Thailand’s Water Management Crisis . . . Commodification or Purification?
By Witoon Permpongsacharoen
Foundation for Ecological Recovery
“What we are facing in Thailand is not a water crisis but a crisis in the dominant system of water management” (Editorial of Watershed Vol. 4 No. 2 TERRA, 1999).
In promoting water privatisation in Thailand, a discourse on water as an object to buy and sell has been produced along these lines, “Water is a commodity. Irrigation water is not a natural supply of water; it contains costs. Therefore, water users must pay for the costs of water and water should be used for activities that generate the highest economic returns and profit.”
The World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have been promoting this privatization discourse in Thailand since the 1997 economic crisis where Thailand received financial and technical assistance from these International Funding Institutions (IFI’s), including loans specifically for agriculture sector restructuring worth hundreds of millions of dollars (US).
However, in Thailand there has been a strong resistance by the Thai public – and a call to recognize community rights. Currently, the National Water Resource Committee is drafting a law that incorporates management and usage of water from waterworks, irrigation and natural water sources. This law would significantly change common property rights and effectively transfer rights to water resources to the state and the private sector, with the rights of when and how much water can be used being tradable among ‘water user groups’. The draft law has been proposed according to the World Bank technical assistance and the ASPL loan conditions set by the ADB in 1999 that is influenced by World Trade Organization’s (WTO) free trade policy.
Transforming the Commons to Commodity
Currently, the majority of water is still a commons; the state only controls irrigation and water works. People’s use of this water source serves local economic, social, cultural, and ecological functions. Examples of water use include direct use of water for agriculture, livestock and everyday life, such as the community water managements systems known as muang faai in Northern Thailand; and indirect use such as fisheries habitat. At the moment, there is no clear, official recognition of community rights to manage water from natural sources; for example, the state can build a dam or divert water from the local use – there is no sense of guarantee. However, Article 48 of the Constitution does broadly recognise community rights in local natural resource management.
Recently, the rapid growth in the industrial and urban sectors have boosted water demand, this means taking more water direct from natural sources and shifting of water from the agriculture sector to industrial and urban sector. This shift is based on the assumption that the latter will provide the best economic returns. The mechanism for this shift is the state control of natural water sources and investment in infrastructure to transport the water to meet industry and urban demand. The state has been doing this by building dams and irrigation systems, so that they can allocate this water to private ownership with the ultimate goal of privatization of water utilities. In order to legitimize this shift, the state must set up a market system where ownership rights can be easily transferred.
The following three case studies highlight some of the conflicts encountered with current water management in Thailand. Finally, looking at these case studies we provide alternative perspective for water rights and management and our recommendations for the future water law.
Case study 1: Chulaporn Dam
The development of the Prom River area in Chaiyaphum Province clearly reflects the problem of water shortage caused by dam management and shows who feels the effects of such mismanagement.
The Chulaporn Dam (Provide Map?) is a multipurpose dam built in the Prom River area from 1970 to 1972 under the plan to develop the lower Khong River. Its major purpose is to generate electricity while the minor purposes mentioned are for fish seed production, flood relief, and irrigation for 80,000 rai of farming area.
The dam uses only one cubic meter of water to generate one unit of electricity. Therefore, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) concentrates on releasing water for electricity generation more than on irrigation for areas along the Prom River. Most water from the Prom River is sent to the power plant and goes down to the Sern River.
The EGAT record during 1993-1995 showed that 86% of water was released for electricity generation and sent to the Sern River. Only 14% of water was released to the Prom River but in some years (4 years) there was none. There has never been a single year that the EGAT has been able to release water to the Prom River to meet its goal of 50 million cubic meters. Therefore, since the Chulaporn Dam started electricity generation, villagers, previously benefiting from the Prom River, have suffered from water shortage.
In 1993, a year after the completion of dam construction, villagers facing water shortage along the Prom River filed complaints to the Prime Minister and the EGAT Governor at that time. Their complaints resulted in the construction of the Huay Kum Dam and None Kwao Dam in the lower Prom River. However, the dams cannot solve the water shortage because they depend on water from the Chulaporn Dam. Moreover, the construction of the None Kwao Dam expanded irrigated areas and increased water demands while the amount of water supply from the Chulaporn Dam remains the same. This has increased the severity of water shortage and created conflicts between villagers in irrigated areas and villagers in the lower Prom River who consume water from the Prom River directly.
In addition, changes in water flow direction and lower amount of water caused by water release from the Chulaporn Dam has lessened efficiencies of earthen and wooden weirs in water management. Both types of weirs have been local wisdom in water management for over 200 years. Water shortage made it necessary to heighten the weir for more holding capacity; therefore, concrete weirs have replaced earthen and wooden weirs in every village since 1975. However, water problems remain unsolved and conflicts strengthened.
Case Study 2: Mae Lao Irrigation Improvement Project
The Mae Lao Irrigation Improvement is one pilot project under the Agricultural Sector Programme Loan (ASPL) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). On September 4th, 2000, Thailand’s Council of Ministers approved a 680 million baht (approx 40 baht is equal to $1US) loan for improvement of the agricultural sector in the Mae Lao Irrigation Project in Chiang Rai Province (see Map?).
