The Metaphorical Links Between Ecology, Ethics, and Society

The metaphorical links between ecology, ethics, and society

Brendon M. H. Larson

Department of Environment and Resource Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1 Canada

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Abstract

It is now widely understood that metaphors are not simply rhetorical embellishment in science, but serve a critical epistemic role for the creation and exploration of theories. Three prevalent ecological metaphors—competition, invasion, and resilience—serve as examples and touchstones of the role of metaphorsin ecology, and how their origin and operationas “feedback metaphors” interweavesecology with its social context. In each case, the social origin of these metaphors implies that they are value-laden at the level of interpretation (i.e., due to their resonance with everyday language) and/or at the level of worldview (i.e., due to the way they highlight some aspects of a comparison while hiding others). Thus, metaphoric choices in ecology should be subject to ethical scrutiny. In effect, this necessitates paying attention to the “evolutionary ecology” of metaphors in ecology itself—that is, attention to factors such as their context, diversity, history, and scale. These normative elements in metaphors bear directly on perennial discussions about objectivity and advocacy in ecology, and how ecologists should use metaphors in science while being cognizant of and sensitive totheir social context.

Keywords: advocacy, science, society, values, worldview

Over the past several decades, the role of metaphors in scientific inquiry has become much more widely appreciated. A metaphor is a figure of speech by which we understand one thing in terms of another, and most of us learned about them in the context of English courses in highschool—or perhaps during our undergraduate education. We learned that “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” in Hamlet’s famous “to-be-or-not-to-be” soliloquywere not actual slings and arrows, but unpleasant things in his life (which he considered ending,by suicide). Hamlet could have just referred to them as the “problems of life.” Instead, Shakespeareemployed a poetic metaphor as rhetorical embellishmentto ‘dress up’hisnarrative. If this is all metaphors do—put the bare facts poetically—then it is not surprising that metaphors were widely disparaged in scientific writinguntil quite recently(Ortony 1993), despite their continual use. However, it is now increasingly recognized that metaphors are not simply embellishments, but cognitive instruments in science that have an “epistemic”[1] function in helping us to understand complex relationships and/or what was formerly unknown (e.g., Keller 1995; Brown 2003).

Here, Idon’t have space to discuss the origin and function of scientific metaphors in detail. Instead, I focus on how metaphors operate as links between ecology and its social context, demonstrating that (i)ecological metaphors originate from the everyday social world; (ii) they are thus value-laden; and (iii) their use in ecology thus requires ethical reflection, particularly in the context of advocacy for conservation outcomes. (For further discussion of these ideas, see Larson 2011a).

Metaphors permeateecology(Worster 1985; Larson 2011a),so a few concrete examples—competition, invasion, and resilience—may help to indicatetheir epistemic function. Each of these terms was adopted as a central metaphor in ecology at a particular point in time: competition a little after the time of Charles Darwin, invasion with Charles Elton in the mid-twentieth century, and resilience with C. S. Hollinga few decades ago(see, respectively, McIntosh 1992; Elton 1958; Holling 1973). They were not simply embellishment, but central concepts adopted by ecologists to better understand natural phenomena by reference to everyday phenomena that were already known. In this sense, then, they were “constitutive” metaphors that directed ensuing empirical inquiry down particular paths rather than others. As time passed, one might say that they were increasingly interpreted as part of the foundation of ecology, that is“factual,” because they were (arguably) subject to empirical test, and more or less empirically supported.

Ecologists chose these metaphors because they helped to understand phenomena; and they did so because of an apt comparison with something everyday and better known. Returning to our examples, ecologists inhabited a world where humans themselves competed and invaded territories, and where the meaning of “resilient” was clear in the context of everyday experiences with things that recover their shape after stress or expansion (e.g., an elastic band). By applying this everyday understanding to something new (that is, by using it metaphorically), ecologists obtained an ability to better conceptualize and therefore to investigate phenomena in nature.

