NAME:Laura Zippel

LESSON:NYStop and FriskPolicy

SOURCE:Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968); The Atlantic; WAPA Search and Seizure Manual (2012); NY Times

TIME AND DAY:Ballard; April 1, 2014, 11:30am; 50 minutes

MATERIALS:PowerPoint presentation; Handout; Articles

  1. GOALS
  1. Introduce students to Terry Stops
  2. Re-Introduce different burdens of proof
  3. Enable students to think about different policy reasons for NY’s stop and frisk policies and apply those reasons to Seattle
  4. Apply information from a news article to a policy argument (critical thinking and analysis skills)

E.Provide a foundation for subsequent classroom debates and active learning exercises

  1. OBJECTIVES

A.Knowledge

1.Re-introduce probable cause

2.Understand Terry stops

3. Understand policy reasons behind and against stop and frisk

4.Review of search and seizure and 4th amendment

B.Skills

1.Active listening

2.Collaboration with peers

3.Critical thinking skills through applying news articles

4.Understanding an issue through different views

6.Engaging in respectful discussion

C.Attitude

1.The study of our constitutional rights can be really interesting

2.Respecting and understanding others viewpoints is instrumental to gaining more knowledge

  1. CLASSROOM METHODS
  1. NOTE: This lesson plan is designed to be taught after the students have already been introduced to the 4th amendment and criminal burden of proofs in general. It is especially useful after you have discussed other search and seizure cases, Miranda rights, and juvenile justice issues.
  2. Terry Lecture (10 min)(Use powerpoint)
  3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968)
  4. Facts: In Ohio, in 1968, a police officer in plainclothes, saw two guys walking around, taking the same route each time, and looking in the same store window. After this happening 5-6 times, a 3rd man came and had a swift conversation with them and then left. The police officer suspected they were going to rob the store and went to talk to them. After identifying himself as a police officer he got their names and patted the outside of Terry’s coat. After he felt a gun, he had all three men put their hand against the wall and patted them all down. Two of them, including Terry, had a gun and were arrested.
  5. Defendant’s Argument:
  6. This was in violation of the 4th amendment b/c it was a search and seizure without enough evidence for a warrant.
  7. Fourth Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
  8. The Supreme court held that the search wasn’t in violation because it wasn’t an unreasonable search and seizure under the 4th amendment
  9. Instead the court said it was reasonable even though he didn’t have probable cause because it was limited in scope and reasonably related to the suspicions of the police officer, that of holding up the store with a gun.
  10. Since the officer only patted down the outside of the cloths until he felt the gun, it was ok.
  11. Proof standards:
  12. Beyond a reasonable doubt: standard for criminal trials. This is the highest burden because someone could potentially be going to jail or lose their life (death penalty).
  13. Probable cause: standard for a warrant. Ask: what is the probable cause standard?
  14. Weaker than beyond a reasonable doubt
  15. reasonable basis for believing that a crime may have been committed (for arrest) and that evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched (for search).
  16. For Terry stops: It's a lower bar than probable cause. Instead the Supreme Court said you only need a “reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity”
  17. Has to be more than a hunch
  18. Reasonable officer standard (think what would a reasonable officer think in that particular place and time)
  19. Objective standard
  20. This means you have to look at the totality of the circumstances
  21. Also point out who is involved in each circumstance and how fast these stops might occur.(no real right answer)
  22. How much time do police officers have to think through Terry stop conditions instead of a jury or judge thinking about probable cause?
  23. Much less time to deliberate and walk through all the evidence.
  24. Is that a good reason?
  25. Pass out articles and handout (10-15 min)
  26. Break the class up and hand out one side’s article to each student except the Mayors get to skim both articles.
  27. NOTE: If you have more time you might want to give them a chance to read all of the articles at the end or at least the article on what the Judge in NY ruled.
  28. Have them read the articles silently to themselves
  29. Have them break up into groups have a triad discussion (25-30 min)
  30. First split them into the article groups to discuss and come up with their best arguments for their side and counters for the other side’s potential arguments: for NY’s law, against NY’s law, and mayors. (10 minutes)
  31. Then have them count off and put them into the triad groups.Within the triad groups each side should have around 5 minutes to explain their side and position. (10 minutes)
  32. When there is 10 minutes left of class have the mayors decide what policy they want to endorse. Have them come up in front of the class and give their thoughts. (5 minutes)
  33. Debrief (5 minutes)
  34. At the end tell them how the NY judge ruled (reforms to end racial profiling) and how the new mayor is addressing it. This is also explained in the last article if you wish to pass it out.
  35. Connect the NY policy to WA, Seattle in particular. You can discuss how Seattle might be impacted by the overturning of this policy and how stop and frisk policies are implemented in WA and Seattle in particular.
  36. Think about recent Dept. of Justice evaluation of Seattle PD
  37. Think about what neighborhoods Seattle PD focus on
  38. Is this comparable to NY? If you were Mayor of Seattle, how would you deal with this issue?

