MODEL ESSAY
Importing Foreign Labour: Inevitable or Unlikely?
- Introduction
Japan is a country that does not, in principle, accept unskilled or semi-skilled foreign labour. Despite this fact, the foreign labour force in Japan was estimated to be around 760,000 in 2002 (MHLW 2004), a three fold increase since 1990 (Shakai 2004).[1] With the Japanese population forecast to decrease significantly in the coming years, many have suggested that the further import of foreign labour cannot be avoided. Others, however, have highlighted the cultural and public safety barriers to bringing in more non-Japanese workers. This essay will ask whether further imports of foreign labour are inevitable or unlikely. First, the terms in the title will be defined. Then, the essay will outline and present evidence to support the two positions. Finally, the validity of this evidence will be analysed and evaluated. The conclusion will attempt to answer the question set in the title.
- Defining Terms
‘Foreign labour’ can refer to any foreign-born individual, legal or ‘illegal’, working in Japan. However, since the importation of skilled or professional white-collar workers is relatively uncontroversial, this essay will focus on blue-collar manual unskilled and semi-skilled workers, who, except for Nikkeijin and trainees, are generally not permitted to work in Japan. According to the Collins English Dictionary (Collins 1986: 781), ‘inevitable’ means something that is ‘unavoidable’, something that is ‘sure or certain to happen’. On the other hand, ‘unlikely’ means something that is not likely or improbable. In the context of this essay, the question is: is it simply just a question of time until Japan’s labour market is opened up to foreign workers? Or are the cultural and social impediments so deep as to make the likelihood of any dramatic influx unrealistic? This is the question that will be answered in the course of this essay.
- Inevitable
There is a great deal of evidence that suggests the inevitability of increasing migration to Japan. First, Japan cannot remain immune from the march of globalisation and the increasing flows of people across borders made possible by improved communication and transport systems. Second, domestic demographic trends, specifically a rapidly ageing and shrinking population, point to serious labour shortages. Finally, widening income disparities between Japan and elsewhere pull migrants to Japan, migrants who are often prepared to engage in the tough low-wage jobs that most Japanese eschew. These three points will be looked at in turn below.
Since 1975 the number of migrants world-wide has almost doubled. In 2000, almost 175 million people resided in a country other than where they had been born (United-Nations 2002). Castles and Miller(1998) call this the ‘age of migration’. Japan has not been immune from this process. As of December 2004, the number of registered foreigners in Japan was just under 2 million, 1.55% of the total population (Japan-Almanac 2005: 90). If so-called ‘illegals’ were added, this figure would be even higher. Moreover, the number of foreigners who visited Japan reached a record 7.45 million in 2005, up 10.3% from the previous year (Daily-Yomiuri 2006b). Globalisation has also driven the transnationalisation of the Japanese economy and seen rising direct foreign investment. “Transnationalization of business”, write Douglass and Roberts (2000: 22), “…generates a phenomenal growth of producer-related services in Japan that are…likely candidates for immigrant labor.”
Another global trend that points to the inevitability of migration is the phenomenon of ageing and shrinking populations. Although all developed countries are affected, it is predicted that Japan – whose population saw its first ever natural decline in 2005 (Yomiuri Shimbun 2006)– will experience such demographic trends particularly acutely:
Table 1: International Comparison of Over 65’s as % of Total Population
Japan / America / Germany / France / Italy2000 / 17.34 / 12.30 / 16.40 / 15.97 / 18.07
2020 (estimate) / 27.85 / 16.29 / 22.51 / 20.45 / 23.85
2030 (estimate) / 29.6 / 20.2 / 27.7 / 23.8 / 28.6
Source: Web Japan (2002); MIAC (2006).
The table shows that Japan already has one of the oldest populations amongst developed countries, a statistic that is forecast to get worse. As a population ages, as a result of rising life expectancy and falling birth rates, the age dependency ratio (the number of workers as a percentage of the total population) falls. In Japan, the percentage of working-age people (aged fifteen to sixty-four) is expected to drop from 68.1% in 2000 to 53.6% in 2050 (Foreign Press Center Japan 2006: 16). Consequences include a shortfall in income-linked tax revenue and a strain on the welfare system (Nikkei-Weekly 2003b; 2003a). The implication, as a recent United Nations report (United-Nations 2000) argues, is that Japan is facing a serious labour shortage that will require the acceptance of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers in order to sustain its economy.
