Title: Active Externalism and Psychoneural Reduction

Author: João Fonseca

Organization: Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

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Stressing the embedded/embodied nature of human cognition as suggested by some new trends in cognitive science, Andy Clark has been defending a perspective labeled extended mind where our cognitive abilities are conceived as highly dependent on external ‘scaffoldings’ such as social institutions, artifacts, and technology. The adoption of this perspective led Andy Clark and David Chalmers to endorse an «active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.» (Chalmers & Clark, 1998).

Given this scenario several questions arise: How much ‘mind’ is to be imputed to the individual brain? Does the mind spread out from the skull? Where does the mind begin and end? One way to clarify these questions is to formulate the old question of mind-brain reductionism within this context. For an active externalist, since mind equals brain plus external supports (Cf. Clark, 1997, 180) it seems obvious that such a reduction does not hold (brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition to mindful capacities and activities).

The present communication aims to defend mind-brain reductionism adopting, at the same time, the view of active externalism. The point to be made is that we should shift from a general, absolute conception of the mind when we are pondering about reductionism. Alternatively, I suggest and defend a philosophical position concerning psychological explanation, which I call ‘methodological relativism’ (that is also a sort of weak instrumentalism). Methodological relativism states that psychological explanations (those prone to reductionist claims) are always relative to a frame of explanatory reference depicting a certain particular cognitive function under certain circumstances (this kind of relativism is congenial to many other sciences). In short: psychological concepts (like the proper concept of ‘mind’) are explanatory relative. Therefore we should not ask if The Mind is reducible to The Brain but instead if all the potential specific and concrete cognitive functions (described in mental vocabulary) are, at least in principle, reducible to a neural explanation.

A consequence of this relativism conjoined with active externalism is that if you pick up a certain cognitive function as an end to be solved there will be several different means to achieve that end depending if one uses distinct external devices or the brain alone (for instance, if the cognitive function is to multiply 23x692, one can do it only mentally or use a pocket calculator or write down an algorithm on paper). Each of these means became ends by themselves for the purpose of psychological explanation (i.e., they became cognitive functions to be explained: how to use a pocket calculator in a certain way, how to write down a solution, etc.). Given the ontological distinction between brain and external devices (implicit whenever ‘extended mind’ is debated), it is nonsense to ask how someone uses its own brain and, on these cases, the ‘primordial’ function identifies with the function to be explained. On the other hand, in the cases where external mechanisms are used, the function to be explained corresponds to the use of those external supports and not to the ‘primordial’ cognitive function. So, we end out with different ‘internal’ cognitive functions that are, at least in principle, all reducible to neural processes. That would make the point of reductionism even if we adopt active externalism; they are compatible.

Alongside, the paper will articulate this ‘methodological relativism’ with some important questions concerning the extended mind such as the co-evolution between brain and environment, the internalization of external information, the ontological status of neural implants and the distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ cognition.

Quoted references

Chalmers, D. & Clark, A., 1998. “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58: 10-23

Clark, A., 1997. Being There; Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.