IV.EVALUATION

A.Active listening and participation during the lecture

B.Active participation during the triad

C. Respect of other viewpoints

Stop-and-Frisk Didn't Make New York Safer (EXCERPTED)

Donald Bloomer, The Atlantic, March 26th, 2014

When former NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly was asked what would happen if stop-and-frisk were curtailed, his response was characteristic of his tenure: “No question about it,” he said “violent crime will go up.” When homicides rose in Chicago, Chicagoans clamored for NYPD-style stop-and-frisk.

In reality, there’s no good reason to assume that these strategies work to reduce crime. David Greenberg has conducted the most comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the NYPD’s practice of stop-and-frisk and crime levels to date, and he finds “no evidence that misdemeanor arrests reduced levels of homicide, robbery, or aggravated assaults.”

No one thinks a police officer with a reasonable suspicion that a suspect has a gun should be barred from frisking the suspect, but that is not what stop-and-frisk has come to mean. The now-abandoned practice of requiring officers (often fresh out of the academy) to meet performance goals for citations and arrests seems wrong on several levels, but the most fundamental one is that it doesn’t reduce crime. A close second is the increased costs to families and communities….

So why are so many so enamored of these dubious tactics?

Stop-and-frisk proponents, like former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, former NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly, and the criminologist Alan Zimring believe that the method is effective because of what they have seen in New York. Crime dropped precipitously in the 1990s, they say, and the reason for it is the distinctive way the NYPD practiced policing.

The simple version is that the NYPD adopted order-maintenance policing, including stop-and-frisk, and crime went down. But the increase in frisks and arrests didn’t predate the drop in crime; it came after the drop in crime. If we widen our perspective, we see that the crime drop in New York City, particularly for property offense, began long before 1990.

What about homicide? After all, citing that link was the most effective claim Bloomberg and Kelly used in support of stop-and-frisk. Well, here’s a piece of data you won’t hear any of the proponents tout: if you look at the 25 largest cities in the United States, only five had significantly higher homicide rates in 2010 than in 1960. Big cities—including New York City—are pretty much back where they started before the massive late-20th century crime-wave. Some of these cities did not see the stunning improvements in homicide rates that New York experienced in the 1990s, but that’s because they didn’t see dramatic increases in homicide rates in the preceding decades.

When you look at all the data and all the research, the puzzle is not so much why crime dropped in New York City, but what caused the great American crime wave in the first place. There are plenty of prominent theories….

Abandonment. The historical evidence ignored by stop-and-frisk proponents also describes widespread changes in police practices across the country. In the years leading up to and during the crime wave, police effectively abandoned disadvantaged communities…. throughout the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s.

Abandonment not only contributed to the rise in crime in New York and many other cities across the country, but…also generated a backlash: after crime reached its peak in the 1980s, there were widespread demands for more police presence in inner-city communities and tougher penalties for offenders.

We changed that by putting many more police officers on the streets, and crime did fall. But that doesn’t mean stop-and-frisk was the source of the drop. Experimental and quasi-experimental data that we have suggests that police presence (independent of stop-and-frisk) is effective. Look at any of several recent analyses of policing, and you see that implementing more foot patrols appears to reduce crime. To be sure, the NYPD put more boots on the ground, but under former Commissioner Kelly, the increased presence was accompanied by unduly aggressive practices that have come to define stop-and-frisk, leading some to believe that those invasive practices should get the credit for reducing crime.

[W]e have ample evidence that polite and respectful interactions between police and suspects encourages people to obey the law more than impolite and degrading interactions. [W]e have evidence that moving police from low-crime areas to higher-crime areas is a cost-effective way to reduce crime. [W]e have evidence that firm and respectful offender notifications can significantly reduce criminal recidivism in general and shootings in particular.

Crime-prevention, though, isn’t just about policing. The Crime Lab at the University of Chicago has shown the efficacy of intensive tutoring and counseling aimed at helping at-risk youth.

