Käytäntöjen Metodisista Funktioista Humen Filosofiakäsityksessä

Humean Experience

A New Perspective on Humean Experience

1Abstract

In this paper, I put forward a new interpretation of Hume central technical term ”experience”. I argue for the affirmation that Hume uses it at least in three senses: (1) a synonym for his other term ”impression”, (2) referring to the ”perceptions” and their relations of one individual, and (3) to the shared experience of human beings. My interpretation is new since normally Hume scholars do not appreciate sense (3). I have two reasons for my interpretation. The first one is empirical: certain passages by Hume show that he employs sense (3). Secondly, appreciating sense (3) makes Hume’s thinking more coherent in two respects.

(1)If reading (1) or (2) is endorsed, Hume’s philosophy will be subject to the charge of subjectivism. The ground of philosophy or science would be subjective experience of an individual – there would be no objective basis. Reading ”experience” what I call social or intersubjective sense avoids the problem of subjectivism. Intersubjective experience is what people share as human beings living everyday life. They can therefore refer to this common ground when they theorize. Thus, it is possible to reach an agreement on that common experience and to build a philosophy or science on it. Intersubjective experience can offer an objective ground for philosophy. By examining Hume’s view about the proper philosophical method, I argue that Hume really thought this way. The first aspect of the second ground is not purely rational.

Reading ”experience” also in sense (3) explains Hume’s ”careless” attitude to the problem of the external world. Hume thinks that reaching an agreement on intersubjective experience and its regularities is a factual possibility independent of the problem of the external world. The metaphysical possibility that intersubjective experience is an illusion does not undermine the fact that we can agree on that experience – since we share it. It just shows the status of knowledge informed by empirical science grounded on intersubjective experience. This knowledge does not concern essences of things. Therefore Hume uses the problem of the external world to support his denial of knowledge of essences, which he generally argues by his Copy Principle.

2Abstract

(2)If reading (1) or (2) is endorsed, Hume’s philosophy will be subject to the charge of subjectivism. The ground of philosophy or science would be subjective experience of an individual – there would be no objective basis. Reading ”experience” what I call social or intersubjective sense avoids the problem of subjectivism. Intersubjective experience is what people share as human beings living everyday life. They can therefore refer to this common ground when they theorize. Thus, it is possible to reach an agreement on that common experience and to build a philosophy or science on it. Intersubjective experience can offer an objective ground for philosophy. By examining Hume’s view about the proper philosophical method, I argue that Hume really thought this way. The first aspect of the second ground is not purely rational.

3Introduction[*]

Though Hume scholarship has much advanced since the last war and Hume’s whole corpus is coming more and more into focus, there are still improvements to be made. In this paper, my aim is to put forward two of them. First, the paper is, as far as I know, the first independent study of Hume’s central technical term ”experience”. Second, I will argue that the term has been misunderstood by almost all Anglo-American Hume scholars.

The misunderstanding is an over-simplification on two levels. The worst over-simplification is to take “experience” as a synonym for Hume’s other central technical term “impression”, a tendency encouraged by. 20th century philosophical terminology which uses of philosophy explains the worst over-simplification. In that terminology, “experience” as a synonym for Hume’s ”impression” or the later ”sense-datum”. That is why it was a standard to read Hume’s ”experience” in that way.

Hume, however, seldom uses the term in this ‘impression sense’. In the first Enquiry for example, there are only two or three uses of this sense (5.1.3[1], 11.1.25[2] and perhaps 12.1.12[3]). If “experience” is read solely in this impression sense, Hume’s famous argument concerning probable reasoning in EHU 4-5, for example, will become incomprehensible. That is why many Hume scholars has appreciated that normally Hume uses the term in a broader sense. From recent years, I take David Owen and Peter Millican as the examples of this broader reading. According to them, experience consists of the perceptions of one individual and their relations in her senses and memory[4] (Owen 1999, 71 and Millican 2002, 120-122). I call this sense ’subjective experience’. Experience in this sense is experience of one individual.

Though this reading is a step forward, my aim is to show that even Owen’s and Millican’s subjective interpretation is over-simplifying. It misses one of Hume’s uses of “experience” and at the same time the real foundation of Hume’s philosophy and the nature of his empiricist project. Therefore the reading sees a problem there where Hume does not, namely, the problem of the external world. My intention is to argue that when it is understood that experience is Hume’s foundation in an intersubjective sense, Hume’s ”careless” attitude towards the problem of the external world will be seen to be coherent. If experience is people’s common experience and it is possible to reach an agreement on that experience, the problem of the external world will not undermine empiricist philosophy or science based on intersubjective experience.

