Towards a Bioweapons Code of Conduct: Possibilities and Pitfalls

Acknowledgements The work undertaken for this paper was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) New Security Challenges Programme (RES-223-25-0053).

Towards a Life Science Code: Possibilities and Pitfalls in Countering the Threats from Bioweapons

Towards a Bioweapons Code of Conduct: Possibilities and Pitfalls

Brian Rappert
Department of Sociology

University of Exeter

Exeter EX4 4QJ

United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)1392 263353

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Introduction

1. In the last few years, many organizations and governments have expressed an interest in establishingan international code of conduct forlife scientistsand others as part of efforts to minimize present and future threats from biowarfare and bioterrorismlogical weapons. Whilenot a new policy suggestion, today there is perhaps an unprecedentedamount of attention toa codeit. Yet despite the wide ranging enthusiasm for setting up such a code, so far its functions have been ill defined and little detailed elaboration has been offeredin terms ofby way of itsits contentor plans for promulgation.

2. The purpose of this article is four-fold: first, it traces the multiple origins of codes in general and then addresses alternative initial conceptions of bioweapon-related codes prevalent in contemporary policy discussions (with particular attention being given to the US and UK). Second, in part by drawing on lessons from previous attempts to establish professional codes in the sciences and elsewhere, varied questions, issues and dilemmas are identified for consideration. Third, on the basis of this review, it describes a wide ranging ‘matrix of codes’ that might be enacted. As part of this, a detailed elaboration is given of a possible ‘code of conduct’to minimize present and future threats from biological weapons. Fourth, overall this article seeks to sharpen critical awareness of the place and purpose of codes in responding to security threats.

The purpose of this article is four-fold: first, it traces the multiple origins and alternative initial conceptions of bioweapon-related codes of conduct prevalent in contemporary policy discussions (with particular focus on the US and UK). Second, in part by drawing on lessons from previous attempts to establish professional codes of conduct in the sciences and elsewhere, it suggests varied questions, issues and dilemmas for consideration. Third, so as to generate further discussion, it provides an example of one possible code. Fourth, overall this article seeks to sharpen critical awareness of the place and purpose of codes in responding to social concernsecurity threats.

3. Although As argued, though the adoption of codes has certain common sense appeal, ensuring any code makes a significant contribution in combatingsecurity threats requires careful deliberation and concerted action. The utility of codes should not be presumed. With each stage in the formulation and spreading of codes, demanding questions need to be addressed about their aims and audience; questions whose answers depend on potentially contentious issuesregardingarms control, science, ethics, and politics.

The Origins of Codes

4. Codes of conduct have long figured as part of the activities of professional organizations; indeed in the 19th century the establishment of codes was central to the formation of medicine, law, and engineering as professions that could be entrusted to largely manage their own affairs.[1][2] Formal codes specifying standards of acceptable behavior for professionals to their clients, employers and the public were predated by related attempts to guide behavior; such as the Hippocratic Oath. In the 20th century,professional codes were further adopted and elaborated, often in response to high profile controversies.[3] In medicine, for instance, the human experimentation atrocities committed in World War II led to the agreement of the ten ethical principles of the Nuremberg Code. This was later complemented by initiatives such as the World Medical Association’s1948 Physician's Oath,[4]the Helsinki Declaration originally agreed in 1964,[5] and the establishment of institutional review boards for biomedical research in many countries.the Helsinki Declaration originally agreed in 1964, and the establishment of institutional review boards in many countries.

5. In the physical and biological sciences, historically the emphasis placed on adopting codes of conduct has been much less acute than in engineering or medicine, not least because the conflictsof interest that motivated many professional codes for the latter areas were less relevant and some wished to characterizescience as a value neutral activity. The lack of a formal code for scientists as a group and the level of awareness of ethical considerations has been a recurring topic of discussion since World War II[6][7][8] as it remains today.[9] [10]

6. Questions about the appropriatenessof the involvement of scientistsin military R&Dhas been one topic generatingsignificant attentionin Western scientific circles; one which has lead to calls for explicit guidelines. Concerns about biological weapons have played a significant part in science-military-societydiscussions. The formation of Pugwash in 1957 and the subsequent creation of a study group into chemical and biological weapons generatedinternational attention to the roles and responsibilities of scientists. Amid the disarmament movement and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s, biological weaponswere the subject of resolutions and debates in professional organizations such as the American Society for Microbiology (ASM)[11] and the AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciences.[12] With the signing of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, debateshifted from the rights and wrongs of biological warfare overall to the appropriateness of activities undertaken as part of ‘biodefense’ programs.

