Working Paper
THE 800-POUND GORILLA IN THE ROOM
US Army Civil-Military Operations: CORDS, CMOCs, and PRTs
Peter W. Connors, PhD
8165906821
Contents
(To be completed after insertion of maps and photographs)
Forward…………..
Chapter 1. Introduction…………….
Chapter 2. US Civil-Military Operations – An Historical Perspective………
Chapter 3. Counterinsurgency, Couterterrorism, and Pacification in Vietnam……
Chapter 4. Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center – CMOC……….
Chapter 5. Regain, Rebuild, Reinforce, and Resolve – PRTs in Afghanistan……..
Chapter 6. The PRT Concept Migrates to Iraq……………
Chapter 7. Conclusion…………..
Bibliography………….
List of Suggested Maps and Illustrations…………….
THE 800-POUND GORILLA IN THE ROOM
US Army Civil-Military Operations: CORDS, CMOCs, and PRTs
Chapter 1. Introduction
Immediately after US Special Forces Task Force Viking liberated Kirkuk on 9 April 2003, local Iraqi residents of all ethnic groups looked to the Americans to restore and maintain law and order in the city. Colonel Kenneth Tovo quickly transitioned his 10th SFG Soldiers from combat to stability and support operations, established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the center of the city, and concentrated on preventing Kurd-on-Arab ethnic violence. Kirkuk remained peaceful as Tovo convened a series of public meetings designed to allow the various ethnic groups vying for power in the city to vent their frustrations. For roughly a week in mid-April, Colonel Tovo was the mayor of Kirkuk.[1]
Phase IV of the 1003V CENTCOM plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) clearly spelled out the requirement for US Forces to be prepared to conduct stability and support operations as combat operations concluded. Combatant commanders and their staffs, however, focused primarily on the warfighting component of the mission, such that, in preparation for OIF, few tactical units had been adequately trained in civil-military lines of operation, such as governance, essential services, and the rule of law. Many commanders believed that civilian teams from other US Government (USG) agencies would assume oversight responsibility for postwar Iraq after the defeat of Saddam and the Baathist regime. Prior to the invasion, CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, told USG civilian officials in Washington – “You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of.”[2] Although 10th SFG Soldiers were forced to improvise, they, nevertheless, developed and successfully implemented ad hoc governance plans for Kirkuk that quelled smoldering ethnic hostilities.
Soldiers from the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team continued the civil-military mission – resolving disputes and rebuilding the infrastructure, economy, and political processes – after they relieved the 10th SFG in Kirkuk. Colonel William Mayville, 173d commander, established a small headquarters at the former Baathist compound in downtown Kirkuk, declared the city a weapons-free zone, and established a network of checkpoints manned by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) traffic police. Colonel Mayville found himself responsible not only for Kirkuk, but also for the dozens of villages, hamlets, and oilfield surrounding the city that comprised his Area of Operations (AO). “Do you know that you are in charge of a million people?” Mayville’s Iraqi interpreter asked him after an evening meet-and-greet with Turkoman community officials.[3]
Colonel Mayville helped negotiate land resettlement claims and, along with his interpreter, broadcasted a live radio call-in program geared toward airing and quickly resolving Kirkuki citizen complaints. Mayville empowered junior officers to resolve local Kirkuk governance issues at the platoon level and established a jobs program to help the unemployed. 173d ABN Soldiers soon realized, however, that each ethnic group was more intent on furthering its own political and economic interests than adopting the tenets of western-style democracy. Kurds and Turkoman petitioned the Americans to reverse Saddam’s Arabization policies and remove all Baathists from positions of power in Kirkuk. Kurds were especially determined to regain their confiscated homes, land, and other property rights. Mayville, however, refused to take sides and enforced the rule of law equally among all Kirkuki communities and ethnicities.[4]
Attached Soldiers from the 96th and 404th Civil Affairs Battalions (CAB) proved invaluable to the 173d ABN’s stability and support mission. CAB personnel managed the Kirkuk CMOC, which quickly became the primary location for citizens to interact with US military representatives in soliciting assistance or lodging complaints. Meanwhile, other CAB Soldiers helped Iraqis restore water and electricity and supervised the distribution of fresh food in Kirkuk. Prior to deployment, these Soldiers had been well trained in providing appropriate support to indigenous governments. What they encountered in Kirkuk, however, was that the city had no government whatsoever, since the Baathist city officials had fled following the liberation. The CAB Soldiers, therefore, helped Kirkukis establish an emergency council, consisting of Kurds, Turkoman, Arabs, and Assyrians, to manage city functions until official interim city council elections – also organized by CAB teams – could be held. Subsequently, six members from each principal ethnic group, plus six independents, were elected by 300 delegates to serve on the 30-member council.[5] “This is not full democracy…but it’s a first step,” Major General Raymond Odierno, commander, US 4th Infantry Division, told assembled Kirkuki delegates prior to the historic election.[6]
For the remainder of 2003, 173d ABN Soldiers continued to shoulder the responsibility for assisting Iraqis with governance, reconstruction, and reconciliation operations in Kirkuk. Civil-Military related initiatives begun in 2003 were continued and improved upon by the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 116th Brigade Combat Team during their subsequent troop rotations in Kirkuk, as governance and rule of law issues increased in importance. When asked if the US Military had been given too much responsibility, Colonel Mayville answered “today you cannot simply focus on traditional military operations to the exclusion of civil affairs, of social and political issues, of the mandate for economic development, or whatever the city needs…the challenge is to find the right balance and to make sure we get it right.”[7] Mayville rightfully took pride in the adaptive nature of his Soldiers and highlighted the way in which the Brigade had transformed as an organization initially in combat to meet the challenges of what was also a core US military mission – that of establishing stability and security in Kirkuk.
