The skeptical view suggests that attitudes towards democracy are relatively shallow, superficial and malleable.
For example, minimalist notions of democracy as a regime type often draw upon Schumpeterian conceptions, where democracy is seen to exist in the competitive struggle for the people’s vote.[i] In this view, therefore, public support for democracy can be measured by approval of a political system where two or more parties or candidates contest executive office through popular elections. Minimalist concepts of democracy focus attention upon the rules governing party competition for government office. By contrast, maximalist or ‘thicker’ approaches to the idea of democracy as a regime type have been strongly influenced by Robert Dahl’s body of work published in Politics, Economics, and Welfare (1953), in A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956), and in Polyarchy (1971).[ii] Dahl argued that liberal democracies are characterized by two main attributes – contestation and participation. In practice, Dahl suggested that democratic regimes or ‘polyarchies’ can be identified by the presence of certain key political institutions: 1) elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and 7) associational autonomy.[iii] Public approval of democracy, in this conception, would need to go beyond support for multiparty elections to also reflect adherence to these other procedures as well. Other ideas of deliberative democracy emphasize the communicative aspects of democratic processes, which are thought to lead towards more informed public opinion.
The widespread appeal of the idea of democracy is expected to be especially important where popular uprisings challenge autocratic regimes, as well as in legitimizing democratically-elected governments as part of the consolidation process.
The association of democracy promotion under the Bush administration with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may also have depressed support for this type of regime, especially in the Middle East and in Muslim-majority states.
Other work has exploring adherence to democratic processes and values, such as approval of the principles of freedom of expression, social equality, civic participation, and social tolerance, and support for specific procedures such as the use of free and fair elections, the independence of the judiciary, or the accountability of the executive.[iv]
In the light of the debates in the literature, we need to reexamine the cross-national evidence for democratic aspirations, understood throughout this study as expressions of support for the principles, normative ideals, and values underpinning democratic regimes. This concept can be measured through surveys by gauging agreement with the idea of democracy, including citizen’s approval of democracy as the 'best form of government' and as 'a good way of governing' for their own country, as well as by monitoring the value and importance of democracy, and also comparing preferences for democratic governance over types of regimes. Cross-national surveys have accumulated considerable evidence concerning mass support for democratic principles in a wide range of nations, as well as among the mass public living under different types of regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America.[v] The previous literature which has examined public opinion concludes that, at least by the mid-1990s or early 2000, support for democratic ideals had become widespread around the world. Even in countries with little or no experience of this form of government, such as Azerbaijan, Iran and Vietnam, the majority of the public say that they support democracy as the best form of government.
Global comparisons
Cross-national evidence for longitudinal trends over several decades is lacking outside of established democracies, although A global comparison of public opinion by Klingemann, based on analyzing data in the early to mid-1990s from the World Values Survey, demonstrated substantial cross-national variations, and relatively low evaluations of the performance of representative institutions, in many third-wave democracies. Confidence in government was especially low in many post-Communist European states and in parts of Latin America.[vi]More recent studies based on a broader comparison across global regions have commonly echoed Klingemann’s conclusions.[vii] For example, Catterberg and Moreno compared trends in confidence towards parliaments and the civil service in three dozen nations where comparisons were available over at least two points of time from 1981 to 2001, using the World Values Survey. The study concluded that confidence in these institutions declined in most of the established and third wave democracies under comparison, with some of the sharpest falls registered in Latin America and post-Communist Europe.[viii] Nevertheless the exact timing of these shifts is often country-specific and many indicators display considerable volatility over time, like a jagged fall, rather than steady secular erosion.
