Why one noun is defined "Mass" in one language and "count" in another tounge?
The English tongue is not as tolerant as some other tongues, with regard to possible heads of NP's. The German tongues, for example, permits adjectives as heads of NP's.
A count noun is a noun whose possible referents are thought of as separate entities.
It thus has the ability to occur in both singular and plural form, to occur with distinctive determiners (such as a/an, many), quantificational determiners (such as every, each, several), and to occur with cardinal numerals.
It does not have the ability, however, to occur with a determiner such as much.
A mass noun (also called uncountable or non-count noun) is a noun whose referents are not thought of as separate entities.
It cannot occur in plural form and with cardinal numerals, can occur with some determiners (such as some and much), but not others (such as many).
Countability is indicated in singular indefinite NP’s not by any modification of the noun, but by its falling within the domain of a denumerator.
Grammatical countability is aggravated by the semantic distinction between object and substance orientation. It is a topic of argument among linguists as to how far grammatical countability is semantically aggravated and how much it is random[1]. Keith Allan[2] dealt with noun countability preferences (NCPs). Countable nouns can be customized by enumerators and have a morphological blot of plural form: one bag, two bags. Uncountable nouns cannot be tailored by enumerators, but can be adapted by not specific quantifiers: for example much, and don't give you an idea about any number difference (prototypically being singular): 1 equipment, some equipment, 2 equipments. A lot of nouns can be used in countable or uncountable surroundings.
Since Quine (1960)[3], many linguists, scholars and psychologists have put suggestions concerning the semantics of the mass-count distinction. Most of these suggestions have the same opinion as Quine’s primary state that count nouns possess built in modes
Of dividing their reference, and thus involve reference to individuals (Gillon, 1992).
However, the study of mass nouns has spawned an outstanding variety of positions, consequential in entire volumes of debate. No less than three fundamental views of how mass nouns narrate to linguistic individuation have been put forth, each of which is discussed below the alternatives are called the “Quinian correspondence hypothesis”, the “linguistic non-specification
Hypothesis” (Gillon, 1992, 1996) and the “inherent plurality hypothesis”.
The systematic link between English mass and count nouns is known for years. Those working within lexical semantics have often cited such systematic links as instances which are vulnerable of treatment by "lexical rules" (Leech 1981)[4], lexical inference rules (Ostler and Atkins 1991)[5], or subtype coercion (Pustejovsky 1995)[6].
Brendan S. Gillon in his article "The lexical semantics of English count and mass nouns" presents the principal morphological and semantic properties of the mass count distinction; to formulate, in terms of lexical (inference) rules, the empirical generalizations pertinent to systematic connection between English mass and count nouns; and to show how such rules fit with a syntactic and semantic theory of English common noun phrases[7].
______
The scholar GillonIn his article "Towards a Common Semantics for English Count and Mass Nouns"[8] has three aims: to present the principal morphological and semantic properties of the mass count distinction; to formulate, in terms of lexical (inference) rules, the empirical generalizations pertinent to systematic connection between English mass and count nouns; and to show how such rules fit with a syntactic and semantic theory of English common noun phrases. The Mass Count Distinction in English In English, the distinction between mass nouns and count nouns has clear morpho-syntactic criteria. First and foremost, English count nouns admit a morphological contrast between singular and plural; mass nouns do not, being almost always singular.
For example, advice is a mass noun (*advices), whereas sugges-lion is a count noun (suggestions). Correlated with this are several other criteria: cardinal numerals and quasi-cardinal numerals (e.g., several) modify count nouns, never mass nouns.
For example, two drinks is acceptable, since drink is a count noun; but two milks is not, since milk is a mass noun. Moreover, little and much modify mass nouns, never count nouns; whereas few and many modify count nouns, never mass.
According to the scholar Keith Allan. In his article"Nouns and countability"[9]The customary disjunctive marking of lexical entries for English nouns as [± countable] does not match the fact that the majority can be used both countably and uncountably in different NP environments: this binary opposition is characteristic not of the nouns, but of the NP's which they head.
