Wakuluk Ilona Edyta
Faculty of Law
University of Bialystok
The roleof operators in the process ofEuropean regionalization
Introduction
Operators(transactors)[1] in the EU areextremelyvaluableactorsnot only of the economiclife- they contribute tonational income, butalsocreate jobs, spendsomefunds for research anddevelopment,createprogress. European integration isbased on theSingle Market, and ithas increasedthe role ofthese entities. Freedom which has been giving like business,services or capital, make a frameworkof economic activitiesgofar beyondnational borders.Of course, such a processalso takes placenotonlydue toprocesses of regionalization, but alsoofglobalization, -opening the borders, elimination ofsuccessivebarriers, anddue to the factthat bothphenomens- regionalizationand globalizationhave grownon the grounds ofone idea-economic liberalism. The effect offree choice ofplace of businesson the one hand and given theroleof operatorsfora given regionis to increasetheir rolein the process ofEuropean integration. One of the aspectsworthexaminingis thegrowing importance ofeconomic entitiesvisible on thestage ofco-creationof EU law. There are some questions about the roleplayed bystrong lobby of employers? Is thegrowingrole of operators threatens thefunction of the state-orthe EU institutions, which inthefieldtookthe powerfrom thestates?
- Europeanbusiness: the statusandimportance
In theEU-27 there areapproximately20.9 millionbusinesses (notincludingnon-financial business), ofwhich0.2% arelarge enterprises. Simultaneously,large businesses, providing about one thirdof employmentin the economyandgenerateinexcessoftwofifthsofvalueadded(notincludingnon-financial business).[2]
In 2008, the EU-27 11 192.7billionofgrossvalueaddedwasgenerated. The business economy (industry, constructions and services) contributed 75,7% of this total.The share ofbusinesseconomyin the production ofvalue added is differentin each EU countryinwhichimportantrolein the production ofvalueaddedhas got agricultural sector(agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing) andadministration (public administration and defense, education, health, social work, other community, social and personal services).The contribution of thissectorin theproduction ofvalueaddedis highestinDenmark, Malta, PortugalandSweden[3].
The role of thebusinesseconomyasjobs inthe EUcan not beoverestimated-non financial business economyemploys133.75 millionpeopleand generate 5 705 billion EUR of value added.[4]
Part ofthecompanies work in the regional, nationalarena. Some ofthem operateoninternationalmarkets,havingaccesstoresourcesthat exceedthe budgetsof smallandmedium-sizedEU Member States.[5] Turnover ofthe largestinternational companiesarecomparableto the size ofthe national incomeof somecountries: for example,General Motors(178.2 billionUSDturnover) isin terms ofeconomic powercomparable withSweden(184.3 billion U.S. dollarsof GDP), Ford (153.6 billionU.S. dollars)canbecomparedwithAustria(GDP 157.9billion), Shell(128.2 billion U.S. dollars) withPortugal(GDPU.S. $122.1billion) andMitsui(126.4 billionU.S. dollars)with Greece.J. E.Garten Yalearguesthatthemultiplicityandthe powerbalancebetween the marketand the state, also betweenpublicauthorityandprivatepower is faltered.[6]
The role ofbigcompaniesis not limitedtocreating jobsand generatingvalueadded. They performmanyfunctionspreviouslyreservedexclusivelyfor the state. International corporationsbearmore thanhalfof expenditure onresearchanddevelopment, ensurethe provision ofmedical, educationalandsocial insurancefor theiremployees.[7] On the basis ofconsiderationsrelating tothe taking over ofresponsibilityfor meetingsocial needsby thecompanyfroma government thatis unwilling orunable tomeetthese needs,thereisthe concept ofcorporatecitizenship. It grew uponthe basis ofdiscussiondevoted tocorporate social responsibility,as awidelyunderstoodconceptalso includesthe activities of enterprisesin theareapreviouslyservedby the state.[8]
Themainstreamdebate onthe role ofthe European integration processoperatorsinthe area ofbusinessisconsideredvital.What'smore, there arealsovoicesthat theiractivitiescan be regardedasthe locomotiveof integration-as themainmechanism ofintegration[9].
