4500-1 (Comd CMTC/DAT)
21 September 2006
Commander LFDTS
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE REPORT –
TRAINING ASSESSMENT OP ARCHER ROTATION 3
References: A. Email Comd LFDTS 12 September 2006
B. Task Force Afghanistan (TFA) Incident Lessons Report 06-043 - Assault on Pashmul dated 08 September 2006
C. TFA Incident Lessons Report 06-045 - Friendly Force Engagement dated 09 September 2006
D. Interviews with TFA Commanders and Key Staff 15 – 21 September 2006
INTRODUCTION
1. Background. On 01 September Regional Command (South) initiated Op MEDUSA to defeat Taliban (TB) concentrations West of Kandahar City with a view to establishing the first of a series of Afghan Development Dones (ADZs). This operation represented a significant change in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations to this point in the ISAF Campaign. The 1 RCR Battle Group (BG) conducted conventional operations against a well trained and determined enemy within a Brigade directed and coordinated context. In the course of fighting this battle, a number of casualties were incurred as a result of the ground manoeuvre, an air-to-ground friendly fire incident and convoy ambushes along Lines of Communications (LOCs). Consequently, in accordance with Reference A, the training focus of the Rotation 3 tactical reconnaissance was directed to determine the lessons learned to inform future land force doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and Professional Development (PD) to better prepare subsequent Rotations and the institutional Army for Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) in the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE).
2. Aim. The aim of this report is to analyse Rotation 2 from a training perspective taking into account the changing situation reflected in Op MEDUSA in order to provide relevant deductions to inform the future development of land force doctrine, TTPs and PD.
3. Scope. This report is based on interviews conducted with the Rotation 2 commanders and key staff in RC (S), the NCE, the NSE and the BG, a review of lessons learned reports produced by the Lessons Learned Cell (references B and C), and first hand reconnaissance of the OP MEDUSA battlefield. The focus of this report is primarily on BG operations, although reference will also be made to formation issues where relevant. It should be noted that while this report concentrates on Rotation 2, these details should be understood in their wider context of events that have occurred since Rotation 0. The analysis will cover the following areas:
a. Overview of Op MEDUSA;
b. Doctrine Implications;
c. Observations on TTPs;
d. Observations on Road to High Readiness (HR) Training;
e. Observations for PD; and
f. Conclusions for land force training at CMTC and the road to HR.
OP MEDUSA OVERVIEW
4. General. OP MEDUSA was a complex operation that unfolded over a prolonged period. At the time of writing this report, the mission had yet to be concluded. It is impossible to explore every aspect of this operation in the context of this report. Rather, the overview will highlight the events that lead to the initiation of the operation, aspects of the COE encountered, the tactical mission and scheme of manoeuvre, and the initial assessment of the tactical effects achieved to date.
5. Lead Up to OP MEDUSA. OP MEDUSA emerged following a series of incidents in RC (S) in August 2006. ISR reports of TB activity, key leader engagements and troops in contact indicated that the enemy was massing forces in the Panjwayi district to the West of Kandahar City. In particular, the engagement by TF Orion in Pashmul on 3 August during which time a number of KIA and WIA were incurred, along with the defence of the Zhari District Centre (ZDC) on 19 August, pointed to the presence of a significant TB force that had adopted sophisticated conventional defensive and offensive tactics, all of which constituted a major change in his operations to this point. Commander RC (S) assessed that these forces were being massed as a manoeuvre force to dominate the region and isolate Kandahar City from the remainder of the country. It is important to note that the timing of this massing coincided with the hand-over of RC (S) to ISAF and the summer ‘campaign season’ when enemy activity has traditional been at its highest. The TB intent was likely to engage ISAF forces tactically and by inflicting casualties, create the conditions for a strategic success that would see a decline in coalition cohesion, along with international and Canadian national resolve to support the mission.