My thesis is thus that Hume uses “experience” in at least three senses: first, as a synonym for “impression”; second, referring to perceptions and their relations of one individual (subjective); and third, to common or social experience between people (inter-subjective). As far as I know, just two Anglo-American Hume scholars have interpreted Humean experience as intersubjective or social: Duncan Forbes (1975, 106) and Donald W. Livingston (1998, 4-7)[5]. I think the simplifying reading of “experience” derives from overlooking the fact that Hume’s conception of human nature is social, not atomistic or individualistic:

“If all this appear evident, as it certainly must, we may conclude, […] that his [man’s] very first state and situation may justly be esteem’d social.”[6] (T 3.2.2.14)

If Hume’s human nature is seen as individualistic or even biologistic or physicalistic, it will be natural to understand “experience” in the subjectivist sense.

I start by considering Hume’s view about the proper scientific or philosophical method, arguing that it is a Newtonian experimental method of analysis and synthesis based on Hume’s theories of probable reasoning and causality. Then I continue to the foundation of the method, experience. I analyse Hume’s uses of the term and argue that as the foundation, experience is intersubjective. I finish by considering the implications of this interpretation for the problem of the external world.

4Philosophical Decisions

In the second paragraph of Part 3, Section 12 of the first Enquiry, Hume starts to present and argue for his second “species of mitigated [consequent] scepticism”. While the first species is the denial of the existence of absolutely certain beliefs (EHU 12.3.24), the second is “the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.” (Ibid.25) This limitation “may be of advantage to mankind”, but normally the advantage is not taken up. For “[t]he imagination of man” does not keep inside the proper scope of human understanding. On the contrary, it avoids “the objects, which custom has rendered too familiar to it.” (Ibid.) But, says Hume:

“A correct Judgment observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience;” (EHU 12.3.25)

In this passage, Hume affirms that “common life” forms the scope of human understanding. What is “common life”? It is that part of everyday life that is common to human beings[7]. So Hume appears to be endorsing the following two principles: (1) Philosophy should somehow limit itself within that common part of everyday life, to “such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience”; (2) Legitimate philosophical subjects are those which can be informed by everyday practice and experience.

So far this is quite obscure. What exactly does Hume mean? The rest of the paragraph does not help much either. After stating his norm, Hume writes that “the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt” is the best way to “bring us to so salutary a determination”. However, we must not stop at the Pyrrhonian doubt. We ought to continue to the second species of mitigated scepticism and Hume goes on to tell us why we should do that:

“Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect that […] philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected.” (EHU 12.3.25)

In this phase, four points can be made about this equally obscure passage. First, the limitation of philosophy to “common life” gives a reason for philosophers to reject Pyrrhonism and accept mitigated scepticism. Second, philosophical conclusions ought to be based on reflections of that “common life”. Third, philosophical reflections differ from those of common life in that they should be “methodized and corrected.” They follow a certain method which involves “correcting” the reflections of common life. Lastly, the passage should be taken as Hume’s mature statement of his correct method of philosophy or science. For it is from the last pages of Hume’s mature work on the subject.

From the two quoted passages, we can thus reconstruct five norms which Hume endorses:

(1)philosophy ought to confine itself within the common part of the everyday life of human beings

(2)legitimate philosophical subjects are those that can be informed by everyday practice and experience

(3)based on the common part of life, and everyday practice and experience, philosophers ought to reason in much the same way as ordinary human beings but disciplined by a certain method

(4)philosophers ought to correct the conclusions drawn by human beings in their everyday lives

(5)based on these four norms, philosophers ought to reject Pyrrhonism and accept mitigated scepticism.

5The Method of Analysis and Synthesis

Let us first focus on norm (3). What is the method philosophers ought to follow? Philo’s words from the first Part of the Dialogues give us a hint:

“He considers besides, that every one, even in common life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy [either on natural or moral subjects]; that from our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endowed with, we always render our principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind.” (DNR I, 36)

The passage is analogous to the last one quoted above from the first Enquiry. There is therefore a good reason to interpret the Enquiry passage from its perspective. Philo says here that in everyday life, human beings aim at more and more “general principles of […] reasoning”. The more general principles of reasoning are achieved “the stronger reason we are endowed with”. The strength of reason, for one, depends on the breadth of “experience”. When larger experience is acquired, it is possible to achieve, through stronger reason, more general principles of reasoning.

My view is that Philo refers here, as does the Enquiry, to Hume’s version of the Newtonian method of analysis (resolution) and synthesis (composition). They affirm that it is the methodized version of everyday reasonings. In Hume’s system, this means that the method is based on his theories of probable reasoning and causality, to which we must now turn[8].

5.1Causality and Probable Reasoning

I call my interpretation of Hume’s theory of causality ‘phenomenal level regularity theory’. By ‘phenomenal level’ I do not refer to 20th century phenomenalism but to the level of Humean perceptions. I believe that on the level of perceptions, Hume endorses a kind of regularity theory of causation. Hume thinks his analysis is valid on this level, but it does not follow that it is equally valid on the real level as well. Thus, my interpretation must not be taken as the standard interpretation that Hume endorses a regularity theory of causation. That theory makes reference to the real level which mine does not[9].

