What’s Wrong With Hypocrisy?
Hypocrisy implies a moral code
George Orwell
A Prime Minister breaking his own election timing law; SUVs bearing “Save the Planet” bumper stickers; millionaire journalists accusing one another of “elitism”: our culture seems to be swimming in hypocrisy, and each of us contributes our share. And almost as prevalent as hypocrisy is condemnations of it: it is, in Judith Shklar’s frequently-cited phrase, “the only unforgivable sin, inexcusable even for those who can justify almost any other vice.”[1] But despite, or maybe because of, its ubiquity, hypocrisy is strangely under-theorized. Few philosophers have much to say about it. My aim in this paper is to give an account of just what hypocrisy is, and so to shed some light on its moral status: why and how is hypocrisy morally significant? What, exactly, is wrong with hypocrisy?
It’s useful to begin with an example: mine is the hypocritical environmentalist, an all-too-familiar target of abuse and criticism. She’s someone who claims that the environment is important to her, and her actions frequently seem to bear this out: she uses eco-chic cloth shopping bags, she’s retro-fitting her home with energy-efficient light-bulbs and appliances and encouraging all her friends to do the same, and she proudly displays a “Save the Planet” bumper sticker on her—no doubt fuel efficient—car. But, worryingly, she continues to drive this car to work even though it would actually be quite easy for her to take public transit, and she sees nothing wrong with this. Now, how should we explain and assess this hypocrisy?
The few philosophers who have developed accounts of hypocrisy generally agree that it is characterized by a particular sort of deception: hypocrites pretend to be morally better than they really are. On this view, our environmentalist doesn’t really think the environment is important: she just pretends to because it’s in style, or so that others will admire her.
I think this deception account of hypocrisy is a complete failure. In its place, I offer a different account, one that dispenses with the emphasis on deception. On my view, hypocrites all care too much about their image for having certain values, and this excessive concern for their image leads them, in many different ways, to fail to honour the values that they claim to have. But their failure need not involve intentional interpersonal deception, though it can often involve self-deception and related failures of self-knowledge. I therefore urge that we reconsider the moral status of hypocrisy. Many hypocrites do exhibit an important moral failure, but their failures are often relatively minor, and are far from being “the only unforgiveable sin.”
I. The deception account of hypocrisy
According to the standard account, the hypocrite is a liar who lies about himself: he deceives others about his true beliefs, desires, intentions, and values—in short, his attitudes. Moreover, he does so intentionally, and with the aim of creating the impression of being morally better than he in fact is. This explains why hypocrisy is seen as a significant moral failure: the hypocrite is a manipulative liar (already bad enough) who wants the benefits of morality without actually being moral.[2]
The standard example for this account is Molière’s character Tartuffe, from the play of the same name. Tartuffe pretends to be pious only so that he can take advantage of his legitimately religious host, Orgon. Tartuffe’s hypocrisy is clear-eyed: he is not at all pious, he knows that appearing pious is to his advantage, and he intentionally acts pious so as to procure that advantage.
Tartuffe may be one kind of hypocrite, but he is far from the only member of the cast. In describing the hypocrite as a highly self-aware, calculating manipulator, the standard account excludes most of those we are inclined to call hypocrites, and so completely fails to capture the scope of this widespread vice; many of those we accuse of hypocrisy are neither self-aware nor calculating. Examples are not far to seek: I chose the hypocritical environmentalist because she is, at this point, a stock character in our political morality play. But I don’t think we’re inclined to call her a hypocrite because we think she is simply lying about her commitment to the environment. Her psychology is not that simple: she might genuinely believe that she is a Friend of the Earth, and still be a hypocrite for all that. The standard account cannot explain hypocrisy’s scope, because it does not give an adequately nuanced explanation of the psychology of hypocrisy. I will argue that this should lead us to re-evaluate the extent to which hypocrisy merits blame.
Those who defend the deception account often try to extend its scope by appeal to self-deception.[3] Perhaps the hypocritical environmentalist deceives others about her attitudes by adopting the strategy of first deceiving herself about them. It is certainly true that many hypocrites are self-deceived, a point I will return to below. Nevertheless, self-deception cannot save the deception account.
Self-deception is motivated false belief: it involves believing something that is false because one wants it to be true, and believing it despite having good reasons for believing it to be false. The hypocritical environmentalist falsely believes that she is environmentally pure because that is what she wants to be true, even though she should know that she is not. Moreover, since she is deceived about the extent to which her actions reflect her self-image, she is self-deceived about herself.
The reason an appeal to self-deception cannot extent the deception account is that interpersonal deception and self-deception are not relevantly analogous: while lying is intentional, self-deception is not. While it is true that some philosophers—Donald Davidson, for example—insist that motivated false belief must be intentional, this intentionalist explanation of self-deception encounters well-know paradoxes, paradoxes that the deflationist, non-intentional account, most prominently defended by Al Mele, does not.[4] And if we cannot intentionally deceive ourselves, then self-deception cannot be part of a strategy for deceiving others. This is a serious problem, since the deception account claims that hypocrisy is wrong because it involves the selfish and unjustifiable manipulation of others. This assumes that the manipulation is intentional.
Once the deception account admits that hypocrites can be self-deceived, it looses its grip on what it is that makes hypocrisy morally objectionable, since it can say nothing about the blameworthiness of self-deceived hypocrites. Rather than extending the scope of the deception account, the appeal to self-deception reveal’s the deception account’s three closely connected flaws. First, it does not properly capture hypocrisy’s scope, since it fails to account for the vast majority of those we most want to call hypocrites. This is due to a second failure, an overly simplified account of the psychology of hypocrisy—not all hypocrites are bald-faced liars. And finally, third, as a result of these failures, it gives us a mistaken account of why hypocrisy is morally troubling.
