INTR13/71/72-310 R. James Ferguson © 2007
Lecture 4:
The Contested Role of Culture in International Relations
Topics: -
1. Types of Cultures: Political, Economic and Strategic Cultures
2. The Pervasive Influence of World-View in Constructing Political Realities
3. Culture and Foreign Policy
4. Cultural Diversity and Assertion of Culture
5. Cultures: Sources of Conflict, Sources of Cooperation
6. The Resources of Cultural Internationalism
7. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading
1. Types of Cultures: Political, Strategic and Organisational Cultures
'Culture' is difficult to define narrowly but remains an important concept in international affairs. At the basic level culture is 'the human made part of the environment' which can be communicated, and which provides the patterns, meanings and knowledge of human activity socially and in relation to the world (see Hudson 1997b, pp2-4 for some further definitions).
Part of the problem with culture is that it is so inclusive that it is hard to know what to exclude (Hudson 197b, p2), and therefore it is very hard to 'operationalise' the concept, hard to test its effects and make exact behavioural predictions. It tends to be a fuzzy concept, but one central to much current international relations thinking. The new emphasis on culture in international relations derives from a number of trends: -
The past decade has also witnessed an explosion of interest in the concept of culture, a development that overlaps with the constructivist emphasis on the importance of ideas and norms. Thus, Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein have used cultural variables to explain why Germany and Japan have thus far eschewed more self-reliant military policies; Elizabeth Kier has offered a cultural interpretation of British and French military doctrines in the interwar period; and lain Johnston has traced continuities in Chinese foreign policy to a deeply rooted form of "cultural realism." Samuel Huntington's dire warnings about an imminent "clash of civilizations" are symptomatic of this trend as well, insofar as his argument rests on the claim that broad cultural affinities are now supplanting national loyalties. Though these and other works define culture in widely varying ways and have yet to provide a full explanation of how it works or how enduring its effects might be, cultural perspectives have been very much in vogue during the past five years. This trend is partly a reflection of the broader interest in cultural issues in the academic world (and within the public debate as well) and partly a response to the upsurge in ethnic, nationalist, and cultural conflicts since the demise of the Soviet Union. (Walt 1998)
Rather than try to cover all the meanings of 'culture', we can start this discussion by briefly outlining three areas where culture is often found useful in understanding international affairs. They are the related areas of political, strategic and organisational cultures, suggesting that different societies may structure these three overlapping areas of human activity in different ways.
A technical definition of political culture can be given: 'Political culture is all of the discourses, values, and implicit rules that express and shape political action and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another, and ultimately provide a logic of political action' (Hudson 1977b, p10). 'Politics' is deeply concerned about power and human relationships (see lecture 2). It also tends to overlap with the five dimensions of national culture as developed by Geert Hofstede including "power distance (attitude toward hierarchy and communication), uncertainty avoidance (attitude toward rules and risks), individualism (attitude toward oneself and others), masculinity (attitude toward rivalry and consensus), and long-term orientation (attitude toward status and social order)" (Young 2002; see further Hofstede 2001). Indeed, these dimensions of political culture can also be mobilised in any self-recognised community or organisation that wields power through the use of rules or established patterns of human relations.
Leaders can often be empowered when they seem to embody or symbolise deeply help cultural beliefs of a nation (Hudson 1997b, p13). Numerous individuals or groups have staked a place on the world stage through linking cultural aspirations with political action. For example, a number of important policies have been based on political and cultural aspirations. The desire for a 'proper place under heaven' in modern China was part of the driving force of PRC policy, seeking to both modernise China and gain a stronger role in Asian affairs internationally (see Johnston 1995 for one view). The current aspirations of India to be recognised as an advanced technological power are in part based on a sense of India having a deep and refined culture worthy of a stronger role in international affairs (see Garver 2001). We can see this in recent efforts by India to engage more strongly as an equal in multilateral security cooperation, following statements by India's Defence Minister A.K. Antony: -
'Our longstanding credentials as a good global citizen will only be further reinforced by the growing stakes that we have developed in the world economy,' he said, adding India's ties with the major powers - the US, Russia, China, the European Union and Japan besides the emerging powers of Latin America and Africa were on a path of rapid expansion.