Finally, Japan, as the second biggest economy in the world and the largest in Asia, will continue to attract foreign workers. Recent signs of economic recovery will only serve to increase the attraction. Moreover, the increasing reluctance of many Japanese to engage in what is termed dirty, dangerous, and difficult low-wage jobs, means that demand is high. Shipper (2002: 50) suggests that about half of the foreign workers who come to Japan work in jobs that Japanese reject. In fact, even non-manual jobs are being shunned by Japanese workers. For example, in 1999, the government decided to offer preferential treatment to foreigners working in 14 sectors, including the legal, medical doctor, and computer engineering fields(Yomiuri Shimbun 2005b). More recently, a severe shortage of nursing care providers has forced the government to open up the sector to foreign workers (DailyYomiuri 2006c).
- Unlikely
Although a large body of evidence points to the inevitability of increasing migration to Japan, other factors suggest that there exist serious barriers to bringing in more foreign workers. First is the popular belief that Japan is a culturally and racially homogenous nation with no history of immigration. Second, fears over public safety, particularly with regard to foreign crime, are growing. Third, a political climate which has seen an upsurge in neo-nationalism makes any policy shift by a traditionally conservative ruling elite highly unlikely.
In the migration literature, Japan is often viewed as an exceptional or ‘negative’ case (Bartram 2000). Japan is one of the few industrialised countries not to have experienced a tremendous inflow of international migrants.[2] Moreover, outside of academia, the term iminis rarely used to describe those coming to Japan. As Douglass (2000: 8) notes, foreigners coming to Japan are not ‘(im)migrants’ but ‘entrants’ (temporary residents). Similarly, Sassen (1994: 64) states that the concept of immigration does not exist in Japan’s law in the entry and exit of aliens. The literal translation of the Japanese ‘Immigration Bureau’ (Nyūkoku Kanri Kyoku) is the ‘Entry Control Bureau’. The emphasis on entrants reflects the dominant officialposition that Japan has neither minorities nor migrants and is not (and has no intention of becoming) a migrant society. Pak (1998: 140-42) calls this position the ‘no immigration principle’, an institutionalisation of the tan’itsu minzoku (‘homogeneous people’) idiom which underlies the state system for controlling foreigners. The belief that an acceptance of immigration would undermine the traditional ‘racial purity’ of Japan acts as a strong psychological break on any increase in the numbers of foreign labourers.
The second reason for doubting that more foreign workers will be allowed into Japan relates to fears over public safety. Opinion polls show that the number of people who feel anxious about crime has doubled since 1998 (Sekai 2004: 147). In a recent Cabinet Office Survey(2006), over 50% of those who thought crime was getting worse put it down to the increase in the number of illegal foreigners(see alsoYomiuri Shimbun 2005a). Prominent politicians have served to fuel public anxiety. For example, ShintaroIshihara, the mayor of Tokyo, made the following comments during a speech to an SDF unit in April 2000:
今日の東京をみますと、不法入国した多くの三国人、外国人が非常に凶悪な犯罪を繰り返している。もはや東京の犯罪の形は過去と違ってきた。こういう状況で、すごく大きな災害が起きた時には大きな大きな騒じょう事件すらですね想定される、そういう現状であります。こういうことに対処するためには我々警察の力をもっても限りがある。だからこそ、そういう時に皆さんに出動願って、災害の救急だけではなしに、やはり治安の維持も１つ皆さんの大きな目的として遂行して頂きたいということを期待しております(Yomiuri Shimbun 2004)
Ishihara later clarified his comments as referring to illegal foreigners only. However, in an emergency situation the distinction between legal and illegal is difficult if not impossible to make. Moreover, the comments and perceptions themselves lack basis in fact. The overall number of foreigners staying illegally in Japan has been falling since 1993 (Daily-Yomiuri 2004a) while the argument that foreigners are more likely then Japanese to commit crimes has been thoroughly debunked (Herbert 1996; Shipper 2005). Nevertheless, this does nothing to dispel the deeply held popular image that any increase in foreign labourers would inevitably have a detrimental affect on public safety.
