"Towards ACultural Comparison of the Developmental Ethics in the Daxue and ChristianIdeas of Moral Learning."
Ole Döring (Bochum, Hamburg)[1]
Abstract
It is rewarding to review the complicated relationship between Christian and Confucian cultures in the light of their capacities to respond to fundamental challenges raised by global modernisation processes. This paper argues in programmatic terms for the hypothesis that Christian and Confucian approaches need not be regarded as mutually exclusive, notwithstanding their different meta-perspectives. A case discussion of the moral developmental program of the Great Learning (Daxue) and its significance for core issues of modern philosophical ethics, as exemplified by biomedical ethics, indicates opportunities for a sufficiently robust common moral perspective that should be pursued systematically. This paper closes with the notion that, whilst grave differences in the ritual formalities and metaphysical anthropology remain, such as about the meaning of family or the original sin, a disciplined practical focus can open perspectives towards common moral rationales. Confucian and Christian cultures of ethics share capacities for pursuing more than merely strategic alliances. They can support different levels of humanistic and enlightened critique against utilitarian or technical approaches to globalising modernisation.
Keywords
Bioethics, Moral development, Commonalities of Confucian and Christian Moral Agenda, Response to Modernity
The argument I would like to develop in this paper pursues the hypothesis: that Christian and Confucian approaches need not be regarded as mutually exclusive. Disregarding the different meta-perspectives of a metaphysical versus a pragmatic-secular oriented frame, the moral development program of the Great Learning (Daxue) and its relation to biomedical ethics, as a case in point, exemplarily indicates a sufficiently robust common moral content that can help to jointly respond to challenges of globalised modernity.
Accordingly, an ethical governance approach, which does not focus on the doctrinal groundwork, can be compatible with worldviews that do not necessarily depend upon a particular moral anthropology or ontology. Rather, they can, in metaphysically less ambitious ways, be satisfied with attending to the purposes of functionality and quality of the process of moral cultivation. In this view, conflicts between these systems appear to be owing to the rituals and social institutions, and symbolic politics. This notion has been expressed early on, for example, in Mattheo Ricci’s accommodation theory and the resulting conflicts with Catholic orthodoxy. On the other hand, the fundamental and principal companionableness of both moral systems in practical terms is materially illustrated through famous Chinese leaders such as Sun Yat-sen. Today, some of the most dedicated and original Chinese bioethicists refer to both, Confucian and Christian ethics, without concern about contradiction of faith. The content of the moral profiles of Christian and Confucian positions in ethics, with their resulting propensity for conflict, obviously depends on the priorities attached to the ethical outlook (including the question of form versus matter of the approach).
In situations at hand that require ethical judgement, a practical attitude that focuses on robust moral performance in the light of issues and general moral intentions, rather than on formal or ritual protocol will find that biomedicine and the globalisation of bioethics present cultural enquiries with plentiful opportunities to explore the meaning and normative significance of „culture”, or “cultures”, in vivo. The price of such an approach is that comparison and negotiation or understanding, on a fundamental level, is largely put aside. What might be gained, however, by virtue of the chief interest in the moral matter, is likely to confirm common basic insights and symbols of deeper moral meaning, with implications for common moral ground even on higher levels of abstraction. It is obviously not the objective of this paper to actually perform such a comparison in sufficient detail but to argue towards this line of research and encourage systematic studies towards such an end.