'This, in itself, is a positive development for international security and stability in a rapidly changing world characterized by multivalence, interdependence and political cooperation among the major powers,' he added.
At the same time, India's rise had given 'no cause for any apprehension' with regard to regional or international stability.
'On the contrary, this is seen as contributing to the development of a more stable world order.' (Bureau Report 2007)
France's claim to be both a cultural and military power (under several Presidents including former President Chirac) is in part based on a strong sense of the Republican tradition in France. The aspirations for German unification became a major feature of former Chancellor Kohl's leadership from 1989, based on a sense of Germany that could take up a strong and positive role in European and international affairs, having overcome many of the legacies of World War II (for Germany's political culture, see Duffield 1999).
Strategic culture overlaps with many of the features of political culture. Strategic culture essentially concerns the methods nations and other organised groups choose to achieve their goals, and the cultural factors which affect the way they seek cooperation or competition in the international scene. For example, several thinkers have argued that China tends to have a very strong strategic tradition which influences political activity, foreign affairs and defence activities, taking it beyond a narrow political realism based on Western models, though power politics is often used (see Fairbanks & Kierman 1974; Zhang & Yao 1996; Dellios 1994; Dellios 1997; Ferguson 1998a; for an alternate view, see Johnston 1995). Likewise, patterns of arms acquisition in some developing countries might be influenced by issues of prestige, affluence and status-hierarchy as much as direct defence issues (see Cha 2001). In this perspective, in times of warfare or intense conflict, certain cultural trends may be intensified, and become even more important than otherwise.
Organisation culture refers to typical ways societies structure power relations in institutions, organise groups to achieve goals, and promote economic activities. Patterns of leadership, manager-worker relations, styles of cooperation and conflict, patterns of openness and secrecy, can be affected by broader cultural conceptions. Unique patterns of organisation culture, and the relationship between political and economic systems, can be detected in Carthaginian, Roman, Islamic, Arabic, Jordanian, Chinese, Malay and Japanese cultures (in general see Moussetis 2006; Nathan 1993a; Nathan 1993b Chen 1992; Watson 1992; Ferguson 1998b), though all these cultures have also been able to adapt to chanced circumstances. The ability to build viable and strong institutions which can carry out tasks and thereafter adapt their roles has been a major feature of the American and European traditions, while others would see distinctive advantages in American, Japanese and Chinese business organisations. From this viewpoint institutions such as NATO, the OSCE, ASEAN, and APEC are not just rational constructs, they also carry varying cultural elements from the cultures that constructed them, e.g. rule-compliance verses dialogue-based institutions.
Moreover, the overlapping of these three areas suggests that 'culture' often has a very broad, background affect on behaviours and institutions, but does not determine all aspects nor totally control specific outcomes. Instead of looking at these three concepts separately, we will look at how culture is used in international affairs, using a range of examples.
2. The Pervasive Influence of World-View in Constructing Political Realities
Culture is important in influencing values, world-views, and the structure of human relationships. In general, 'culture tells us what to want, to prefer, to desire, and thus to value' (Hudson 1997b, p8). The way culture can affect attitudes and social relations has already been verified in a wide range of areas, including varying patterns of individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and cultural complexity (Hudson 1997b, p8). In summary, cultural variables can be shown to influence a wide range of social, political and business behaviours. However, it is less clear whether a particular cultural pattern in general can ever be used to predict an individual response, the way a government may act in a particular case, or the outcome of a specific negotiation or reaction to a crisis. Furthermore, individuals may utilise chunks of culturally acknowledged behaviour to meet their own ends, often in an individual or creative way (Hudson 1997b, p9). Likewise, educated individuals in the modern period often have access to more than one cultural system, e.g. an ethnic identity and a professional or alternative educational cultural base, e.g. biculturalism across two languages (see Huang 2000). Culture and knowledge systems can also be competitive and contested; they can empower some and exclude others. There is thus ‘a darker side to knowledge: the fear of failing to master it, of being excluded from it, of becoming its object’ (Hobart 1995, p49).