While thedominantapproachof regionalizationas aconstructiveprocess, created by thegovernments andgroups, arealsooccupiedapositioninwhich theintegrationis definedas thebottom-up process, performedby theentitiesparticipatingin the economic process.Integrationin thiscaseoccursnotasa consequence ofthe actions of MemberStates,but theactivitiesof entrepreneurs, participants inthe SingleEuropean Market.[10]The implementationof manyprogramsorinitiativeswould becompromisedif not forthe inclusion ofEuropean companiesbutalsoAmerican.[11]
- Competitionforbusiness
Important meaning of operatorscombinedwith thepossibility offull freedom ofchoiceofthe allocationof these activitiesposes the threatof lossof revenue for thestatebudgetinthe form of taxes. This mayhinder thefulfillment oftherole ofthe stateprovision of essentialsocialneeds.So it is aneed tocompete for theremainingcompaniesinthemarketaswell asacquiringnew ones.
Relocation[12]is a phenomenon causednotonly onregionalintegration processes, but thebroader–globalization, andis nota newphenomenon.However,it becomesappropriateto review therisksofrelocationin terms ofEuropean integration, whichfor examplecanitcome alive. Entryto theEU-10countrieson 1 May 2004and2countriesfrom 1 January 2007significantlyexpanded thegeographical scope ofbusiness opportunitiesinthe territory ofcountrieswhichsuchofferlowertaxrates. On the basis ofconsiderationsrelating tothe relocationprocessinthe EUtherearethreadsofsocialdumpingor the needs fortax harmonizationin the EU.
Relocation canoccur notonlybetween MemberStatesof the regional groupbut alsobetweenthegroupingandthe restof the world. In thissituation,there is apulseon regional levelto createincentives whichmaybe reflectedinthe legislationof the grouping. Incentivesmayalso include aninflux of new investors, itisthe inflow ofFDI(Foreign DirectInvestment).
In 2009 totheEuropean Unionwere sent361949million dollarsforeigndirectinvestment, the crisishas causeda significantdecreaseincomparisontoprevious years,when the value offoreign directinvestmentwas, respectively,in 2008- 536917and 2007- 923810million dollars.The EUcompetesforforeign investment inflowsto othereconomies, both developedanddeveloping countries. Economiesof developed countriesin 2009attracted383,349million U.S. dollarsof foreign investment, while the economies of developing countriesby almost halfmillion dollarsmore -548,297 U.S. dollars. UnitedStatesin 2009sawthe influxof foreign investmentsamounting to129,883million dollars,andcountriessuchas ChinaandIndiarespectively95,000and34,613 million dollars.[13]
According to World Investment Prospect Survey, EU remain among the top tree direct investment host regions. However, theforecastisincreasedinterest indevelopingandtransitioneconomies, especiallyinSouth, EastandSouth-East Asia, and, toalesserextent, LatinAmerica.Incomparisonthe most attractivedestinationsof foreign investmentinflowsin thetopfiveeconomieswerefourcountriesthat do not belongto ahighly developed:China,India, BrazilandRussianFederation.[14]
Beingthe recipient ofa substantialpart ofFDI, while experiencingincreasing competition fromdeveloping countriesin attractingforeign investment, the EU has amotiveforcreatingthe newincentivesandsolutions that promoteFDIinflows.