At the same time, however, building on Easton’s original insights, Critical Citizens emphasized that the concept of systems support was not all of one piece, so that considerable care is needed in disentangling the most appropriate components and measures.[ix] In contrast to the survey data showing rising skepticism about democratic institutions, little systematic evidence suggested a long-term ‘crisis’ in support for democratic principles over these decades, indeed rather the reverse; at the end of the twentieth century, these values commanded almost universal acceptance as an ideal; as Klingemann concluded, “I can find no evidence of growing dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of government.”[x] Nor was this pattern confined to Western societies; according to the burgeoning range of cross-national surveys, widespread public support for democratic ideals was apparent in many parts of the world, even in many states governed by autocratic regimes.[xi] The consensus which has emerged in the previous research literature, on the basis of survey evidence until the late-1990s, suggests that
Despite these general patterns, it remains to be determined why systems support, including overt lip service to democratic values and approval of the democratic performance of their state, should be exceptionally high in Viet Nam and China, one-party Communist states. This puzzle requires further investigation in subsequent chapters and several alternative interpretations remain possible. Propaganda theories suggest that public opinion polls cannot be relied upon when conducted in states which sharply curtail freedom of speech over political issues and which stifle public expressions of dissent.[xii] The cumulative result of years, or even decades, of tight media control in restrictive and isolated societies such as Burma and North Korea is usually assumed to have a powerful impact on citizens, especially the effect of state control on political views.[xiii] Autocracies with restrictive media environments aim to suppress critics and to provide positive messages about the regime, rallying support for the authorities, as well as manipulating more diffuse feelings of patriotism and spreading ideological values favorable to the regime. State-run propaganda and official censorship may also mobilize public support for the government. If state control succeeds in its objectives, then regular exposure to the news media in this environment would be expected to generate confidence in the government and state institutions and to reinforce a strong sense of nationalism. In a repressive climate, when responding to social surveys, people in Viet Nam and China may be unwilling to express negativeattitudes towards the current regime. Yet this view is not given prime fascia support by the high level of approval of democracy recorded in these nations. Alternatively, instrumental or performance-based interpretations suggest that public opinion polls capture a genuine snap-shot of public opinion, with positive attitudes towards government in Viet Nam and China reflecting the rapid growth rates, successful economic expansion, and marked improvements in living standards experienced by millions of people living in these states in recent years, as well as the pro-state ideological legacy of communism. [xiv] What do the Chinese and Vietnamese understand when they give high marks to democracy in their own country? Is this an issue of how the term ‘democracy’ is conceptualized in Confucian cultures, if understood as representing ‘government for the people’ rather than ‘government by the people’, as Shi suggests?[xv] Can this be attributed to problems of trying to gauge political attitudes through using opinion polls in autocratic states which suppress freedom of speech and overt criticism of the governing party? Or is this the product of limited information, effective state propaganda, and official censorship, all of which may encourage citizens to believe (falsely) that they already live in a democratic state
[i] Joseph A. Schumpeter. 1950. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. 3rd ed. New York: Harper & Row.
[ii] Robert A. Dahl. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press; Robert A. Dahl. 1971. Polyarchy. New Haven, CT:YaleUniv. Press; Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom. 1953. Politics, Economics, and Welfare. New York: Harper Collins; Robert A. Dahl. 1989. Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: YaleUniversity Press. p. 221; Robert A. Dahl. 2005. What political institutions does large-scale democracy require?’Political Science Quarterly 120(2): 187-197.
[iii] Robert Dahl. 1989. Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: YaleUniversity Press. p. 221
[iv] Herbert McClosky and John Zaller. 1994. The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Towards Capitalism and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Jacques Thomassen. 1995. ‘Support for democratic values.’ In Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Eds. Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[v] Michael Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Roderic Camp. ed. 2001.Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin AmericaPittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Russell J. Daltonand Doh Chull Shin, eds.,2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific RimOxford: Oxford University Press.
[vi] Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.
[vii] See, for example, Neil Nevitte and M. Kanji. 2002. ‘Authority orientations and citizen support: A cross-national analysis of satisfaction with governments and democracy.’ Comparative Sociology 3-4: 387-412; Mattei Dogan. Ed. 2005. Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians. The Netherlands: Brill; Colin Hay. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
[viii]Gabriela Catterbergand Alejandro Moreno. 2006. ‘The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new and established democracies.’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18(1): 31-48.
[ix]David Easton. 1965. A framework for political analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; David Easton. 1975. ‘Reassessment of the concept of political support.’ British Journal of Political Science5(OCT): 435-457.
[x]Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.
[xi]
[xii] Norris and Inglehart..
[xiii]Brett Gary. 1999. The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press.
[xiv]Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes. 2001. ‘Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental.’ British Journal of Political Science 31(3): 447-474.
[xv]Tian Jian Shi. 2009. ‘Talking past each other? Different understandings of democracy and their consequences.’ IPSA 21st World Congress, Santiago.