The Netherlands: quality assurance, the road from assessment to accreditation, 1985 – 2004

Marian Hulshof (Coordinating Inspector, Inspectorate of Education), Ko Scheele (Inspector, Inspectorate of Education), Liesbeth van Welie (Chief Inspector of Secondary and Higher Education), Hans de Wit (Senior Policy Advisor, University of Amsterdam)

1. Introduction

The year 1985 was a turning point in higher education quality assurance policy in the Netherlands. The Minister of Education announced a new higher education steering concept: ‘Autonomy and accountability’ as a result of which higher education organisations could develop and execute their own policies and were held accountable by external quality assessment. The external assessment was to be executed by peer review, organised by the VSNU (Association of Dutch Universities) and the HBO-council (Association of Dutch Universities of Professional higher education). These peer reviews were preceded by internal study programme assessments throughout the country. The VSNU and HBO-council developed protocols and guidelines for both the internal and the external reviews. The external reviews were subsequently subject to a meta-evaluation by the Inspectorate of Higher Education.

In 1999, 29 European Higher Education Ministers signed the Bologna Declaration. The main goal of the Bologna Declaration is the establishment of a European Higher Education Area. The ministers committed themselves (among others) to the implementation of comparable qualifications and degrees and quality assurance co-operation. This aim would be served by transparent quality assurance systems. In the policy paper “Choice for quality” the Dutch minister Hermans proposed a higher education accreditation system. In doing so, he pursued the following objectives:

  1. Strengthening of international benchmarking in quality assessment.Accreditation can contribute to better international benchmarking, because:

-the operation of the Dutch quality assessment system will become more transparent if a quality assessment results in a formal and recognisable quality mark;

-it will be easier for foreign quality assessment organisations (e.g. EQUIS, ABETT) to obtain a place in our quality assessment system;

-institutions can obtain international recognition for themselves by calling in a foreign quality assessment authority for an external programme review or by co-operating with foreign institutions.

  1. Transparency of the quality of education. Accreditation grants a formal quality mark, thus concluding the process of quality assessment with an explicit overall judgement with a clear distinction between programmes that meet the qualitative standards and those that do not.
  1. An independent position towards branch organisations and government. The present system of quality assessment is in the hands of the institutions of higher education themselves. Accreditation by an independent organisation can contribute to a broad, strong base for the system of quality assessment, both nationally and internationally.
  1. Consequences of insufficient quality. Accreditation can result in discontinuation of a programme at the moment the accreditation expires and is not renewed.
  1. Assessing the quality in the growing segment of private programmes. Accreditation sets the same requirements for government-funded institutions as for private institutions.
  1. Choice in assessment. The independent positioning of a system of accreditation will contribute to the accessibility of our quality assessment system for foreign organisations.
  1. Role of the Inspectorate of Education. The ministerial responsibility towards parliament will be accomplished by the Inspectorate of Education, which will supervise the accreditation system.

In 2002 the Dutch Higher Education Act was changed. That year the accreditation system in the Netherlands became effective and a new organisation was established. The newly established Nederlands-Vlaamse Accreditatie Organisatie (NVAO, the Dutch-Flemish Accreditation Organisation), has the status of an Independent Administrative Authority (ZBO). A ZBO is a way to attribute decision powers to an organisation that is formally independent, although it is financed by the Government. The NVAO can, within the Dutch law, regulate its operations, but it has no quality assurance policy tasks The minister cannot interfere into the NVAO’s daily operations and its decisions.

The Bologna Declaration also was the starting point for the development of a new quality assurance protocol. Like they did in the development of the system of peer review in the early eighties, the higher education institutions were widely involved in the formulation of the protocol. In the former peer review system, the VSNU and the HBO-council formulated their respective protocols for quality assessment: they were the ‘owners’ of the quality assurance system. In the new accreditation system, this is the NVAO’s responsibility. Institutions were able to react on the accreditation protocol and, as result of that, several adaptations were made. The Minister remains responsible for the final version of the quality assurance protocol.

In this article we will elaborate on both the old and new quality assurance system, based on policy context characteristics. The concluding paragraph will emphasize the consequences of the shift from quality assessment to accreditation over the past twenty years with regard to the ministerial responsibility and the total quality assurance cycle, as well as the European and international context.

2. Characteristics of the former quality assurance system

The policy paper ‘Higher Education: autonomy and quality’ (HOAK, 1985) marked a new area of higher education quality assurance. Until the eighties the universities of professional education were organised within the system of secondary education, which meant that compliance to regulation was seen as the principle guarantee for education quality. The Inspectorate had to approve personnel decisions and curriculum proposals.