7. Since then various efforts have been made to translate voiced concerns into formalized codes.For instance, at least partially with an eye to biological weapons, in 1985 the ASM published its‘Code of Ethics’ which obliged microbiologists to ‘discourage any use of microbiology contrary to the welfare of humankind’, though leaving the meaning of this phrase open for interpretationindeterminate. In 1989 the US Council for Responsible Genetics (CRG) started a pledge for scientists not to participate knowingly ‘in research and teaching that will further the development of chemical and biological agents’.[13] In the 1990s Student Pugwash developed a pledge for young scientists analogous to the Hippocratic Oathto promote ethical reflection. It included the promise that individuals ‘will consider the ethical implications’ of their work.[14][15] Combining various oaths, codes, and declarations the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility launched an appeal covering all forms of military research.[16] In 1999, the British Medical Association recommended: ‘Professional scientists and physicians have an ethical responsibility to reinforce the central norm that biological and genetic weapons are unacceptable. This should be explicitly stated in codes of professional conduct in order to safeguard the public interest in matters of health and safety’.[17] In a similar fashion, during the 1990s individuals such as long time BW prohibition campaigner Matthew Meselson made repeated calls for the adoption of codes of conduct.[18] In a similar fashion, during this time individuals such as long time BW campaigner Matthew Meselson made repeated calls for the adoption of codes of conduct.[19]

8. Arguably the attention given to codes intensified in 2001 after the failure to reach agreement on a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC as well as 9-11 and the US anthrax attacks. These two sets of events have brought intersecting, but not necessarily complementary, initiatives to establish codes of conduct. In November 2001, following the US rejection of the Protocol to the BTWC, President Bush made a number of proposals emphasizing primarily national rather than international measures to strengthen the BTWC, including that State Parties consider how to ‘Devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of ethical conduct that would have universal recognition.’[20] The same month Pax Christi[21] called for biotech industries to adopt a code in respect of BW concerns.Arguably the attention given to codes intensified dramatically in 2001 after the failure to reach agreement on a Verification Protocol to the BTWC as well as 9-11 and the US anthrax attacks. These two sets of events have brought intersecting, but not necessarily complementary, initiatives to establish codes of conduct. In November 2001, partially in response to the US rejection of the Verification Protocol, President Bush made a number of proposals to strengthen the BTWC, including that State Parties consider how to ‘Devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of ethical conduct that would have universal recognition.’[22] Thate same month Pax Chisti[23] called for biotech industries to adopt a code in respect of BW concerns. During 24-25 November 2001, the 16th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions[24] debated the merits of codes among other topics.

9. In early 2002, in a Green Paper about the BTWC by the UK Foreign Office concurred with the US by including among possible measures to strengthen the BTWC a call for a code in suggesting that itIn early 2002, in a Green Paper about the BTWC by the UK Foreign Office concurred with the US call for a code in suggesting that oneit:

would be developed by academic and professional bodies to lay out standards internationally for work relevant to the prohibition of the Convention. Such codes could include, inter alia, a statement that scientists will use their knowledge and skill for the advancement of human, animal, and plant welfare and will not conduct activities directed towards the use of micro-organisms or toxins or other biological agents for hostile purpose or in armed conflict.[25]

As conceiveda code or codes would help realize the suggestion long made as part of the BTWC that practicing scientists should be engaged with itthrough educational programs.[26]

10. In late 2002 several major scientific and medicalorganizations lent support to the suggestion that codes might have some policy utility. The ASM reaffirmed bioterrorism and ‘the use of microbes as biological weapons’ violated its Code of Ethics.[27] At its annual General Assembly, the World Medical Association adopted the Washington Declaration calling for bioresearchers to ‘consider the implications and possible applications of their work and to weigh carefully in the balance the pursuit of scientific knowledge with their ethical responsibilities to society.’[28] In reply to the Foreign Office Green Paper, the British Royal Society gave its support to ‘codes of conduct that are developed by academic and professional bodies’ in stating:

Addressing issues of scientific responsibility and ethics in research is an important but complex undertaking, which can only be tackled in a number of complementary ways. One is the agreement of a universal set of standards for research that can be incorporated into internationally-supported treaties; another is a concerted effort to increase awareness of international treaties and implicit codes of ethical conduct amongst researchers.[29][30]

At almost the same time the International Committee of the Red Cross launched its ‘Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity’appeal to prevent the hostile use of biological agents.[31] As part of this it asked political authorities ‘To encourage the development of effective codes of conduct by scientific and medical associations and by industry to govern activities and biological agents with potential for abuse’ and askedscientific and medical communities to ‘To adopt professional and industrial codes of conduct aimed at preventing the abuse of biological agents’.[32] Following a recommendation by the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, in September 2002 the UN General Assembly and the Security Council endorsed the recommendation that codes of conduct be established across those areas of research relevant weapons of mass destruction.[33] The Policy Working Group suggested that codes of conduct should:

Aim to prevents the involvement of defence scientists or technical experts in terrorist activities and restrict public access to knowledge and expertise on the development, production, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction or related activities.

