HOT Meeting notes 10/25/2018Page 1 of 33
HOT MEETINGS & Memos from HDC & BPA
Items from ITB Inception and Roll Out are orange
Items from What It’s Like to Work With USACE are violet
Items excerpted from FOIA responses and HOT minutes are black
1986-03 Report on Index Test box (Dave Bishoff)
1986-04 Analysis of Clarence Cannon Data (Sheldon)
1986-06-11 BPA to Corps (Sheldon)
1987-09 PGE-PHP-2 Report (Gary Hackett)
1987-12 PGE-PHP-2 Report (Terry Bauman)
1988-05-28 PHP2 Classic Test (Sheldon)
1988-12-27 Patent (Albright & George Mittendorf)
1990-03 Evaluation of USACE Index Test Box (Sheldon)
1990-04 History of 3D Cam (various newspaper clips)
December 4, 2000
2000-12 BPA Completes GDACS @ McNary (BPA)
9/5/01 HOT / Tom Murphy will lead a small team to determine the role of the “Black Box,” and how it fits in with project operations, and develop a presentation. / MurphyI believe this is the earliest reference to my Index Test Box. Lee Sheldon started at HDC in 2002, so this predates his involvement. Lee says he introduced my Index Test Box to HDC as a possibility, and has no idea what this refers to.
Ed Miska denied any knowledge. Rod Wittinger told Tom Murphy over dinner while we were all at McNary Dam in December 2005 that he had been watching Woodward’s patent, waiting for it to expire before he made his move.
2003-09-06 USACE ITB Solicitation #1 (HDC)
2003-09-12 USACE ITB Solicitation #2 (HDC)
Contract W9127N-04-D-0009, ATECo was signed May 26, 2004. We tried to do as much preparation and interface design work as possible prior to the first trip to Portland. Three (or more) trips were planned; we wanted the first trip to accomplish more than just familiarization and introductory tasks, but conflicting information from Corps technical personnel and other vendors that were already supplying equipment to HDC about the hardware configuration and availability of RS-232 computer communication ports made this impossible.
July 4, 2004 Copyright applied for
July 19, 2004 Copyright approved
1.) Trip to Portland, August 23-28, 2004 - One week before my trip to Portland in August, Lee Sheldon (A “rehired annuitant” listed in the Contract as an “HDC Contact”) setup a meeting with Steve Atkinson (the mechanical engineer on the 3-D cam development team for HDC), Clay Fouts, (HDC’s liaison to Automated Control Systems Incorporated [ACSI], the “captive-supplier” that I am alleging contracting favoritism to), and Joe Fisk (from the GDACS maintenance team). We wanted to have a meeting with the “movers and shakers” on the project so we could get the whole story and make a plan with everyone in agreement while I was there. All three of these men said they’d be available to attend our planned meeting. When I got there on Monday morning (Aug 23), We learned that all three of these men had taken the whole week off as vacation with no forwarding or contact information, and had left instructions with their subordinates that no communication was to be had with any outsiders (specifically me), intentionally blocking any progress during the first scheduled trip to Portland. Despite prior agreement to meet with me, the three key players I needed to meet with stood me up.
2.)August 23 2004- By late Monday morning I found a GMT member with the information we needed that didn’t get the notification that I was to be avoided. We had the meeting to discuss the GDACS hardware & software, and made a workable plan for how to proceed1. It was decided that I would work with an HDC-designed 3-D cam that was a “stand-alone” configuration instead of the integrated GDACS 3-D cam that they actually used to control the turbines. This was so that I could do my testing and ITB demonstration without connecting my computer directly to their GDACS control system. When we went to McNary Dam to see the 3-D cam, we found that the intended stand-alone 3-D cam had been removed, supplanted with an obsolete, useless, non-functional Seawell 3-D Cam computer, effectively blocking the hardware interface inspection that was planned for this trip to McNary Dam. This surprise hardware substitution made the specified equipment unavailable to me while I was in Portland.
3.) The Contract specified that I was to use a GDACS Mockup that was known to be located in the HDC facility. Shortly after the Contract was signed, the Mockup went missing, and while I was in Portland we found it in the storeroom at ACSI, disassembled and scattered about the room, rendered useless as a test-bed for the project. Test-bench equipment written in my Contract had been removed, disassembled and hidden by HDC personnel to prevent my use of it.
Footnote:
1. Let me add an anecdote about Rod Wittinger, my TL’s perception of the situation at the start of the project when I was in Portland in August 2004. After the meeting at HDC (where I had to find and recruit a GMT representative because everyone from GMT who was supposed to be available to meet with me was on vacation) I was sitting with Rod Wittinger (my TL, the HDC Senior Mechanical Engineer at that time) discussing the meeting’s relative success. He seemed skeptical, so I asked if he thought my plans wouldn’t work. He said that technically, he was certain I could make it work, but realistically, he didn’t think, “they would let me make it work.” I asked him, “Who are they?” He just chucked, changed the subject and invited me to lunch. All too soon the reason for his reservations became clear to me.