6. OP MEDUSA COE. OP MEDUSA was conducted in the Panjwayi district approximately 15 kilometers to the West of Kandahar City. The operation was mounted and conducted in a combined and joint context using RC (S) manoeuvre elements, NATO force enablers and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces. It was supported from the NSE in Kandahar Airfield (KAF) and from CSS elements projected forward into the OP MEDUSA AO. Planning and preparation unfolded rapidly within a period of a couple of weeks. The salient aspects of the OP MEDUSA COE were as follows:
a. Enemy. The TB forces operating in Panjwayi displayed a high degree of tactical sophistication. The enemy operated in teams of roughly platoon equivalent size (20 – 30 fighters) over which effective command and control was maintained. During the operation, the TB managed tactical reliefs-in-place and coordinated attacks against our forces. Defences were prepared as strong points making extensive use of natural and man-made obstacles and inter-locking arcs of direct fire with small arms, RPG 7s and SPG guns. Indirect fire from mortars was responsive and well coordinated. Obstacles on roads were particularly prevalent with extensive use of Pressure Plate Improvised Explosive Devices (PPIEDs). (Five such devices were found in a 50-metre span of road leading into a TB defensive position). Enemy fieldcraft was excellent. Trench lines (reminiscent of World War 1) were well prepared by hand and superbly concealed to evade detection by ground and airborne ISR assets. Trenches were tied into thick mud walls that proved extremely resilient against both direct fire weapons (25 mm, small arms) and C4. The TB was highly motivated and fought in place. Fire discipline was imposed in order to draw our forces into killing zones. Counter-attacks of small mobile teams were launched from flanks to attack the depth of our assaulting forces. Enemy gunnery, particularly with the SPG, was very good resulting in the defeat of a LAV 3 and support vehicles during one assault;
b. Terrain and Civilians in the Battlespace (CIBs). The terrain was extremely difficult in the OP MEDUSA AO due to the combination of natural and built up features. Enemy defences were anchored on the Arghandab River that provided a natural impediment to high-speed manoeuvre to the defensive positions. Although dried up for the most part, the steepness of the banks canalized movement to fording sites where we were vulnerable to enemy direct and indirect fires. Canals criss-crossed the manoeuvre space and proved an impediment to off-road movement for LAVs. Corn and marijuana fields (with stalks extending to a height of six to eight feet) limited visibility and provided excellent concealment for both TB fighters and natural obstacles. Within the built up area, perhaps the most significant terrain features were the mud walls and the vineyards. Mud walls approximately eight feet high and two feet thick (with variances) dominated the terrain. These made command and control difficult and provided excellent protection to TB fighters. (In one case, a breech in a mud wall was achieved only after using 10 blocks of C4 for a single mouse hole). The vineyards covered earth mounds approximately three to five feet high with rows arranged every three feet or so. The growth was dense causing one individual to describe these features as “the Normandy bocage times 1000.” The vineyards made dismounted manoeuvre difficult and were inaccessible to LAVs without engineer support. Although early September, heat was a factor with daily temperatures exceeding 40 degrees Celsius. There were no civilians in the AO as they had been warned to leave prior to the operation through an effective PSYOPs campaign (leaflets, police notification, leader engagement). The number of civilians displaced by the operation is thought to be approximately 15,000; and
c. Friendly Forces. RC (S) conducted the operation as a combined, joint task force. Manoeuvre elements were comprised of the CA BG, TF 31 (a Afghan Kandak with a US Embedded Training Team), Mohawk 6 (a US infantry company mounted in HUMVEEs), Task Force Grizzly (an ad hoc US force formed from US and CA elements), DK Reconnaissance squadron, a NL infantry company (-), and a SOF task force. Combat enablers in the form of indirect fire, Predator and Sperwer UAVs, Spectre gunships and CAS were provided through a combination of ISAF and CJTF-76 assets. Two US Route Clearance Packages (RCPs) consisting of three specially configured vehicles each for IED detection and defeat were grouped with RC (S) and the 1 RCR BG. Manoeuvre elements were made available for OP MEDUSA due to the shifting of UK and NL forces to FOB MARTELLO and SPIN BOLDAK to assume security tasks. An NSE forward command post was collocated with the forward BG HQ along with a commodity point for combat supplies
7. Mission and Scheme of Manoeuvre. The following were the missions and schemes of manoeuvre for the Brigade and 1 RCR BG:
