Armstrong 1

On June 30th, 1960, the Republic of the Congo, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo as it is now known, was officially recognized as an independent nation, ending its long and oftenviolentcolonial period. Within eleven days of its independence, the province of Katanga in the northern part of the country seceded, with the leader of its secessionist movement, MoiseTshombe, declaring it an autonomous state. For three years, despite the refusal of the United Nations and other international organizations to officially recognize its sovereignty, Katanga continued functioning as an independent state, partly because of Belgian support and military protection. The Katangese feared that the newly decolonized Congo state would face serious unrest between the various, disunited ethnic groups and political disorder under the leadership of Prime Minister Lumumba, whomTshombe claimed had Communist leanings. The reasons for its secession proved paradoxical; its secession actually contributed to the chaos and greater distrust between ethnic groups and provinces in the new nation, causing violence to erupt in many regions of the DRC (Okumu 1963). Its secession also increased communication between Prime Minister Lumumba and the Soviet Union in his desperation to establish stability and unity in his nation. The historical significance of its secession cannot be overstated. The focus of this paper is twofold.First, this paper argues that the secession highlighted how unprepared the DRC was for its abrupt independence and revealed the poor legacy Belgium left behindas well as Belgium’s strong interest in continuing to assert its influence in its former colonial territory. Second, this paper will also argue that the secession has helped set a precedent for the government’s limited power and the nation’s susceptibility to ethnic tensions, economic issues, and warring rebel groups, issues that still plague the DRC today and hinder its development. As Katanga was one of the more developed areas of the Congo region in 1960, with greater urbanization and industrialization, and one of the wealthiest areas due its abundance of mineral resources, the disruption it caused to the DRC’s decolonization process and formation of an independent state has proven to have a resounding impact on its development, which for this paper, refers to the peace, political stability, and relative prosperity of citizens in the DRC over the last half century.

Prior to independence, many elements of the DRC’s colonial past demonstrated the nation’s ill preparedness for independence. Since King Leopold first colonized the Congo in the late nineteenth century, the focus of the Belgians in the area had beenprimarily to exploit the region’s resources for its own economic gain. King Leopold craved the Congo Free State’s, as it was called, abundance of ivory and rubber. For Belgium, when King Leopold handed it over to the state in 1905, it was the minerals such as copper, cobalt, and uranium that it wanted, though Belgium employedmany of the same callous tactics that Leopold had (Exenberger and Hartmann 2007). Moreover, the Belgians tended to colonize regions where the resources were most abundant or where they could maximize trade efficiency. This left regions like Katanga more developed than others, sparking resentment among different groups since some were more privileged than others (Lemarchand 1962). In addition, millions died as a result of the Belgian’s brutal economic tactics. The violent means that Belgium used to create its exploitive enterprise arguably contributed to the violent culture in the DRC following independence, a culture that resulted in the ousting and torturous death of Prime Minister Lumumba (Kent 2010). For the Congolese, violence and coercion appeared the most effective way to manipulate the country’s politics, as they had learned from the Belgians.In addition, Belgium’s primary focus on economic development hurt the DRC’s efforts to develop politically and socially. The Congolese were unaccustomed to engaging in political affairs, and in fact, only fifteen Congolese held university degrees at the time of independence(Exenberger and Hartmann 2007). The colonial government was closely linked to private Western industries, protecting their economic interests, and regions like Katanga strongly benefited from the relationship between politics and economics more than others (Okumu 1963).

