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"Quality vs. Quantity of Weapons"

posted by picard578 on June 18, 2013 / defenseissues.net

Introduction

In modern materialistic society where the value of everything (including human life) is considered in monetary terms, many people see more complex and more expensive weapons as being automatically more capable than cheaper weapons, thus justifying the costs. Defense spending proponents argue that “nothing is too good for troops”, thus justifying procurement of ultra-expensive weapons.

But in reality, more expensive is not automatically better if there is no discipline to specify what is important and stick to it. Mounting requirements will start requiring very heavy trade-offs, thus compromising specifications in primary mission.

For example, the battle rifle has to have a powerful round capable of reaching long ranges which also means lot of recoil. This means that bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles are best for that role. The assault rifle’s primary requirement is to put lots of rounds down the range quickly enabling suppressive fire, which does not allow for powerful rounds. As infantry combat has ever since World War I usually happened at ranges of 100 meters and below, it can be seen that the assault rifle and not the battle rifle is best suited for the standard infantry weapon with bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles being relegated to special roles. Yet for the person who does not understand reality of infantry combat, bolt-action rifles with their very long range may seem superior to assault rifles.

Thus the only way to see what works and what not is to study combat data over a long period and understand what makes an effective weapon. That is what I am going to do here.

Lanchester laws

While in ancient combat where lines of soldiers fought, each unit of an army that was outnumbered by factor of 2 had to be twice as effective as each unit of outnumbering army in order for it to break even (or as more commonly said, force a stalemate). But that does not hold true in modern combat today.

Modern combat is a ranged affair. Individual units are highly mobile and do not fight in relatively static formations. The result is that combat between units becomes several-on-one affairs unlike the phalanx’ one-on-one affair. Which automatically means that equation is different. No longer does an army outnumbered by 2-to-1 have to have 2 times as effective units but rather 4 times as effective. It is not always applicable as ground combat (particularly infantry combat) still faces force-size-to-area constraints so the exponent is often adjusted to 1.5.

But while it would appear to give large advantage to quantity, there are times where a numerically inferior force won over a numerically superior one. These victories, however, could only very rarely to never be attributed to the quality of weapons alone.

Quality versus Quantity – a false dilemma

This lack of understanding among general populace and even many military personnel has led to a definition of effectiveness as “how loaded with high technology this weapon is”. Hugely costly weapons are being justified under “troops deserve the best” and “we can’t win the war with inferior weapons”.

But while at first look it would seem a reasonable assumption, the reality is often that when combined with above-mentioned lack of understanding of combat, it results in costlier weapons that are less effective than cheaper ones both individually and as a system.

Still, in some cases the more effective weapon is also more costly and expensive. Such is case with air-to-ground precision-guided munitions when compared to dumb munitions dropped from same altitude.

Quality vs Quantity through history

Antiquity

A lot has been said about decline of the Roman Army in 3rdand 4thcentury A.D. Impressive lorica segmentata (segmented armor)-- which according to some accounts was capable of stopping ballista arrows -- got replaced by chain and scale armors which could not even stop ordinary arrows. Scutum changed shape from a square curved shield to a round flat shield more reminiscent of Middle Ages. And the Imperial Gallic helmet was also replaced by types more similar to Middle Age helmets in way of production if not look. But what were causes of that change? And what effect did it have on Roman military capability?

Causes were primarily strategic and economical in nature. Mounting barbarian pressure on borders increased the number of troops required at the same time that the economy suffered. Barbarians themselves, having often served in the Roman military in past centuries, took home knowledge of Roman tactics. They were also better equipped than before.

All of this put strain on imperial logistics. Thus replacement of lorica segmentata which according to one documentary had “more knots to tie than an evening dress” with hamata (chain armor or maille) and squamata (scale armor). Segmentata could seem to be easier to make and maintain at first impression by having far less parts than other two. But that is wrong.

First, it had relatively small number of large thick plates which required skilled workforce to produce. Bronze connections were no easier to make and they caused problems with maintenance of armor. Hamata and squamata, while being made of far larger number of parts, were far easier to mass-produce with less educated workforce, being fairly simple in design. Hamata was also self-maintaining as rust is rubbed off the armor just by wearing it.