1 Cultivating bioethics
This is a challenge for philosophy, hermeneutics and anthropology. It also marks a fundamental step in the work on the conceptual and symbolic repertoire of ethics. The descriptive and methodical interest in matters of philology and historical studies is transcended and transformed, once we enquire about qualitative assessments of their ethical content and explore their normative impact. At the same time, these latter disciplines are instrumental in defining the range of plausible interpretations; they inform us about the facts, as far as their faculty is concerned. Moreover, this exploration, in a context of contemporary affairs, introduces to academic hermeneutics a fresh perspective, pertaining to the fabric and procedural logic of understanding. What are the differences or similarities between interpreting a highly institutionalised and firmly metaphysically rooted religion, such as Christianity, and an ethical tradition of reflected practices that clearly offers some metaphysical orientation (especially since its struggles with the Buddhism) but should be described primarily as programmatically political and secular in its moral interest, such as Confucianism?[2]
Such studies pertain to political, social critical, moral or ethical writings, when a perspective of a “good life” is concerned with prescriptive accounts. In bioethics, as the particular area of ethics dealing with issues raised by the modern life sciences, we are encouraged to go beyond the realm of history and philology proper because it raises questions about the meaning of humanity and a “good life”. It addresses the range of legitimate action, interference with nature and moral obligations. In other words, bioethics can mobilise cultural resources in ways that go beyond positive assumptions, as they are presented as being meaningful, explicitly or implicitly, symbolically or in connotation, from the view of the respective stakeholder. These questions are assessed differently, according to their particular cultural or societal context. An ethical judgement thus reflects on what it actually means to respect different cultures and societies. It cannot confine itself to political, legal and regulatory, or “experts’” approaches, as is often the misunderstood image of bioethics. In terms of religious comparisons, it provides context for reflection about how morality functions in practice, with a heuristic tendency to disregard or rationalise the related metaphysics.
However, such reference to context-specific „culture“ does not trump universal ethical considerations. Without a heuristic framework of ethics that can hold universally binding regulatory principles in order to prevent abuse of power, there will neither be prevention from undue influence of partisan morality, illegitimate domination of interests, or, coercion and injustice, nor can the diversity of individual “cultures” be appreciated or protected. It would also mean to forego the opportunity to explore moral common ground underneath the distinguishing ornaments of ordered convention. The case of bioethics illustrates how we, on the firm grounds of moral conviction but not necessarily subscribing to the same design of organised and reflected morality, may overcome ethical relativism by the very conceptual means that enlighten practically interested hermeneutical understanding itself.
Owing to the human-centered perspective of medicine, an analysis of bioethics in a given social-political-cultural context, e.g., China, or in a traditional system such as Confucianism or Christianity, reminds us of the primary practical importance of moral qualities of individuals in performing, assessing and improving of morality, in relation to themselves and towards others. It reconfirms the importance of a culturally enlightened reconstruction of social practice. The ultimate purpose here is obviously to serve the progress of ethics in medicine. Accordingly, ethics should be appreciated as a reasonable and scientific assessment of the meaningful cohabitation of the moral, legal and political normative practices in society.
2 Setting the stage: trust
A key material issue in contemporary biomedical ethics, as a domain of social ethics, is the rehabilitation of trust. The biomedical turn in medicine and health care raises questions of responsibility, credibility, and trust, which can be assessed only in view of the related social-cultural framing conditions. One theme of trust emerges from concerns about the independence and emancipation of science from secondary interests. It is guided by an interest in the sustainable development of science. Sustainable trust depends on a common basis of mutual acknowledgement among human beings, sincere taking of responsibility, and interest in mutual knowledge-related benefit, between science and society. This foundation of legitimacy stands in question, when sciences, with their particular theoretical and methodological mindset and strong economic (or political) alliances, promulgate their capability to guide society towards a better life, in their own right.
A healthy bioethics could serve as a facilitator of criticism and building of such trust. A debate of issues of bio-medical ethics, or bioethics, has the particular function to generate terms of fundamental trust in a sustainable development of the sciences in society, regionally and globally.
