Selected Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Action and Post-Crisis Recovery

Needs Assessmentand Capacity Assessment

Needs Assessment

  • Pressure to spend and act can divert attention from comprehensive needs assessment.During response to the tsunami, WHO and UNICEF were deeply absorbed by the simultaneous implementation of numerous humanitarian activities. The self-imposed obligation to spend large amounts of funds in a short time may have sidetracked the need to compile and provide a comprehensive and continuous picture of the situation. As a result, overall assessment in the areas under their leadership was occasionally weak or nonexistent. (Lesson from the tsunami) (Goyet et al, 2006, p.55)
  • Challenges exist where access andmonitoring capacity is low. There is a real danger that mapping of needs will be weakest in the most under-served areas, skewing the response away from the greatest need.(Lesson from multiple emergencies) (BoughonLeturque, 2009, p.11,19)
  • Creating spaces and opportunities relevant to young people is an important element in enabling them to become partners in change and can be pivotal in bringinga child-friendly perspective to needs assessments. Following the tsunami, adolescents from the affected countries came forward to involve themselves in assessing damage to schools; they helped rebuild classrooms and homes; and they provided psychosocial support to their peers and younger children. Each of these settings provided them with an opening to interact with both peers and adults, helping them to articulate their concerns and develop solutions to problems. Giving young people access to such gateways is important to trigger their inventiveness and harness it in the vital task of reconstruction. Care must be taken to ensure that the participation of children is voluntary and has significance and meaning in their own lives.(Lesson from the tsunami) (UNICEF, 2005, p.29)
  • Differentiate and prioritize between immediate needs and those resulting from longstanding poverty and conflict; beware of assuming all needs as critical.
  • Assessments must provide information to assist in the prioritisation of needs, as different approaches, partners and speeds are required to address truly life-saving needs.
  • Where ground work has not been done to establish transparent and contextual analysis of needs, assessments using international standards (such as Sphere) without contextualization can squew follow-up planning; for example setting response targets at levels far higher than pre-crisis levels. This is particularly problematic where response only addresses emergency affected populations.
  • Geographic segmentation of poverty and food security in urban areas – and therefore targeting of response – can be difficult given that urban areas often include a wide range of people from very wealthy to very poor living in close proximity. Wealth ranking is often complicated by the higher costs of living in urban areas compared with rural settings, affecting typical ratios such as income relative to costs of food and other necessities. (Lesson from multiple emergencies) (ALNAP 2009)
  • The needs of households with chronically ill, elderly and/or disabled members are often forgotten, or temporarily put on hold during disaster recovery and response. (Lesson from multiple emergencies) (ALNAP 2009)
  • Since situations change and needs evolve, follow up is important to consistently identify the most vulnerable. Assessment must be ongoing and adapt to new information, and this is especially important where populations move around frequently and unpredictably.Early identification of vulnerable groups indicates recognition of disparities between people living in various situations. Yet, very little was done to assess more specifically and on a continuous basis how the needs varied among these groups and then to target the most needy. (Lesson from Indonesia and Darfur) (UNICEF, p.12)

Capacity Assessment

  • Capacity-mapping of all partners in a sector should be undertaken as a quick, light exercise at the outset, focused on engaging the majority of actors, but concentrating on the most valuable. Following the 2004 tsunami, it was found that there is a case for limiting the number of agencies to those which can add real value to the overall response. Capacity-mapping of all partners can be taken as a quick, light exercise, but mapping takes time and needs to be focused. A selection process for identifying the most valuable agencies quickly is required.(Lesson from the tsunami) (Bennett, 2006, p.68)
  • Locate and assess capacity and political will at different institutional levels of the government. Decisions as to where to engage, whether at the center or at lower levels, will need to be based on a political analysis of the specific context aimed at locating capacity and will at different institutional levels. This is of crucial importance: in contexts where lack of willingness at the central level is a significant constraint to pro-poor service delivery, donors may be able to find “pockets of willingness” or “entry point” within certain ministries or at lower levels of government. In this way donors can build on existing pro-poor political will and work with lower-level institutions with the aim of integrating initiatives into government processes and structures in the longer term. (Lesson from multiple emergencies)(Pavanello and Darcy, 2008, p.15)
  • Assess the capacity of the business community/private sector. When scaling up response is critical, and traditional partners' capacity is limited, the national private sector can be a useful partner; this is assuming adequate attention can be given to ensuring quality standards. It is critical to utilize these partnerships effectively, and coordination is particularly crucial. (Lesson from Myanmar) (Turner, 2008, p.26)
  • Assess CO’s capacity to build local NGO capacity in terms of staffing, scope of work and balance between capacity building and response. With national NGOs, the intensity of capacity building work involved cannot be overstated. UNICEF COs need to carefully assess their capacity to engage in this and how they will approach it. The practice of twinning international NGOs with national NGOs within a sector as practiced in Somalia is a promising approach to share and engage more partners in this capacity building work. (Lesson from Somalia) (UNICEF, 2007, p.37)
  • Assess the capacity and track record of an implementing agency, before concluding a partnership agreement. In a fragile society it is not advisable to pick-up a national actor/NGO and then enter into a partnership unless close monitoring and mentoring activities are possible. Capacity analysis must be wary of identifying “brief case NGOs”, i.e. with little or no real capacity to implement beyond a very limited scale. (Lesson from Somalia) (UNICEF, 2006, p.71; UNICEF, 2007, p.25)

Bibliography

ALNAP (2009) Responding to urban disasters: Learning from previous relief and recovery operations.

Bennett, Jon (2006) "Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-Affected Countries" . Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

Boughen, Louise and Henri LeTurque. (2009) Implementation of the WASH Cluster Approach: Good Practice and Lessons Learned. Final Draft Version. The Global WASH Learning Project.

Goyet, Dr. Claude de Ville and Moriniere, Lezlie (2006) “The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response.” Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC).

Pavanello, S., and Darcy, J. (2008) “Improving the provision of basic services for the poor in fragile environments: International Literature Review Synthesis Paper”Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London.

Ockelford J. et al.(2008) “Review of the WASH Cluster in Bangladesh SIDR Response” Global WASH Cluster Learning Project.

Turner, Robert (2008) “Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Response to Cyclone Nargis.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB), Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS), on behalf of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

UNICEF (2005) "Lessons Learned from the Tsunami Response – Health and Nutrition.” EMOPS.

UNICEF (2005) ”Voice of Hope: Adolescents and the Tsunami.”

UNICEF (2006) “Evaluation of the ELMAN-UNICEF partnership in support of the reintegration and rehabilitation of children associated with militia in Somalia and recommendations for future UNICEF interventions in this field.” United Nations Children’s Fund.

UNICEF (2006) “The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster: Evaluation of UNICEF’s response (emergency and recovery phase). Indonesia Report.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

UNICEF (2007) “Review of the 2006 UNICEF Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa -- Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia Phase I Report.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

UNICEF (2008) "Solomon Islands Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster: An evaluation of UNICEF's Response in the Emergency and Initial Recovery Phases.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

EMOPS-HPS(KM) & PD-HATIS 1