Nevertheless, nouns do have countability preferences; some enter countable environments more readily than others. And not all nouns occur in all kinds of countability environments. A noun's countability preference can be computed by checking its potential for occurrence in a definitive set of countability environments.
In the dialect examined In Keith's article"Nouns and countability"[10], well-formedness conditions on NP must consider eight levels of countability among English nouns-not, as custom has it, only two.
Allan has shown in his article that countability is a subcategory of the NP not the nouns. nouns do have computable countability preferences[11].
Comparison between Allan and Gillon:
Gillon has stated that MNP's and CNP's differ only minimally.
Demonstrative and quanified nouns phrases, bare plurals and bare singulars fall within the purview of Gillon method about MNP's and CNP's.
Allan has argued that countability is a subcategory of the NP not the nouns. nouns do have computable countability preferences[12].
Gillon has published his article 12 years after Allan and the semantics of NP's has divelopped in that period. It seems that the two scholars agree on the basis but Gillon has stated that MNP's and CNP's differ only minimally. Thus Allan sees a big difference between MNP's and CNP's. Allan has argued that nouns do have computable countability preferences[13] thus Gillon is indifferent to that statement.
The countability of a NP can be examined in three main criterias:
- If the head constituent of an NP falls within the scope of a denumerator, it is countable
- If the head constituent of an NP is plural, it is countable
- If his listeners do not already know the countability of the NP reference, the speaker must make it known to them.
- If the head constituent of an NP falls within the scope of a denumerator, it is countable:
one car*one lightning
a car*a lightning
each car*each lightning
every car*every lightning
three cars*three lightning(s)
many cars*many lightning(s)
no carno lightning
all carsall lightning
some carssome lightning
2. If the head constituent of an NP is plural, it is countable:
sheep
scissors
measles
physics
3. If his listeners do not already know the countability of the NP reference, the speaker must make it known to them.
This water is cold.
The lightning has frightened Caspar, and he’s hiding under the car.
A lexical entry cannot be simultaneously countable and uncountable. For example:
Englishsugar (m)
Russian
сахар (m)
Hebrew
סוכר(m/c)
This coffee has too much sugar in it.
*This coffee has many sugars in it.
В этом кофе слишком много сахара.
*В этом кофе слишком много сахаров.
בקפה הזה יש יותר מדי סוכר.
*בקפה הזה יש יותר מדי סוכרים.
סוכרים הם קבוצה גדולה של פחמימות.
In his work he uses his knowledge of writing codes.
* In his work he uses his knowledges of writing codes.
В своей работе он использует свои знания написания кода.
* В своей работе он использует свое знание написания кода.
Знание - сила.
בעבודתו הוא משתמש בידע שלו בכתיבת קודים.
* בעבודתו הוא משתמש בידעים שלו בכתיבת קודים.
The sky is blue
The skies are blue.
* Many skies are blue.
Небо голубое.
Небеса голубые.
* много неб
השמים כחולים.
* שמים רבים הם כחולים.
Water is wet.
Home waters.
* Waters are wet.
Вода мокрая.
околоплодные воды
* Воды мокрые.
המים רטובים.
* מים רבים הם רטובים.
two pieces of soap
* two soaps
два куска мыла
* два мыла
שני סבונים
שתי חתיכות סבון
alotofresearch
* manyresearches
одно исследование
много исследований
מחקר אחד
מחקרים רבים
Conclusions:
AllanhasshowninhisarticlethatcountabilityisasubcategoryoftheNPnotthenouns. nounsdohavecomputablecountabilitypreferences.