4.)August 28, 2004 returning home - it had been decided that the computer-to-computer communication method would be setup by me using a standard RS-232 port and SoftPLC’s (free) ComGenie utility program, using SoftPLC’s TopDoc® programming environment to edit the software in the Corps’ SoftPLC turbine control computer. HDC was supposed to buy the TopDoc software on their Government credit card and have it drop-shipped to me so that it would be Government property that I would turn over to HDC when I was done with it. Despite my continual pestering HDC’s GMT didn’t get around to ordering the software for over a month, and then had it sent to Portland instead of drop-shipping it to me as planned. The package had been opened when it arrived here 2 weeks later, and several inexplicable technical complications with setting up and using SoftPLC’s TopDoc program delayed gaining access to editing the software in the SoftPLC computer for another 3 weeks. When the equipment and software was finally all together and working, it was learned that there was never any editable software in the SoftPLC computer. GMT simply ignored my protests and changed their directives to have me work in another direction. Ralph Banse-Fay, the Contracting Officer, decreed that this was excusable ignorance on the part of HDC GMT personnel. The entire SoftPLC TopDoc code editing exercise had been an expensive time & money wasting “wild-goose chase.”
5.) On October 12, 2004an Email memo to the Contracting Officer’s Representative outlining difficulties with gaining access to the 3-D cam equipment prompted a “Stop-Work Order from October 14 to 25, during which time he called internal meetings at HDC that resolved the problems and persuaded GMT personnel to cooperate and provide access to the 3-D cam equipment (for a while).
2004-10-12 Pre-Stop Work Memo (Albright)
Oct 28, 2004 HOT
Type 1 optimization
Ed Miska indicated that he is coordinating Type 1 optimization with GDACS at the projects. The team is developing a single prototype proof of concept for MCN unit 5, with the option of developing similar consoles for the rest of the system for about $10k each. At this time, the access point is not clear – they may be able to use the GDACS signal directly rather than obtaining it separately. Eventually the Type 1 optimization will need to coordinate with the digital governors and integrate with GDACS. There was some discussion about where to put the next index test box and the license involved.
Type 2 optimization
Lee Sheldon reported on the load sharing computer optimization program. The program is being tested; the next phase would upgrade it to an operational program. Ultimately for T2 optimization to be effective, BPA will need to improve its generation projections. T2 will have its first phase working by January 2005.
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6.) December 2004 As a result of the Stop-Work Order, there were personnel changes2, and a technical shift of direction. Dan Perrier of ACSI recommended, and Ed Miska of HDC directed me to switch communication method from the cheap, readily available RS-232 communication ports and the free ComGenie software to the OPC method, further directing that I must use the RSLinx product from Rockwell International. Rockwell marketing professed RSLinx worked with Visual Basic (the computer language that I was using), but it does not. After purchasing $3,350 worth of RSLinx software and struggling with it for 5 weeks, Rockwell finally admitted they don’t really support Visual Basic, telling me the wasted time was my fault for trying to use it with Visual Basic - and not reading their service bulletins that said so. HDC GMT (Ed) directed that I use RSLinx on the recommendation of ACSI (Dan).
Footnote:
2The Personnel Changes were to remove Clay Fouts as the HDC liaison to ACSI and contact person for my project, replacing him with Mark Kingstad. Both Clay Fouts and Mark Kingstad, were already liaisons from USACE HDC to ACSI, as explained below:
When the difficulties I was running into became excessive 5 months into the project, I described them in a letter to my COR, Dave Ebner, who put a “Stop-Work” order on the project because of the overt and covert resistance I was always running into. Dave used the heightened clout from the Stop-Work order to call meetings and find out who was causing so much trouble. Dave found that it was Clay Fouts working against me.
Click here: 04-10-12 Status Report that prompted Stop-Work
Clay was the official liaison from USACE HDC to ACSI. Dave found that in that capacity Clay was protecting ACSI’s business with HDC by preventing anyone from getting close to or learning anything about the turbine control systems; seemingly to prevent anyone from finding out how screwed-up the governor 3-D cams that HDC and ACSI designed and built were.
Dave’s fix action from the Stop-Work order was to have Clay removed as the liaison to ACSI, but it didn’t really help. Mark Kingstad, the assistant liaison was promoted into the slot; he was just as obstructive as Clay, or worse.
What is significant about Mark was that when I needed ACSI’s street address about a year ago, I Googled the words, “automated,” “control,” “systems” and “incorporated” to get the address from the Internet. I found that ACSI was incorporated in Oregon, while their company is located in Washington. That’s no a big deal, there is a legal tax advantage from setting it up that way; but the search engine also gave three other very similar company names (below).