Attractingbusinessesisreasonable-increasesthe chanceof economic developmentandmodernization. At the same timeforcingittomarket deregulation, and limitedability to shape an economic policy,employmentandsocialpolicy.[15]
Countries thatare unable toprovideadequate infrastructure,they do not haveadequateresourcesrelevant to thecontemporaryinternationaleconomic activity arecircumventedbytransnational corporationsandinternationalcapital flowsand knowledge. An exampleof such aprocessisalmostthe entireAfrican continent.[16]
3.Effect ofoperatorson thedevelopment ofpoliciesandlawsin theEuropean Union
The importantroleof operatorsimpliesthe impactonthe integration process- fromlaw-making process-they aredue totheirweightentities,whichisright, directly or indirectly canco-shape. Theirnegotiating positionis determined, inter alia, market share, or disposal ofa keytechnology.[17]
Isreasonableto drawattentionto thedesign ofdecision-makingin the EUinterms ofthe impact ofeconomic entitiesthatplayinthis process.
Witha significantimpactonthe socio–economic situation operatorsinthe EUhave asignificantrole inthe lawmaking process- suchasitsoriginators(not mentionedat this pointofthe legislativeinitiative, whichwith someexceptions,has beengrantedan exclusive to European Commission)oritsrecipients. Entrepreneurs of the EU, affectedby theiractivitieson theprocess ofEuropean integrationin thelegal dimension and bysupportingthe implementation ofthe EU legal order. This happensbecause ofan enforcement actionbefore thenational courtsandthejudicial systemof the European Union.[18]
Decision making system in the EU does notprovide fordirectinvolvementof operatorsintheprocess. The activities ofthe legislative authorityEU:EUCouncilandEuropean Parliamentdoes not providevisibility of theWe can onlyemphasizethe universality ofthe electionsto theEuropean Parliament, membersof whicharerepresentativesof all thestructuresof EU citizens, includingoperators. Activities of
operatorsin theEUcan be seen, butinthe institutionsandtheir opinions-herewillplaya leadingrole theEuropean Economic and Social Committee. Not havinga directlegislative initiative, nor acting asthe legislative function, effectivelyaffects theshape ofthe legislative processin theEU: European Commission actson81% ofEESCopinions. The structure of the Commission clearlyprovides the roleof the Employers, whoare concentrated inthe firstofthreegroups ofthe body. GroupIfocusedmembersrepresentingthe privateand publicsectorsof industry, SMEs, chambers of commerce, transport andfinancial services.[19]
Interactionof society(natural and legal persons) in theEuropean Union institutionscantakethreeforms:
throughrepresentationin the European Parliament, whosememberscomefromuniversalsuffrageinfree and secret ballot, so they arerepresentatives ofEUcitizens;
throughconsultationinthe institutionalform, expression ofwhichis theactivity ofthe advisory bodies ofthe EU-European Economic and SocialComitteeandComitteeoftheRegions, in accordance with theirduties competences definedinthe Treaties;
throughlessformaldirect contactswith stakeholders.[20]
The European Commissionhas a longtraditionof consultinginterestedpartiesin formulatingpolicies. The consultation mechanismispartofthe EU institutionsat everystage ofdecision-making process-fromshapinga legislative proposalby the European Commissionafter thefinaladoption ofthe actand itsimplementation. However, the existence ofinstitutionalizedadvisorybodies -EconomicandSocialCommitteeandCommitteeoftheRegions, shall not preclude the need fordirectcontactsbetween theECandstakeholders. Moreover, extensiveconsultationswiththe European Commission'sduty tohavetheirsourcein theEU primary lawprovided forin theTreaty of Amsterdam. Thusit is assumedthatthere is nocontradictionbetween thewideconsultationandtheconceptofrepresentativedemocracy. At the same time, should beemphasizedthat thedecision-makinginthe European Unionislegitimizedbytheelectedrepresentativesofthe Europeanpeoples. Thus, the activeparticipation ofstakeholdersin the process ofEU lawcanreceiveavoicebutnotavote.[21]
Despiteemergingconcernsanddiscussionson the consultationand collaboration withstakeholdersin formulatingpolicies,traditionsof lobbyinginthe EUdevelopsalongwiththedevelopment of European integration.