1)The same word in different languages might act differently regarding countability
2) The distinction between count and mass nouns
cannot be based on only one criterion
3) Countability is primarily a property of NP’s
James Pustejovsky in his article "The Generative Lexicon Computational Linguistics" discuss four major topics relating to current research in lexical semantics: methodology, descriptive coverage, adequacy of the representation, and the computational usefulness of representations. In addressing these issues, I will discuss what I think are some of the central problems facing the lexical semantics community, and suggest ways of best approaching these issues. Then, I will provide a method for the decomposition of lexical categories and outline a theory of lexical semantics embodying a notion of cocompositionality and type coercion, as well as several levels of semantic description, where the semantic load is spread more evenly throughout the lexicon. I argue that lexical decomposition is possible if it is performed generatively. Rather than assuming a fixed set of primitives, I will assume a fixed number of generative devices that can be seen as constructing semantic expressions. I develop a theory of Qualia Structure, a representation language for lexical items, which renders much lexical ambiguity in the lexicon unnecessary, while still explaining the systematic polysemy that words carry. Finally, I discuss how individual lexical structures can be integrated into the larger lexical knowledge base through a theory of lexical inheritance. This provides us with the necessary principles of global organization for the lexicon, enabling us to fully integrate our natural language lexicon into a conceptual whole
Quantity judgments and individuation: evidence that
mass nouns count
David Barner*, Jesse Snedeker
Laboratory for Developmental Studies, HarvardUniversity, Shannon Hall,
25 Francis Avenue, Cambridge, MA02138, USA
Received 23 December 2003; revised 28 April 2004; accepted 8 June 2004
Abstract
Three experiments explored the semantics of the mass-count distinction in young children and
adults. In Experiments 1 and 2, the quantity judgments of participants provided evidence that some
mass nouns refer to individuals, as such. Participants judged one large portion of stuff to be “more”
than three tiny portions for substance-mass nouns (e.g. mustard, ketchup), but chose according to
number for count nouns (e.g. shoes, candles) and object-mass nouns (e.g. furniture, jewelry). These
results suggest that some mass nouns quantify over individuals, and that therefore reference to
individuals does not distinguish count nouns from mass nouns. Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 failed to
support the hypothesis that there exist one-to-one mappings between mass-count syntax and
semantics for either adults or young children. In Experiment 3, it was found that for mass-count
flexible terms (e.g. string, stone) participants based quantity judgments on number when the terms
were used with count syntax, but on total amount of stuff when used with mass syntax. Apparently,
the presence of discrete physical objects in a scene (e.g. stones) is not sufficient to permit quantity
judgments based on number. It is proposed that object-mass nouns (e.g. furniture) can be used to
refer to individuals due to lexically specified grammatical features that normally occur in count
syntax. Also, we suggest that children learning language parse words that refer to individuals as
count nouns unless given morpho-syntactic and referential evidence to the contrary, in which case
object-mass nouns are acquired.
q 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords: Mass nouns; Count nouns; Quantity judgment; Language acquisition; Individuation
0022-2860/$ - see front matter q 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2004.06.009
Cognition xx (2004) 1–26
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: (D. Barner).
DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1. Introduction
An ongoing debate in the study of language and its acquisition is how syntax and
semantics are related, and how knowledge in one domain might facilitate acquisition of
knowledge in the other. One example of where the relationship between syntax and
semantics in acquisition has been thoroughly debated is the case of the mass-count
distinction, which surfaces in many of the world’s languages. In English, count nouns (e.g.
cat, table) are those words that can appear in both singular and plural forms and can be
modified by cardinal numbers (e.g. one, two), and quasi-cardinal determiners such as
several, many, these, and those. Mass nouns (e.g. milk, sand), can take none of these
determiners, cannot be pluralized, and sometimes are modified by terms such as little or
much. Psychologists have long wondered whether this distinction might be rooted in prelinguistic
ontological knowledge, or inversely, whether syntax might provide the
foundations for conceptual development.
Quine (1960) adopted the latter position, and intimated that the acquisition of masscount
syntax is necessary for individuating and tracing the identity of physical objects in
the world. According to Quine, count nouns, but not mass nouns “possess built in modes,
however arbitrary, of dividing their reference” (p. 91). Whereas cats are quantified in catsized
units, water can be divided and quantified in arbitrary portions. Thus, determining a
quantity of cats involves enumerating cat-sized units of stuff, while quantifying water
involves no such default unit of measurement. By delineating boundaries of perceived
phenomena, the divided reference of count nouns could provide the inner walls of an
“intellectual chimney”, up which the developing child could scramble to an understanding
of the spatio-temporal continuity of objects, as objects (see Carey, 1993, for discussion).
