Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies:
What is the Role of Social Capital?
Anirudh Krishna[*]
Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Political Science
Duke University
Box 90245
Durham, NC 27708-0245
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Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies:
What is the Role of Social Capital?
ABSTRACT
What factors account for a more active and politically engaged citizenry? Macro-national institutions, micro-level influences (such as individuals’ wealth and education), and meso-level factors, particularly social capital, have been stressed variously in different studies. How do these different factors stack up against one another? What contribution does social capital make compared with the other factors? And how – through what channels – is social capital brought to bear on issues of democratic participation? These questions are examined here with the help of an original dataset collected over two years for 69 village communities in two north Indian states, and including interviews with over 2,000 individual respondents. Analysis reveals that institutions and social capital work together in support of active participation. Social capital matters, and its effects are magnified when capable agents are also available who can help individuals and communities connect with public decision-making processes.
Keywords:
Political participation
Social capital
India
Word Count: 9,894 (incl. notes, tables and references)
In the last two decades, as democracies have been established in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, concerns have been raised regarding the extent to which citizens participate in public decisions. Merely crafting democratic institutions from above is not enough, it is argued. Unless citizens have faith in these institutions and unless they engage in large numbers with diverse processes of self-governance, democracy might end up being no more than an empty shell, devoid of substance, and often providing merely a thin cover for dictators and authoritarian regimes (Dahl, 1971; Davidson, 1992; Huber, Rueschmeyer and Stephens, 1993; Mamdani, 1996; Ost, 1995).
Higher political participation does not always guarantee that democracy will flourish (Huntington, 1968; Kohli, 1990). But governments can be more effectively held to account, constitutionally guaranteed rights can be enforced, and individuals’ and communities’ demands can be better represented within the policy process when ordinary citizens participate actively in the politics of their country. As more people are drawn into the business of democratic decision making – and fewer groups get left out – the democratic process gets legitimized across a wider domain (Bunce, 1999; Przeworski, 1991).
Voting turnouts can often overstate the extent to which citizens truly participate in public decision making. Citizens can be mobilized to vote through threat or inducement even when they have no clear choice among competing candidates – and sometimes even when there are no competing candidates.[1] So voting figures cannot be relied upon to provide a clear indication of peoples’ participation in democratic self-governance (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, pp. 47-48); other indicators, related to participation in campaigning, contacting, and protesting, need to be consulted to assess how actively citizens engage with diverse processes of public decision making (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1971).
What factors influence the extent to which these more active forms of participation are embraced among a wider section of the populace? Different sets of factors have been identified as observers have looked variously at micro-, macro-, and meso-level interactions. Micro, individual-level factors such as wealth, status, and education have been stressed by one group of studies (Almond and Verba, 1965; Bennett and Bennett, 1986; Lipset, 1960, 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1971, 1978). Macro-national variables, such as design of state institutions, have been identified by another group of analysts (Duverger, 1954; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Joseph, 1997; Linz, 1994; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Moore, 1966). In addition, meso-level variables, operating at the level of community groups and social networks, have been stressed more recently by a third group of studies, undertaken within the rubric of social capital (Laitin, 1995; Newton, 1997; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995, 1996; Seligson, 1999).
The first task of this paper will be to assess the relative worth of these alternative causal arguments. Which among the macro-, micro-, and meso-level variables makes the greatest difference for political participation? Particular attention will be paid in this regard to evaluating the contribution of social capital.
Introduced relatively recently into this discussion, social capital is expected to have a dominant influence on participation rates. “Citizens in civic communities demand more effective public services,” it is maintained, “and they are prepared to act collectively to achieve their shared goals. Their counterparts in less civic regions more commonly assume the role of alienated and cynical supplicants” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 182). Whether citizens are active and engaged participants – or whether they are alienated and cynical nonparticipants – depends entirely, in this view, on the available level of social capital.
Social capital is expected in this reckoning to provide not just the glue (which binds community members together into collective action) but also the gear, which directs community members toward participating in democracy building. While the first (glue) part of this expectation follows directly from the definition of social capital, the second (gear) part is not so self-evident. Social capital has been defined by Putnam (1995, p. 67) as “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit,” so high social capital communities should act together collectively more often than low social capital communities. However, the ends toward which collective action will be directed do not follow automatically from this definition of social capital.