Stability Operations a Core US Military Mission
In 2005, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 that defined stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states or regions.” The Directive further acknowledged and re-affirmed that stability operations were indeed a “core US military mission” on a par with and “comparable to combat operations,” that should be “integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”[8] Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, released in 2006, further described stability operations – along with offensive and defensive operations – as a critical component counterinsurgency campaign planning. “The exact mix varies depending on the mission” and the situation in the respective commander’s Area of Operations. Commanders will often “act as diplomats as well as warriors” and interact with a “wide variety of nonmilitary agencies,” FM 3-24 explains.[9]
In a 2007 Landon Lecture speech at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates praised the stability operations efforts of US combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting the “decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term, success.” “The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past,” Gates told the Landon audience, adding “our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils… they’ve done an admirable job…and the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities.”[10] Secretary Gates went on, however, to lament the disproportional participation of civilian representatives in on-going OIF and OEF stability operations. “There is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – non-military foreign affairs programs in diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development,” he explained.[11]
Civil Affairs Branch Expansion
In the meantime, the US Army was expanding the size and proficiency of its Civil Affairs Branch, which is equally capable of performing many of the civilian-oriented roles and missions encountered in stability operations environments.[12] In the April 2009 Report to Congresson Civil Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC&IC), led by Michael Vickers, described Civil Affairs forces as being trained to “provide expertise to military commanders in their interaction with civil societies,” adding “all US military commanders are charged with overseeing civil-military operations within their areas of responsibility.”[13] The ASD Report also cited the revised definition of civil-military operations from Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 released the previous summer:
The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernment civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational; area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government.[14]
JP 3-57 further noted the following characteristics of Civil Affairs activities and operations:
(1) They are designed to enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present;
(2) They require coordination with other US government organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector; and
(3) They involve the application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.[15]
Irregular warfare (IW) – the violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations – was identified in the ASD Report as the type of warfare most likely to be encountered by US forces in the foreseeable future. As such, DoD Civil Affairs force development initiatives began focusing on potential global, long-term, irregular warfare campaigns, such as counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and stability operations in support of friendly countries deemed critical to vital US national security interests and countries in which the population becomes the center of gravity. Therefore, addressing the Civil Affairs “capability and capacity gaps related to IW and the whole-of-government approaches to stability and reconstruction operations” became an official DoD transformation priority as described in the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.[16]
Currently, there are approximately 8,000 US Army Soldiers, 90% of whom are Army Reservists, designated civil affairs qualified. Over the next several years, the Army intends to adjust the civil affairs personnel mix to roughly 25% active and 75% reserve. Each Army Division is allocated one civil affairs battalion, while each Brigade Combat Team is provided with a civil affairs company in direct supporting roles. Both generalists and functional specialists staff civil affairs battalions and companies. Generalists mobilize civilian resources and help prevent civilians from interfering with military operations. Functional specialists work with foreign nation officials to provide essential services, restore infrastructure, and develop reconstruction plans.[17]
With respect to the notion of a whole-of-government approach to stability operations, Colonel Norman Cotton, Assistant for Civil Affairs Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, reaffirms that the Secretary of Defense’s Guidance for the Development of the Force, FY2010-2015 calls for the development of “interdependent joint force/interagency packages proficient in performing large-scale, civil-military operations needed to defeat irregular threats including capabilities needed for stability operations and enabling/transitioning to civil authorities.”[18] In order to attain these required capabilities, DoD is increasing the size of both the active duty and reserve civil affairs forces and continuing to refine/transform the comprehensive military civil affairs program as it relates to irregular warfare and whole-of-government approaches to stability operations. Finally, since the military’s role is only one component of the whole-of-government approach to stability operations, DoD has stipulated that civil affairs capabilities in support of stability missions be “compatible and the complementary to those of other government agencies.”[19]
This Long War Occasional Paper traces the history of US civil-military operations (CMO) beginning with the French and Indian War. Next, the Paper describes in detail the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) project that turned around a “disjointed and ineffective civilian pacification program” by placing it under military control during the Vietnam War.[20] Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and the accomplishments of PRTs and embedded PRTs during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM will subsequently be explored in depth.
