Case #2: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Page 2 of 7
ISP-202: Central Challenges in American Foreign Policy – Graham Allison
Case #2: Blocking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
Distributed: February 14, 2007
Due: February 26, 2007
Situation:
The world is as it is today. All conditions relevant to the case are materially the same as they were on February 14, 2007[1], except for the hypotheticals introduced specifically in the case.
As the conditions in Iraq deteriorate, the rise of Iran becomes more vivid. Elimination of the Taliban to the East and Saddam to the West has left Iran as the major power in the region. After fighting Israel to a standstill last summer, Iran’s client, Hezbollah, has emerged as the dominant political force in Lebanon. Many now foresee the rise of Shiite power across the Arab crescent. With the wind at its back, Iran’s nuclear program is on track to cross the point of no return this year.
The official U.S. intelligence estimate predicts that Iran will not acquire a bomb until “early to mid next decade.” In November 2006, however, the then-Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte pulled together an entirely private “Team B” effort to reassess that timeline. In a “President’s and Vice President’s Eyes Only” memo, Negroponte concluded that Iran is significantly further advanced than previously thought, its “technical delays” having been essentially tactical. In Negroponte’s view, Iran is now most likely on a fast track that will produce a bomb’s worth of HEU by the end of 2007 or early 2008.
This possibility has motivated President Bush’s new urgency in addressing the Iranian challenge. Visible in the President’s State of the Union, the administration is deliberately taking a more confrontational approach to Iran. Vice President Cheney’s national security adviser John Hannah has declared 2007 “the year of Iran.” Critics are now worrying that the administration’s approach risks provoking an escalation that could lead to war. The President’s view is that “rattling his cage” in ways that remind Iran’s leaders of America’s military power should make them more willing to deal.
Secretary Rice sees Iran’s nuclear challenge a “Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion.” The administration has identified two bright lines of special concern: (1) technical independence, that is, knowledge of how to construct and operate a cascade of centrifuges so that, if interrupted, Natanz could be replicated; and (2) operation of 3,000+ centrifuges in a cascade continuously for nine months to produce the first bomb’s worth of highly enriched uranium.
The President is clearly frustrated. In private, he recognizes that his administration’s approach to North Korea failed to prevent North Korea producing a stockpile of plutonium—indeed, testing a nuclear bomb. He is determined not to allow Iran to become the second new nuclear state on his watch. As he has said, the U.S. “will not allow the regime in Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons.” But the more he and others in the administration examine the military attack option, the less attractive it appears. He is convinced that the U.S. can destroy all the targets we can identify (and that Israel can do so as well). But a military attack is unlikely to erase knowledge from the heads of people who acquire technical competence in constructing and running a cascade of centrifuges. Furthermore, air strikes cannot destroy targets that we have not identified, including possible parallel covert cascades. Moreover, as the administration has examined the list of actions Iran could take in response to an American attack on its nuclear facilities, and the likely retaliation others in the Muslim and Arab world would take against American and allies’ interests, this path seem even less attractive.
On the diplomatic front, the President has concluded that the sanction route is almost certainly too weak and too slow to prevent Iran’s reaching its goal line. This view was reinforced by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana’s assessment last week that the European strategy of negotiations and economic sanctions will not be enough to halt Iran’s nuclear bomb. The U.S. won a very modest victory when it successfully lobbied the IAEA to suspend 22 out of its 55 technical nuclear aid programs with Iran, and the State Department is confident that on February 21st the IAEA will report to the UN Security Council that Iran has failed to comply with its demand that it stop enriching uranium. But the next round of negotiations to impose stronger sanctions will expose sharply the differences among sanctioneers. Both Russia and China are opposed to Iran acquiring nuclear bombs. But both have concluded that this outcome is probably inevitable. Neither is prepared to pay significant short-term economic costs to slow or prevent this happening. The White House suspects that both countries see the sanctions process primarily as a mechanism to keep the U.S. engaged so it doesn’t attack Iran.
