Project ‘Improving Responsiveness to International Change’

Roundtable ‘How should the U.S. and Europe deal with ‘pariah regimes?’

Munich, December 11/12, 1997

Comment by Phil Gordon, IISS, London on the introductory papers:

Kenneth M. Pollack, Between Morality and Strategy. Understanding U.S. Policy Toward

Rogue Regimes

Sven Behrendt: Europe and the ‘Pariah-State’-Debate: The Quest for Realistic Pragmatism

These two papers reflect very well the stereotypical differences between most Americans and most Europeans (Germans) on dealing with rogue states. The American paper emphasizes confrontation, morality, and military deterrence, and the German paper emphasizes dialogue, compromise, and trade.

Let me pick up on some of the main themes and arguments found in the two papers, both those I share and those I disagree with.

1. The Definition of Rogue States. I agree with Behrendt that the concept is a flawed one. The only possible use of such a concept is to drum up domestic political support for a policy of confrontation with certain states by painting them as pariahs or villans, but this advantage is outweighed by the fact that one concept suggests one policy, which is unfortunate. As any analysis of "rogue states" demonstrates, each case is very different, and each requires different policies. Still, as Pollack points out, good concept or bad, we are now stuck with it.

2. The Question of "Morality". I was not fully comfortable with the tone of Pollack's paper, which suggested--inadvertently perhaps--that US policies on these issues are moral, while Europe's are immoral. The fact is, I think we have to admit, neither US nor European policies are working very well, and we should be careful before assuming that "we" (whoever we are) are the righteous ones. The Munich analogy used in the paper--suggesting that Europeans have not learned from their mistakes about confronting dictators, is also flawed. None of the rogue states is analogous to Nazi Germany either in power or likely intentions; certainly Cuba is not (!). One might just as easily have used the Versailles analogy (as Europeans might), and come to opposite policy conclusions. Pollack's main point, of course, is that whether their policies are really moral or not, Americans think in these terms, and Europeans should not fail to understand this. This is certainly correct, and the point is well taken. Like Pollack, I am concerned that Americans will (rightly or wrongly) come to see Europeans as "appeasers," with negative consequences for the Atlantic Alliance.

3. Sanctions. All analysis aside--for in fact European and American assessments of the rogue state problems are not hugely different--the main policy difference between the two is that the US favors applying broad economic sanctions, whereas Europeans emphasize diplomacy and trade. Americans (including Pollack) seem to stress that rogue states must be confronted, punished, and deterred, while Europeans (including Behrendt) are doubtful that these states can be isolated and instead stress dialogue and interaction. Europeans, including Behrendt, make good arguments against sanctions--they are a blunt instrument, have a poor historical record, and are ineffective against terrorism, which is unfortunately not very expensive to undertake. Sanctions can also have the unintended side effect of strengthening the very hard-liners one is trying to undermine. At the same time, Behrendt and other Europeans seem to overlook the case for sanctions and confrontation made in Pollack's paper: Economic sanctions reduce the opportunity for rogue states to undermine their neighbors and threaten them militarily; reduce funding available for the production of weapons of mass destruction; provide an incentive for the rogue regime to change; and deter other potential rogue states from misbehaving.

This is a difficult debate and there are not easy answers. Still, an American like Pollack is justified in asking Europeans who oppose sanctions just what they recommend instead. The thrust of Behrendt's paper is to say that containment of rogue states American-style does not work, but he does not suggest what does work. In other words, Behrendt, and other Europeans, fail to respond to Pollack's challenge to articulate just how they think their policies are likely to bring better results.

Both of these papers are very useful in stimulating discussion of one of the most difficult and important policy issues of our time.

Philip H. Gordon

Carol Deane Senior Fellow in US Strategic Studies

Editor, Survival

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London