Ethically, trust is one of the working conditions for respect, in the form of self-respect and the respect towards others. Ideally, patients trust that doctors treat them as best as possible, the public trusts that politicians are concerned with the commonwealth and that scientists pursue a better understanding of the real world. Throughout current bio-medical ethics debates, doubt about the trustworthiness of key players is being raised. There is a tendency to take personal greed, double standards and a merely rhetorical reference to moral arguments for granted, among politicians, commercial enterprises and researchers. Ethical standards seem to support an overly individualised anthropology that prudently offers suspicion and caution rather than trust and respect. This development is fuelled by the development of biomedicine towards a market place that is regulated by economics or law and is lacking a fundamental sense of humane community. The combined spirits of competitiveness and economic rationality, when left without general moral orientation, such as by solidarity or submission under an overall and immaterial aspiration, (be it coined in terms of virtue or de-ontological ethics), could lead to dismemberment of society and communities. Such a development might jeopardise the success of the vision of sustainability and respect for human beings, as well as the integrity and freedom of the sciences. Like other social contracts, sustainability of trust depends on the resolve of the elite to make examples of honesty, responsibility and trustworthiness.
This is not a new theme. Trust is addressed as a primary value of political and social philosophy in early Confucian writings,[3] highlighting a special sense of reciprocity between trust and trustworthiness. During the Warring States Period, when the world appeared to be drowning in chaos and lack of orientation, symbols of trust were situated and systematised in a context of social or political contract.[4] Early Confucians noted that, without the presence of xin (trust, confidence), „a covenant is of no use“[5].
This observation is evidently relevant for a state of positive norms, and the law in particular. It is impossible to imagine the medical institution of an „informed consent“ form, if either the consenting party is not duly respected, or the calling party uses it to cheat, or, if public institutions fail to protect and guarantee the validity of the contract in cases of a conflict.[6] This is just one example of the dependence of normative institutions in general on the trust and trustworthiness of the agents. Moreover, it indicates that such institutions cannot properly fulfil their purpose, when based merely on a reduced legalistic or formalistic concept of practice.[7]
Thus, in the minds of philosophers of ancient China, cultivation of trust evolved as an important generator for peace, stability and development on all levels, individually, inside the family and in society. At the same time, it was confirmed that, in terms of the genesis and practical logic of moral evolution, trust is rooted in the character of the individual agent, from where it branches out and connects with other individuals, depending on external nourishment and guidance, as well as on experience of interaction. The most important moral principle and virtue, humaneness (ren), by definition includes trust and trustworthiness[8]. Xin (or: its quality of presence or absence, respectively) connects the individual in any role or function, with society and the public.
The practical implications of this concept construe the actor, (such as, in the context of bioethics, the doctor or researcher), as a responsible causal factor. The goal, to become trustworthy in order to be qualified to take a position, implies self-cultivation, namely education beyond professional training as a life long process; interaction and learning-by doing; creative thinking and responsiveness to criticism, together with sincere self-criticism and self-cultivation. It also calls for institutions that provide reliable and durable conditions that allow trustworthiness to unfold.
Trust as a practical concept is exemplified in the two positions of Meng Zi and Xun Zi. Whereas Meng Zi appeals to the individual’s efforts to promote the process of moral cultivation in terms of an expression of his true innate nature (ren xing, ziran zhi xin, that was later developed by Wang Yangming in his concept of the „good inner knowledge“, liang zhi), it is Xun Zi who emphasises, how trustworthiness should be standardised, with the help from positive authorities, normative codes and institutions, (as it can be found later correspondingly in the canonical educational reforms of the Song dynasty under the influence of Zhu Xi).[9]
3 A Confucian example
Why to begin with a focus on a largely subjective notion, such as „trust“? Why to begin with the subjective root, rather than with the principle of development, or the fully branched prescriptive model for emulation? According to Meng Zi, the beginning already bears the necessary elements required to process and guide the moral development, in a kind of genetic moral program code[10].
Traditionally, the Chinese classics have been credited with particular competence in matters of practical guidance. In our days, however, while we witness a shift of the focus of ethics towards different levels and micrologies of culture and practice, we hardly find serious references to it.