Beside this support forcodes of a general nature, various organizations offered proposals for proscriptions on biodefense, such as the Joint Code of Conduct statement for Biodefense Programs[34] and the Council for Responsible Genetics ‘Call for a Ban on the Genetic Alteration of Pathogens for Destructive Purposes’.[35]

11. In November 2002, codes of conduct entered the formal agenda of the BTWC when the President of the Fifth Review Conference Tibor Tóth proposed the establishment of a series of annual expert and States Parties meetings for 2003, 2004 and 2005 in the run-up to the 2006 Sixth Review Conference so as to ‘promote common understanding and effective action’.[36] In 2005, the topic for the meeting will be ‘The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists’. In November 2002, codes of conduct entered the formal agenda of the BTWC when its Chair Tibor Tóth proposed the establishment of a series of annual expert and States Parties meetings for 2003, 2004 and 2005 in the run-up to the 2006 Sixth Review Conference so as to ‘promote common understanding and effective action’.[37] In 2005, the topic for the meeting will be ‘The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists’.

12. Since then attention to a code has continued to spread and its possible advantages repeated. During November 2002, the 18th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions again considered the merits of codes.[38] That December the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons supported an ‘international code of conduct for scientists working with dangerous pathogens.’[39] The biomedical charity the Wellcome Trust stated a code could play an important role the self-governance of the international scientific community by making it‘aware of potential risks and concerns relating to terrorist misuse of research, and of the regulatory and ethical responsibilities that they hold.’[40] Despite reservations about the utility of a code from industry and funding councils, the UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee urged British learned societies and funding councils to ‘consider introducing an overt ethical code of conduct’ linked to professional membership[41]analogous to the Hippocratic Oath. This should be done if the scientific community did not want to risk having ‘ill-judged restrictions placed on it by politicians’.[42] As part of a wider education strategy to alert scientists about the dangers of bioterrorism and dual-use knowledgeThis least the scientific community risk having ‘ill-judged restrictions placed on it by politicians’.[43] As part a wider education strategy to alert scientists about the dangers of bioterrorism and dual-use knowledge, in 2004 the National Research Council report Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism argued that ‘it is the responsibility of the research community, including scientific societies and organizations, to define what’ steps are needed to minimize the possibility thatscientific knowledge will furtherbiowarfare or bioterrorismand ‘to provide scientists with the education, skills, and support they need to honor these steps. These principles should be added to the codes of ethics of relevant professional societies’.[44] In part as a response to this report, the goals charged to the recently established US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurityinclude developing ‘Professional codes of conduct for scientists and laboratory workers that can be adopted by professional organizations and institutions engaged in life science research’.[45]

13. In March 2004 the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War lent its support to establishing 'a code of ethics … guided by the Precautionary Principle.'[46] In April, as part of document entitled The Individual and Collective Roles Scientists can Play in Strengthening International Treaties, the British Royal Society further elaborated its expectations for a code, shifting its explicit emphasis towards devising an enforceable code of practice.[47] In May-June, Pax Christi further elaborated its expectations for a code and other responsive measures necessary to prevent the spread of biological weapons.[48]

14. In sum, there is a renewed interest in codes to govern the scientific and industrial community. Despite the extent and varied interest in a code or codes, there is a lack of detailed proposals about just what it would entail. A close reading of the initial proposals mooted though would suggest that there are different conceptions about who should devise codes; whether they should be voluntary or enforceable; what purpose they might serve (raise awareness, proscribe specific actions); what issues they should cover; by what mechanisms they could be agreed; whether a new code is necessary or existing ones should be augmented; and whether there should be a single universal code or varied local ones. Taking these points together, In sum, there is a renewed interest in codes of conduct as means of mobilizing scientific and industrial communitiesy. The extent and varied interest in a code or codes belies the lack of detailed proposals about just what it would entail. A close reading of the initial proposals mooted though would suggest that there are different conceptions about who should devise codes; what purpose they might serve (raise awareness, proscribe specific actions); what issues they should cover; by what mechanisms they could be agreed; whether a new code is necessary or existing ones should be augmented; and whether there should be a single universal code or varied local ones. a codecould could includeserve such diverse audiences and aims as:

* Scientists largely unaware of the possible ‘dual use’ implications of their work;

* Members of ‘the public’ who wish to see an explicit acknowledgement of concern;

* Governments who have established physical and biological containment measures that fall short of or exceed standards existing elsewhere;

* Researchers actively deliberating what to do in relation to ‘dual use’ experimental findings;

* Politicians seeking evidence that the scientific community is responding (so that it need not);

* Members of professional life science organizations who do not believe concerns about biological weapons are a significant priority;

* Would-be state and non-state actors that are considering initiating offensive prohibited bioweapon programs;

* Conscientious biomedical and scientific practitioners policing less scrupulous colleagues.

Box 1 lists in more detail and groupsed together some of the calls made about codes to further illustrate the diversity of codes on offerthinking about this topic. With the rangediversity of of aims and audiences envisioned, multiple criteria couldmight be used to judged the effectiveness of any code. These could include whether they bring about compliant behavior, challenge existing ways of thinking about the implications of the life sciences, promote a basis for an equitable disarmament agenda, raise connections between hitherto unconnected security and research issues, or prove responsive to future scientific innovations.