The Paper concludes by building a case for drastically reducing, and possibly eliminating altogether, the whole-of-government approach to stability operations. The entire civilian component of the currently-stated stability operations mission could be easily undertaken and accomplished by highly-trained US Army Civil Affairs Soldiers embedded with Brigade Combat Teams. Stovepiping, confusing reporting channels, and unity of effort would thereby be eliminated and replaced by a clear, concise, unity of command. In 2004, Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) commander, Lieutenant General David Barno gave his regional brigade commanders full authority and responsibility for everything that occurred in their respective AOs. Only the US military had sufficient manpower and materiel to get things done and to make thing happen Afghanistan. “We own it all,” Barno frequently told his staff – the US Army is the 800-pound gorilla in the room.”[21]
1
[1] Charles Briscoe, et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006), 364-370.
[2] General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2004), 441.
[3] Unidentified Iraqi interpreter quoted in Kevin Dougherty, “Army ‘Mayor’ Plans for Diversity in Kirkuk’s Future,” Stars and Stripes, 4 May 2003, 1, (accessed 8 March 2010).
[4] Colonel William Mayville, interview by FRONTLINE, 1 December 2003, 5, 16, (accessed 7 March 2010).
[5] Charles Briscoe, et al., 381-383.
[6] Major General Raymond Odierno quoted in United Nations Foundation, “Kirkuk Elects City Council: Ba’athists Loose Jobs,” U.N. Wire, 27 May 2003, 1, (accessed 6 March 2010).
[7] Colonel William Mayville, interview by FRONTLINE, 1 December 2003, 20.
[8] Gordon England, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, 28 November 2005, 2, (accessed 22 July 2010).
[9] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC, December 2006), 1-19, 1-22, 2-8.
[10] Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007, 3, (accessed 28 October 2010).
[11] Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007, 4. October 2010).
[12] Civil Affairs became a separate branch of the US Army in 2006. Although the US Navy and US Marine Corps each have Civil Affairs capabilities, this Long War Occasional Paper focuses primarily on US Army Civil Affairs operations.
[13] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 3, (accessed 22 July 2010).
[14] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Washington, DC, 8 July 2008), GL-6.
[15] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, GL-6.
[16] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 5; DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 24-25.
[17] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 7-8, 12.
[18] Colonel Norman Cotton, “Civil Affairs Study,” Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, Briefing, 4 March 2009, Slide 6, file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Peter/Local%20Settings/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.IE5/WO5H86AC/CA_Study_4Mar09_v2_%5B1%5D.ppt#267,6,Stability Operations – Policy (accessed 29 October 2010).
[19] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 13.
[20] Dale Andrade, “Three Lessons from Vietnam,” Washington Post, 29 December 2005, 1.
[21] Lieutenant General David Barno, interview by the US Army Center of Military History, 21 November 2006, 34.
Chapter 2: US Civil-Military Operations - An Historical Perspective
Civil-Military operations have been a critical component of warfare for millennia. After overthrowing the Persian Empire and defeating the last Persian king, Alexander the Great gave the order to rebuild Babylon and the Alexandrian soldiers soon became schoolmasters.1 Americans have been conducting civil-military operations since the colonial era. This chapter presents a brief overview of those historic instances in which the US military undertook missions that required the resources and manpower necessary to successfully perform civil-military functions involving host nation governance, physical reconstruction, institution building, re-establishing rule of law, humanitarian assistance, caring for refugees and displaced persons, and curtailing civilian interference with combat operations. The importance of civil-military operations has grown steadily over the past several decades to the point where CMO now constitutes a significant component of both the OEF and OIF counterinsurgency campaign plans, addressing critical issues such as interagency coordination, host nation collaboration, management of civilian contractors, and relations with allied nation officials and nongovernmental organizations.