But the choice of these metaphors was also an interpretive and definitive act. The choice of these metaphors was not inevitable because ecologists could have adopted other ways of understanding by choosing other metaphors. Other metaphors, however, may not have resonatedas well with the cultural contexts in which ecologists introduced them. The chosen metaphors reflected prominent aspects of the prevailing zeitgeist. The role that symbiosis plays in contemporary evolutionary biology demonstrates that early ecologists might have chosen some other metaphor than competition (Larson 2011), andit also demonstrates that scientists are more likely to choose metaphors and follow the lines of inquiry to whichsuch metaphors point because they resonate with theprevailing cultural assumptions about the world.

According to Keddy(1989), the competitive and masculine culture in ecology prioritized study of competitive interactions (and associated empirical exploration) over cooperative ones (also see Boucher 1986). Further, some scholars question whether competition is an appropriate metaphor for passive interactions,such as the shade of one plant preventing the growth of another, that are transformed by the metaphor into combative ones(e.g., Keller 1988). Davis et al. (2001)claim that the Nazi threat to mid-twentieth century Britain incited Elton to adopt the metaphor of “invasion” (as opposed to viewing highly mobile species as simply spreading or expanding demographically). I’m not familiar with published explanations for the recentrise of the resilience metaphor in ecological thought, though this would be an interesting topic for an historian of ecology to pursue.

Moreover, there is synergistic feedback between the metaphors adopted within ecology (and other sciences) and the cultural context in which they originate(e.g., Stepan 1986; Bono 1990; Maasen et al. 1995). Elsewhere (Larson 2011a), I have made the case for calling these “feedback metaphors.”[2] The metaphors originatein everyday language;they are applied within science, where their use shapes scientific inquiry;and, their use in sciencein turn feeds back into culture. If this were not the case, the metaphoric referent would have been too obscure to be useful and to communicate to other scientists as well as to lay people (including funders and the broader public). If scientific metaphors did not reflect and resonate with their cultural context, they wouldnot endure—and indeed many havenot. For example, as space exploration has been given a lower and lower public policy priority, the “spaceship-Earth” metaphor, ubiquitous around the time of the spectacular Apollo moon missions, has all but dropped out of environmental discourse.

The referents of feedback metaphors occur at various scales. Often the referent is bodily experience—e.g., so-called cognitive metaphors sensuLakoff and Johnson (1980), such as “balance,”which is the referent of mathematical equilibrium according toCuddington (2001). In other cases, the referent of a metaphor is cultural. The cultural context of some metaphors may be somewhat obscure (e.g., a “keystone” species, drawn from Medieval architecture), or they may sometimes reflect the discourse of the day—called discourse metaphors byZinken et al.(2008)—e.g.,“meltdown,” drawn from nuclear-power-plant accidents, which, in turn, is drawn from metallurgy. Sometimes a metaphor may be much more deeply embedded in the cognitive structure of the society—called root metaphors byPepper(1942)—e.g., “mechanistic” explanations.

Given that these core metaphors in ecology reflect the society in which they occur, they are implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) value-laden. This occurs not least because metaphors can have different meanings (“polysemy”), which occurs at various levels as well. At an interpretive and psychological level, many of these metaphors have a popular “resonance” that is quite strongly value-laden, for example “invasive” species are, by that token, bad things. The value resonance of some metaphors (and their alternatives) isextremely context-dependent. Partisans of free-market economics might view competition as a good thing, while partisans of Keynesian economics might view cooperation more favorably. Sometimes eveninvasion can be a good thing (e.g., when we want to introduce a species to control another that’s deemed a “pest”). At their worst, ecological metaphors can have racist, sexist, or misogynistic overtones (e.g., Haraway 1989; Zuk 1993; Herbers 2007).

