.
  22. If the release of radiation appears deliberate, control the scene, apprehend suspects,conduct an investigation, and if, the incident appears to be terrorism-related, ensureDPS and the FBI are advised.
  23. EMS will:
  24. Provide medical care and transportation for injured persons.
  25. Alert hospitals of the potential for contaminated victims.
  26. Hospital(s) will:
  27. Provide medical care for casualties as needed.
  28. Be prepared to decontaminate patients.
  29. Other departments & agencies as appropriate will:
  30. Provide personnel, equipment, and supplies requested to support emergencyoperations.
  31. Provide technical assistance to the Incident Commander and the EOC upon request.
  32. In accordance with established procedures, provide personnel to staff the IncidentCommand Post or EOC.

Source:Baca County, (CO), Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan – ANNEX D

  1. Direction and Control
  2. DHS coordinates the overall Federal Government response to radiological Incidents of National Significance in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 and the NRP. In the NRP Base Plan, Figure 4, Structure for NRP Coordination: Terrorist Incident, illustrates the organizational framework that DHS utilizes to respond to terrorist incidents. In the NRP Base Plan, Figure 5, Structure for NRP Coordination: Federal-to-Federal Support, illustrates the organizational framework that DHS utilizes to respond to non-terrorist Incidents of National Significance.
  3. DHS, as the overall incident manager for Incidents of National Significance, is supported by coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies. Coordinating agencies have specific nuclear/radiological technical expertise and assets for responding to the unique characteristics of these types of incidents. Coordinating agencies facilitate the nuclear/ radiological aspects of the response in support of DHS. For any given incident, the coordinating agency is the Federal agency that owns, has custody of, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise designated responsibility for the nuclear/ radioactive material, facility, or activity involved in the incident. The coordinating agency is represented in the Joint Field Office (JFO) Coordination Group, the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). The coordinating agency is also represented in other response centers and entities, as appropriate for the specific incident.
  4. Coordinating agencies are also responsible for leading the Federal response to nuclear/ radiological incidents of lesser severity (those incidents that do not reach the level of an Incident of National Significance).
  5. Coordinating agencies may use the structure of the NRP to carry out their response duties, or any other structure consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) capable of providing the required support to the affected State, local, or tribal government.
  6. Cooperating agencies include other Federal agencies that provide technical and resource support to DHS and the coordinating agencies. These agencies are represented in the IIMG, the HSOC, and other response centers and entities, as appropriate for the specific incident. They may or may not be represented in the JFO Coordination Group.
  7. DHS/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/EPR/FEMA) is responsible for maintaining and updating this annex. DHS/EPR/FEMA accomplishes this responsibility through the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC).
  8. The Attorney General, generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats and for coordinating activities of other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, investigate, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States, including incidents involving nuclear/radioactive materials, in accordance with the following:
  9. The Atomic Energy Act directs the FBI to investigate all alleged or suspected criminal violations of the act. Additionally, the FBI legally is responsible for locating any illegally diverted nuclear weapon, device, or material and for restoring nuclear facilities to their rightful custodians. In view of its unique responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act (amended by the Energy Reorganization Act), the FBI has concluded formal agreements with the coordinating agencies that provide for interface, coordination, and technical support for the FBI’s law enforcement and criminal investigative efforts.
  10. Generally, for nuclear facilities and materials in transit, the designated coordinating agency and cooperating agencies perform the functions delineated in this annex and provide technical support and assistance to the FBI in the performance of its law enforcement and criminal investigative mission. Those agencies supporting the FBI additionally coordinate and manage the technical portion of the response and activate/request assistance under this annex for measures to protect the public health and safety. In all cases, the FBI manages and directs the law enforcement and intelligence aspects of the response, while coordinating its activities with appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal governments within the framework of this annex, and/or as provided for in established interagency agreements or plans. Further details regarding the FBI response are outlined in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Source: the National Response Framework, January,2008 , reference back to the National Response Plan, 2004