A Thomistic Reflection on John Locke’s Theory of Natural Law
Peter P. Cvek, Associate Professor, Saint Peter’s University, Jersey City, New Jersey USA
ABSTRACT
This paper is a reflection on Locke’s theory of natural law from the perspective of contemporary interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the relationship between natural law and natural inclinations. At the heart of the natural law tradition is the belief that moral principles or basic human goods are rooted in nature, or more precisely, that these principles can be discovered by rational reflection on those natural inclinations which constitute the core of human nature. Every natural law theory assumes that there is a necessary connection between Natureand Reason. Traditional theories will include God, while modern versions may adopt a more secular approach. My concern is with Locke’s theory of the natural law, more specifically, on how Locke understands the crucial relationship between natural law and natural inclinations. Moreover, I intend to examine Locke’s comments on natural law from a Thomistic perspective. First, I review three contemporary interpretations of the relationship between natural law and natural inclinations based on Aquinas’ Treatise on Law. Second, I re-examine Locke’s theory of natural law in light of the aforementioned interpretations of Aquinas. While Aquinas forges a synthesis between nature, reason, and God, I will show that in his struggle to produce a “modern” version of natural law Locke was compelled to adopt a theologically-based conception of natural law, which subordinates both nature and reason to God and revelation.
A Thomistic Reflection onJohn Locke’s Theory of Natural Law
At the heart of the natural law tradition in ethics is the belief that moral principles, or basic human goods, are rooted in nature, or from an epistemic point of view, that these principles can be discovered by rational reflection on natural inclinations, those inclinations which constitute the core of human nature. Every natural law theory therefore assumes that there is a significant connection between Nature and Reason. Traditional theories will also take for granted that there is some relationship between natural law and God.
My primary concernin this paper is withJohn Locke’s theory of the natural law, more specifically, on how Locke understands the relationship between natural law and natural inclinations. This will, of course, also shed light on the role played by Reason and God. But while it is common to interpret Locke’s thought from within the intellectual context of other 17thcentury natural law theorists, in this paper, I intend to re-examine Locke’s often fragmented comments on natural law from the perspective of contemporary readings of Thomas Aquinas’s discourse on law.
In the first part of the paper, I will briefly review three recent interpretations of the relationship between natural law and natural inclinationsinAquinas. I will also identify how each interpretation construes the relationship between the Nature, Reason, and God. In the second part, I will re-examine Locke’s theory of natural law in light of the aforementioned interpretations of Aquinas. While the Thomistic theory of natural law represents a synthesis of these three elements into a comprehensive unity, I will argue that in his struggle to produce a “modern” theory of natural law Locke, perhaps ironically, was compelled to construct a theologically-based conception of natural law, which subordinates both Nature and Reason to God and revelation. Nevertheless, despite their differences, the natural law theories of Aquinas and Locke can be seen to be part of a broader Christian natural law tradition which views morality as a function of the relationship between Nature, Reason, and God.
Thomas Aquinas on Natural Law and Natural Inclinations
One of the hallmarks of the natural law tradition is the attempt to ground morality in human nature, or more precisely, natural law ethics is based on the belief that there is a necessary connection between natural inclinations and the principles of natural law, a connection mediated by human reason. This thesis issuccinctly captured by Thomas Aquinas in theQuestion 94, art. 2S.T.I-II. After distinguishing between theoreticaland practical reasoning, Aquinas states that the first principle of practical reasoning is founded on the nature of the good, since thegood is that which all things desire. Therefore,the first principle of natural law is that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Allthe other principles (or precepts) of the natural law are based on this formal principle, for all those things which reason naturally apprehends as good belong to the natural law. More importantly, this apprehension of the good, and therefore the order of the natural law principles, is said to be based on the order of natural inclinations, for “all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequentlyas objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance” (I-II. 94, 2).By reflecting on the order of natural inclinations, Aquinas arrives at four fundamental principles (or basic human goods)of the natural law, which can be listed as the preservation of life, the care and education of children, knowledge, and the good of an ordered social life. Each is these goods is said to be connected to, or inferred from, a specific natural inclination.
The problemswith the most obvious reading of this derivation, however, are well known. Aquinas seems to suggest that the mere rational apprehension of an ‘inclination to x’ reveals to reason that‘x is good’. But why should that be the case? Does this apply to every inclination, including those that appear to be aimed at evil, or only to those inclinations apprehended as promoting some good? And if the latter, then of what use are the inclinations, assuming that the inclinations themselves need to be evaluated by reason? In any case, the precise nature of the relationship between natural inclinationsand natural law is not explained here and has generated considerable controversy among contemporary proponents of a Thomistic theory of natural law (see Brock, 2005).