The quality of university programmes was regulated by Academic Charter, which had detailed prescriptions of the curricula content. Until 1984 the Inspectorate had no responsibility towards the universities. From the point of view of higher education strategy, the Academic Charter was causing major delays. The global content of new curricula had to be discussed in different panels and organisations within and outside the given university. After that the Academic Council, the Education Council and the Judicial Council had to react, before the Government could approve the final proposal. On top of this restrictive character, the Academic Charter curriculum prescriptions were lacking clear indications for actual quality. It was felt that the universities needed to be granted a greater autonomy to react to the dynamics and changes in societal expectations and demands.

Corresponding with the quality assurance, the higher education planning was aimed at educational program approval, based on detailed requirements. In the early eighties the minister proposed a major change. Planning needed to be executed at a higher aggregation level, the disciplinary sector (a conglomerate of study programs). The following sectors were determined: agriculture, science, technical studies, medicine and dentistry, economy, law, behavioural & societal studies, arts and humanities, educational studies. The chosen solution for both aforementioned problems was a more interactive strategic planning system on the national level and an external quality assurance system. Within the national policy framework, institutions were autonomous to develop study programs, while accountable for external assessment afterwards.

2.1 The steering paradigm

The steering paradigm of the HOAK-policy paper can be characterised as ‘deregulation’, as a result of which the higher education system could react more adequately to external environmental developments. Permanent change and the need for continuous quality improvement call for a more distant role of the government in favour of more institutional autonomy of the higher education institutions. Regulation should be restricted to key issues, and procedures leading to homogeneity should be reduced to the minimum.

2.2 The steering model

Before 1985, higher education steering was very specific and aimed at too much detail. Because of the low steering aggregation level some policy instruments didn’t work, while others, like quality assessment had a low status. Moreover, the institutional responsibility was diffuse. This steering model was replaced in the HOAK-paper by a new steering model in which the peer review system was introduced. The role of the government was subsequently changed.

The relation between government and institutions changed from ‘unicentric’ to ‘pluricentric’ (Teisman, 1995), and had certainly all the characteristics of a policy network, which guarantees commitment of the educational field. The Inspectorate of Education was given the task to execute the ministerial responsibility for educational quality by performing a meta-evaluative role. This meant that the methodological quality of the peer assessments were evaluated.

2.3Policy

After publication of the HOAK-paper the new quality assurance system was developed. The starting point of the assessment is a self-evaluation study, written by the given institution’s staff members. The peer committees assess the curricula during a (on average) two day site visit. The assessment criteria are derived from the VSNU and HBO-council protocols. The site-visits themselves are coordinated by the VSNU and HBO-council and carried out under their responsibility.

Given that the external quality assessment was organised by the higher education field itself, the institutions and the staff were willing to accept the peer review system. The peer review system has two main functions: accountability and quality improvement, with a strong emphasis on the latter: they add to the analysis of the existing situation. In various evaluations they also judge initiated improvement processes. Through the publication of the report the institution accounts for the quality of their programs. The visiting committee observations are listed along the HBO-council and VSNU frames of reference and the quality standards, resulting in a judgement.

Due to the fact that the peer review was performed under the responsibility of the higher education field itself, a meta-evaluation process was built into the system. The Inspectorate of Education evaluates the methodological robustness of the peer review, e.g. the composition of the committee (independent experts), its working procedure, and the consistency and transparency of the report. After approving the report, the Inspectorate identifies the cases that give cause for serious concern. This evaluation is carried out on the bases of criteria, which are explicated in a public frame of reference. In the case of serious shortcomings the Inspectorate meets with the institutions concerned in order to investigate the steps that have already been taken, as well as the intentions to improve the situation. If there is no evidence in that direction, the Minister will be informed. In cases of a continuing lack of quality the Minister is formally allowed, after a public warning, to withdraw the right to grant a degree, ‘civilus effectus’, (and funding) of such programs.

Since the start of this system for national quality assessment of higher education in 1986, the higher education institutions developed internal quality management procedures. At the same time criticism on the quality of the external system was heard e.g. that the peer review reports were too general, not baring a profound critical comment, and not focusing at the specific mission and ambitions of the institution. Nevertheless, quality experts agree on the fact that the most important benefit of this former Dutch quality assurance programme was that it stimulated institutions to establish their own professional tailor-made quality management systems.

2.4Policy rationale

The HOAK-paper policy implied a rationale that this model would serve efficiency and quality, which can be expressed by the following propositions:

  1. Strategic planning in favour of regulation leads to more efficiency
  1. Quality assessment by peers in favour of compliance to regulation leads to quality improvement and accountability.

The assumption behind the peer review system was that both accountability and improvement would be enhanced.

3. The changing role of the Minister of Education

This paragraph will go into the developments within the quality assurance system with an emphasis on the Minister of Education’s responsibility for higher education quality. By law the minister has assigned the supervision of higher education to the Inspectorate of Education.