The administration’s newfound urgency on this issue is only heightened by reports of Iran’s recent success at operating two 164 centrifuge cascades in it pilot enrichment facility, linking the two cascades, feeding UF6 into them, and fast-tracking installation of the 3,000 centrifuges in an underground facility that will give them industrial-scale enrichment.
Assignment:
The President and the Secretary of State have concluded that they need a serious strategic reassessment of our strategy to block Iran’s nuclear weapons program. As the new member of the policy team, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte has been given this assignment. His task is to start afresh and to reexamine our position today, our national interests, and our options. Specifically, the President and the Secretary have asked Negroponte to be inventive in exploring options between acquiesce and attack that best protect and advance American national interests.
Known for your capacity for strategic thinking while on Nicholas Burns’ team, Negroponte has hired you to assist him in finding a path between these two options. He asks you to write a three-page analytic options memo (or one-page outline or group presentation) that presents three “outside the box” strategies for resolving this conflict, evaluates the pros and cons of each, and makes a recommendation.
The President has told Negroponte specifically that he should not be constrained by prior positions taken by the administration. The task is to be inventive, to be prepared to use all the sticks and carrots in the American arsenal, and, indeed, everything in the international arsenal that can feasibly be mobilized to this end. Our operational objective, the President reiterated, is to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons within the foreseeable future, by which he said he means at least five years.
Logistics:
Per the SOP, group presentations are to be no longer than 10 minutes. Groups must post their presentations to the course website AND either email Professor Allison an electronic copy of their presentation (preferred) to , or bring a hard copy to his office (L-368) no later than 11:00 AM on February 26th for his review prior to class.
Memos and outlines should be submitted to the course website no later than 11:00 AM on February 26. In addition you are required to bring 2 hardcopies of the assignment to class. No late papers will be accepted.
For those students writing a memo or outline, you are permitted (not required) to attach an appendix of no longer than one-half page that identifies questions of fact or analysis to which you do not know the answer, but that you believe the individual writing the memo in the real world would be able to answer. These questions should have a decisive influence on your analysis and/or recommendations. List the questions and then provide some indication as to who, where, or how these questions would likely be answered.
All course assistants are available to answer questions regarding this case during their office hours. However, the CA principally responsible for this case is Ashely Stover ().
Case Background Material:
You will find extensive background material in your course packets and the supplementary articles handed out in class and posted on the course website with the case. However, you are not confined to the readings in the syllabus and are welcome to reach out to other sources of information. Your memo, outline, or presentation, however, must be strictly your own work, and in the case of the presentation, your group’s work.
In addition to the assigned readings, further information can be found at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/ (Carnegie Endowment: Proliferation News)
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/ (Nuclear Threat Initiative: Iran)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/index.html (Global Security; Iran Special Weapons Guide)
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/index.html (Institute of Science and International Security: Iran)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6979727/ (Interactive of Iran’s nuclear facilities)
Appendix: Timeline: Iran[2]
Iranian Revolution
1979
February 1: The Islamic fundamentalist, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, returns to Iran following 14 years of exile
in Iraq and France for opposing the regime.
April 1: The Islamic Republic of Iran is proclaimed following a referendum.
November 4: Islamic militants take 52 Americans hostage inside the US embassy in Tehran. They demand the
extradition of the Shah, in the US at the time for medical treatment, to face trial in Iran.
Iran-Iraq war
1980 – Iraq invades Iran following border skirmishes and a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. This marks
the beginning of a war that will last eight years.
1981 – The American hostages are released, ending 444 days in captivity.
1985 – After the US and Soviet Union halt arms supplies, the US attempts to win the release of hostages in
Lebanon by offering secret arms deals. This will later become known as the Iran-Contra affair.
1988 – Iran accepts a ceasefire agreement with Iraq following negotiations in Geneva under the aegis of the UN.
1989 – Ayatollah Khomeini dies. On June 4th, President Khamene'i is appointed as new Supreme Leader.