- Lobbyingin theEuropean Union- the representation ofbusiness
European integration, forthe entry intoforce ofthe TreatyonEuropean Unionwasessentiallyeconomicorientation. The constructionof a customs union, the entry into force ofthe SingleEuropean Actand theestablishment ofeconomic freedomsof the singleEuropean marketanda processof creating economic- monetary union is milestonesaroundwhichthe storyfocuses oneconomic integrationin the EU. It has become alargelymarket regulator. Taking over thecompetence of Member Statesin manyareas ofbusinesshas becometherecipient oflobbying activities. The very factimplies astrongerpositionmarketizationcompanies[22]; from thefact thatthe transfer ofcompetencesfrom theMemberStatesonthe level ofEU institutions, it appears that thelatterbecametherecipientin the course ofthe integrationactivities ofinterest.[23] Interest groupshave developedso the "European strategy", which is expressed bythe factthatalmost70% of German, British and Frenchtrade associations tomaintaincontactswithinstitutions, both domestic andEuropean.[24]
Lobbyingthe Europeanactioncan be understoodasinterest groupstoinfluencedecisionsnot yettakenthe adjectiveEuropeanstatesthatthese activitiesrelate tothe European Union.[25]The European Commission defineslobbyingas "all activitiesaimed atinfluencingtheprocesses ofpolicy formulationanddecision-makingby theEuropean institutions ".[26]
Amongthe most populartheoriesexplainingthe phenomenon oflobbyingatEuropean Union level,the modelshould be mentionedBroscheidaA.and D.Coen(informational modelof lobbying), the modelBouvenaP.,and the modelCrombezaCh.. Extremelyinterestingare theexplanationsP.Bouvena, whichexplainsthe existence oflobbyingthe EUon the basis ofpresencein decision-makingin theEUdependenceof public and privateactors.They needeach other'sresources-information. Thisinformationmaytakethe form ofknowledge ofthegeneral European interest, national interestorthe interest ofthe sector. Crombezexplainsthatinterest groupsexertinfluence ondecisionsinthe EUlegislative processby providingpolicy makers with informationonthe effectsofdecisions, policies.[27]Lack of perfectinformation,which isthe rightinstitutionis thejustificationforthe existence oflobbyinginformation. Pressure groupsprovidingexpertisemaythereforeprovide an importantandnecessarylinkinthe lawmaking process.
Risks arisingfromthe operation ofpressure groupsand theirrole inEUlaw-making processistheirmonopolization. If thepressure groupspresentposition ofknowledgeanda limitedgroup ofactors(eg, geographicallylimited)[28]tothe decisionstakenbyworking with themmay consideronlya limitedinterest ofstakeholdersare representedandnotthe entireenvironment fromwhichthey originate.The remedywould appear tobea pluralisticsystem oflobbying.
The problemof representativeness inthe activitiesof pressure groupsas early as 2002saw theEuropean Commission. On theonehand,there is aneedtopressure groupsrepresenta broad, balancedrange of viewsof theenvironment. On theotherhand, therepresentativeness of theorganizationslobbyingcan notbe thesoleconditionon whichsubjectstocooperatewiththem, for, nationalandregionalviewpointscanbeequallyimportant- due tothefact thatdiversityinthe EU Member States. Moreover, minorityviewscanmake an importantcontribution totheshapingof thepost,and can notbeignored.[29]
TheEUoperatesa verywiderange oforganizations, groupsandassociationsfocusedonlobbyingfirms, associations, ministries ofmemberstatesorstateagencies. Actionis no stranger tolobbyingtheEUinstitutions, whichusethismechanismin its relations withother EU institutions.[30] The size, diversity ofactivitiesandlocationsmake it difficultassessment ofthe number ofgroupsactivelyworkingin thearea ofthe lobbyingbusinessin the EU. It is estimatedthatamong thepressure groupsinthe EUis dominated byorganizationsrepresentingthe business world, which according tosomeauthorsrepresent66% of pressure groups[31]andaccording to others,theirparticipationis as high as80%.[32]Inorder tohighlightthe roleof operatorsinlobbyingthe EUisfoundedto providea select few-includingthe oldestandmost successful-lobbying groupsin the field oflobbying.
