Deliberation and Civic Virtue -

Learnings from a Citizen Deliberation Experiment
Kimmo Grönlund, Maija Setälä and Kaisa Herne

Paper prepared for delivery at the research seminar “Political Participation and Modes of Democracy”, December 10th 2007. International IDEA, Stockholm

Kimmo Grönlund ()

Social Science Research Institute

ÅboAkademiUniversity

P.O. Box 611, FIN-65101 Vasa, Finland

Maija Setälä ()

Department of Political Science

University of Turku

FIN-20014 Turku, Finland

Abstract

The present paper focuses on the “side-effects” of democratic deliberation, that is, the potential of deliberative mini-publics to enhance political knowledge, efficacy, political and social trust as well as the propensity for the participants to engage themselves in political and other collective action. Our empirical analysis is based on a deliberative experiment, called citizen deliberation, held in Finland in November 2006. The topic addressed by the experiment was whether a sixth nuclear power plant should be constructed in Finland. We find that the volunteers who were willing to take part inthe experiment were more inclined to act politically than the average citizen already prior to deliberation; they also possesseda higher level of internal political efficacy and had more trust in the parliament and politicians. When it comes to the impact of deliberation, participation in the experiment increased political knowledge, but did not affect the participants’ sense of internal efficacy. The sense of external efficacy did not increase either, but the participants’ trust in the parliament and politicians did rise. Interpersonal trust increased slightly as well as the participants’ willingness to take a particular kind of collective action (electricity saving). However, deliberation did not to increase the participants’ preparedness to take political action.

1. Introduction

Theories of deliberative democracy have dominated the academic debate on democracy in recent years. Simultaneously with the expansion of a theoretical debate on deliberative democracy, some problems related to the fulfilment of the deliberative ideals have been tackled at a practical level. Most notably, a variety of deliberative citizen forums, also calleddeliberative mini-publics have been developed and experimented with around the world (Dryzek and Goodin 2006). Deliberative mini-publics include, among others, citizen juries, consensus conferences and deliberative polls.[1] In deliberative mini-publics, a representative sample of citizens gathers together to discuss a certain controversial policy issue. Before the actual discussions, participants usually hear experts and read briefing material on the issue at hand. Discussions are moderated and follow certain rules of procedures in order to ensure that the ideals of deliberative democracy, such as impartiality and mutual respect, are followed.

So far, deliberative mini-publics have mostly discussed pre-determined policy issues, and they have not raised issues on the political agenda, which was one of the basic ideas of Robert Dahl’s (1989) model of ‘minipopulus’. Deliberative democrats have regarded deliberative mini-publics as instruments of democratic reform, mostly because they are expected to provide a representation of enlightened public opinion but also because they are believed to enhance certain civic virtues. As the formulation of informed and reflective judgements on political issues is the main aim of democratic deliberation, civic virtues can be regarded as a positive “side-effect” of deliberation. However, the development of civic virtues may enrich representative democracy more generally (see e.g. Elster 1986).

Our empirical analysis is based on the results of a deliberative experiment, called citizen deliberation, which was held in Finland in November 2006. The topic addressed by the experiment was whether a sixth nuclear power plant should be constructed in Finland. Our experiment did not follow exactly any of the pre-existing methods used in deliberative mini-publics as it was mainly designed as a scientific experiment. The focus in the present paper is on the “side-effects” of deliberation, that is, the potentials of deliberative mini-publics to increase political knowledge, efficacy, trust as well as readiness to political and other collective action. The analysis is carried out in two stages. First we compare how the volunteered participants differ from a control group, and second we trace how deliberation affected the participants.

2. Theoretical background

In the following, we review previous theoretical discussions and empirical findings on the impacts of deliberation, and the participation in deliberative mini-publics in particular, on civic skills and inclination for political participation.Based on this discussion, we formulate hypotheses on the effects of deliberation. Although theories of deliberative democracy are based on different philosophical traditions (Rawls 1993; Habermas 1996), they share a similar ideal of collective decision-making. According to this ideal, democratic decisions should be based on public discussion among equal citizens or their representatives. In this discussion, political views are mutually justified and judged only by their merits. Decision-making based on deliberation is expected to bring about more rational and reasonable decisions than decisions based merely on the aggregation of individual preferences. This expectation is based on the effects of deliberation on individual preferences as well as the values and beliefs supporting them.

Elster (1998) explains the effects of deliberation on values by “the civilizing force of hypocrisy”. This refers to the observation that in public discussion individuals have to justify their opinions by appealing to values that are acceptable to others. Arguments appealing to self-interest are not effective in deliberation, unlike the ones referring to generalized principles of justice and public goods. Deliberation is thus expected to “filter” the participants’ preferences and values, not only at the level of rhetoric, but also at a more substantial level.[2]

Deliberation can also be expected to increase the rationality of collective decisions because the plausibility of beliefs and consistency of argumentation is tested in public discussion. Deliberative democrats thus argue that deliberation is corrective in terms people’s beliefs because it is base on a process of mutual justification. The argument that deliberation is corrective has been challenged, for example, by Sunstein (2005). According to Sunstein, social pressures related to deliberative discussion may lead to undesired consequences, such as amplification of errors and group polarization. However, there are certain procedural factors, most notably the use of moderators, which help to avoid group pressure effects in deliberative mini-publics. Furthermore, the use of expert information in deliberative mini-publics limits the pool of factual arguments put forward in course of deliberation.

