Speech of Mr. Vlad Spanu

Executive Director of the Moldova Foundation

The case of Moldova

CSIS Conference ”Wider Europe and the Transatlantic Link”

Panel 1: The Future of NATO and EU Enlargement

Tuesday, 25 October 2005, Washington, D.C.

My presentation will be focused on Moldova and security threats that are related to its Eastern region Transnistria, which is uncontrolled by the constitutional authorities of Moldova. An entity supported politically, financially and militarily by the Russian Federation and it has had a negative impact on developments in Moldova, Ukraine and the whole South-Eastern European region. After giving you a bit of background, I will try to answer the questions “why Moldova needs to be part of the Euro-Atlantic structures” and “why the West needs a stable and predictable Moldova,” and then I will briefly outline some scenarios for future development of Moldova as a state leaving some food for thoughts.

Why should we speak about a small nation of 4.5 million, insignificant from the economic point of view for the international community and, known in the last five years as the poorest country of Europe, as every article on Moldova in the international press likes to underline?

Moldova is a place where geopolitical interests of major powers, civilizations and religions collided and continue to collide due to its cross-roads location. It was the case 2000 years ago when the Roman empire concurred Dacia, a kingdom of Thracians north of Danube, then in the 13th century when the great Tatar invasion took place; followed by the Ottoman empire’s control that began in the 15th century, then Russian invasions starting with 18th century and ending with the concur of Eastern half of Moldova named Bessarabia in 1812 that is still underway with the Russian troops stationed in Moldova. Today, Moldovans fight the same fight for independence as their ancestors did for thousands years but now with lesser success. It is time that the international community should turn its eyes to Moldova and get actively involved.

If you look back to analyze the Moldovan foreign policy since its independence in 1991, you are most likely to see a “zigzag” line of the official Chisinau, struggling between the two magnets – Russia and the West.

The only time Moldova was on course – in lining itself with the Baltic States that shared with Moldova similar fate as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 – was in 1989-1992 when the Popular Front seized power from the Soviets. But masterminds in the Kremlin got it off course pretty easily as a result of the Transnistrian armed conflict in 1992 inspired and sponsored by Moscow that ate all political, financial and social recourses of the new-born state. And weak Moldova headed by inexperienced politicians lost the battle against stronger Russia. It could not be otherwise without any intervention of the West that was not interested in Moldova at all at that time, had little clue what was really happening on the ground.

After 1992, the Moldovan politicians in power looked eastwards. All of the Moldovan presidents, most of prime ministers and foreign ministers that had a stake in designing Moldovan foreign policy were formed as individuals during Soviet times – trained in Moscow, held administrative positions or were Communist Party apparatchiks.

Furthermore, in 2001, the Communist Party took full control of the country – the parliament, presidency, government and even judicial system and business. The Communist Party won elections without hiding its name and its pro-Russia visions.

But surprisingly, in 2004, a year before new parliamentary elections, the Communist Party turned 180 degrees in its foreign policy from uniting Moldova with the Russia-Belarus Union, and opposing privatization and economic reforms. Now, its priority became to integrate Moldova into the European Union, thus alienating itself with the pro-Western opposition headed by Christian democrats and Liberals.

Why these radical changes happened and what it was that has driven hard core communists to change their views?

1.  Vladimir Voronin, who is the most powerful man in Moldova - head of the Communist Party and the 3rd Moldovan president - failed to keep his 2001 electoral promise to unite Transnistria with the rest of Moldova. Despite his unprecedented efforts he could not find understanding from Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma whose cooperation he sought. Neither of them was interested in a united Moldova.

2.  Since 2001, main personalities in the Communist Party got a Western first-hand experience in political and business terms, thus seen with their own eyes the difference between the Soviet anti-West propaganda they were used to and the reality of the Western democracy and its economic development.

3.  The West not Russia came to Moldova to assist in building and strengthening democratic institutions, elaborate new market oriented legislation and reforms. And those investments started to bring their fruits by 2004.

4.  In 2004, the CP started to lose support of its constituency and could not longer keep itself in power with just pro-Russian slogans and ultimately they gave the electorate what it wanted

Moldovans, including the CP, saw that only the West can positively contribute to solving country’s problems: (a) the Transnistrian 15-year old conflict, (b) withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions from Moldova, (c) boost foreign investment and trade without undermining Moldova’s political and economic stability and independence.

And Moldovans, looking around in their neighborhood to the West and North, could easily find good examples of economic development and models of foreign policy to follow – Hungary, Poland, Baltic States. But most importantly, developments in Romania, a country that shares with Moldova its language, history and culture. Just in the early 1990s the level of development in post-Ceausescu Romania and in the new-independent Moldova was similar. Today, starting with high quality new roads, increased average salaries and pensions, booming economy are seen by Moldovans as soon as they pass the Romanian border.

There are many arguments why the West needs a stable Moldova. Today, we leave in a totally different world than in 1991. The geopolitics has changed. In 2004, NATO became Moldova’s neighbor as Romania joined the organization. The EU is going to share its Eastern border with Moldova in 2007 or whenever Romania is admitted to the organization as a full member. Both these organizations started to realize that Moldova is not exclusively Russia’s business anymore.