In my interpretation, perception an+1 will be the Humean cause of perception bn+1, iff three conditions are fulfilled. First, perception an+1 is prior to perception bn+1. Second, mind[10] feels determination to associate perception an+1 with perception bn+1. Third (and here I make use of the modern type/token distinction):

There is experience that the perceptions of type a have always (n times) been conjoined with the perceptions of type b.

In other words, there is uniform experience of constant conjunction between the perceptions of type a and the perceptions of type b. In Hume’s terminology, particular instances of conjunction between tokens ax and bx are “experiments” or “observations” (EHU 7.2.27). Diagrammatically, the third condition is therefore as follows:

experiment1 / a1 / conjunction: temporal succession, no connection / b1
resemblance / resemblance
experiment2 / a2 / conjunction / b2
resemblance / resemblance
.
.
. / .
.
. / .
.
.
resemblance / resemblance
experimentn / an / conjunction / bn

When these three conditions are fulfilled, we start to use the words “cause”, “effect”, “causal relation” and “causality”[11] with respect to tokens ax and bx.

The second condition refers to Hume’s theory of “probable”[12], “moral reasoning”[13], “reasoning concerning existence[14]/(matter[15](s[16])) of fact[17]” or “reasoning concerning matter of fact or[18]/and (real) existence[19])”, and builds on experience in the sense explicated above. After having that experience, mind draws two inferences. We infer first that there is universally a causal relation between tokens ax and bx, that is, we infer a universal conclusion from experience concerning particular instances. I call this probable reasoning ‘universal’, and it is in fact an instance of what is often called Hume’s Uniformity Principle: “similar causes will, in the future, have similar effects to those that they have had in the past.” (Millican 2002, 128) This universal probable reasoning, and thus in general the Uniformity Principle, are in turn the ground of what I call ‘particular probable reasoning’, which involves inferring by a cause and effect association from the perception of token ax to the perception of token bx or vice versa. When we have experience of the form described, mind infers the perception of token bx from the perception of token ax or vice versa. Since particular probable reasoning operates by means of universal reasoning and the Uniformity Principle, its validity depends on them.

5.2Explication of the Method

Though both types of probable reasoning can be made reflexively, and that is necessary for human subsistence in Hume’s view, it is also possible to make them reflectively. This is manifest in Hume’s reflections about the proper philosophical or scientific method, i.e. in the method of analysis and synthesis. In general, the analysis phase proceeds from a set of particular effects to general causes or principles and the synthesis phase from these general causes to another set of particular effects. However, to fill in the detail, let us reconstruct Hume’s method from the systematic analysis of his theories of causality and probable reasoning.

Let us suppose that there is experience of conjunctions between perceptions x1-xn regularly followed by perceptions of type b. These perceptions form the particular set for the starting point of the analysis. The task is to find the qualities in which perceptions x1-xn resemble. In other words, the aim is to analyse a1-an from x1-xn. When they are found, the experience and particular experiments may be reduced to the general affirmation that in this experience ‘a  b’. After that, if the experience is large enough, it will be justified, because of the Uniformity Principle, to infer that universally ‘a  b’. In that case, a universal causal principle is achieved. The aim is to reduce universal causal principles into as few as possible (parsimony or Ockham’s razor). This happens by finding resembling qualities between different types and thus reducing them to types that are more general. When as few universal causal principles as the subject matter allows are found, the analysis phase is over and the synthesis may start. In this synthesis, the universal causal principles are used to explain other particular causal relations. For example, when we have Newton’s law of gravity, it is possible to use it to explain tides.

In this light, Philo’s words and norm (3) mean that in everyday life, we make universal probable reasonings and particular ones based on them. Philosophers make use of the same reasonings but develop them into the method of analysis and synthesis, and use this method carefully. Since philosophers have a method, they are able to correct mistakes made in everyday reasonings as norm (4) demands. However, what is important for my purposes here is the experience that both operate on. Next I will therefore examine what this Humean experience and its objects are, and in doing so will unfold norms (1) and (2).

6Intersubjective Experience

There are two levels in Hume’s analysis of “experience”, the first of which is the subjective level of perceptions. Above I have presented a systematic interpretation of the analysis on that level. Humean experience consists of perceptions and their relations. Conjoined perceptions, experiments, and constantly conjoined resembling perceptions are the most important parts of that experience. I think it is uncontroversial that Hume uses experience in this subjective sense as the collection of subject’s perceptions and their relations[20]. From that point of view, it is tempting to conclude that Hume’s project and subject are Cartesian. My own view is, however, that this is not the case. Perceptions are just the terms of analysis in Hume’s science of human nature and therefore Humean experience may be analysed in those terms. The analysis on this level has advantages as I will argue, but the analysis on the other level is more important for Hume’s purposes. The explication of that level reveals that Hume’s subject is not Cartesian, but is by contrast common-sensical.