a. RC (S) Brigade. The RC (S) mission was to defeat the TB in Pashmul in order to set the conditions for the establishment of the Kandahar ADZ. Commander RC (S)’s intent was to disrupt the TB in the district, achieve security for the local population and freedom of manoeuvre for aid agencies, complete Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to achieve rapid reconstruction, and subsequently develop the region’s governance and economic capacity. The scheme of manoeuvre involved four phases: first, shaping the AO through an intense use of air and indirect fires; second, disruption of TB forces through the conduct of brigade manoeuvre; third, exploitation of success to the West of Panjwayi to create a secure zone for the ADZ; and fourth, stabilization operations to support the return and security of the population in the region. It should be noted that the shaping phase of the mission was abbreviated and Commander RC (S) was required to initiate manoeuvre earlier than originally planned. This was due to the window of availability of key enablers, such as Predator, that were required for OP MOUNTAIN FURY in RC (E) that was running concurrently with OP MEDUSA. During subsequent phases, Commander RC (S) used simultaneous ground manoeuvre of BG and TF elements, initially on converging axes, to attack the flanks of the enemy positions. TB concentrations were then destroyed piecemeal through overwhelming fires throughout the depth of their defences. Artillery fire was particularly effective and was employed extensively by manoeuvre elements in contact and SOF deployed in depth OPs. Manoeuvre feints were regularly used to divert enemy attention from main effort manoeuvre and to force the TB to expose themselves so that they could be destroyed through direct and indirect fires; and
b. 1 RCR BG. At the BG level, manoeuvre resembled traditional advance to contact with reconnaissance elements leading, supported by RCPs, to define the enemy and the going. Companies secured terrain and leapfrogged to maintain momentum. Fire support was provided through a combination of indirect fire coordinated by FOO/FACs and direct fire from support positions either within the BG or elsewhere within the formation scheme of manoeuvre. The incident on 03 September described at Reference B occurred at the outset of the mission when the enemy picture was incomplete and without ground reconnaissance elements leading the advance. At the time of writing this report, the BG was still transitioning from phase 3 to 4 of the mission.
8. Tactical Assessment. At the tactical level, OP MEDUSA was a highly successful mission that resulted in a significant reversal for TB forces massed in Panjwayi district. TB intentions to isolate Kandahar City were foiled and enemy forces suffered hundreds of casualties. As well, to this point in the operation, there are some indications that popular support for ISAF has increased in Panjwayi district as a result of OP MEDUSA. However, it is expected that the kinetic effects of OP MEDUSA will be transitory. The TB has demonstrated that they are adept at infiltrating fighters into the region and it is expected that enemy force numbers will be replenished in the coming months. Consequently, there is no belief that the TB movement has been defeated in Kandahar province, nor in RC (S). Still, it is believed that it will be a few months before the TB attempt to mass forces again. Ironically, there is some unofficial suggestion that the TB will enter into a more dangerous posture reverting back to terrorist tactics involving the use of suicide bombers and IEDs to inflict casualties on ISAF forces. This assessment acquired some credibility on 18 September when an IED inflicted numerous casualties on the 1 RCR BG.
DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF OP MEDUSA
9. General. Insurgencies are generally thought to occur in three stages: terrorist tactics, guerrilla hit-and-run operations and conventional operations when the insurgency is able to mass forces and considers that the conditions are right to engage military forces in sustained operations. OP MEDUSA was a brigade level conventional operation in the context of COIN. While the transition to conventional offensive manoeuvre imposed a number of challenges on Rotation 2, existing land force tactical doctrine for offensive operations was applied successfully and determined to be sound. Obstacle crossing, employment of ISR, manoeuvre and fire coordination are all examples where commanders thought that CA doctrine served them well. It was noted that achieving simultaneity of manoeuvre, (i.e. manoeuvre on converging axes, attacking with direct and indirect fires, manoeuvring and applying fires through the depth of the enemy), proved decisive in destroying TB fighters or forcing them to withdraw from strong points to facilitate their destruction. From a doctrinal perspective, problems were incurred when extant doctrine was not followed - the attack of 03 September that was lead without ground reconnaissance is a case in point. The focus of this report is where discrete aspects of tactical doctrine were found to be lacking or refinements to existing doctrine are required.