Reality Construction Through Info-Computation

Reality construction through info-computation

Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic,Mälardalen University Sweden

Abstract.The talk will address some intriguing and still widely debated questions such as: What is reality for an agent? How does reality of a bacterium differ from a reality of a human brain? Do we need representation in order to understand reality? Starting with the presentation of the computing nature as an info-computational framework, where information is defined as a structure, and computation is information processing, I will address questions of evolution of increasingly complex living agents through interactions with the environment. In this context, the concept of computation will be discussed and the sense in which computation is observer-relative. I will use the results of on information integration and representation to argue that reality for an agent is a result of self-organization of information through network-based computation.

Weizmann Institute of Science. "Scientists Show Bacteria Can 'Learn' And Plan Ahead." ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 18 June 2009. <

“E. coli bacteria. New findings show that these microorganisms' genetic networks are hard-wired to 'foresee' whatcomes next in the sequence of events and begin responding to the new state of affairs before its onset.

Bacteria can anticipate a future event and prepare for it, according to new research at the Weizmann Institute of Science. In a paper that appeared June 17 in Nature, Prof. Yitzhak Pilpel, doctoral student Amir Mitchell and research associate Dr. OrnaDahan of the Institute's Molecular Genetics Department, together with Prof. Martin Kupiec and Gal Romano of Tel Aviv University, examined microorganisms living in environments that change in predictable ways.

Melissa B. Miller and Bonnie L. Bassler(2001)QUORUM SENSING IN BACTERIA, Annual Review of MicrobiologyVol. 55: 165-199

Quorum sensing is the regulation of gene expression in response to fluctuations in cell-population density. Quorum sensing bacteria produce and release chemical signal molecules called autoinducers that increase in concentration as a function of cell density. The detection of a minimal threshold stimulatory concentration of an autoinducer leads to an alteration in gene expression. Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria use quorum sensing communication circuits to regulate a diverse array of physiological activities. These processes include symbiosis, virulence, competence, conjugation, antibiotic production, motility, sporulation, and biofilm formation. In general, Gram-negative bacteria use acylatedhomoserine lactones as autoinducers, and Gram-positive bacteria use processed oligo-peptides to communicate. Recent advances in the field indicate that cell-cell communication via autoinducers occurs both within and between bacterial species. Furthermore, there is mounting data suggesting that bacterial autoinducers elicit specific responses from host organisms. Although the nature of the chemical signals, the signal relay mechanisms, and the target genes controlled by bacterial quorum sensing systems differ, in every case the ability to communicate with one another allows bacteria to coordinate the gene expression, and therefore the behavior, of the entire community. Presumably, this process bestows upon bacteria some of the qualities of higher organisms. The evolution of quorum sensing systems in bacteria could, therefore, have been one of the early steps in the development of multicellularity.

E. Peter Greenberg

E. Peter Greenberg, Tiny teamwork, NATURE | VOL 424 | 10 JULY 2003 |

Turing

Turing's argument is simply that the brain should also be considered as a discrete state machine. In his classic statement, made in a 1952 radio broadcast [12]:

“We are not interested in the fact that the brain has the consistency of cold porridge. We don't want to say 'This machine's quite hard, so it isn't a brain, so it can't think.'”[12] Transcript in the Turing Archive, King's College, Cambridge.

“The remarkable success of this search confirms to some extent the idea that intellectual activity consists mainly of various kinds of search!”

“The remaining form of search is what I should like to call the “cultural search”. As I have mentioned, the isolated man does not develop any intellectual power. It is necessary for him to be immersed in an environment of other men, whose techniques he absorbs during the first 20 years of his life. He may then perhaps do a little research of his own and make a very few discoveries which are passed on to other men. From this point of view the search for new techniques must be regarded as carried out by the human community as a whole, rather then by individuals.” (“Intelligent Machinery”, unpublished paper, Turing Digital Archive AMT/C/11 p. 36)

HIGH LEVEL COMPUTATIONAL PROCESSES: SEARCH

(a) intellectualsearch,

(b) genetical or evolutionary search, and

(c) culturalsearch.

