The Evolution of Fisheries Governance Paradigms

The evolution of fisheries governance paradigms

Jon Nevill Draft 20 March 2008

Who hears the fishes when they cry? It will not be forgotten by some memory that we were contemporaries. Henry David Thoreau, 1849.

Abstract:

The dominant paradigm of the fishing industry today sees the activity as essentially one of resource extraction – the production of wealth from a natural resource – like timber harvesting or mining. While philosophers (and occasionally broad national policies) may discuss intrinsic value, such concepts appear rarely (if ever) in fishing industry dialogs. Over the last two decades the concerns of conservation biologists regarding ecosystem protection and precautionary management have entered fishing industry literature – if not fishing industry practice.

This paper outlines the main features of the mould in which the dominant paradigm has been formed over the last half-century. Attention is drawn to the development of the precautionary, ecosystem and adaptive approaches within modern fisheries management. It has been suggested that the management tools which were lacking at the start of the twentieth century are now available, and that the essential challenge of the industry over the coming decades is one of implementation. However, fishery damage to productive ecosystems, and overfishing in the face of regulation remain pervasive. These problems, as well as the freedom to fish the high seas under flags of convenience, remain as thorns in the side of such optimism.

Current fisheries paradigms:

Humans have been fishing for many thousands of years. Modern fisheries, and the mentalities behind them, have evolved from, but are hugely different from those ancient artisinal fisheries Today, fisheries are characterised by paradigms totally dominated by a homo-centric view of the world – fish are a resource to be used. Left in the ocean, their intrinsic value is negligible or non-existent.

Ragnar Arnason (a professor of fisheries economics at the University of Iceland) expresses a typical view from the fisheries economics discipline:

…[F]ishing is fundamentally a production activity. As such it is no different from other industries. It follows that its social purpose is to maximize the net value of production, i.e. the difference between the value of landings and the cost of producing these landings. In this way the contribution of the fisheries to the GDP and, hence, general welfare is maximized. Anything else implies economic waste. Economic waste means that goods that could have been used to increase someone’s personal utility are squandered. That, of course, is morally reprehensible (Arnason 2000:1).

Fish habitat has also been seen by the commercial industry, until very recently, as having no economic value, indeed no value at all – at least when it gets in the way of a trawl[1]. This view has allowed bottom trawling over vulnerable habitat to continue (Gray et al. 2006, NRC 2002) – a practice which may be compared to clearfelling a forest to catch a herd of deer. In spite of protests dating as far back as the fourteenth century (Jones 1992) this outrageous practice continues today under the official sanction of fisheries management agencies around the world[2].

There are other ways to view the world and the place fisheries have in it.

In his paper Traditional marine conservation methods in Oceania and their demise Johannes described the way in which central Pacific island cultures viewed fishing through the lens of spiritual beliefs and long-standing traditions – with the result that fishing did not occur at many sites and times important for the lifecycles of harvested fish, turtles and seabirds – and traditional systems of tenure also helped prevent overfishing (Johannes 1978). Western philosophers, such as Thoreau (quoted above) Lynn White (White 1967) and Aldo Leopold (Leopold 1948) argued for a deep respect for nature, irrespective of its direct benefit to man. This view was put forward, if not officially endorsed, by Australia’s national biodiversity strategy in 1996 (Commonwealth of Australia 1996:2) The argument is still being put forward (see, for example, Callicott 1991, 2002) although with no apparent impact on fisheries cultures or frameworks (FAO 2005a).

Hunting game and catching fish:

There are obvious similarities between the hunting of game on land, and the capture of wild marine animals (here referred to as ‘fishing’). The differences, however, are stark. Hunting on land is now tightly controlled in developed countries, where many large animals were pushed to extinction by hunting pressures over the last millennium (eg: Marshall 1966, Myers 1979, Holdaway 1989, Rosser & Mainka 2002). Available evidence suggests extinction through hunting has been a pattern for millennia (eg: James 1995, Alroy 2001, Roberts et al. 2001, Prideaux 2007).