Fortunately, the natural law tradition itself provides a useful typography for understanding this problem. Philosophical reflection on natural law has ultimately been a function of attempting to understand the relationship between three fundamental realities: Nature, Reason, and God. While all three elements play a role in any natural law theory,significant differences in emphasis will distinguish one interpretationfrom another. As luck would have it, we have contemporary examples of each approach.
Lisska: Nature
The interpretation groundedprimarily in Nature maintainsthe very tight connection between natural inclinations and natural law principleswhich is seeminglyimplied by Aquinas in Question 94. Anthony Lisska’s Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction(1996) is one of the best contemporary defenses of what might be called the “traditional” reading. This Aristotelian inspired approach grounds reason’s apprehension of natural law in a teleological understanding of human nature and inclinations (Lisska, 99). On this reading, the ends that identify the human telos are objectively good, not only because they are the objects of inclinations, but because their achievement contributes to the optimal functioning (or perfection) of any human being. Hence, the goods associated with the natural law are essential to the full actualization of human potential and the achievement of the highest good, described variously as well-being, human flourishing, perfection, or happiness.
Finnis: Reason
In contrast, other commentators have argued that our knowledge of the natural law lies not in reflection on natural inclinations, but in reason’s ownunderstanding of the good. What has become known as the ‘new natural law theory’ has been developed most fully by John Finnis in his Natural Law & Natural Rights (1980) and more recently in Aquinas (1998). Finnis insists that the principles of natural law are grasped by reason as self-evident (per se nota) and indemonstrable(Finnis, 1980, 33-34). On this reading,practical reason’s apprehension of the goodis logically prior to any theoretical understanding of human nature. For Finnis, the rational apprehension that the object of this inclination is a good does not consist in simply observingthat such an inclination happens to exist. Rather, the role of reason is(to paraphrase Brock, 59)to“make the inclination itself intelligible” by rationally demonstrating that the object of this inclination is somethingvaluable for its own sake. And, while it may seem strange to have a theory of natural law sans nature, Finnis concedes that the experience of inclinations and their objects might provide the raw material for reflection, but it is the task of reason alone to apprehend what is good. He also assumes that these goods will as a matter of fact be the objects of natural inclinations, although this appears to be more of a happy coincidence, or an arrangement made possible by God, as Finnis (1998) later speculates.
Porter: God
Much of the contemporary debate over natural inclinations and natural law has taken place in the space between these two approaches, with different commentators finding different levels of interplay between nature and reason. Most of these accounts have continued the modern emphasis on constructing a philosophical conception of natural law which is independent of any theological commitments. It is worth noting that metaphysically speaking, both Lisska and Finnis agree that for Aquinas natural law is grounded in the eternal law in the mind of God, but they also insist that appeals to God or divine revelation play no epistemic role in explaining our apprehension of natural law. In this sense, both interpretations arenaturalistic in their approach to knowing the natural law. One exceptionis found in Jean Porter’sNatural Law and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (1999) and Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (2005). Porter defends what she calls a “theological” conception ofnatural law. According to Porter, the scholastic understanding of natural law was primarily based onthe study ofvarious texts, with Scripture beingauthoritative (Porter 2005, 8). Within thisproject,Naturewas fundamentally understood through the theological categories of creation and providence (Porter 2005,65). So that even when human beingswere grasped by reason in terms of the inclinations inherent in their nature, they remained “creatures” in and through which God manifested his creative power and wisdom (Porter 2005, 69).
In terms of the relationship between natural law and natural inclinations, Porter partially agrees with the traditionalinterpretation: the scholastics did ground their accounts of natural law in “a robust concept of nature,”butthey also took for granted that “nature underdetermines morality” (Porter 2005, 126). Hence, it was necessary to view human inclinations within a broader theological context. It was thisScriptural-based understanding of human naturethat provided“the necessary framework within which reason move(d) from reflection on human inclinations to a developed account of natural law morality” (Porter 2005, 80). While Aquinas assumedthat reason and revelation will ultimately agree in revealing the natural law, it is important to note that Porter’s thesis is stronger than that. According to Porter, Scripturehas a necessaryepistemic role to play in facilitating our human knowledge of natural law that is not found in the aforementioned naturalistic interpretations.On herreading, our apprehension of natural law is not based onunaided reason alone (Finnis),nor on unaided reason reflecting on natural inclinations (Lisska), but reason informed by revelation.In this sense, Porter’s conception of natural law is decidedlytheistic in character, as opposed to the naturalistic interpretations advanced by Finnis and Lisska.