Search and sort classify (group) andconnect/relate

Search

Compare

Relate & group

Connect

Update

Sterrett, S. G. (2014) Turing on the Integration of Human and Machine Intelligence. [Preprint]

URI: /

A Revival of Turing’s Forgotten Connectionist

Ideas: Exploring Unorganized Machines

ChristofTeuscher and Eduardo Sanchez

Logic Systems Laboratory, Swiss Federal Institute of TechnologyCH – 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

PLURALISM & CONNECTIVITY OF THEORIES

PROBABLY. APPROXIMATELY, CORRECT

“The quest for machines (and codes) that never make mistakes was only a first step toward machines (and codes) that learn from them.Probably Approximately Correct is a detailed, much-needed guide to how nature brought us here, and where technology is taking us next.”

George Dyson, author of Turing’s CathedralCover, Probably Approximately Correct

PARALLEL: TURING SEARCHES & TYPES OF EVOLUTION

“This ambitious little book suggests quantitative, mathematical theory to explain all essential mechanisms governing the behavior of all living organisms: adaptation, learning, evolution, and cognition. This theory has the characteristics of a great one; it is simple, general, falsifiable, and moreover seems probably, approximately, correct!”AviWigderson, Nevanlinna Prize winner Prof. of Mathematics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

“[Valiant] grounds his hypotheses in solid computational theory, drawing on Alan Turing’s pioneering work on ‘robust’ problem- solving and algorithm design, and in successive chapters he demonstrates how ecorithms can depictevolution as a search for optimized performance, as well as help computer scientists create machine intelligence.... [H]is book offers a broad look at how ecorithms may be applied successfully to a variety of challenging problems.”

Tononi G. (2005) Consciousness, information integration, and the brain, Prog Brain Res.150:109-26.

Abstract“Clinical observations have established that certain parts of the brain are essential for consciousness whereas other parts are not. For example, different areas of the cerebral cortex contribute different modalities and sub modalities of consciousness, whereas the cerebellum does not, despite having even more neurons. It is also well established that consciousness depends on the way the brain functions. For example, consciousness is much reduced during slow wave sleep and generalized seizures, even though the levels of neural activity are comparable or higher than in wakefulness. To understand why this is so, empirical observations on the neural correlates of consciousness need to be complemented by a principled theoretical approach. Otherwise, it is unlikely that we could ever establish to what extent consciousness is present in neurological conditions such as akinetic mutism, psychomotor seizures, or sleepwalking, and to what extent it is present in newborn babies and animals.“

“A principled approach is provided by the information integration theory of consciousness. This theory claims that consciousness corresponds to a system's capacity to integrate information, and proposes a way to measure such capacity.The information integration theory can account for several neurobiological observations concerning consciousness, including: (i) the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; (ii) the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; (iii) the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized seizures; and (iv) the time requirements on neural interactions that support consciousness.”

WHY PHENOMENOLOGY IS NOT A RELIABLE BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING OF MIND, AND WHY NATURALIZATION OF MIND IS NECESSARY FOR EVERY SCIENCE-BASED EXPLANATION

GiulioTononi(2004) An information integration theory of consciousness, BMC Neuroscience, 5:42, doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42

WRONG IDEAS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS

Comments to the article by C. Koch
A "Complex" Theory of Consciousness, Scientific American July/August 2009

“It seems that unit of consciousness is the word.”

“Any organism that has to make a decision to act based on sensory input is conscious of the input that requires the decision.”

“an organism is an information processing system...so why not "any information processing system....". So then is any artificial intelligence that takes auditory, visual, tactile information from the environment and reacts to this conscious?”

1. I agree with Koch’s suggestion that behaviour cannot be the sole guide to animal consciousness (he states that consciousness requires ‘neither sensory input nor behavioural output’).