We can, of course, look at the way that culture influences the decisions of leaders and restricts government action through popular pressure (e.g. via the linkage of domestic politics and foreign agenda). Culture is an important context which effects foreign policy in specific cases (see below). However, at a deeper level, we can also argue that international relations in its broadest sense is itself the product of the interaction of different cultures. In this sense, international affairs are also an intellectual and cultural phenomena, 'of which changing ideas of war and peace are important aspects' (Iriye 1997, pix). Just as to some extent national communities must be 'imagined' and created (Iriye 1997, p16, following Anderson 1983), so too international relations can be imagined and re-invented within certain parameters, creating new communities of interest (see Williams 2007). Akira Iriye argues that 'the internationalist imagination has exerted a significant influence in modern world history' (Iriye 1997, p16), e.g. the vision needed to create the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as to create hundreds of diverse international organisations (IGOs, International Government Organisations and IGNOs, International Non-Government Organisations, which perform diverse international roles). Internationalism and an international orientation are also part of a cultural matrix that has formed over several centuries but become more prominent through the influence of globalisation and complex interdependence among states. Likewise, the intellectual tools accepted and perspectives used in international relations means that different nations are sometimes influenced by rather different ‘schools’ of thought, e.g. the somewhat more behaviourist orientation of much US research, the more historical trend of some English theoreticians, and new, emerging patterns of international relations analysis in the PRC (see Geeraerts & Men 2001; Thomas 2001; discussed further in later weeks).
There is another crucial way in which culture shapes international affairs. Most developed, large-scale communities over the last 5,000 years have developed a vision of inter-state relations, 'world-system' or world society, to support the idea of reaching out into this broader world (Buzan & Little 2000). Different societies took very different views on how models of this world should be constructed. China, in the imperial past, developed a system of Asian international relations based on the tribute system, with a core, civilised area, surrounded by frontier states linked by tribute, then a more distant 'wild' region, with Chinese culture viewed as a key influence across these zones (see Mackerras 1992; Perelomov & Martynov 1983). In traditional Western Christendom, a community of Christian nations sharing religious and moral outlooks was envisaged as the basis real community and international law before the advent of the modern state system.[1] Even when nation-state came to be viewed as the main source of political authority, only in the second half of the twentieth century would non-Europe nations be recognized as fit to join this club or be accepted as part of this 'civilised' community (Iriye 1997, p20). In Islam there was a recognition of a zone of peace, the Dar al Islam surrounded by a potentially hostile Dar al-Harb, the zone of non-believers where there were high levels of conflict (for one view, see Sivan 1998). If taken as a core schema, such views might call for political action. These reforming Islam has linked to a wider sense in Muslim communities that the time is ripe for further development of the role of Islam on the world stage, either to push forward and help transform a greater part of the world into the dar al-Islam (house of Islam), including the reform of corrupt governments, or to find a more lasting interaction between belief, science, and modernisation that does not undermine the pillars of faith (McAmis 2002, p2; taken up further in later lectures).
Both Christianity and Islam had certain universalising tendencies, trying to reach out to all of mankind. In the modern period, with the end of most European Empires, the state system first developed in 17th century Europe was extended to virtually all of the planet, as the world was carved up by borders based on over two hundred nation states. There has been a rapid expansion of independent states as some Federal states, e.g. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, fragmented into a number of smaller entities, many of which demonstrate serious problems in the viability of the state system (see Huntington 1996, p33-36). As we have seen in earlier lectures (see lecture 2), there are debates as whether this pattern of self-determination will continue, or whether this will result in smaller, less viable units that will still need to negotiate their relations with their neighbours. Even the Ottoman Empire, in the end, accepted that it could not organise its international affairs purely through the prism of a universal Caliphate, but began to make treaties and agreements with states such as France and Russia, eventually enmeshing itself within wider European patterns of 19th century diplomacy (see Ihsanoglu 2001; Mansel 1997)