The impact of deliberation on participants’ opinions and knowledge on the issue(s) at hand as have been regularly studied in conjunction with the research reports on deliberative polls and also other deliberative mini-publics. It has been established that participation in deliberative polls enhances political knowledge on the topic of deliberation (see e.g. Fishkin & al. 2000; Luskin & al. 2002; Andersen & Hansen 2003). Deliberation seems to improve participants’ understanding of the natural and social causalities relevant to the topic of deliberation. This is rather predictable considering the design of deliberative polls and also other deliberative mini-publics. The increase of political knowledge on the issue can be understood as an indication of the educative effects of deliberation and the development of civic skills.

Deliberation can also be expected to increase other capabilities required in participating in the political system. There have been theoretical and empirical studies on the other “side-effects” of deliberative mini-publics. For example, Gastil (2000, 358) has argued that deliberation increases the sense of political efficacy and thus encourages political action. In addition to participant’s knowledge, deliberation can be expected to improve participants’ capacities to comprehend and to resolve political problems. Participation in public deliberation can be expected to improve the civic skills of the participants: e.g. formulating and justifying proposals, listening to others, cooperating and compromising (Fung 2003). The improvement of political skills may be reflected in an increased sense of internal efficacy, which is a measure of individual’s subjective evaluations on one’s own competencies of political participation. (Crosby 1995; Smith and Wales 2000; Gastil & al. 2002).

Some evidence suggests that democratic deliberation has increased people’s feelings of political competence, i.e. internal efficacy, although the evidence is mixed (see Morrell 2005). It may be assumed that the increase in internal efficacy makes people more inclinedto political participation. However, there are also other factors contributing to political participation. The sense of external efficacy seems to be crucial if we consider participation in the context of representative democracy, such as voting and party membership. External efficacy refers to perceptions of the responsiveness of the political system to citizens’ action and demands (Morrell 2005).

Political trust is rather closely related to the concept of external efficacy as it refers to the extent to which political institutions and actors fulfill people’s normative expectations, such as responsiveness. It has been established that certain types of political trust, e.g. trust in parliament and politicians, increases the propensity to vote (Grönlund & Setälä 2007). It may be assumed that participation in deliberative mini-publics enhances both external efficacy and political trust. As the deliberators learn and understand the complexities related to political issues, they may become more understanding and trusting of the procedures and actors of representative democracy.

However, there are also other ways by which deliberative mini-publics may enhance “civic virtues”. Theorists of democratic participation, for example John Stuart Mill (1858) and, more recently, Benjamin Barber (1984) have discussed the potentialities of participation in discussions on public issues to help citizens to overcome their immediate self-interest and subjective values and become more “other-regarding” (Barber) or “public spiritedness” (Mill). John Stuart Mill pointed out the need for “schools for public spirit” in representative systems, which refers to different forums for public discussion (Ackerman & Fishkin 2002).

In the course of deliberative discussions, participants hear alternative viewpoints and have to relate their own demands and views to them. Participants have to appear other-regarding because self-interested arguments are not effective in deliberation. The deliberative setting can thus be expected to encourage arguments appealing to generally acceptable views of justice and public goods. “Public thinking” evolving in the course of deliberation can be expected to change the ways in which participants think about the issue at hand, but also public issues more generally. This kind of public-spiritedness may enhance participation in the context of representative democracy, but it may also increase other forms of political action, including forms of political participation that are not directly linked in the representative system. These include, among others, demonstrations, political consumerism, and civil disobedience.

Deliberation may also increase interpersonal trust. The above-mentioned assumption that deliberators have to appear other-regarding and public spirited may be generalized so that deliberative settings encourage expressions of socially desirable motivations, which, in turn, may increase interpersonal trust. There are also certain other features in deliberative settings that enhance the evolution of norms such as sincerity and consistency among deliberators, which, again, may increase interpersonal trust. The fact that several individuals are involved in deliberations helps to discover deception and inconsistencies, and the ongoing character of deliberation allow punishments for deceptive and inconsistent behavior, including loss of credibility and loss of reputation of trustworthiness. (Dryzek and List 2003). Furthermore, because deliberative mini-publics include people representing different social groups, they may be expected to enhance generalized interpersonal trust in particular. Interpersonal trust is often regarded as an element of social capital that facilitates collective action, including many forms of political participation (Putnam 2000, 19-21).

Based on the theoretical arguments above, we may expect the following, partially interlinked, effects of the participation in deliberative mini-publics. We anticipate that deliberation increases:

i)political knowledge,

ii)the sense of internal political efficacy,

iii)external efficacy and political trust,

iv)public spiritedness and other-regarding attitudes, and

v)interpersonal trust.

vi)For the reasons above, deliberation may be expected to increase the preparedness to act politically, including both conventional and unconventional political participation.