3.1Period 1986-1993 – The development of the external quality assessment system

The premises of the HOAK-paper is enhancement of the higher education institution autonomy: the government will ‘steer at a distance’. Instead of prescribing quality standards, the government will react on the basis of the higher education output. To accomplish this the higher education institutions should give public account of the study programmes quality. In the HOAK-paper the minister challenged the higher education institutions to take responsibility for organising the quality assessments. The period 1986-1993 has been used by the umbrella organisations to develop the system and to perform pilots.

The Inspectorate’s task was to analyse the peer review reports (meta-evaluation). In 1992 the Inspectorate published its first meta-evaluation report, that evaluated especially the institutional quality improvement after the peer assessments since 1989. The Inspectorate concluded that universities did not yet adequately handle the observed shortcomings. Moreover, the universities hardly reported upon this follow-up. The minister’s role in this quality assurance system was rather limited. The Inspectorate reported its observations by means of separate meta-evaluative reports. This did not lead to ministerial interventions.

3.2 Period 1993-1998 – Towards a more effective system

In the period 1993-1998, the supervision by the Inspectorate is based on article 5.2 of the Higher Education Act (WHW, 1992), stating that supervision of the quality assurance is assigned to the Inspectorate of Education. The quality assurance is described in article 1.18 of the Higher Education Act (WHW) as follows: “The executive boards […] take care, that – as much as possible together with other institutions-the assessment of the quality of teaching and learning in the institution takes place on a regular basis, amongst others by independent experts. The assessment within higher education institutions takes place on the basis of – amongst others-judgements of students on the quality of education. Inasmuch as this judgement is based on independent experts, the outcomes are public.”

On the first of March 1993, the minister and the umbrella organisations made arrangements on the actual organisation of the higher education quality assurance system and the supervision by the Inspectorate. After publication of the peer review report, each university would react officially. The universities for professional education agreed to react by means of their umbrella organisation, the HBO-council. This official comment consists of both a collective reaction and reactions of the given institutions.

Parallel, the Inspectorate performs the peer review report meta-evaluation, with emphasis on the reports’ carefulness and the accountability and improvement function. On the basis of the peer review report, the institutional comments and interviews with university officials, lecturers and students, the Inspectorate advises the minister whether its intervention is needed with respect to programmes with structural insufficient quality. In that case the minister can (and mostly will) give a so-called ‘statement of concern’, which can result eventually in a procedure to withdraw the ‘civilus effectus’ (and funding) of such programs.

About two years after publication of the peer review report the Inspectorate evaluates the institutional handling of the peer review report. In a public report, in which the individual institutions and programmes courses cannot be identified, the Inspectorate reports its general findings. In a confidential note to the minister, the Inspectorate reports on the programs with insufficient institutional handling.

3.3 Period 1998-2003 – Adjustment of the arrangements of 1993

In the 1998 Higher Education and Research Plan (HOOP) arrangements have been made for the further external quality assurance development. The new arrangements became effective on December 17th of 1998. The minister’s aim was to accelerate the peer review follow-up process and homogenise the arrangements for the universities and universities for professional education.

This new arrangement enabled the Minister to give a public warning within a shorter period of time.

As a consequence, the Inspectorate’s procedure was slightly changed. It will– after the publication of a peer review report-identify serious shortcomings. If the Inspectorate finds sufficient evidence for long lasting serious shortcomings, it will inform the minister. The Minister is not bound anymore to give ‘statements of concern’, he directly can give a public warning. This warning will be published by a press release.

If the institution achieves unsatisfactory results in the improvement process, a procedure leading to deprivation of rights and funding is feasible, although the minister can decide to postpone the public warning. If the shortcomings do not give rise for the Inspectorate to inform the minister, it will comment on the improvement measures to the institutions. After about two years (the evaluation of the institutional handling) the Inspectorate will determine whether the program has yet adequately reacted to the peer review committees findings and recommendations.

4. The system of accreditation

4.1Legislation

In the policy paper "Choice of quality” (Keur aan kwaliteit, 2000) the Minister of Education proposes the introduction of a system of higher education accreditation. Accreditation is considered to be a systematic quality assessment of a program based on a priori determined quality standards, executed by an independent authority and resulting in an integral judgement about basic quality of the program in question.

In addition to the determination of basic quality, there also is a feasibility to evaluate particular quality programme characteristics, if the institution wishes to do so. Only when the basic quality is sufficient, the program will be accredited. If not, the minister will be advised to deprive the program of its rights and funding. The minister is authorised to fund temporarily non-accredited programmes of major societal goals have to be met (e.g. teacher training programs). In that case the Inspectorate of Education will supervise these programmes.