In considering whether opening up to unskilled labour is inevitable or not it is important to consider also whether the political will exists to instigate sweeping policy change. Ruling elites in Japan have traditionally been characterised as conservative (van-Wolferen 1989). Although the Koizumi government has instigated some notable reforms, there is little evidence of a more liberal policy stance. In fact, the 1990s saw a distinct shift to the right (McCormack 2000), the upsurge in neo-nationalism (Abe 2001) taking concrete form in the passing of the flag and anthem bills, revision of the constitution, and patriotic clauses in a new fundamental law of education. In terms of migration policy itself, there have been no signs of a loosening of the relevant laws; conversely, tighter immigration controls, harsher penalties, and tougher laws have been responsible for a significant drop in numbers of illegals (Daily-Yomiuri 2003; 2004d; 2004c; 2004b). The likely introduction of a foreigners’ fingerprint database in the near future adds to the sense of a more not less conservative immigration policy (Japan Times 2006).
- Analysis
The evidence in section (3) seems to suggest that importing more foreign labour is inevitable. There are a number of problems with this evidence.
First, while it may indeed be difficult for Japan to resist the steady march of globalisation and the transnationalisation of the economy, global migration levels have actually stabilised in recent years (OECD 2005: 17/53). In particular, since 9/11 there has been a noticeable global backlash against migrants and multiculturalism as witnessed by growing anti-migrant sentiment in Europe(The Telegraph 2014).
Second, while demographic factors will inevitably result in a shrinking labour force both public opinion and government policy suggest this can be offset by utilising more women and elderly Japanese (Yomiuri Shimbun 2014). Whether this will be enough to meet future labour needs is as yet unclear.
Finally, it can be argued that Japan is no longer as appealing as it once was for foreign migrants, especially following the bursting of the bubble, the two “lost decades,” and rampant deflation. The latter in particular undermines the “wage gap” argument, especially given the rise of wages in Japan’s largest source of migration, China (Bloomberg 2014).
On the other hand, there are also problems with the argument that ideological, popular, and political factors make the opening up of Japan to foreign labour unlikely.
First, while the tan’itsu minzoku ideology still retains a strong psychological pull on the population it has increasingly been attacked in the academic literature. Moreover, the notion of Japan as a multicultural society (tabunka kyōsei shakai) has been gaining ground in Japan, as evidenced by the establishment of the Gaikokujin tono Kyōsei de Kentō Kaigi (
Second, while fear of “foreign crime” continues to be cited as a reason for caution in accepting foreign labour, public opinion has softened in recent years. While the finger was pointed firmly at foreigners in a 2006 Cabinet Office poll on the reasons for a decline in public security, the number of people blaming foreigners almost halved in the 2012 poll (Cabinet Office 2012). This suggests that the “foreign crime” discourse is no longer a serious brake on bringing in foreign labour.
Third, while there has been much talk of a swing to the right (ukeika) in Japan in recent years, Abe has shown himself to be a realist whose major interest is in rejuvenating the Japanese economy. In April 2014, he noted that it was necessary to discuss the utilisation of foreign workers (Asahi Shimbun 2014); on the other hand, at the same time he also stressed that government moves “should not be misunderstood as a migration policy” suggesting that major reform is unlikely in the near future. In the final analysis, it is difficult to escape the impression that however rational or logical the arguments and however desperate the need for opening the door to blue collar workers, the ideological and social impediments appear to make the likelihood of any radically new migration policy, in the near future at least, very low.
- Conclusion
This essay asked whether the opening up of the Japanese economy to foreign labour is inevitable or unlikely. First, the terms in the title were defined. Then, the two positions were outlined and evidence presented to support these two positions. Finally, the validity of the evidence was analysed and evaluated. The conclusion was that, despite some promising signals, Japan is unlikely to open its door to blue collar workers any time soon: while the needs are undeniable, policy-makers hands remain ideologically tied and public opinion remains conservative. In this sense, Japan is perhaps a good example of how popular belief and stereotype can override rational argument, even when the result may ultimately be detrimental to national self-interest.
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