The names of Australian government departments reflect changes in the place wild harvesting has had in western (not just Australian) culture. In the century following the British invasion of Australia[3], hunting wild animals moved from uncontrolled to partially controlled by State governments. At the close of the nineteenth century, the colonies of Victoria and South Australia each created a Department of Fisheries and Game to control and promote these activities[4]. The Victorian Department, many decades later, was replaced by two departments: a Department of National Parks and Wildlife, and a Department of Fisheries. These departments, years later, were subsumed by the creation of larger departments – fisheries into the Department of Primary Industries, and wildlife into the Department of Conservation, Forests and Lands, which later became the current Department of Sustainability and the Environment. Victorian statutes also reflect this trend. The Game Act 1890 underwent several major revisions until the Wildlife Act 1975 replaced the Game Act 1958. While the Fisheries Act 1890 similarly underwent several major revisions, it remains the Fisheries Act 1995.

These changes reflect an increasing awareness of the impact of human activities on wild terrestrial animals, leading to programs for their care and conservation (allowing certain harvesting activities to continue under increasingly tight controls). Of interest to the current discussion, while the impact of human harvesting on the marine environment has been well documented in scientific circles, public and political awareness of these impacts remains low. In spite of the parlous state of our marine environment (see below) it may be quite some time before we see Fisheries Acts around Australia (or around the world) replaced by Marine Conservation Acts.

Although the culture of the bigger players in the commercial industry has undoubtedly changed to some extent, recreational fishing cultures remain in much the same state as they were many decades ago, if the ‘letters to the editor’ in spearfishing magazines are any indication (xx cite title, date, pages of typical). The ecological impacts of recreational fisheries should not be dismissed. Lewin et al. (2006) and Cooke & Cowx (2004) have drawn attention to the potential of recreational fisheries to cause major ecosystem damage, and Balon (2000) has discussed related ethical issues.

Overfishing:

Overfishing is defined in this discussion as a level of fishing which puts at risk values endorsed either by the fishery management agency, by the nation in whose waters fishing takes place, or within widely accepted international agreements. A point of critical importance in this regard is that a level of fishing intensity which successfully meets traditional stock sustainability criteria (for example fishing a stock at maximum sustainable yield) may well be considerably higher than a level of fishing intensity which meets criteria designed to protect marine biodiversity (Jennings 2007). The wide endorsement of the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 implies that the latter level is now the critical level by which overfishing should be measured. However overfishing (for almost all of the twentieth century) was defined in practice as a fishing level which exceeded the estimated maximum sustainable yield.

As with other examples of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968) the beneficiaries of overfishing are fishers interested in short term profits. In the long term there are no beneficiaries, only losers, with the fishing industry itself heading the list (Sumaila & Suatoni 2005; Sethi et al. 2004, Sissenwine & Rosenberg 1993).

Many writers (eg: Johannes 1978) have recognised that overfishing may be expected in the ‘commons’ of the oceans, where the benefits of over-exploitation accrue to the exploiter, but the costs of the resulting degradation are shared across the owners of the commons. An obvious question, then, is ‘have regulators anticipated overfishing, or reacted to it?’.

In an examination of four of Iceland’s most important fisheries, Matthiasson (2003:1) found that “serious attempts to reform management practices only got underway when the fishery had collapsed or was close to collapse”. This pattern seems to have typified most major fisheries worldwide (Pauly et al. 2002, Rosenberg 2003). Fisheries have had a long history of overharvesting and ecosystem damage (Jackson et al. 2001) and this important feature deserves scrutiny – explaining in part the advocacy of ecosystem-based management approaches in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Overfishing occurred before the advent of industrial fishing. Saenz-Arroy et al. (2005), Barrett et al. (2004), Jackson (2001), Steele & Schumacher (2000), and Pitcher (2001) for example discuss archaeological and anecdotal evidence of historical overfishing, including that by artisinal cultures and recreational fishers. In the United Kingdom “overfishing was already an issue in the 1850s” (Schwach et al. 2007:798). At the very start of the era of industrial fishing, Roughley (1951:179ff) describes several major instances of overfishing along the east coast of Australia commencing in the early 1920s.