There arecross-sectoralandsectoralorganizationsrepresentingbusiness interests.In thegroup oforganizationsacross sectors,theseincludethe oldestto beBusinessEuropeformerlyasUNICE(Union des Confederationde l'Industrie etdesEmployeursd`Europe) establishedin 1958.[33] Among theachievements ofUNICEincludethe impactonagriculture issues,a compromisesolutionthrough negotiationsthe membershipof Spain andPortugalaswell assimilartrade-offsduring the accession negotiations10countriesaccedingon 1 May 2004.[34] For themajorlobbyingorganizationrepresenting theinterestsofEUbusinessesshouldERT-European RoundTable ofIndustrialist, foundedin 1983.His workis estimated to beextremelyeffective: among othersin theareaof introducing a commonmarketoreconomicandmonetary union.[35]ERTwas foundedby45heads ofEuropean companieshas playedan importantrole intheeconomic policy ofthe European Economic Communityand inthe preparationof the Treatyon European Union.[36] Companies in theERTrealizingsalesinexcess of€1.000billion, approximately6.6millionholdjobsintheEurope.[37]
In theEUthere arealsonumerousbusiness organizationsrepresentingsectoralinterestssuch asautomotive, foodandagriculture. The largestandmostinfluentialinclude theEuropean Chemical Industry Council(CEFIC -ConseilEuropeendesFederationsdel`Industries Chimique) andthe EuropeanFederation ofPharmaceutical Industries and Associations(EFPIA -European Federation ofPharmaceuticalIndustriesAssociations).[38]
The tendencyinthe development ofEuropeanbusinessgroups,the representationis to create aplatformlinkingdiversestakeholdersto achievea common goal, such asthe ENE G8 gatheringeightcompanies(large industrialenergy consumerssuch asMercedes-Benz andThyssen), whosecommongoal wastospeed upliberalizationin the Europeanenergymarket. An example ofan activeplatform forthefood sectoristhe EuropeanFood InformationCouncil, which brings together suchCoca-Cola, Masterfoods, Danone andKraft.[39]
It is estimatedthat18% of the organizations lobbyinginBrusselsare theindividualrepresentativesinBrussels onprivate, national and internationalcompaniessuch asSiemens, Philips, IBM,. The most widelyrepresentedAmerican companies.[40]
Amodel of the wayof lobbyingthe European Commissiongivesdata froman openregister ofinterest groups, which, however, is voluntary, and therefore must notcontain acompletelist ofthoselobbyingtheEuropean Commission.[41] Of the3,989[42]companies registered, 507areindividualcompanies. IndividualrepresentationsarebothEU firmsas well asfromoutsidethe EU,includingU.S. firmsrepresented: BritishAirways, BritishAmericanTobacco, Carrefour, DeutschePostDHL, GlaxoSmithKlein, Unilever,Bank ofAmerica, Yahoo![43]. Among45Polish companiesare for example: Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A., Związek Banków Polskich, Polskie Koleje Państwowe S.A.