US imposes sanctions
1995 – US imposes oil and trade sanctions over Iran's alleged sponsorship of terrorism, attempts to acquire
nuclear arms, and hostility to the Middle East process. Iran denies the charges.
1997 – Mohammad Khatami, a reformist, wins the presidential election with 70% of the vote, beating the
preferred candidate of the conservative ruling elite.
1998 – Iran deploys thousands of troops on its border with Afghanistan after the Taliban admits killing eight
Iranian diplomats and a journalist.
2000 – Liberals and supporters of Khatami win 170 of the 290 seats in the February Majlis elections, thus
gaining control of parliament, previously dominated by conservatives since the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Khatami's second term
2001 – President Khatami is re-elected after winning just under 77% of the vote.
2002 – US President George Bush describes Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil", warning of the
danger of long-range missiles being developed in these countries.
2002 – Russian begins construction of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr despite strong objections from US.
2003 – UN nuclear watchdog, IAEA, gives Tehran weeks to prove it is not pursuing an atomic weapons program.
November: Iran says it is suspending its uranium enrichment program and will allow tougher UN
inspections of its nuclear facilities. IAEA concludes there is no evidence of a weapons program but cannot rule out the possibility.
Conservative resurgence
2004 – June: Iran is rebuked by the IAEA for failing to fully cooperate with an inquiry into its nuclear activities.
November: Iran agrees to suspend most of its uranium enrichment while in talks with the EU.
2005 – May: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran's ultra-conservative mayor, wins presidential run-off elections.
Nuclear crisis
2005 – Late 2005: Tehran says it has resumed uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant and insists the program is
for peaceful purposes. IAEA finds Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2006 – January: Iran breaks IAEA seals at its Natanz nuclear research facility.
February: IAEA votes to report Iran to the UN Security Council over its nuclear activities. Iran resumes
uranium enrichment at Natanz.
April: Iran says it has succeeded in enriching uranium to 3.5% at its Natanz facility.
August 31: UNSC deadline for Iran to halt its work on nuclear fuel passes without Tehran compliance.
December: Iran hosts a controversial conference on the Holocaust, which includes Holocaust deniers.
December: The UN Security Council votes to impose sanctions on Iran's trade in sensitive nuclear materials
and technology. Iran condemns the resolution and vows to speed up uranium enrichment work.
IRANIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES
ISP-202: Central Challenges of American Foreign Policy
Require Reading List for Case #2: Blocking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
Distributed: February 14, 2007
Due: February 26, 2007
Required:
· Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran. (New York: Times Books, 2006) pp. 83-85. (CP)
· Flynt Leverett, “Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options Toward Tehran,” (New York: Century Foundation, 2006). pp. 11-16 (O)
· International Atomic Energy Agency, “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFOCIRC/170 (22 April 1970) (O)
· United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions.” 31 July 2006. (UNSCR 1696) (O)
· United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment.” 23 December, 2006. (UNSCR 1737) (O)
· Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Multimedia: Fuel Cycle,” in Nuclear Terrorism Tutorial. (O)
· Samore, Gary. IISS Strategic Dossier: Iran's Nuclear Weapons Programs. Institute for International Strategic Studies. September 2005. pp. 33-67
· Laura Secor, “Whose Iran?” New York Times. 28 January 2007. (O)
· Fathi, Nazila and Michael Slackman, “Rebuke in Iran To Its President on Nuclear Role.” New York Times. 19 January 2007. (O)
· Stockman, Farah. “US Unit Works Quietly to Counter Iran’s Sway.” The Boston Globe, January 2, 2007. pp 1-2. (O)
· Anonymous Letter. Iran’s Spring 2003 Proposal for Cooperation. Released by the Financial Times. (O)
· Flynt Leverett, “Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options Toward Tehran,” New York: Century Foundation, 2006. (O)
· George Perkovich, “Five Scenarios for the Iran Crisis,” IFRI Security Studies Department, Winter 2006. (O)