Each of these three interpretations provides a distinct way of understanding the relationship between natural law and natural inclinations, as well as the interplay between Nature, Reason, and God. While each of these approaches is reflected in Locke’s natural law project, I will show that Porter’s theological and Scriptural account of natural law has much to recommend it, not perhaps as the definitive reading of Thomas Aquinas, but as an illuminating way of understanding the development of John Locke’s conception of natural law.
John Locke on Natural Law and Natural Inclinations
At first blush,Locke’s conception of natural law seems far removed from that advanced by Thomas Aquinas. In the great debate between the intellectualist and voluntaristtheories of law, Aquinas is the quintessential intellectualist, whileLocke is clearly committed to some form ofvoluntarism. Upon closer examination, Locke most likely adopteda variation of the so-called “middlecourse” between intellectualism and voluntarism associated with Francisco Suarez and Nathaniel Culverwell (Tully 1980, 41). This conception of law is best illustrated in his early Essays on the Law of Nature.In the SixthEssay, Locke states that the formal cause of a law is the will of a superior (185).God, or more precisely, God’s will, is the cause of the morally obligatory character of the natural law. But, ifGod’s will is the formal cause,then human nature is the material cause, for it is only by rationalreflection on human nature that one is able to know what God has commanded. For this reason, in the Seventh Essay, Locke describes the natural law as “a fixed and permanent rule of morals, which reason itself pronounces, and which persists, being a fact so firmly rooted in the soil of human nature” (199). Based on thisdistinction, Locke describes the natural law as “the decree of the divine will discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason commanding or prohibiting” (111).In so far the content of the natural law is “discernible by the light of nature,” i.e., reason, which is able to indicate “what is and what is not in conformity with rational nature,” it would appear that, as with Aquinas, the key to understanding Locke’s theory of natural law depends on determining how Locke construedthe crucial relationship between natural inclinations and natural law. This would also seem to commitLocke to a naturalistic approach to natural law, despite his theistic and voluntarist account of moral obligation.
Samuel Zinaichhas recently argued that,in his early Essays, Locke assumed the validity of the Aristotelian world-view. If true, this wouldseemingly commit Locke to the traditionalunderstanding of the relationship between natural inclinations and natural law. On the one hand, Zinaich’s defense of an Aristotelian reading of the Essaysis certainly plausible given Locke’s claim to ground natural law in human nature. While demonstrating the existence of the natural law, Locke cites both Aristotle and Aquinas (Essays, 113, 117),and while defending the good of social life, Locke claims that all human beings are “urged to enter into society by a certain propensity of nature”(Essays, 157). Zinaich compares this favorably to Aquinas’ derivation of natural law principles from natural inclinations(39). On the other hand,there is considerable evidence that the aforementioned reference to a natural propensity is the exception to the rule. Locke continuously warns that natural appetites, desires, or inclinationsare more likely to run contrary to the moral law than provide guides to right conduct, and that it would be a mistake to hold that the “principles of moral action and a rule to live by” can be found “in men’s appetites and natural instincts …just as if that was morally best which most people desired”(Essays, 213). So, while Locke does believe that there are principles of action inherent in human nature, he seems to believe that theycannot be the basis for our understanding of morality.
Moreover, when he has the opportunity to affirm that the natural law can be known by rational reflection on natural inclinations, Lockeexplicitly denies it.This denial is all the more intriguing in that it occurs only in the title of an unwritten essay, “Can the Law of Nature be Known from Man’s Natural Inclinations? No. According to Zuckert, this title of an unwritten essayis Locke’s definitive rejection of any relevant connection between natural inclinations and natural law (201). There is no way of knowing why Locke never completed this essay. Zinaich’s suggestion that the essay would be redundant, merely repeating the denial that the natural law is inscribed (innate) in the minds of men contained in the Third Essay, is unconvincing, since a natural inclination is not equivalent to an innate idea, and Locke certainly affirms the former, while denying the latter (73).However, his explanatory note, to the effect that there is no way to discriminate between inclinations which dispose us to do our duty from those that lead us astray without “some sense of who God is,” is more telling (Zinaich 73, note 37).
It would seem that for Locke without some knowledge of God, rational reflection on human nature alone is insufficient to reveal the principles of natural law.The exactnature of the role played by God, however, is not fully explained here. Nevertheless, this appeal to Godmightprovide a response tothe most decisiveobjection toLocke’s defense of natural law: his rejection of natural teleology. There is no doubt that Locke eventually rejects the Aristotelian worldview, in favor of the corpuscular theory of nature, according to which the real essences of things are configurations of matter in motion, explainable in terms of efficient causes. It is likely that Locke had his suspicions even while writing the Essays. On the traditional reading,Locke’s rejection of Aristotelianism, especially the idea of final causality, is tantamount to a rejection of the natural lawdoctrine itself (Feser110).