Seventy years later, Ludwig et al (1993) – looking back over a long history of resource over-exploitation, concluded (my italics):

There are currently many plans for sustainable use or sustainable development that are founded upon scientific information and consensus. Such ideas reflect ignorance of the history of resource exploitation and misunderstanding of the possibility of achieving scientific consensus concerning resources and the environment. Although there is considerable variation in detail, there is remarkable consistency in the history of resource exploitation: resources are inevitably overexploited, often to the point of collapse or extinction. We suggest that such consistency is due to the following common features: (i) Wealth or the prospect of wealth generates political and social power that is used to promote unlimited exploitation of resources. (ii) Scientific understanding and consensus is hampered by the lack of controls and replicates, so that each new problem involves learning about a new system. (iii) The complexity of the underlying biological and physical systems precludes a reductionist approach to management. Optimum levels of exploitation must be determined by trial and error. (iv) Large levels of natural variability mask the effects of overexploitation. Initial overexploitation is not detectable until it is severe and often irreversible.

Fishery managers were quick to respond to Ludwig’s paper. Both Rosenberg et al. (1993) and Aron et al. (1993), while not contesting Ludwig’s essential logic, pointed out that there were a number of outstanding examples of well-managed and apparently sustainable fisheries.

Fifteen years have passed since these arguments appeared in the pages of Science. With the benefit of the passage of time, have events supported the view that Ludwig’s pessimism was overstated? The answer is ‘yes and no’. Some of the specific fisheries cited by Rosenberg and Aron in 1993 are still relatively healthy and producing high yields – these are oceanic pelagic fisheries of species with short lifespans, rapid growth, and powerful reproductive strategies. However other cited fisheries have experienced marked declines in some areas, as well as notable ecosystem damage[5]. It would appear on balance that the passage of time has, if anything, added some weight to Ludwig’s views. The term ‘Ludwig’s ratchet’ (used in the paper) has now entered the scientific literature (eg: Pitcher & Haggan 2003, Hennessey & Healey 2000).

Fisheries managers, if nothing else, are remarkable for their optimism in the face of a long and well documented global record of resource over-exploitation (eg Jackson et al. 2001) accompanied by widespread and direct damage to marine habitats from fishing gear (Gray et al. 2006, Gianni 2004). The high level of uncertainty inherent in fishing lies at the heart of this optimism, and at the heart of management failures which continue the long-standing tradition of optimism in the face of contrary evidence.

Fisheries governance in the latter twentieth century:

Following the Second World War (which had given many north Atlantic fish stocks a temporary reprieve from harvesting pressures) the expansion of State fishing fleets created considerable tensions between fishing nations, resulting, for example, in gunboat diplomacy between Iceland and the UK (Matthiasson 2003). These pressures led some nations to declare sovereignty over an extended fishing zone (eg: 200 miles by Peru in 1947) and to the formation of the first regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) – some with a history of slow and ineffective management coupled with both industry and member-State non-compliance (Anderson 1998). Later, the adoption of the UN-sponsored Law of the Sea 1982 (in force in 1994) allowed coastal States to manage fisheries on their surrounding waters with confidence that their operations would not be challenged by fleets from neighbouring States. This of course provided national fishing agencies with challenges new in both scope and nature. The Law of the Sea, and subsequent deliberations by the UN General Assembly (and particularly the UN Fish Stocks Agreement’) also provided both a framework and an impetus for further development of RFMOs in other parts of the world. However, of all regional ocean authorities, the CCAMLR Commission stands alone in having a charter primarily resting on ecosystem conservation (xx reference needed).