The West does not need an instable country where about 1/3 of its labor force fled abroad searching for better paid jobs – mostly illegally in Russia, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; a country with unpredictable foreign policy, with a separatist regime in its Eastern region that became a smuggling haven of arms, goods, drugs and humans, that is ready to escalate again into an armed conflict that would engage not only Moldova, but also Russia, Ukraine and other countries in the region; a country where Russian troops still consider themselves at home despite numerous requests and demands of the Moldovans to leave and despite Russian government’s 1999 Istanbul commitments.

If the US and EU are champions in supporting democracy around the world, how can violations of human rights in its backyard could not be noticed for 15 years? For 15 years the majority of population in Transnistria – mostly Moldovans (40%) and Ukrainians (28%) – leave in fear, can not exercise their rights to study in their native language, or enjoy freedom of speech, form political parties. For 15 years, this region is ruled by the people like Igor Smirnov, who was sent by the Soviet KGB from a military plant in Kamchatka to organize a secessionist region in Moldova. Why are 68% of people in Transnistria represented by Igor Smirnov at the negotiation table on the future status of Transnistria? Who is going to create a democratic environment for these people in order for them to freely tell us what they really want?

Many analysts who follow regional events had high expectations of post orange Ukraine. The disappointment was high when we saw a new Ukrainian plan on Transnistria designed by the former National Security and Defense Council secretary Petro Poroshenko, who is also one of Yushchenko's closest confidants, a native of Transnistria with strong business interest there. Poroshenko passed the plan into the hands of President Yushchenko to be promoted under the winds of Ukrainian orange revolution. But the plan was not advocating for democratization and demilitarization of Transnistria, as the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk stated immediately after the exciting events in Kiev last December. Instead, the plan was pushing for elections in Transnistria in 2005 with the aim to legitimize the current leadership. More then that, the launch of the plan was followed by a “Summit” of the champion of democracy in 2004, Victor Yushchenko, and the Soviet-times red commissar, Igor Smirnov.

Fortunately, the EU and the US started to be more involved in the region than ever.

For the first time, this month, the EU and US accepted to be part of the Transnistrian conflict settlement process. Recently, the European Union approved its first-ever Border Assistance Mission, now being launched on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border to control what goes in and out of Transnistria.

The idea to involve the West was launched first by the Moldovan civil society, then it was contemplated into the 3-D strategy (democratization, demilitarization, and decriminalization of Transnistria) a document that was elaborated and promoted with the direct participation of the Moldova Foundation. Then the initiative was echoed by the Moldovan opposition and government that became later a unified position of the Moldovan society.

The move came after Russia pressed Moldova to accept so-called Kozak Plan that intended to impose a federalization concept for Moldova – where Transnistria and Moldova would act as two equal parties, thus legitimizing the unconstitutional regime in Tiraspol and creating a window for Transnistria to quit Moldova whenever it pleases.

Now, what are scenarios for future developments in Moldova? Depending of the level of involvement in Moldova of the West, Russia and Ukraine, I see four scenarios:

- Full engagement of the US and EU

- Preserving the status quo for Transnistria

- Russia marginalizes EU and US

- The Ukrainian factor

1.  Full engagement of the US and EU: Moldova avoids federalization model and implements the 3-D concept; settles the Transnistrian conflict and manage to integrate the region with the rest of its territory; Russia withdraws its troops and munitions; Moldova first becomes an associate EU and a full NATO member, then a full EU member.

2.  Preserving the status quo for Transnistria: Russia keeps Smirnov in power as long as the situation permits, then he is changed by a new younger figure for another decade. Russian troops maintain their presence in the region as the dominant force with or without an OSCE mandate.

3.  Russia marginalizes EU and US. The federalization model is imposed; Transnistria quits the federation and is transformed either into an enclave as part of Russia (a Kaliningrad model) or becomes an independent entity heavily influenced by Russia. Russian troops remain in Transnistria.

4.  The Ukrainian factor. Under the federalization model, Transnistria quits Moldova and joins Ukraine; Russian troops are forced to withdraw; relations between Ukraine and Moldova and Ukraine and Romania become hostile; as an exchange for Transnistria, both Romania and Moldova raise demands on returning Northern Bocovina and Southern Bessarabia taken by the Soviet Union from Romania in 1940 under Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, thus opening the Pandora’s box for revising borders.

The scenarios Nr.3 and 4, how attempting they might sound to nationalistic elements in Russia and Ukraine, could not be afforded neither by Russia, nor by Ukraine. We already see the “Transnistrian boomerang” for Russia when weapons produced in Transnistria kill Russian soldiers in Chechnya. Besides, if implemented, both these scenarios would become a precedent for Russia’s and Ukraine’s own separatist movements in places like Tatarstan and Crimea.

Scenario No.2 – status quo for Transnistria – Moldova already rejected it, and it is not acceptable any more by the international community and neighboring countries.

I do believe that the scenario No.1 will prevail. All the indicators tell us this. It is in the best interest for every player involved, including Russia, at least in the long run.

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