Think about it, humans can be in states where they are not conscious to their actions, such as sleep walking. The brain is receiving sensory stimuli and making decisions based on that, and yet there is no consciousness involved.

Another example is unconscious processes of the brain, such as visual and audible processing. The brain can completely filter out certain information from our visual and audible experience, descriminating what we are to be conscious to.

I think consciousness is a heightened state of awareness, and it is achieved by specific mechanisms in the brain. How the mechanisms achieve the phenomenon of consciousness is a big question, and the extent to which it can be explained by physical and biological processes will determine our understanding of it.

GiulioTononi (2012) The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness: An Updated Account. Archives Italiennes de Biologie, Vol 150, No 2/3, 290-326

Abstract

This article presents an updated account of integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) and some of its implications. IIT stems from thought experiments that lead to phenomenological axioms and ontological postulates.The information axiom asserts that every experience is one out of many, i.e. specific – it is what it is by differing in its particular way from a large repertoire of alternatives. The integration axiom asserts that each experience is one, i.e. unified – it cannot be reduced to independent components. The exclusion axiom asserts that every experience is definite – it is limited to particular things and not others and flows at a particular speed and resolution.IIT formalizes these intuitions with three postulates.

The information postulate states that only “differences that make a difference” from the intrinsic perspective of a system matter: a mechanism generates cause-effect information if its present state has specific past causes and specific future effects within a system.

The integration postulate states that only information that is irreducible matters: mechanisms generate integrated information only to the extent that the information they generate cannot be partitioned into that generated within independent components.

The exclusion postulate states that only maxima of integrated information matter: a mechanism specifies only one maximally irreducible set of past causes and future effects – a concept. A complex is a set of elements specifying a maximally irreducible constellation of concepts, where the maximum is evaluated at the optimal spatio-temporal scale. Its concepts specify a maximally integrated conceptual information structure or quale, which is identical with an experience.

Finally, changes in information integration upon exposure to the environment reflect a system’s ability to match the causal structure of the world. After introducing an updated definition of information integration and related quantities, the article presents some theoretical considerations about the relationship between information and causation and about the relational structure of concepts within a quale. It also explores the relationship between the temporal grain size of information integration and the dynamic of metastable states in the corticothalamic complex. Finally, it summarizes how IIT accounts for empirical findings about the neural substrate of consciousness, and how various aspects of phenomenology may in principle be addressed in terms of the geometry of information integration.

Consciousness Wars: Tononi-Koch versusSearle

Posted on March 17, 2013

GuilioTononi has proposed a theory of consciousness he calls “Integrated Information Theory” (IIT)*. Very roughly, the theory is based on Shannon’s concept of information, but extends this by adding a property refers to as “Integrated Information”. Information will exist in an entity when it has information and is connected. This property is called “Phi” (pronounced “phee”, written φ) and can be computed. The higher the Phi, the more conscious the entity.

Although theories of consciousness are not new, this one is special: it has high-profile converts, perhaps the most noteable being Christof Koch. Koch, Cal Tech professor and chief scientific officer of the Allen Brain Institute, is best known for his book, The Quest for Consciousness: a Neurobiological Approach. A new Koch book, Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist is largely a description of and paean (eulogy) to IIT. It’s fair to view Tononi and Koch as collaborators.

John Searle is an eminent philosopher who thinks about the brain and is taken seriously by Neuroscientists. Until recently he and Koch were on the same page. For example, Searle has endorsed Koch’s concept of studying the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC). Searle frequently writes for the New York Review of Books, and has on occasion generated debate. Notable was Searle’s 1995 critical review of Daniel Dennett “Consciousness Explained” that generated a prolonged exchange.

In the January 10, 2013 issue of the New York Review of Books Searle reviews “Confessions” and solidifies his disputative reputation**. The review is devastatingly critical. The essence of Searle’s criticism is that IIT employs a mindful observer to explain mind. There is a little man in the middle of the theory; that information isn’t information until it is “read” by an entity with a mind. There may be message in the information carrier, but it becomes information when read.***

The story doesn’t end there. The March 7 issue of the New York Review of Books contains an exchange of letters between Koch-Tononi and Searle (not behind paywall).