How can bioethics be encouraged to take Confucian ethics serious, as a reason-guided core of Chinese philosophy? A prominent study example is the Daxue (the “Great Learning”). Although its scope is obviously not concerned with specific areas of practice, such as bioethics, its moral development rationales by virtue of their universal practical aspirations, establish the pattern of a habitually moral character disregarding the concrete context, or, rather, prepared to act properly under any circumstance. In this sense, the Daxue can be reconstructed so that it offers a program with an ambition to systematically integrate politics, sciences, society, communities, individual and common morality, within an elaborated ethical framework and, at the same time, a concrete illustration of the stages of moral development, embedded in a hierarchical architecture of virtues, principles and policy priorities. Such reconstruction, with regard to a concrete program of ethical tasks, can serve for dialogue and comparison between Christian and Confucian thought. This program hinges upon the individual as responsible subject in moral character building.
The Daxue, on the programmatic level, is interesting in particular for its integrating approach to morality, governance, a theory of learning, and science. It includes a „scientific” assessment of knowledge (ge wu) that might suggest compatibility with science and ethics, though not being scientific in any contemporary meaning. It delineates an understanding of cultivation, on the individual (xiu shen) and polis’ (tianxia ping) levels, as a holistic endeavour toward comprehensive moral development that might be translated into „Bildung” and „Wissenschaft”, respectively. And it endows ethics with an optimistic practical telos for moral progress and moral optimism (zhi shan, neng de), challenging moral partisanship and formalism as well as legalistic distortion or political instrumentalisation of ethics. Moreover, the Daxue takes a substantially ethical standpoint that criticises and acculturates utilitarian or mere prudential consideration (“Make profit!” wei li) according to the humane imperative of “goodness” (“Embrace righteousness!” yi yi). Hence, it embraces a moral culture in a nutshell.
In addition, on the societal level, the Daxue proposes an interpretative key in order to assess, e.g., the role of the individual as member of a family and of a state, the relative meaning of particular virtues or principles, such as “filial piety” xiao, which is highlighted as core value in the unfolding process of the enlargement of moral capacity in particular by Zengzi, the assumed author of both, the Great Learning and the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing), within their moral context. It organises the relationship between individuals and communities, the particular role(s) of an individual in a practical hierarchy of norms and authorities, in different roles according to social functions (wu lun).
Strangely, in spite of its obvious ethical potential, this canonical text[11] does not seem to play a significant role even in expressly labelled „Confucian” contributions to bioethics today, or in cross-cultural studies, even when authors support the relevance of Confucian ethics. Prominent bioethicists from the Chinese mainland seem to regard Confucianism as a traditionalistic problem rather than a resource[12] to guide modernisation.
However, different voices are heard occasionally[13]. For example, Cheng Chung-ying, in a philosophical discussion of bioethics, refers to the moral transformation of human beings and „the ideal of transforming the human being, not only into a human person but into the human person toward perfection, namely the supreme moral person“, that is, the shengren. Here, Cheng observes that, though „we cannot know how biological and biomedical discoveries and inventions will help our becoming (...) a supreme moral person“, „one thing is quite clear: the idea of a shengren requires an understanding of the moral development abilities of human nature“.[14].
Cheng continues, „morality requires an inner source of development and creativity“, that „presupposes that the human being is a free and creative agent with autonomy of his own will, and that he is capable of self-discipline and self-control.“[15] This seemingly modern notion, expressing Confucian and Christian fundamental assumptions, includes the conception of a „human process-identity“[16]. It synthesizes the patterns of individual moral development and the relational or social nature of the human being, and generates a multi-dimensional concept of humanity. Thereby, it echoes other developments in philosophy proper, for example, Kants universal humanistic ethics and moral pedagogy, hermeneutic phenomenology (Paul Ricoeur), cultural anthropology after the narrative turn (Clifford Geertz), and the related studies of “Leiblichkeit” as well as achievements from critical feminism.