Why should high social capital communities necessarily direct their collective energies toward participating in democratic activities? Why should high social capital not result, instead, in increasing support for antidemocracy alliances? And what ensures that participation in politics (of any kind) will be attractive in the first place? Collective action is not costless to its participants, and it is often “easily assumed that people have nothing better to do with their time than political participation” (Pieterse, in press, p. 4). The automaticity assumed in the social capital argument – namely, that high social capital leads directly to greater political participation – is not analytically or conceptually clear.
Whether high social capital leads to high, low, or no participation in democracy may also be affected by the nature and capacity of a mediating agency. In particular, the orientation and organizational capacity of political parties might matter as much as or more than the inclinations of individual citizens. Berman (1997a, 1997b) demonstrates such a result for the case of interwar Germany, where she finds that a dense network of civil society organizations not only failed “to contribute to republican virtue, but in fact subverted it.” This “highly organized civil society...proved to be the ideal setting for the rapid rise to power of a skilled totalitarian movement [the Nazis]… Without the opportunity to exploit Weimar’s rich associational network...the Nazis would not have been able to capture important sectors of the German electorate so quickly and efficiently” (Berman, 1997a, pp. 414-422). The nature of the mediating agency – the Nazi party in this case – resulted in converting high social capital into high participation in undemocratic activities.
Social capital is by itself a “politically neutral multiplier,” Berman suggests, neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Whether social capital strengthens, weakens, or leaves unchanged participation in democracy depends, in this view, on the nature and capacity of the mediating agency.[2]
In the empirical analysis that follows, I will examine the original social capital view, which claims that social capital translates directly into higher political participation, providing both glue and gear. I will also separately examine the agency view, namely, that capable agency is necessary in addition to high social capital; agency helps gear collective action, while social capital provides only the glue.
The second task of this paper is to examine whether social capital provides both glue and gear, or whether gear needs to be provided separately by political parties or some other type of agency. Questions related to political participation in general, and social capital more specifically, are addressed in the context of rural India. Democracy has been in place continuously for 50 years in this setting, except for a brief hiatus between 1975 and 1977. Survey and case study investigations conducted in the Indian context can help test the validity of alternative theoretical claims related to political participation.
Methodology and Measurement
The two questions for research are examined here with the help of an original dataset compiled for Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, two Indian states that in 1991 had a combined population of 110 million persons. Survey and case study materials were collected for 60 Rajasthan villages located in the districts of Ajmer, Bhilwara, Rajsamand, Udaipur, and Dungarpur, and nine villages of Mandsaur district in the state of Madhya Pradesh. Fieldwork was conducted between the summer of 1998 and the summer of 2000. Getting into and out of villages and locating and meeting people was not difficult, as I have lived and worked in these areas for many years.[3]
A combination of case study and statistical methods was employed for studying trends in these villages (Ragin, 1987). Sixteen villages were investigated as case studies, and all 69 villages were studied through quantitative analysis of survey data. A total of 2,232 residents of these 69 villages (average population: 1,254) were interviewed using a 114-point questionnaire that was developed at the end of an initial six-month period of field study. These questionnaires were pilot tested in four villages before being refined and extended to the larger group of villages.
Interviewees were selected through a process of simple random sampling. The most recently compiled voters’ lists for each village constituted the population from which this statistical sample was drawn.[4] Friends who are villagers in Rajasthan helped form a team of 16 field investigators, equally men and women. These investigators assisted me in administering the survey instruments.
Additional information was gathered from government departments’ annual reports and by interviewing 105 city-based professionals, including government officials, party politicians, doctors, lawyers, and bankers, who have regular contact with villagers in these areas. In addition, 408 village leaders were interviewed using a separate (and shorter) questionnaire, and focus groups were organized in public spaces in each of these 69 villages. Different variables corresponding to competing hypotheses were operationalized and measured using the instruments described above.
A variety of different political activities are usually consulted to assess peoples’ participation in politics, including voting, election campaigning, collective action around policy issues, contacting political representatives, and direct action such as protests and demonstrations (Almond and Verba, 1965; Bratton, 1999). The following survey items, adapted from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), helped assess these features in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh villages.