Company Name -date of incorporation distance from Portland
President
Address
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ABBAJAY AUTOMATED CONTROL SYSTEMS, LLC -2005 120 miles
DAVID ABBAJAY
BEND OR 97701
ACS-AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC. –1996 to 2005 7 miles
RONDA J KINGSTAD
BEAVERTON OR 97006
AUTOMATED CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC. –1995 8.1 miles
DANIEL K PERRIER
VANCOUVER WA 98682
AUTOMATED SYSTEM CONTROLS, INC. –1999 21.5 miles
RICHARD L MCELDERRY JR
NEWBERG OR 97132
Note that the bottom two companies on the list have the two middle words in the name switched around, so instead of “Automated Control Systems Incorporated,” it’s “Automated System Controls Incorporated.” That company was incorporated 4 years after ACSI’s incorporation in 1995.
Even more curious is “ACS Automatic Control Systems Incorporated.” The President, Secretary and Registered Agent for this company are all Rhonda Kingstad. The white pages in the phone book (available over the Internet) show that Rhonda is the wife of Mark Kingstad, the assistant liaison from HDC to ACSI. Googling Rhonda’s name found she was a full-time teacher at their local community college; she probably doesn’t have the specialized knowledge required to run a controls company, and as a full-time teacher at the college probably wouldn’t have the time anyway. Shortly after I started pushing back at HDC, Rhonda’s company was “administratively dissolved” on July 1, 2005.
When this cozy arrangement was set-up in 1995, it wasn’t possible to search the Internet and find the Oregon Secretary of State’s website when looking westward from Illinois to check on this stuff - score 1 for the Internet.
When I first started complaining to Mr. Jones at USACE IG, he tried to protect the status quo by deflecting my complaints and placating me. Army IG had pigeonholed an earlier DOD IG complaint for 180 days, and then closed it without any action. However, when I brought the corporate “shell game” described above to DOD IG’s attention, my contact there said, “We’ve seen this sort of thing before; these are “shell-companies that are used to move money and material around in secret.” Using this perceived impropriety, DOD IG bypassed Army IG and directed USACE IG to do a proper investigation into my complaints by elevating the priority from an “information” to an “action” item, and the respondent from whoever happened to answer the phone at HDC to the 2-Star General in charge of the Division in Portland. They won’t tell me anything; but apparently something happened. General Martin, the Major General in charge of the Portland Division of USACE accepted a transfer shortly after this happened and left town.
7.) In February 2005, I unilaterally switched to Software Toolbox’s TopServer. When I got the OPC server working, HDC refused to give me the configuration and OPC data tag-names for their GDACS control system, claiming Homeland Security Act prohibited it; directing me instead to purchase this sensitive information from another supplier (ACSI) for $1,000.
April 22, 2005 HOT
Link to Ed Miska 05-04-22 T1-Future memoEd is making plans for the Index Test Box, but he had never index tested a turbine, and didn’t know what the Winter Kennedy taps were for at this point in the project.
8.) In May 2005, the Index Test Box was delivered to HDC. GMT (Ed) insisted that the visual graphic displays on the ITB be removed so that the powerplant personnel could not observe the positioning accuracy of the 3-D cam, blade controller - essentially defeating the purpose of the ITB.
9.) In May 2005, the 1-year performance period of the contract expired. HDC directed that a Contract Mod must be signed before I could continue work and getting paid. Negotiations to re-define the deliverables in our “Time and Material” Contract took over a month. When the contract was presented to me for signature, it had secretly been tampered with by unauthorized personnel (Ed again) without the knowledge or approval of the COR or myself. The text of the contract had been altered in such a way as to compel me to give HDC the Source Code to the ITB software program without the agreed upon compensation. I refused to sign the Contract it until it was restored to the text we had agreed upon. The contract was not restored to the agreed upon text for over 2 ½ months, causing a 10 week hiatus on the project.
June 2006,
HDC directed that I must sign a modified contract because the 1-year performance period had expired. I negotiated the terms and deliverables as long as the contract was on the table. We reached an agreement on the contract terms, and Dave Ebner sent it around for approvals.
2005-06 Type-1 Optimizer USACE Contract Mod
10.) June 2005 during this hiatus, HDC and ACSI personnel contrived a “Zero-Problem3” between in the Index Test Box to GDACS communication interface. This problem could not be reproduced with my equipment here. HDC (Ed and Dan) insisted the only way to solve this problem was for me to give them my Source Code so they could debug it. I refused, demanding that my proprietary software remain proprietary until HDC paid me the agreed-upon price of $750,000 for it. After months of struggling with this contrived problem that prevented any field-testing, the problem just went-away without explanation, but was easily reproduced on demand by GMT (Ed) in August 2004 for Rod Wittinger to see when he reassumed the Technical Lead position. GMT and ACSI had retained a known defective version of the ITB software program to demonstrate the “zero-problem” whenever it suited them.
Footnote:
3. The “Zero Problem” was a complicated and contrived computer problem engineered by Ed Miska of HDC and Dan Perrier of ACSI to sabotage the Index Test Box field test at McNary Dam and discredit my product, my company & me.
From the first day of the project, my main task was to establish communication between my IBM PC computer and the Corps’ SoftPLC computer that is used in the Corps’ Generic Data Acquisition and Control System (GDACS) in order to get the data about the turbine efficiency performance.