It is understoodthatitis theEuropeanbusiness associationshavethe greatestimpactonthe European Commission.[44]
Corporationshavean impactthrough itsactivitiesnot onlyin
Brusselsbutby affectingthenational structures. A goodexample is thenegativeattitude ofGreat Britaininthe EUsocial policy, which comesfrom thepressureof Britishcompanies interested inreducingthe costof production.[45]
A new instrument forthe expression of opinionsand positionsin thecreation andimplementationof EU lawis the European Business TestPanel(EBTP) operatingatthe European Commission'sDGInternal Marketand Services. Currently,hefocuses3,619members-toEBTPcanjoinanycompanyirrespective ofsizeandsector ofactivity, provided thatis establishedwithin theEuropean Union (or NorwayorIceland). By participatinginconsultationsunderEBTP, business cancontributeto improvingthe quality of legislationandsupport theimprovement ofbusiness environment.There isan opportunity to commenton both thedesign stageactandshare their observationson theconsequences ofongoingactivitiesof the EU. While thebig improvementis the ability toexpress their viewsin one oftheofficial languages ofthe EU,theeffectiveness ofthistype ofsoftinstrumentsisdifficult todetermine(European Commissionis not obliged torespondpositivelytothedemandsandopinions.).[46]
- The role ofoperatorsandthe roleof the state andinstitutions inthe processof European integration
Importantoperatorsin theprocess of European integrationraisesthe question ofwhethertheirgrowing roleat the expense ofthe role of thestateorinstitutionof the grouping.First,it becomesreasonableto define whichis the naturalrole of the state/institutiongroup inthe European integration process.
Oneofthe manyconsequences ofEuropean integration is theerosion of theclassicalnation-state.[47]Membership inthe EUMember States' sovereigntyis limited. However, understandingsovereigntyinterms ofabilitytoovercome thespecial interestsfor thegeneralinterestandnoting thethreattosovereignty, such asnon-transparentdecision-making procedures, isstayingout ofthe integration processescouldfurtherrestrictthesovereignty.[48]
On the basis ofeconomic policy, state sovereigntyisnotpracticable, the proofof whichis thefunctioning ofsupranational structuresandvoluntaryintegration groupings[49], forwhich thestatethendelegatethe powersornotparticipatingin thedecision making process.[50]It is worth notingthat "thedelegation ofsovereignty"will be held for the benefit ofcitizens,consumers, sinceeconomic decisionsare leftto market forcesmoreeffectivelythanthe government.[51]
Interms ofthe role of thestate/institutions inthe processof European integrationmayproveextremely importanttoconsiderWaltersandHaahr, whooffer interestingreflectionson therole ofstate/government ofthe European institutions inEurope(they do so on the basis ofconsiderationsconcerning theinfluenceof liberal ideas and ordoliberal in the shape of theeconomic governanceof Europe). Also significant isthe titleof one of thesubsections of the monograph"Governance Europeforfreedom", which is suggestivebackgroundanalysis ofthe role ofthe European state/institutions inthe liberalhistory ofEuropean integration. The role ofthe state -in the spirit ofeconomic liberalismSmithand Ricardo, setting upa self-regulatoryfunction ofthe market -was to beminimizedandto relymainly on theprotectiongiven tofreedom. Accordingordoliberałówconceptof the common market, it is not a naturalconceptand requiresconstant attentionruling- requirescreatingan institutionalstructure.Thereforeimpossibleto separatepolitics fromeconomicsof law. The visionof the common marketcontains elementsthat constitutethe role ofthe state insocial and economic life. The single market,"must promise ofliberalization"in an attempt tostrike a fair balancebetween theliberalizedeconomy andthe social economy, he established a necessaryand positiverole of the State/the European institutions.[52]
It follows thatthe process ofEuropean integration,havinganchored in theidea ofeconomic liberalism, butthe intervention ofthe institutionhe founded, and has not leftherself-market mechanisms.
Reflections onthe degree ofeconomic sovereigntytake place on theplane, thetwo opposingpolesareautarkyand globalization.Between theseextremesthere areintermediatesolutions-integration processes,whichisan example ofthe EU.With the developmentdirection: autarky-regionalization, globalizationis a reductionof state sovereignty.[53]The differenceindepletingthecountry's sovereignty as a resultof globalizationandregionalizationistheirsource- inthe caseof globalizationis theunintendedconsequence, inthe case ofregional integration-is theresult of a consciousdecision by thestates.[54]In theprocess ofdecliningstate sovereigntychangingitstheirclosedeconomiesin theglobaleconomy, the question arises: Isintegrationunderstoodas astep inthe processof globalization,the effect of reducingthe role of thestateoras aresponsetoglobalization,itprotects?