Voting
C5. In talking to people about elections, it is found that they are sometimes not able to vote because they are not registered, they don’t have time, or they have difficulty getting to the polls. Think about the Vidhan Sabha (state legislative assembly) elections since you were old enough to vote. Have you voted in all of them, in most of them, in some of them, rarely voted in them, or have you never voted at all in a Vidhan Sabha election?
C6. Now thinking about the local (Panchayat) elections that have been held since you were old enough to vote, have you voted in all of them, in most of them, in some of them, rarely voted in them, or have you never voted at all in a panchayat election?
C7. Think back to the recent Vidhan Sabha elections held last year in winter. Did you happen to vote in that election?
Campaign Work
C8. We would like to find out about some of the things people do to help a party or candidate win an election. During the last Vidhan Sabha election campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?
C9. Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches or things like that in support of a particular candidate?
C10. Did you do any (other) work for any one of the parties or candidates during that election?
C11. How much did your own work in the campaign contribute to the number of votes the candidate got in your village -- a great deal, some, very little, or none?
Contacting
C12. How often in the past one year have you gotten together with others in this village and jointly petitioned government officials or political leaders – never, once, a few times, or quite often?
C13. What about the local panchayat leaders? Have you initiated contact with such a person in the last twelve months?
Protest
C15. In the past two years, have you taken part in any protest, march or demonstration on some national or local issue?
Voting, campaigning, contacting and protesting cover a wide range of activities associated with involvement in democratic decision making, and they represent different means by which citizens seek to influence the choice of policy as well as the selection of policy makers. However, not all citizens take part equally in each of these activities, it is found. Increasingly higher costs must be borne by citizens who participate in the more proactive forms of self-expression. Consequently, many more citizens take part in voting and progressively fewer citizens are involved in campaigning, contacting, and protesting. As many as 91% of villagers said that they had voted in the last election to the state legislature (item C7).[5] However, only 25% of respondents said they had campaigned actively on behalf of a party or candidate (item C10); 33% said they had personally contacted a public representative at least once during the past year (item C12); and only 11% said they had taken part in any protest or demonstration.
It would appear from these figures that only a small fraction of rural Indians are actively participating in the process of democracy. However, these participation rates are not dissimilar to those observed in other democracies, where similar surveys were conducted at about the same time.[6]
Voting percentages tend to overstate citizens’ active engagement in public decision making, as discussed earlier. Empirically, too, voting stands apart from the other three forms of participation.
Factor analysis conducted on the opinions reported by north Indian villagers shows that the three survey items that correspond to voting all load highly on a single common factor. However, a separate common factor is associated with the other seven survey items related to campaign work, contacting, and protesting.[7] Voting forms one dimension of political activity, and campaign work, contacting, and protesting – the more voluntary and less socially obligatory acts – constitute a separate dimension.
These results of factor analysis show that villagers who are active in one form of political activity, say campaign work, are likely to be equally active in the other two forms, contacting and protesting. A single underlying quality or set of attributes seems to be at work that makes some villagers participate more actively than others. To identify these attributes and to distinguish more active from less active villagers, the Index of Political Activity is constructed by taking a simple sum of scores of these seven items.[8] The least active individuals achieve a score of zero points on this index, while the most active respondents score a full 100 points.[9] We now have a standard by which to compare political participation levels and a means by which to test our alternative hypotheses.
Alternative Explanations and Independent Variables
What factors are associated with high levels of political activity? The different theoretical views examined above are operationalized below in terms of independent variables. These variables are tested in the next section in association with the dependent variable, the 100-point Index of Political Activity.
(i) Macro View: Structures Matter
According to the school of thought that holds macro-institutional structures accountable for participation rates, villages located within this relatively small area – of roughly 150 kilometers north to south and the same distance east to west – and sharing the same national institutions should not differ very much in terms of political participation scores. The same set of national institutions produces the same set of participation-enhancing and participation-reducing influences, so significant inter-village differences should not exist – and if they do, it is only because institutions make an unequal impact, for instance, if some villages are remotely located or otherwise disconnected from institutional effects.