Police departments across the country (including the NYPD under Commissioner William J. Bratton and Mayor Bill DeBlasio) have begun implementing programs based on hard evidence derived from large-scale studies like those described above. It is disappointing that just as these officials are embracing practices supported by empirical research (not to mention by the citizens in the communities being policed), proponents of now-discredited tactics want to turn back the clock. Happily, they are rapidly becoming relics of history, not guides for the future. Evidence-based policing and crime prevention is here to stay, and we’ll all be far safer for it.

Reviewing the Rationale for Stop-and-Frisk (EXCERPTED)

Paul Larkin, The Atlantic, March 24th, 2014

Any angler will tell you: “If you want to catch fish, you have to go where the fish are.” The same is true when fishing for street crime.

In the case of crack cocaine, you need to focus on urban, poor, African-American neighborhoods, because trafficking is primarily the workof dealersin those communities. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, Harvard Law School Professor Randall Kennedy, and others agree about the demographics of the crack trade. Indeed, no one seriously disagrees. The only question is how to address the problem….

The only question, then, ishowto solve the problem, and this requires us to address three important, difficult, and unavoidable questions. They’re important, because they shape the policy debate. They’re difficult, because they involve contentious subjects. And they’re unavoidable, because no one can honestly address this subject without taking a position on them.

1. Is this technique useful? Yes. Street cops think so; just ask Big Cat and Gesuelli, the two Newark officers…. Police administrators think so, as witnessed by the strong endorsements from former NYPD Commissioners William Bratton and Ray Kelly. Criminologists also think so. “Broken Windows,” the 1982 Atlantic article by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, formed the basis for today’s preventive street policing. Franklin Zimring, Chair of the Berkeley Criminal Justice Studies Program, analyzed New York City data and concluded in 2012 that the crime reduction correlated positively with the NYPD’s law enforcement strategy, which includes preventive street patrol—not with economic and sociological explanations. Accordingly, there is experiential, theoretical, and possibly empirical support for the technique’s effectiveness.

It is easy to understand why critics discount its benefit for law-abiding black residents. Offenders are arrested, convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned—events that lend themselves to statistics, photographs, and media stories. Crimes that do not occur—and people who do not become victims—are invisible. Yet the lives saved and improved by aggressive street patrol are real, even though they are unidentifiable.

2.Is this technique inherently bigoted?No. Cops of all races stop and frisk diverse suspects. Crack trafficking and violent crime are concentrated in minority communities, and, asZimringhas noted, “preventive street policing cannot be made much more colorblind than the demographic patterns of violent crime.” The law also forbids bigotry. A cop may stop and frisk a suspect only if he has a “reasonable suspicion,” based on the facts of each case, that a suspect is involved in crime or is armed. An offender’s race can help the police identify a known suspect, but his race cannot make himintoa suspect. Yes, street cops sometimes make mistakes, but the Supreme Court allowed for those errors by adopting a low threshold for stops and frisks. Reasonable suspicion does not require an officer to be right, or even to be more likely right than wrong, so we should not be surprised if the police often err.

Moreover, selling crack is illegal, so offenders are discreet, not obvious. And crack dealers arm themselves because they cannot call the police if someone steals their goods or refuses to pay; violent retribution is their only recourse. Street cops therefore face potentially deadly risks when they question suspects in close quarters. The fact that police perform a high number of frisks without discovering any weapons can be more likely attributed to caution than racism.

3.How can we prevent this technique from being used oppressively?The remedy is not to outlawthetechnique butto take these four steps.

Step 1: Ensure a diverse demographic profile within the police department. New York City and Newark have done that, as Bergner noted. It reduces the risk that the local police will be seen as outsiders “occupying” a community.

Step 2: Train and retrain officers in the law, and include the NAACP and ACLU as academy lecturers.

Step 3: Discipline street cops for unduly aggressive stops and frisks, and have them apologize sometimes if they are wrong. Officers will object that admitting a mistake undermines theauthoritynecessary to maintain dominance in a world of lions, not lambs. Sometimes this is true, but not always.

Step 4: Have senior commanders brief neighborhood residents on what the police do and why. If the community views the police favorably, politicians and the media will come around.

One last point: Don’t blame street cops for problems they did not cause and cannot remedy. Make progress onthatproblem, and the stop-and-frisk problem will fade away.

Forbidding the police from properly using this technique, however, cannot remedy the real problem—unless the theory is that outlawing this technique will so terrify Sutton Place residents with the prospect of returning crime to its 1960s levels that residents eventually will pony up whatever funds are necessary to solve the real problem. I’m cynical enough to believe that that strategy underlies some of the criticism, but I’m hopeful enough to bet that it won’t work. The people suffering from drug trafficking and crime deserve better than political gambits, and they deserve ittoday, not down the road.