Writing on the history of fisheries management frameworks, Garcia (1995) divided the later half of the twentieth century into five stages:

• 1946-58, post-war reconstruction;
• 1958-72, fishery and fishery research expansion;
• 1973-83, establishment of a new economic order (the Law of the Sea);
• 1984-92, transition to addressing global social, economic and environmental concerns (particularly fleet overcapacity and IUU); and
• 1993-2000, meeting the challenge of global sustainability.

This period saw huge changes in the technology available to fishers, partly as a result of technical breakthroughs (including military spin-offs) and partly due to commercialisation driven by expanding global markets. These include radar, deep sounders and fish finders, large and sophisticated plastic nets and longlines, improved refrigeration and onboard processing, satellite navigation and space observation systems. Expanding fisheries out-paced scientific investigations, nowhere more apparent than in the deep sea, where entire seamount habitats were destroyed before any scientific investigations could be conducted (Koslow 2007).

Garcia underlines the importance of two international ‘forums’ – the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly is the birthplace of both influential resolutions, together with resulting conventions and agreements. These two vehicles (the UNGA and the FAO) have been (and continue to be) vital to the negotiation and promulgation of fishery reforms – and more generally ocean governance reforms. It is notable that Garcia’s final phase starts in 1993 – the time of the collapse of the Atlantic northern cod fishery (see below).

Caddy & Cochrane (2001) also provide a critical examination of international fisheries governance developments of the second half of the twentieth century, highlighting the importance of:

• exclusive economic zones under the Law of the Sea;
• the UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992, and the subsequent implementation program (Chapter 17 of Agenda 21);
• the voluntary FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995; and
• the UN ‘Fish Stocks Agreement’ 1995 (in force 2001).

The UN Conference on Environment and Development also saw the birth of the international Convention on Biodiversity 1992, reflecting in part increasing interest in marine matters by conservation biologists.

This period was also marked by an important event which “spread alarm amongst fishery scientists, managers and environmental groups around the world” – the collapse of the huge Canadian northern cod fishery (Caddy & Cochrane 2001:660). Prior to the sudden collapse and closure of the fishery in 1992, Canadian fisheries had been seen as a model of good management. This event was partially responsible for the way in which the FAO subsequently championed the precautionary approach – explicitly included in both the Code of Conduct, and the Fish Stocks Agreement 1995.

The collapse of the cod also promoted an interest in management theory and systems amongst both fishery scientists and managers. Prior to this time, most fishery managers had at least a rudimentary background in fish biology, but little interest (and less knowledge) of management science. Managing single-species fisheries for maximum sustainable yield (MSY) was still generally accepted practice, in spite of obvious short-comings (Larkin 1977). Basic field-based biology and simple mathematical models prevailed. All this was to change, albeit fairly slowly.

Writing shortly after the collapse of the northern cod, Stephenson and Lane (1995) suggested:

Recent fishery failures, combined with changing views on management, point to the critical and urgent need for a new approach to fisheries management. Future management should focus on integrated fisheries, rather than solely on fish populations, and will require an appropriate combination of biological considerations with operational, social, and economic considerations of the fishery. …. We propose integration of the traditional fields of fisheries science and management with the scientific approach of management science to form Fisheries Management Science. Fisheries management science provides the framework and methodologies for defining multiple objectives and constraints, modelling alternative management scenarios, and assessing and managing risk. This framework accepts diverse information sources toward anticipatory decision making and consensus building, and offers a new paradigm within which effective fisheries management can emerge.

The plight of the northern cod also prompted the listing of the species – although still widespread – in the IUCN Red List of Threatened Animals 1996. This caused a good deal of controversy, and highlighted the very different views of fisheries managers and conservation biologists on the importance of precaution (Mace & Hudson 1999). This difference between these groups remains unchanged and unresolved (Rice & Legace 2007).