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Choosing Peace: Jimmy Carter and the Iran Hostage Crisis
From 1939 to 1975, a period of time spanning seven United States presidencies, there were only 11 years during which the United States was not involved in a major military conflict. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, the Vietnam War had just ended two years prior. And two years later, on November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took approximately seventy Americans captive. This terrorist act triggered the most profound crisis of the Carter presidency and began a personal ordeal for Jimmy Carter and the American people that lasted 444 days. Over the next forty minutes-or-so, we will look at the origins and resolution of the Iran hostage crises, and attempt to understand why President Carter, a military man who knew the importance of a strong defense, chose not to wage a war against Iran.
Like other presidents before him, Jimmy Carter search for the delicate balance between a strong military and an eagerness to work for peace. “As long as I am in the White House,” he was once quoted as saying, “I will keep a strong defense. We build weapons for peace to let the world know our nation is strong.” While that sounds like something that all presidents should say, Carter was true to those words: since the Vietnam War, the U. S. defense budget had decreased steadily but he INCREASED it every year of his presidency.
In fact, the American military was in transition during Jimmy Carter’s presidency – moving toward new weapons and tactics. A nuclear engineer by trade, Carter served under Admiral Hyman Rickover, the father of America’s nuclear submarine program, who placed Carter in command of one our country’s first two nuclear submarines, the USS K-1. As a result, Carter was knowledgeable about modern weaponry and intensely interested in the nation’s defense. He canceled expensive weapons systems like the B-1 Bomber and continued development of more practical and advanced weapons, including stealth fighters and other bombers. They were closely guarded secrets during his administration that are now indispensable tools of today’s armed forces. With that said… why did President Carter not respond more forcefully or effectively with regard to the Iran Hostage Crisis? Let’s take a look at that . . .
The origins of the Iran Hostage Crisis began more than 25 years before President Carter took office, in 1953, when the U. S. helped force out a democratically elected leader in Iran and replaced him with Shah Reza Pahlavi. The Shah was a loyal ally in the Middle East but led a brutal regime. Fleeing revolution, he left Iran in January, 1979. Gravely ill by the fall, the Shah was admitted to the U. S. for medical treatment. Only a few days later, on November 4, 1979, Iranian militants overran the U. S. Embassy in Tehran.
“For nearly a year the crisis handcuffed the administration, which tried everything it could think of to end the standoff: suspending oil imports, freezing Iranian assets, expelling Iranian diplomats, imposing economic sanctions, even conducting clandestine negotiations.” (Brinkley, 10). Unfortunately for the hostages, their families, the United States, and for President Carter, the hostages were not released until 444 days later, on the day that Ronald Reagan was inaugurated the 40th president of the United States. That’s the short version of the origins of the crisis. Here is the longer version . . .
On November 15, 1977, the Shah and Shahbanou of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Empress Farah, visited the White House. Before that evening’s state dinner, they presented President and Mrs. Carter with a beautiful tapestry: the Gilbert Stuart likeness of George Washington, which appears on the front of the U. S. dollar bill. In fact, that gift is still on display to this very day in the newly renovated Jimmy Carter Presidential Library& Museum, in Atlanta, GA. Although it was a first for the Carters, the Shah had had a long, somewhat sordid relationship with the U. S. that predated the Carter administration by many, many years.
Speaking of the Shah’s relationship to the U. S. Carter said “I continued, as other Presidents had before me, to consider the Shah a strong ally. I appreciated his ability to maintain good relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and his willingness to provide Israel with oil in spite of the Arab boycott. At the time of his visit to Washington in November 1977, I was especially eager to secure his influence in support of Sadat’s dramatic visit to Jerusalem, which had just been announced.” (Carter, 435)
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, began his reign in 1941, succeeding his father, Reza Khan, to the throne. In a 1953 power struggle with his prime minister, the Shah gained American support to prevent nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. In return for assuring the U. S. a steady supply of oil, the Shah received economic and military aid from the eight American presidents who held the office before Carter. This pre-existing relationship is one of the reasons that Carter would later feel obliged to accommodate the Shah when he fled Iran and sought cancer treatment here in the U. S.