My account corrects all these mistakes: by giving a more nuanced account of hypocrisy’s psychology, I both extend hypocrisy’s scope and give a better explanation of its moral import.
II. Hypocrisy as misdirected concern
Thought deception account fails, it begins with an important insight: hypocrites want to appear better than they actually are.[5] Its mistake is to emphasize the role of lying in satisfying this desire. On the account I will defend, hypocrites care too much about their image as people with certain values, and this excessive concern leads them to fail, in a variety of ways, to properly honour the values they claim to hold. In a phrase: hypocrisy is a failure to ‘value one’s values’, brought on by an excessive concern for one’s image as someone with certain values.[6]
Though the desire to appear better than one is is an important feature of hypocrisy, there is nothing necessarily hypocritical about it: after all, there’s nothing hypocritical about a desire for self-improvement. The question is what must be added to this desire to make it hypocritical.
The hypocrite’s desire is to appear to be virtuous. The problem with this desire is not that it is it is deceptive, but that it is misdirected. There is nothing hypocritical about wanting to be virtuous, but there is, as Bernard Williams points out, something “suspect” about the person whose deliberations consider whether their actions are virtuous. Kind people do kind things, but they rarely do them under that description. When the kind person acts, her reasons are considerations such as “he is in pain”, and “he needs it more than I do,” rather than “this would be kind.” To think of one’s own actions in terms of the virtues, says Williams, represents “a misdirection of the ethical attention.”[7] Such ethical attention is misdirected because it primarily considers how others would describe one’s actions, rather than how one ought to act. This sort of deliberation externalizes one’s moral attention, focusing it on the wrong sorts of considerations.
This definition of hypocrisy is comparative: a hypocrite’s desire for an image of virtue is stronger than his desire to actually be virtuous. It is possible to care about one’s image without being a hypocrite: Aristotle even reserves his highest praise for the magnanimous person, who cares a great deal for honour.[8] And those who genuinely care about the values they profess are can still be hypocrites. The environmentalist’s hypocrisy lies in not caring about the environment enough, rather than in not caring at all. So hypocrisy does not consist simply in either self-regard or an absence of concern for one’s professed values: it consists rather in an excessive self-regard and insufficient concern for one’s professed values.[9] This excess of self-regard leads hypocrites to fail, in many different ways, to properly honour the values they claim to have.
What are such failures like? Tartuffe is an extreme case, since he cares nothing for the values he pretends to have: all he cares about is deceiving others for profit. Most hypocrites, however, are different. Consider, for example, Proust’s Mme de Cambremer.[10] She genuinely loves art, and thinks highly of her discriminating and independent taste. But it is also important for her own self-image that others see her a sophisticated art critic. When, upon dismissing a painting in the Louvre, she is told that Monet admires it a great deal, she quickly changes her opinion. Soifer and Szabados, who are interested in the difference between hypocrisy and (mere) changes of mind, argue that her change of mind is hypocritical, since she allows the views of others to influence her evaluations, even though by her own lights those views should be irrelevant, since she prides herself on having independent taste. But she may still value art: she just cares more about her image for having good taste than she does about the art itself.
While some hypocrites care too much about what others think of them, not all hypocrites are concerned about their public image. For many hypocrites, it is their self-image that matters most. Our environmentalist might not care at all about what others think of her, but still care very much about being able to see herself as morally righteous. She might still be a hypocrite even if she keeps her view to herself and merely congratulates herself privately for being such a friend of the Earth.
The fact that her concern is for her own self-image, and not how others see her, will influence that ways in which she fails to honour her professed values. Unlike Mme de Cambremer, she will adopt moral beliefs that she truly believe are correct, and she will adopt them because she believes them to be correct. Mme de Cambremer fails to honour the values she claims to have because she adopts her beliefs for the wrong reasons: because someone she respects has them. Our environmentalist, however, may have formed her beliefs for the best of reasons: she might genuinely believe that human activity is threatening the future of the planet, and that we have a responsibility to prevent this harm. These are legitimate reasons, apparently un-driven by a self-interested concern with her image. What, then, is the failure of practical reason that makes her a hypocrite?
Ultimately, her failure is that she does not properly honour the values she claims to hold by translating those values into action. This failure can, in turn, be partly explained by self-deception. The hypocritical environmentalist cares more about believing that she is eco-friendly than actually being eco-friendly, and this preference can affect the ways in which she forms her beliefs. She might, for example, be too quick to believe industry claims that bio-fuels are good for the environment, and equally too quick to dismiss scientific reports that such fuels emit just as much carbon as conventional fuels. If a less biased person would recognize that the industry claims amount to “green-washing” and the scientific reports are grounded in solid research, then our hypocrite’s excessive self-concern will have led her to form a false belief in the face of the evidence, and so she will be self-deceived.[11]
Her excessive concern for her own image leads to her self-deception, and this, in turn, leads directly to her hypocritical failure to properly honour the values she claims to hold. Her self-deception is a central element of her hypocrisy. Though she can truly claim that she believes protecting the environment is an important responsibility, she has not fully integrated this belief into her larger pattern of beliefs, values, judgments, and intentions. She does not recognize the sacrifices she would have to make in order to bring about her goal, and she may well be hesitant to make those sacrifices. She does not recognize the extent to which her own comfort depends in part on environmentally harmful practices. On both counts, she is too eager to criticize the moral complacency of others, and not eager enough to consider the ways in which she, too, might be morally tainted.