At the level of worldview, scientific metaphors are also implicitly and subtly value-laden. This largely originates from the manner in which all metaphors both highlight and hide. As I said, a metaphor is chosen because it is apt. If new species did not colonize (also a metaphor) in a manner that we could compare with “invasion,” then we would not utilize the metaphor at all—we might say “colonize” rather than “invade.” So by using that metaphor, we highlight the ways in which widely spreading species are like invaders conquering a country. But there is also an “is not” with every metaphor;that is, there are ways in which the phenomenon is not like the metaphorical referentand the metaphor hides this “is not” from view. Further, in contrast to a stated simile—X is like Y—the very act of comparison is itself obscured. The “invasion” metaphor, for example, implicitly vilifies a species that shows up in a new place. But species do not have agency or intent to harm (even if they often do cause harm) and they are notcrossing borders bounding countriesthat are geopolitically demarcated (Larson 2005, 2011b). The value-laden elementof this metaphor leads to a strong bias towards interpreting the phenomenon of spreading species in terms of what is highlighted by the metaphor, while ignoring what is hidden. This can lead to epistemic limitations and to inappropriate social responses—for example, a response to these species as if they are “bad” and “vicious” rather than just species doing what species do.

From a philosophical point of view, these feedback metaphors implicitly blur the bright line scientists typically would like to draw between fact and value. Such melding of fact and value occurs in science all the time. Many ecologists and conservation biologists, for example, naturally interpret “invasive species” as something against which we should, without question, defend the homeland(Larson 2008). While this interpretation may beappropriate if“invasive species” are defined in terms of their harmfulness, the metaphor is misleading in ecology, where they are defined simply in terms of their tendency to spread(Lodge et al. 2006). To shift metaphors,as it were, most laypersons would wish to cultivate ecological “stability” and to restrict ecological “disturbance,” even though contemporary ecology now recognizes the importance of disturbance for ecological renewal and the maintenance of biological diversity (Worster 1990; Lodge and Hamlin 2006).

Not only in science itself do metaphors meld fact and value (as “invasion” so obviously demonstrates), but also when a metaphor from science, interpreted as an “is,” is used to justify how things “ought” to be in the cultural context from which it is drawn (see Fleming 2006; Elliott 2009; Larson 2011). The classic example is the “survival-of-the-fittest” metaphor drawn from Darwinian evolutionary biology and then used as a justification for competitiveness within society, as in Social Darwinism, and even as justification for eugenics and for genocide (Keller 1992; Taylor 1998; and see Larson 2011a for further nuance).

Accordingly, the choice of which metaphor to use is an ethical and value-laden one,not just epistemological, even though scientists have often restricted discussion to a metaphor’s epistemic dimensions—as if science were indeed “objective ” and occurring in a social vacuum. Although the attempt to be objective is a laudable ideal, it is ultimately not possible to actually achieve(Putnam 2002; Kincaid et al. 2007; Douglas 2009), despite the determinationby the early 20th-century Logical Positivists to draw a sharp distinction between objective facts and subjective values. This is not to suggest that the selection of a metaphor can be deliberately managed because no scientist can operate as a perfect “social engineer.” Metaphoric choices are often quite unconscious, even though one goal of this chapter is to make their choice more conscious or at least more transparent. On the other hand, there are now some very good examples of biologists who have consciously used metaphors, such as “invasional meltdown” and “DNA barcoding” (Larson 2009, 2011), to promote a particular worldview and its associated values.

Not only is the choice of metaphor an ethical choice, it is also performative, which enlarges its significance even more. By performative, I mean that the metaphors we choose are not merely cognitive: they lead to actions in the world that have consequences. The naturalistic fallacy—inferring an “ought” from an “is”—provides one example of such consequences (see Wilson et al. 2003; Fleming 2006). That is, while a metaphor may seem like a scientifically validated “is,” it in fact implies“oughts” that contribute to social decisions, actions, and outcomesthat may sometimes be undesirable. Even if we do not consciously transpose a metaphor from one domain to another (e.g., “competition occurs in nature, so it ought to occur in human society”), in the case of some metaphors the“is”is strongly tied to an “ought” and associated actions (e.g., “those species are invading a forest”, so we are led inexorably to think, “therefore, we ought to stop them”).