Early in the 1960s, the Shah announced social and economic reforms but refused to grant broad political freedom. Iranian nationalists condemned his U. S. supported regime and his “westernizing” of Iran. During rioting in 1963, the Shah cracked down, suppressing his opposition via his brutal police force, known as SAVAK. Among those arrested and exiled was a popular religious nationalist and bitter foe of the U. S., the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Between 1963 and 1979, the Shah spent billions of oil dollars on military weapons. The real price of military strength was his loss of popular support. On September 7, 1978, the Shah declared martial law throughout Iran, following which there was a bloody confrontation between police and protesting Muslims. Several hundred people were killed. From that point forward, the strength of the demonstrator’s grew as they demanded the Shah’s abdication. (Carter, 438)
Even after the Shah’s bloody crackdown Carter said, “Still, there was no question in my mind that the deserved our unequivocal support. Not only had the Shah been a staunch and dependable ally to the United States for many years, but he remained the leader around whom we hoped to see a stable and reformed government organized and maintained in Iran.” (Carter, 440)
On January 16, 1979, the Shah fled Iran in exile, and on February 1, 1979, the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran from Paris and whipped upped popular discontent into rabid Anti-Americanism.
On October 20, 1979, sixteen days BEFORE the U. S. Embassy in Iran would be overrun, the Carter administration made the decision to admit the Shah to the U. S. for medical treatment. “Zbig felt that it was better for us if the Shah would come to the United States, so that we could demonstrate to the world our continuing support for an old ally.” (Carter, 448) The Shah arrived in New York two days later and was admitted to New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, to be treated for cancer and gallstones. (Brinkley, 10)
According to Carter, “Cy reported to me on October 22: ‘The Iranian Government reacted with moderation when informed by us that the Shah will visit the United States for medical reasons. We have told them that neither the Shah nor the Shahbanou [Empress Farah]… will engage in political activity.” (Carter, 456)
On October 31, 1979, Carter receives a memo from David Aaron, his Deputy National Security Advisor. Written just 5 days before the embassy is overrun, the memo reflected concern for an upcoming religious holiday/political demonstration in Iran to protest U. S. policy and the Shah’s presence in New York City. While noting that a rally and march were supposed to end at some distance from the embassy, Aaron also wrote “but the chances of demonstrations or an attack there are considerable.”
Aaron noted too that contingency plans were in place for this, and that “The security of the building has been greatly reinforced since February and is nearly impregnable short of a heavy weapons attack. The Iranian police have promised to provide security for the compound.” All of this came to a head on November 4.
On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Iran was overrun by 3,000 militants. They took 66 Americans captive (3 of them 66 from the Iranian Foreign Ministry). Six more Americans escaped. Of the 66 taken hostage, 13 were released on Nov. 19th and 20th; one was released on July 11, 1980, and the remaining 52 were released on Jan 20, 1981. The hostages ranged in age from 21 to 65 years old, came from 26 states, and varied in occupation from Marine guards, to a Private businessman, to an embassy cultural officer.
“Sunday, November 4, 1979, is a date I will never forget,” Carter would later write in his memoir, Keeping Faith, “Early in the morning I received a call from Brezinski, who reported that our embassy in Tehran had been overrun by about 3,000 militants, and that 50 or 60 of our American staff had been captured… We were deeply disturbed but reasonably confident that the Iranians would soon remove the attackers from the embassy compound and release our people” (Carter, 457)
At this early stage in the siege Carter says “It is not at all clear what the militants wanted… As kidnappers, they seemed to have no clear ideas about ransom, except to repeat the cry we had been hearing over since January 16 of the previous year – return the Shah and his money to Iran.” (Carter, 458)
On November 5, day two of the crisis, Carter received a letter from Kenneth Bleakely, President of the American Foreign Service Association. Blaeakely wrote Carter noting that the AFSA “wished to emphasize that the protection of the lives and safety of the individual Americans involved must remain the paramount concern of the United States Government.” Carter’s approach to the crisis suggests that he either adopted, or already wholeheartedly agreed with the AFSA about the primacy of hostage safety from the very beginning of the crisis.