3. Experimental procedure

In this path we describe the experimental procedure used in citizen deliberation. The selection of participants consisted of three stages. The citizen deliberation experiment began by drawing a random sample of 2500 persons among all eligible voters in the constituency of Turku region in Finland.[3] A survey measuring e.g. opinions on energy policy issues and several background variables as well as a preliminary invitation to take part in the citizen deliberation was sent to the sample in September 2006.[4]At this second stage there were elements of self-selection. The survey was answered and returned by 23.7 percent (n = 592) of the sample and 244 of the respondents agreed to participate in the event.When asking about the respondents’ willingness to take part in the experiment, we offered them a compensation of 100 Euros in the form of a gift voucher. They were told that this voucher would be received at the end of the deliberation day. We also promised to cover their travel expenses and told them that the meals during the day were complimentary. A reminder to return the survey was considered unnecessary because more than enough participants volunteered.

As a third stage in the selection process we needed to cut down the number of participants so that the theoretical target sample of 144 people, that is, 12 small groups consisting of 12 participants each, could be reached. Therefore, we invited 194 of the 244 volunteered to take part in the citizen deliberation event. This final selection of the invited people was based on stratified sampling in order to guarantee representation in terms of age and gender. Within the age and gender based strata, random sampling was used. Two small groups were reserved for the Swedish-speaking minority. The experiment itself was held on Saturday, November 18, 2006. Of the invited, 135 participants finally showed up. The socio-demographic and political characteristics of the participants, non-participants and the voters of the Turku area constituency are compared in appendix 1. It can be seen that men were somewhat over-represented among the participants. It means that even though we did control for gender in accepting participants, more women than men chose not to show up at the deliberation day. Nevertheless, different age groups were represented in the same proportion as their shares are among the voting age population within the constituency.The participants were clearly more educated than the Finnish population on average, which probably reflects the elements of self-selection at stage two in the process. Politically speaking, supporters of the Centre party, Social democrats and especially the Left wing alliance were less present than the parties’ support at the parliamentary election in 2007 in the constituency. Supporters of the Green party were, on the other hand over-represented.

The topic of citizen deliberation was nuclear power. More specifically, the participants were asked to make a decision on the question of “Should a sixth nuclear power plant be built in Finland?” Nuclear power was chosen as the topic for several reasons: (1) It is a relevant topic which concerns all citizens; (2) It is an actual issue debated in the media and it has been a strongly politicised and contested issue in Finland; (3) The decision of building nuclear power plants is a part of the democratic process because the parliament makes the final decision; (4) It was (correctly) expected that the political decisions on the issue would not be made before the citizen deliberation event.

Table 1 shows the phases of the experiment. The deliberation day in November started with a quiz where we measured the participants’ knowledge on energy politics through 10 questions. The quiz also included five questions addressing general political knowledge. After completing the quiz, participants were asked to read briefing material on nuclear energy. An expert panel was then heard and questioned in a plenum. The panel consisted of four members: two members of parliament, one from the conservative National Coalition Party supporting nuclear power and the other from the Green Party opposing nuclear power; a director of communications of a Finnish power company in favour of nuclear power; and a representative from the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, against nuclear power. Each member of the panel made a short presentation after which the participants were allowed to pose questions to the experts.[5]

Table 1 about here.

After the plenum, the participants completed a short survey of seven questions measuring the possible preference effects of the provided information and the expert panel.The actual deliberation took place in 12 small groups to which participants were randomly allocated. The small groups consisted of 10 - 13 members. The discussions in small groups were moderated by a trained person. The discussions lasted for three hours, after which the groups were asked to make a decision on whether a sixth nuclear power plant should be built in Finland. The group sessions ended with a survey with the same questions that the very first survey in September (apart from the background variables), the participants’ feelings about the deliberation day as well as a replication of the quiz measuring political knowledge

Along with the briefing material, the participants also received a written description of the rulesfor the group discussions. The document emphasized respect for others’ opinions, giving reasons for one’s opinions, openness to other’s points of view as well as plurality of opinions. The moderators also read aloud these instructions. The moderators were asked to interfere to the discussion only if a member of the group dominated the discussion or if there was somebody who needed encouragement to take part in the discussion. In the beginning of the small group discussions each participant stated a theme which they considered important when reaching a decision on a sixth nuclear power plant. The moderator wrote the mentioned themes down on a board. A free debate on these themes followed.

There were two experimental treatments. Namely, in six small groups the decision was made by secret ballot, whereas in the other six groups it was made by formulating a common statement. This was the only difference between the groups, i.e. otherwise they followed exactly the same procedure. In the vote groups, members could vote yes, no or cast an empty ballot. In the common statement groups, there was a predetermined procedure of writing a final statement which all groups followed. The procedure was designed to help the groups to achieve their task, i.e. to complete the statement within the time limit of the event, as well as to avoid group pressure.The procedure emphasized the search for “meta-consensus” at the level of themes and facts related to the nuclear power decision, but no consensus on the issue itself was required (cf. Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006). We found that there were not serious group pressure effects in the common statement groups and that the discussions were in this respect “deliberative” throughout the day (See Setälä & al. 2007).