Assumingthat theprocesses ofregionalizationare complementary to thephenomena ofglobalization, or treatingasa form ofglobalization,the integration ofactivities underthe-limitedgeographicallyandpolitically-of the regionandgroupof countriescan be expectedasa consequenceof targeted, limited only bythe scale. On the basis ofrelevantconsiderations, is therefore to approximate thesameeffectof globalization on therole of thestate, institutions andeconomic entitiesinthis dimension.
In an eraof globalization,the statelosesmuch ofitstraditionalrole. Changesitsrole in shapingforeigneconomic relationsandthusreducesitsimpacton theadjustment ofgross domestic product. Manydecisionsarein factatthe level ofsupranational organizationsandtransnationalbusinesses. Fieldactivitiesfortheireconomic policytightensup, especially whenit comestoensuringmacroeconomic stability,lowinflation, controlledthe budget deficit,balance ofpaymentsandpolicyinterest.[55]
To paraphrase thetitle of theworkhis father'sliberalism, AdamSmith, the effect of globaleconomic activityis "wealth withoutnations".[56]The liberalization of thelimitsof state powersinceindependence, reducesthe stateanddecreasesitsabilityto gatherresources andpolicy implementation.[57]
The diminishingrole of governments inthe global economyL.Thurowobserves: "National governments are losingpower. They haditwhenthere was astate-wide economy. Andbecause thestateeconomyloses its significanceforthe global, governmentslosepower. The role ofcapital marketis largerthanany state. If themarket"finds" that theeconomic policyof Thailandisthepoint ofview,inadequatecapital market, Thailandwill leadto bankruptcy". P.Kennedysimilarlynotesthat "theautonomyandfunctions of the stateareerodedunder the influence oftransnationaltrends".[58]
On the otherhand, the processesof regional integrationmaybea responseto globalization: the regionalizationcreates theconditionsfor meeting thechallenges of globalization.Globalization, whichinconjunctionwith theflowsof capital andthe loss oftaxesmakes it difficult tofillthe role ofstateprovisionof basicsocial needsarepitted againstregionalization, whichresponds tothisthreat-including, in addition to economic goals- includingthe socialaspects ofdevelopment.[59]
Resultingeitherfromthe phenomenaof globalizationandregionalizationgrowingposition of the companiesraises someconcernsand risks. The growingconcentration ofpower oftransnational corporations, theirsignificanceandimpactonthe riskcreatedby the new law, in whichthemechanism offreemarketsand healthycompetitionloses itsmeaning. Inpractice,moreoftennotfree competitionandmonopoly oftransnational corporationsimposea solution. More andmorereason, therefore, arethosewhorecognizethattransnationalcorporationsreallydo notsubordinatethemselvesonly by the state, but alsothe market.Globalizationnotonlystarts the process ofunderminingthe state butalsodefines amore generalprocess ofalienatingandalienatedfrom theeconomic phenomenaof man's power.[60]
This threathas beenobservedinthe conceptsordoliberal. Ifprovokedfearamongliberalsconcentration ofpolitical power, ordoliberalsperceivethe riskofpowerbymonopoliesand cartels. While"market liberalismmobilizeagainstthe state", itordoliberalizmnotesthatcouldleadtosubstitution ofa state monopoly– by the private sector.[61]
What'smore, large corporations(with monopolypower) are able toconvince thegovernment andthe publicthat"what is good for GeneralMotorsis goodfor theUnitedStates". Even ifasolutioncan only use thecorporationsareable toconvincethatthis is also abenefittosociety, and the argumentsput forward, such asstrategicimportance(eg food production) and protection ofnationaltraditions.[62]