While many people agreed with the sentiment that the lives of the hostages should be put first, according to at least one historian, “Carter had made a fatal error to state at the outset that his primary concern was bringing the hostages home alive. The Iranians used this to blackmail the Carter Administration.” (Brinkley, 10)
On day three of the crisis, Carter makes a diplomatic attempt at ending the crisis via a personal letter written to Khomeini. Delivered by Ramsey Clark and William G. Miller, the letter asks that the Ayatollah “release unharmed all Americans presently detained in Iran and those held with them…” Carter states “I ask you to recognize the compelling humanitarian reasons, firmly based in international law, for doing so.” It is worth noting that Carter also assembled a team and commenced plans for a possible rescue mission on this day. (Carter, 459)
On November 8, Carter’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bob Beckel, drafted a memo to White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, about congressional reaction to U. S. Iranian students’ protests. After having briefed 200 members of the House on the Iranian situation Jordan brought several observations to Beckel’s attention, two of which were that:
1. “There is an extraordinary amount of hostility running through the Congress toward the Iranian students in the United States – from left to right, Democrat to Republican.” Also, “we are encouraged almost unanimously to stop all demonstrations by Iranian students and to use our influence with local governments to refuse permits across the country.”
2. “Tom Harkin on the left and Bob Dornan on the right have joined forces to call for the ouster of the Shah.”
The Carter administration decided against returning the Shah to Iran, but Carter began to take more forceful measures, such as embargoing Iranian oil in November 11, now day eight of the crisis.
By day 11, Carter issued an Executive Order Blocking Iranian Government Property, and blocked delivery of $300 million dollars in military items to Iran.
On November 17, 1979, day 14 of this crisis, Khomeini announced that the Iranians would release 13 women and blacks “who were not spies” because women and minorities already suffered “the oppression of American society.” With that said, two women and one African-American did remain among the 53 hostages left. The Carter administration reaction to this? “Mixed emotions.”
According to PresidentCarter, “We had sent strong warnings that the trial or punishment of any hostage would bring serious consequences, involving military action, so we viewed this release of thirteen of the hostages with mixed emotions.”
As the winter of 1979 turned to the spring of 1980, and negotiations failed to produce a deal, frustrated Americans demanded stronger action. “No one can know how much pressure there was on Jimmy to do something,” Rosalynn Carter recalled. “I would go out and campaign and come back and say, ‘Why don’t you do something?’ And he said, ‘What would you want me to do?’ I said, ‘Mine the harbors.’ He said, ‘Okay, suppose I mine the harbors, and they decide to take one hostage out every day and kill him. What am I going to do then?” As interesting as it is to hear me relay this conversation, you can hear it for yourself if you visit the newly renovated Jimmy Carter Library & Museum, in Atlanta, GA, because Rosalynn’s comments are part of our new introductory film.
On April 7, 1980, day 157 of the crisis, President Carter makes an announcement about Iran, addresses Congress, and issues an executive order. He announces punitive measures against Iran such as breaking diplomatic relations with their government, closing down the Iranian embassy and consulate, issuing sanctions against U. S. imports to Iran, and using the already-frozen Iranian assets being held in U. S. banks to pay out damage claims to the hostages’ family members. Deportation proceedings were started on Iranian students illegally in the U. S. Iran, in response, decided to withdraw billions in U. S. banks. Carter countered by freezing ALL Iranian assets held in U. S. banks.