The period that surrounds a nation’s independence marks a critical period in determining the stability and future development of the nation. The abruptness of the Congo’s transition to an independent state put the nation in a very fragile state, which ultimately precipitated the secession of Katanga.After World War II, a nationalistic and anti-colonial culture emerged, making many Congolese increasingly discontented with Belgian colonial rule. In the 1950s, however, Belgium was in denial of this, believing that the Congolese also enjoyed the benefits of their economic relationship and that they had kept the Belgian Congo well isolated so that nationalistic movements in the areas bordering it would not infiltrate the region (Okumu 1963). The riot in Leopoldville in January of 1959 made Belgium aware of their false conceptions. Many, such as Minister of the Congo Auguste de Schrivjer, warned that the Belgian Congo needed at least four years to successfully transition to an independent state, but the fear of a potential of war similar to French Algeria and further rioting later in 1959 pushed the Belgians in January of 1960 to decide that elections for the new government would be held in May of 1960 (Kent 2010). By July, the Belgian colony would be a colony no more. The short time between the initial rioting in the Belgian Congo and the Belgium’s decision to decolonize left the politicians of the future independent state rushed to organize and enforce a government. Furthermore, Congolese political figures held conflicting views on how the provinces should be governed post-independence. While Prime Minister Lumumba believed in a strong centralized government that united the countries, President Kasavubu and Tshombe thought that the different provinces should be governed separately, which is why Tshombe’s secessionist movement in Katanga was, in part, a protest to the election of Lumumba as Prime Minister (Okumu 1963). One of the major issues leading to Katanga’s secession was not that leading figures failed to agree but that there was very little time to compromise.

When Katanga seceded, Belgian troops were sent in to supposedly “protect” the Europeans still living in the DRC, but it became clear to Lumumba and the international community that Belgian troops were primarily present to defend Katanga as it moved forward in establishing itself as an independent state. For Belgium, a strong relationship to Katanga in which Katanga relied on it for protection meant it could continue protecting its enterprises in the region and allowed it to continue exerting the same control that it had under colonial rule. Belgium made Katanga, as many historians have referred to it, a “puppet state” (Okumu 1963). Belgian intervention in the domestic dispute was an obvious violation of the resolutions passed that granted the DRC its sovereignty and that stipulated Belgium could only intervene upon the request of the Congolese government. Although Prime Minister Lumumba pleaded with the UN to intervene, the UN claimed it was not within its jurisdiction to get involved. In reality, Belgium’s refusal to remove its troops from the DRC caused a dilemma for the UN whose close ties to Belgium and the West in general conflicted with its ability to properly correct the problem and force Belgium to withdraw from the DRC. Thus, the UN presence in the DRC during this time was mainly to protect civilians who fell victim of tribalism and factionalism, not to settle territorial disputes. This is one of the reasons that Lumumba sought the help of the Soviet Union—other nations like the United States could not interfere without hurting their relationship with Belgium (Kent, 2010).

To say that the DRC has struggled in the years following its independence is an understatement. The Human Development Index, which takes into account the average life expectancy, literacy rates, and the standard of living in a country, ranks of the DRC as the 186th country out of 187 countries in the low human development category, the lowest possible category (IHDI 2013). It is important to evaluate and understand how initial obstacles like the secession of Katanga has contributed to its struggle. Ironically, Katanga, as the second wealthiest province in 1960, seceded in part because many in Katanga did not believe the rest of the Congo region was developed enough and did not want its revenues to fund public expenditures in other parts of the nation. However, its secession, a strong disruption to the decolonization process, left the Congo region even more poorly developed long-term. First, the DRC had faced an economic crisis without Katanga’s extensive commerce and mineral reserves. Second, in seceding, Tshombe and other secessionists undermined the central authority of the DRC, showing how little control the new government hadover its realm. The controversy, in dividing the country, further revealed ethnic tensions, helping spark violence throughout the DRC. It also revealed how much control Belgium still had in the DRC and how little international organizations like the UN could do about it because of their biases (Okumu 1963). Also very important was the fact thatKatanga’s secession forced other regions to consider secession as well, though they were not as successful.In evaluating the manyimplications of Katanga’s secession,the overarching issue that emerged was that its secession encouraged a strong level of distrust in a unified independent state, causing a widespread lack of faithin the prospect of a nation governed by a central authority. Even in the DRC today, there is still very little unity and very little faith in central government. The DRC is still recovering from a civil war in the late 1990s, proof of the strong disunity present in the Congo, which killed approximately three to four million people. The eastern part of the DRC is called by the international community the “Lawless East” due to the absence of law-and-order and its being host to strongholds of various rebel groups. While Katanga’s secession is not wholly responsible for the issues the DRC has faced, it certainlywas one of many factorsthathascontributed to the existing weak and fragmented nation that is the DRC.

Bibliography

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Okumu, Washington, Lumumba’s Congo: Roots of Conflict. New York: Ivan Obolensky, INC, 1963.