Over time, metaphors have their greatest power in the performativity of an entire worldview, as evidenced by some subfields and schools of thought in ecology. In the history of ecology,as already pointed out, there has been a decided emphasis on studies of competition as opposed to cooperation. The “invasive species” has been so powerfully performative as to give rise toan entire field of “invasion biology.” Resilience is a fairly new metaphor in ecological science, but one that has become an increasingly common metric of the state of an ecosystem and its ability to tolerate anthropogenic change. Interestingly, though, one might say that the increasing prevalence of this metaphor in ecological discourse actually reflects a narrowing of options, thus in effect reducing our cognitive resilience for understanding ecological change in diverse ways. As ecologists, we should always be sensitive to whether our metaphoric lenses have become too narrow or whether a greater plurality of metaphors would be helpful for maintaining diverse options for responding to change.

As a consequence of the way they operate, ecological metaphors create a significant tension between neutrality and advocacy. Some would argue that we can dispense with the problem of metaphors by simply abandoning them, but that is hopeless because of their cognitive function—and even the attempt to be neutral is value-laden (Weber and Word 2001). More to the point, many ecologists, philosophers, and social scientists argue that ecology would be more effective in terms of conservation outcomes if it became more explicitly and consciously value-laden(e.g., Westoby 1997; Norton 1998; Bradshaw and Bekoff 2001; Robertson and Hull 2003; Foote et al. 2009). Conservation is, after all,motivated by values. That the contemporary zeitgeist is broadly inconsistent with sustainability values poses a significant problem for conservation becausethe metaphoric referents available for use by conservationists may not be consistent with desired sustainability outcomes (see Larson 2011a). There is an ongoing challenge here to find metaphors that speak positively to people about conservation and sustainability and that do not simply reinforce the largely incompatible, contemporary worldview (which puts a premium on consumption and economic growth).

Concluding thoughts and recommendations

Bringing to light the operation of metaphors in ecologyexposes several tensions that lie at the heart of claims of scientific objectivity and the role of science in conservation and sustainability initiatives. Conservation problems are not simple ones, where facts lead to clear decisions (Sarewitz 2004), but instead they are complex, uncertain, and contested(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). As a result, diverse values come into play that drive the direction society will take. Therefore ethical decisions are inescapable because the choice among diverse values is by definition an ethical choice. Science must thus respond in moving in a more democratic direction(Kitcher 2001), despite fears that this will devalue science to the lowestcommondenominator of public opinion, subject to extra-scientific manipulation, such as we see with the success of climate-change denial (which is a particular sort of manipulation that must be acknowledged and prevented where possible). Gone is the previous, implicit model of the relationship between science and society/citizens (top-down, science-first), to be replaced by a more bottom-upmodel where society is more involved in decisions formerly thought to be determined by science alone(Dietz and Stern 1998; Pielke 2007). This is uncomfortable for some ecologists, but many increasingly recognize that advocacy and public engagement as a necessary path forecology (Lubchenco 1998; Balmford and Bond 2005; Palmer et al. 2005; Foote et al. 2009; Nelson and Vucetich 2009).

Finally, it is important to reflect on one of the overarching metaphors in this book, that of “worldview.” A worldview emphasizes the sense of vision, the view of something. In that sense, it is coincident with the attempt by science to be objective, to take a “disembodied” gaze at the world. As Heidegger (1977, p. 133-134)put it, “As soon as the world becomes picture, the position of man is conceived as a world view … The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture.” The problem here is that vision is one of the more “distancing” senses insofar as it separates the viewer and the observed (Ingold 2000). This may be inconsistent with the more embodied linking of ecology, ethics and praxis that we here seek. But sometimes it seems that the harder we try, the more enmired we become in language, the very metaphor of a “link” further suggesting two reified entities that must be reconciled. Awareness of feedback metaphors in ecology demonstrates the extent to which facts and values, science and society, are less linked (or in need of linking) than intertwined (a weaving metaphor, I suppose). We can no longer pretend that science exists in splendid isolation because attention to ecological metaphorsdemonstrates that ecology and ethics are already inextricably integrated.