My read: I thought the original Searle article was clear and powerful. I’ve read both Tononi and Koch and never quite gotten IIT. I found the Tononi/Koch letter a muddle, and Searle’s reply clear. Since I don’t really getIIT, I don’t want to take sides. Opinions are welcome in the comments section. It will be interesting to see how this plays out.

Update March 18. Panpsychism is a battleground in the Koch/Tononi letter and Searle’s response. According to wikipedia, which seems an adequate source here,

In philosophy, panpsychism is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, Gustav Theodor Fechner, Friedrich Paulsen, Ernst Haeckel, Charles Strong, and partially William James are considered panpsychists.

My take: both get hits. Searle doesn’t acknowledge the “local” panpyschism of IIT. IIT has a spatially restricted, spatially centered panpsychism, according to Tononi and Koch in their response letter. That’s why my consciousness doesn’t mix with yours. If a theory of consciousness uses panpsychism, especially a special form, isn’t it assuming the very hard part, asking for special help from novel laws of physics?

Update 2 march 19 A few hours ago I re-read chapter 8 of Koch’s “Confessions”, which contains the entirety of Koch’s description of IIT. I also reread Searle’s review of “Confessions”, and the NYRB letter exchange. In Chapter 8 I searched for a clear description of “connectedness” but couldn’t find it. I don’t know if connectedness is statistical or involves causality. I also looked for an indication that IIT’s panpsychism is localized — that it is centered around a local maxima — but couldn’t find it. My conclusion is that the Koch book is, at best, a remarkably incomplete description of IIT. (and the Koch book is what Searle reviewed.) IIT depends heavily on connectedness; to evaluate IIT we must know what what connectedness means and how a system could detect its own localized connectedness without an external observer. Perhaps readers could direct us to answers.

Update 3 Jan 1, 2013. Christof Koch describes panpsychism in a Scientific American: Is Consciousness Universal?. Refers, nicely, to Searle. —

* Tononi has a book “Phi: a voyage from the Brain to the Soul“. It’s not a traditional scientific explanation of Phi, but an important resource. Seems intended to deliver the feeling, rather than bedrock substance of Phi.

**Can Information Theory Explain Consciousness? Most of the review is behind a paywall. Contact me (). Zenio permits me to send out the text of the paper, one email at a time.

*** Colin McGinn makes this argument eloquently in a more recent article in the NYRB, Homunculismwhich is a review of Kurzweil’s current book. This is not behind a paywall.

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Can a Photodiode Be Conscious?

Christof Koch and GiulioTononi, reply by John R. Searle

In response to:

Can Information Theory Explain Consciousness?from the January 10, 2013 issue

To the Editors:

The heart of John Searle’s criticism in his review of Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist [NYR, January 10] is that while information depends on an external observer, consciousness is ontologically subjective and observer-independent. That is to say, experience exists as an absolute fact, not relative to an observer: as recognized by Descartes, je pensedonc je suis[I think therefore I am]is an undeniable certainty. Instead, the information of Claude Shannon’s theory of communication is always observer-relative: signals are communicated over a channel more or less efficiently, but their meaning is in the eye of the beholder, not in the signals themselves. So, thinks Searle, a theory with the word “information” in it, like the integrated information theory (IIT) discussed in Confessions, cannot possibly begin to explain consciousness.

Except for the minute detail that the starting point of IIT is exactly the same as Searle’s! Consciousness exists and is observer-independent, says IIT, and it is both integrated (each experience is unified) and informative (each experience is what it is by differing, in its particular way, from trillions of other experiences). IIT introduces a novel, non-Shannonian notion of information—integrated information—which can be measured as “differences that make a difference” to a system from its intrinsic perspective, not relative to an observer. Such a novel notion of information is necessary for quantifying and characterizing consciousness as it is generated by brains and perhaps, one day, by machines.