About 80-100 years ago before the establishment of the Mae Lao Irrigation fai (small weir), farmers in Dong Khanun area built Chao Wor fai switching water from the Lao River. They dug a 500-metre-long Rongthan muang (traditional water storage system) through which they distributed water to the farmlands in many villages in Chiang Rai Province. Rongthan muang water meets the Mae Khao Wang Basin through San Ma Khet subdistrict, San Phak Hee subdistrict, and Hua Ngom subdistrict in Phan District.
In 1950, Irrigation Department started to build the Mae Lao fai to be finished in 1963. The right bank area of the irrigation system replaced some former areas that used water from Rongthan muang. Many farmers then changed to use irrigation water instead. However, most farmers still use water from both water storage systems and have never been faced a situation of water shortage. But in some areas inaccessible by the Rongthan muang especially in mountainous areas, farmers depend only on irrigation water and sometimes face water shortages.
Today, the Mae Lao Irrigation Project covers 148, 343 rai irrigation area (6.25 rai = 1 hectare). The project will distribute water only to 71 percent of the area (105,600 rai). The project was built to improve the older irrigation system built in 1950. The project aims to block and divert water from the Mae Lao River for distribution to agricultural areas. Some parts of the irrigation area that are mountainous required a 180-kilometre long canal for water distribution.
The project had the following objectives:
1. To improve the efficiency of the existing old and low-quality irrigation system to use and distribute water at the required time and in the required amounts.
2. To develop forms of water management through the participation of farmers and community organizations.
3. To develop the area as a place for quality products that can serve the market demands.
4. To develop and promote participatory activities in the developmental process.
The ABD produced many recommendations for this project, specifically on the need for increased community participation and the steps to obtain their cost-sharing objectives. However, their recommendations are based on information they collected that assumed that farmers were producing crops (specifically rice) for profit. We show below that this is not the case. Footnote: More info available in the Executive Summary of A Strategy for Participatory Irrigation Management in Thailand (ADB TA 3260-THA) and also in the book Water Privatisation in Thailand.
In order to evaluate the impacts, especially economic, at the village-level, some sample surveys were initiated in Ban Dongkhanun of Thanthong Sub-district, Ban Tha-Hor, Ban Nong Phak Jik and Ban Pong Daeng of Sai Khao Sub-district in Phan District, located in the right bank of Mae Lao Irrigation areas.
It was found that most villagers grow rice for their own consumption first and then for sale. Their major income came from employment and other kinds of farming. The cultivation system used both wet season rice farming and dry season rice farming. The dry season rice farming started in 1986, after the expansion of irrigation system and the governmental promotion of dry season rice farming.
Half of the farmers in some villagers such as Ban Tha-Hor have no rights to their own land. They have to rent lands for farming from landlords and pay them in goods. But farming costs, including such production requirements as fertilizers, rice species, land improvement and transportation, are quite high as shown in the following table.
Table 3: Production Cost and Income of Rice Farming In Ban Tha-Hor, Ban Dongkhanun, and Ban Nongtum in Phan District, Chiang Rai Province.
Category
/ Average Cost(Baht/rai) / Production Per Rai (Baht/kg) / Price
(kg/rai) / Selling Price (Baht/Rai) / Profit
(Baht)
1. Wet season rice-farming / 2,137 / 658 / 5 / 3,290 / 1,153
2. Dry season rice-farming / 2,310 / 770 / 3.5 / 2,695 / 385
Cost of production, especially rice farming, is higher than Bt 1,495.10 as to ASPL evaluation. But this is not a net amount. In fact, farmers are unable to sell the whole amount of crops. Some of them have to separate half or one-third of their crops as a compensation of land rental. Part of them is also split for their own consumption. Farmers usually do not get high earning from rice growing.
Due to the high cost of rice plantation and less income, 90% of farmer families in three villages were in debt at an average of Bt. 50,000. Their economic hardship is caused by the high cost of production and low price of goods, not the shortage of water.
The project impact could be summarized as follows:
1. Farmers have higher cost of production than what was evaluated by the project. They also have a debt burden without ownership of the farmlands. The cost recovery for irrigation will only create more economic problems for the farmers.
2. Farmers do not have the problem of production inefficiency as indicated by the project. The data of both pre- and post-improvement production gross is higher than what was evaluated by the project.
3. In fact, farmers do not face a shortage of water because they can use water from the old water storage system and the irrigation canal. The real problem is caused by the low price of agricultural products, no bargaining power, higher cost of production, and large debt burden. Solutions should not come from irrigation improvement, but low production cost, distribution of land ownership, decrease of external production dependence and bargaining power of selling price.
From the survey of above villagers, the following information about the ADB loan-based Mae Lao Irrigation Improvement Project, was given to farmers. First, no charge for irrigation service fee and farmers can continue to use water before. Thus the farmers agreed for the improvement and the use of concrete for the construction of irrigation canals so that they do not need to undertake cleaning of the weirs in the traditional water storage system. The state officials also told them that water would be freely accessible.
Second, in some areas, farmers had no knowledge about the cost recovery plans. The local Irrigation Department officers have never raised the issue in any of the village meetings. The officials only mentioned the construction of the project.
The fact that farmers in Mae Lao Irrigation areas were not given this significant information is in contradiction to what is explained in the Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry website under “irrigation cost recovery”:
1. Farmers should participate in the study of cost recovery of irrigation system that will be constructed in their farmland since they will take the whole responsibility in the future. This construction can be compared to the construction of household water connection in which the house owners take full responsibility for the cost.