Comments on a Naturalist Physicalist Defense Against Schneider S Problem of the Base

Comments on “A Naturalist Physicalist Defense Against Schneider’s Problem of the Base”

By Jason Waller (Eastern Illinois University / Kenyon College [starting August 2017])

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I think this is a fun and thoughtful paper. I have five major questions about your argument.

1)p.10. I am skeptical of the weaseling procedure working in the mathematical case. You say that this procedure involves asserting proposition P and then qualifying P. But this strikes me as wrong, instead it seems to me that P is never asserted. Instead proposition P* is asserted (namely, P plus qualification.) For example, when asked if all of the kids have eaten dinner and I say, “Yes, all but Billy.” I never assert that all of the kids have eaten, I assert only that all of the kids (in the assumed set) minus Billy have eaten. If this is right, then I don’t think this procedure will work in the mathematical case because the formulas seem to express a proposition all by themselves without the qualification that comes later in another language (e.g., English.)

2)p. 11. I am skeptical of the claim that we ought to prefer the theory which makes the world simpler. This would seem to no longer be a methodological assumption, but now a significant metaphysical one. For example, Berkeley’s Immaterialism arguably entails a simpler world than physicalism with its complex base and layers of superveining properties (for Berkeley all we need are minds and ideas in minds.) But this is an inference that you would certainly resist. To say that we should prefer the simplest physicalist theory of the world is to begin with a major metaphysical commitment, not a methodological one.

3)p. 12. I think one needs to be careful in this discussion to distinguish what metaphysically individuates a thing from what allows us to know that one thing is not another. Whether x is an individual independent of y and whether we can know this are two different questions. It seems likely to me that what epistemically individuates is not likely part of the essence of a thing. I also see no reason to assert that what metaphysically individuates a thing is (often) a part of its essence. Take a Platonic Form (like the Good), when I see an instantiation of goodness in my dog (he is a good dog after all) this particular property of goodness is individuated from other instances of goodness. But it seems that whatever individuates this particular instance of goodness is not part of the essence of the property of goodness itself (which the dog has.)

4)p.13. I am not persuaded that “energy radiated per unit of volume” is an entity with an essence needing individuation. Instead this seems to be an activity of a body (the body radiates at such and such a rate). If this is right, then what individuates this activity (or, perhaps, state) is whatever individuates the body (why is this radiating done by body x and not some other body…) So this example may not be a good one for you to use.

5)p. 14. I don’t see the inference from a disagreement over metaphysical methodology to the conclusion that Schneider’s view “doesn’t make sense” (p.14-15). That strikes me as far too strong unless you can provide an argument to the effect that following your preferred method is necessary for meaningfulness (and so all philosophers ought to follow this method.) I see no way to make such arguments and so you do not seem entitled to the claim that S’s view makes no sense. The claims offered certainly seem coherent and consistent, so they certainly seem meaningful. If the claims did not make sense (e.g., were really grammatically correct meaningless nonsense) then it is unclear what exactly you are arguing against—all you would need to do would be to point out that S is asserting nothing at all. If the claims are meaningful, then your argument is of the form: “S did not follow my preferred method, thus her claims are false.” But this strikes me as obviously invalid.