A flat round shield was also easier to make than square curved one. But it was even more indicative of changes in tactics. No longer able to afford huge losses, the Roman army used what was basically a phalanx formation with front ranks stopping the enemy and rear ranks showering enemy with missiles. This was combined by outflanking maneuver by cavalry (a tactic used by Macedonean phalanx).

Still, well-trained and disciplined Roman armies often won against larger numbers of barbarians despite latter often having equipment that was quality-wise (if not comparable) then at least close to what Romans had. The end result is clearly in favor of personnel and command quality combined with personnel and material quantity.

But in the end despite the Roman military itself remaining capable, huge military expenditures did their work and support structure collapsed without Romans being any wiser initially. But they only thought about it as a temporary setback. The cause of that was that as their society, military, and supporting structures became more complex in response to various crises, the costs of maintaining them started exceeding benefits. At that point, the Empire started draining more resources than producing them. And when reserves were drained, the entire system collapsed.

The same effect of forced simplification of system will later repeat itself in the Eastern Empire in 7thand 8th centuries ADalthough with less politically catastrophic results. The complex system basically ate itself. It was less effective in adapting to problems while requiring more resources, simply because complexity itself caused friction which caused additional resource depletion because of greater amount of resources required to maintain it. (Good article here.)

As it can be seen, after a certain point increased complexity resulted in performance actually decreasing. The effect was magnified by number of health and climate problems (lead poisoning, droughts, and similar) that hit at about the same time. A simpler society may have been able to adapt. But the high complexity of late Roman society rendered it inert. The situation is same for any system be it social or technological. The more complex weapon may be more effective up to a point. But soon, resources required to keep it in operation will start to increase faster than effectiveness which can justify expenses as the system enters area of diminished returns. And sometime after that, increased complexity will cause it to enter area of negative returns where increased complexity causes performance to fall. This effect can be clearly observed with modern aircraft (but more on that later).

The Roman Republic suffered losses during the Punic wars that were militarily far worse than any sustained by the Roman Empire, suffering 3 major military defeats in short order and loosing around 130.000 troops in total. However, being able to raise large numbers of conscript – but still well-trained – troops as opposed to better-equipped and at least as well trained, but very expensive professional troops of the Empire meant that Republic was still able to withstand these losses and win while fighting two-front war against Hannibal in Italy and his brother Hazdrubal in Spain.

For comparison, the Battle of Mursa, in which 54.000 soldiers were killed had devastating consequences for the Late Roman Empire. It is important to note about the Republic military that all citizens eligible for military service had to participate in military exercises and maneuvers at set times. These were carried out at “Mars’s field”, named after Roman god of war (Mars, originally god of spring, later to become god of war under Greek influence). During the later part of his operations in Italy, Hannibal was basically confined to southern part of the pennisula, unable to attack Sicily and forced to constantly move because foraging parties weren’t allowed to go far away from main body, else they risk being destroyed by Roman patrols.

If we go further back, the ancient Spartan military was full-blown “quality over quantity” example since there never were many Spartiates available. Spartan forces were most respected and feared in Greece. But they never went on long campaigns outside Pelopones and the relied a lot on allies as they were needed to keep helots in check. When Thebe defeated Spartan army, Sparta was unable to replace losses, especially after Pelopida freed helots. The result was the permanent loss of Spartan power.

Earlier still, Greek phalanx consisting of hoplites brought an end to an era of individual duels fought by well-equipped aristocrats, thus causing early forms of democracy to be formed. Both a greater number of fighters and their mutual support meant that “heroic” type of individual combat disappeared.

Homeric phalanx itself was an imitation of an Assyric formation. Expensive Mykenaian bronze armor was replaced by “inferior” but cheaper hoplite armor which by the time of Greco-Persian wars came to be made from leather (which was cheaper than bronze). This allowed larger number of well-equipped and well-trained fighters to be fielded.

The Macedonian phalanx itself, often seen as ultimate evolution of Greek phalanx, was a very capable formation. But it was not long spears (sarissa) which made it so capable but rather the combined-arms approach which combined heavy and light infantry, archers, and cavalry. Soldiers were also well-drilled, being able to deploy and redeploy quickly. Armor used by Macedonean phalanx was stiff linen-textile armor with bronze and iron plate armor being used in small quantities. Nevertheless, cheap linothorax proved to provide acceptable protection.