However, contrary to Quine (1960), a growing body of evidence indicates that well
before children master the mass-count distinction they have a rich base of knowledge
about the world and the physical objects that fill it. For example, studies of word extension
in 2-year-olds (e.g.Imai & Gentner, 1997; Soja, Carey, & Spelke, 1991) and numerical
cognition in infants (e.g. Carey & Xu, 2001; Spelke, 1985; Wynn, 1992), indicate that
linguistically naı¨ve children are able to individuate and trace the identity of objects, and
that their treatment of objects differs systematically from their treatment of non-solid
substances (Huntley-Fenner, Carey, & Solimando, 2002). Such studies suggest that
knowledge of objects, individuation, and identity is not supplied by the acquisition of noun
phrase quantifiers and the mass-count distinction.
Quite opposite in spirit to Quine, Macnamara (1972, 1982) suggested that prelinguistic
semantic categories might form the core of syntactic categories (see also
Braine, 1992; Schlesinger, 1971). Thus, categories such as “object” and “substance”
might be used by children to infer or build the categories “count” and “mass”,
respectively. While many of children’s early words appear to respect this semantic
categories hypothesis, several studies suggest that children’s acquisition of the mass/
count distinction is not based on an object/substance distinction (Gathercole, 1985;
Gordon, 1985, 1988). For example, according to Gordon (1985), when provided with
syntactic and semantic cues, children ranging in age between 3;5 and 5;5 years old
overwhelmingly categorized words on the basis of syntactic context, even when
syntactic and semantic cues were in conflict. In fact, when semantic cues were
2 D. Barner, J. Snedeker / Cognition xx (2004) 1–26
DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS
provided to children in isolation, only older subjects (between 4;6 and 6;0) were able
to consistently use semantics as a basis for category assignment.
As noted by Bloom (1999), mapping theories of the type proposed by Macnamara
(1982) do not capture what children seem to know about the relation between NPs
and their semantics. Various studies suggest that, very early in life children have an
abstract notion of “individual”, which is superordinate to the notion physical object.
For example, evidence exists that 6-month olds quantify over non-objects like sounds
(Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 1990), and that 2-year olds, who are just beginning to
count physical objects, can also count sounds or actions (Wynn, 1990; also, see Giralt
& Bloom, 2000, for evidence that 3-year-olds can count holes and parts). Studies of
language development mirror these results, showing that children are sensitive to
syntactic information when acquiring nouns that refer to sounds (Bloom, 1994),
puddles (Soja, 1992) and collections of things (Bloom & Keleman, 1995). As noted
by Gordon (1985), early knowledge of grammar seems to reflect an adult-like
appreciation of quantification, and seems to have little concern for semantic
distinctions such as object/substance.
Based on this kind of evidence, Bloom (1999) suggested that children might
identify count and mass nouns in the input on the basis of their use to refer to
individuals or non-individuals (see Gordon, 1985, 1988; Macnamara, 1986; Xu &
Carey, 1996 for similar suggestions). For example, hearing the word chair used to
refer to an individual thing, the child might infer that a count noun expression is
being used. Likewise, having construed a spatially bounded body of water to be an
individual thing, the child might assume that the word puddle is a constituent of a
count noun phrase. In any case where the child construes a referent to be an
individual, whether that individual be a chair, puddle, sound, idea, or unified group of
objects, he or she might also assume that the noun phrase used to express the concept
is a count noun phrase. Correspondingly, any phenomenon that is referred to by a
noun phrase, yet that is not an individual, could be mapped to a mass noun phrase,
yielding the following mappings:
(1) a. individual/count noun
b. non-individual/mass noun
Although this seems to capture a much wider range of empirical phenomena than
previous proposals such as Macnamara (1982), it is not clear that Bloom’s proposal
remedies the problems it was intended to solve. While infants appear to have a rich
understanding of individuation that spans both concrete and abstract domains, it is not
clear that the mass-count distinction is based on a referential difference of this nature. In
fact, a large literature in linguistics has debated this question since Quine’s initial
discussion of the mass-count distinction, resulting in at least three distinct views of what
the correct interpretation of mass-count syntax might be. As we will show below, none of