Numbers weren’t always helpful, though. In the Battle of Marathon, the more numerous Persian army was annihilated by tactical genius of Miltiades. It did not help that Persians were primarly relying on missile troops which have not proven effective in face of well-equipped and well-drilled Athenian army. While the Persians won the later Battle of Thermopylae, their fleet was defeated in Battle of Salamis which meant that they were unable to supply their forces. Effectively, Greeks forced them to fight the battle against the earth, one that the Persians could not win. As a result, the Persians had to pull most of their forces back to Persia leaving behind a (relatively) minor force that was defeated in Battle of Plaetea. In fact, much of the Persian force died of starvation and disease, never returning to Asia.

It must be noted that in all three battles, the Greeks managed to counter maneuver advantage given to Persians by their cavalry through clever use of terrain. In the Battle of Plaetea, the Persians had believed that Greeks were running away and thus attacked from a disadvantageous position. Also during Battle of Thermopylae, the Greeks did not carry armor (though they did not fight almost-naked as 300 would have it; they did carry garment), instead relying on large shields, training, and a wall built previously by Phocians to carry the day and keep Persians at bay until they had no choice to retreat. It would have happened had not Persians managed to outflank defenders through the mountain pass. In the end, a 2,000-strong Greek rearguard was annihilated while covering retreat of main army. In the following Battle of Salamis, the Greek fleet managed to draw large and unwieldy Persian ships into narrow pass of Salamis, outflanking and ultimately defeating them.

People in antiquity had ideas about superweapons such as the author of the so-called (original title is lost) “Of Matters of War”. The author, while aware that Roman Empire was in trouble, obviously did not understand real problems the Empire was facing such as collapsing economy, depopulation, and apathy. He like everybody else saw problems as temporary and incidental, not structural, in nature. So he proposed numerous wishful weapons.

A similarity can be found in many later authors and even weapons designers and “strategists” up to and including the modern day. To them, the answer to all problems is “more, more expensive weapons” and “more money”. Yet it only serves to worsen (not solve) the problems in question. Rarely is the question asked whether a weapon in question could be replaced by a bettercheaper one.

Middle Ages

While Western armies had knights whose charge could not be withstood by Ottoman heavy cavalry, Ottomans won almost all large battles. Reasons were better coordination between troops and larger numbers of troops (particularly infantry). In smaller engagements, Christians often won as their system of command could cope with requirements of battle when smaller forces were used.

But this did not really help and the Ottomans only took relatively small number of fortified cities in direct attacks. Reason was that Ottomans practiced strategy of raids, devastating the countryside, and forcing people living in it to move to safer areas. Without people around, fortified cities had to either be abandoned or be supplied over long distances, thus rendering them vulnerable. This generally happened in depth of 50 kilometers from nominal borders.

Ultimately, Christians adopted same tactics, especially in Croatia and Hungary. Croatian troops put lessons learned during 230 years of warfare with Ottomans in use during 30 Year War using tactics for which the West proved mostly unprepared. In fact during the war, the name “Croatian” was more often used as a designation of a type of cavalry specializing in irregular and “blitz” warfare than for nationality as both numbers and ethnical composition of such (originally exclusively Croatian) units increased as their usefulness was realized. From that time also comes “kravata” (necktie, cravat), having developed from piece of cloth that Croatian soldiers tied around neck so as to have emergency bandage readily available if wounded.

While the Battle of Krbava Field is often cited as start of true troubles for Croatia, tactical successes against Ottomans were achieved both before and after it. The Ottoman strategy however rendered these successes superfluous as it meant that Ottomans were taking territory without having to win battles. It also meant that Western heavily-armed and -armored knights -- despite being long regarded as most important part of the army -- were strategically of minor importance despite their great tactical shock value (similar to modern tanks). Of far greater strategic value proved to be light irregular and semi-regular raiders such as hussar cavalry which appeared in Croatia and Hungary during 15th century, most likely as a response to Ottoman raiders (as well as predominantly infantry units of similar nature) which served both as raiders and as garrisons in fortified strongholds. (Hussar or huszar comes from Croatian word “gusar” meaning “privateer” or “pirate”).

Tactically when forced to face Western heavy cavalry in the field, Ottomans used a mass of infantry to stop their charge. Once that was achieved, Ottoman cavalry would outflank and annihilate Western cavalry with a rout of often-underequipped and undertrained Western infantry to follow soon thereafter.