Daniela Fisichella
University of Catania
Section 8. Relazioni internazionali (International Relations)
Panel 8.4. The Quest for a new EU Global Strategy: Between theory and practice
Chairs: Elisa Piras, Kateryna Pishchikova
Good news from the EU Global Strategy? A lexicon to cope with swift transformations, from theory to practise.
1. Introduction
International community lives through transformations. Some of them are positive for its general balance, some others are like strong waves endangering its survive. Decoding international relations brings with it an effort to point out single factors to balance, in order to redress aftermaths as a result of bad political national choices; sometimes, even broad natural disasters have an incidence at the international level of relations.
XX century can be defined as ‘an era devoted to cooperation’, notwithstanding two World Wars and, by contrast, because of them. If the first half of it has been spent along tragedies, the dramatic aftermaths apparent at that time drove international community as a whole towards an ‘assessment of peace’.
‘Peace’ is still a target, far from being built and farer from being hold. But political shift from war policies to peace multilateral engagement is meaningful itself. Even though international community lacks any kind of homogeneity, basic principles rooted in it let us to remark crucial differences within it through centuries. International relations widely changed after the Second World War, and multilateralism got a great emphasis: intergovernmental organizations became the new size of State agreements, framed in a relevant institutionalisation unknown before the War. The second half of XX century brought important transformations, either in international community composition – many new States gained independence, so new State actors emerged – and in national policies adopted to face with international mainstream: “globalisation” has overturned existing rules, leading at the same time to several new non-State actors having an incidence on international politics. Indeed, emersion of new actors - multinational companies, intergovernmental organisations (IO), non-governmental organisations (Ngo’s), terrorists,often raises emergencies within international relations, as they are not ready or just set to deal with new realities. Current political international environment is full of threats since rather a long time, and they are increasing instead of getting weaker.
Threat is one of the main words in lexicon of this presentation, and it’s the first one as it summarizes the huge feeling of a permanent fear, currently breathed within and beyond State borders and inside civil society. Fear is the second word representing States’ attitude as well as individuals’ feelings: among both, single person’s ‘nationality’ seems to track many reactions . And may be nationality would like to be used as the third word in lexicon referred to hereafter: but nationality is a dangerous word, as too often it’s paired to State control, and in strong opposition to‘non-national’ factors, both situations and people. Too many differences are nowadays seen as a threat to rights stemming from nationality and, above all, to security. Global security is the keyword to read through international community post September 9/11 and to focus national policies adopted to manage threats beyondborders. But it’s now definitely clear that distinction between inside and outside is obsolete, as XXI century policies need to be wide and built on an holistic approach: current threats are blurring international polity – if there was one.
2. The European Union’s mirror: from internal and external relations policies to a single pattern.
As an IO, European Union’s [1] actions are inspired by dynamism, a great deal of initiative within competences conferred by States, and definition of roadmaps concerning each single field of cooperation. Contrary to a common belief, negative factors for States’ stability do not constitute parallel crisis for IOs: or, at least, international institutions’ capacity to react can’t be prompter and swifter than States. Current times foster euroskepticism at any level, either European and national, both inside and outside EU: financial instability jeopardizes internal market assets; the high rate of unemployment spurs on social tensions; the European soul promoted by good programs and plan for younger people, seems to work with them but is unable to exert a driving force on elder people: UK’s referendum result confirms it, and Prime Minister’s Theresa May caution in activating exit procedure is an evidence of strict bounds among European Member States, even by different nature and motivations. At internal level, dissent around European single currency still is one of the most returning item, while consent on European internal market is widely shared, as it allows and guarantees free movement of goods, persons, services and capitals. Within borders, most problems related to free circulation of persons has been faced and solved by regular and thorough action of European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law; now, limits are given to welfare measures extension and notwithstanding prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality – as on any other grounds - Member States sometimes question the equality principle, often getting a confirming ECJ’s statement. If denying national welfare measures enhance social exclusion and marginalization, free movement of persons has been so far taken under control by European law application. The 1985 Treaty of Schengen and the 1990 Schengen Implementing Convention both established the abolition of checks at the Member States common borders, and a uniform regime of external borders controls. The Schengen acquis is an integral part of EU Treaties and it basically rules movement of persons at the EU external borders. In terms of a ‘strategy’, the Schengen acquis has been so far the main legal frame for third countries nationals within their regular circulation, and in general terms it doesn’t give too many reasons to complain. In spite of those reproaching EU weakness and inadequate checks on external borders, EU control system gave good results and increased benefits either for EU citizens and for third countries nationals. Distinction between European internal policies and engagements taken in external relations field stressed some pivotal differences, mainly dealing with asymmetry between EU competences ‘inside’ and member states powers ‘outside’. The latest revisions of EU Treaty empowered EU as far as concern some crucial policies, consequently reducing States sovereignty, as it happened in Title V of European Union Treaty (EUT) and Part V of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). StrengtheningEU institutions in external matters is extremely important, as it conforms to a strategy of replying to several threats and challenges involving the international community as a whole. If a strategy plan is the common EU way to rule each single policy, strategy becomes nowadays a need and not a choice, as only strategy underlines a consistent approach to tackle global challenges. A simple question is: “If current threats are not represented on a national level anymore, aren’t easy to be foreseen and to be struggled, are ‘hybrid threats’ crossing countries like ghosts, why States still persist in conceiving national strategy plans, so reducing effectiveness in multilateral plans?”. States are severely suspicious towards loss of sovereignty, and international relations express it even when forms of institutional cooperation are provided. EU is not very ‘glamorous’ in XXI century, so much hit by frequent storms in relations with Member States. Focusing on current threats, it would be better if Member States realize that only multilateral cooperation can explore a consistent reply to them: instead of trying to destroy EU already built so far, and engaging to improve it according to international community inputs, it can’t be denied that EU offers a prominent pattern of multilateral action, either inside it and outside. With reference to migration, it must be observed that it could have been stopped at external borders only if internal borders survived: but if they would, EU would never exist according to its first aim of single market and freedoms of movement. EU external borders are not akin to a huge wall securing Member States territories, because EU wasn’t conceived in a protectionist size in its external dimension since its true origin in the 1950s; and it shouldn’t be forgotten that EU enjoys competence in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice [2], that slims conceptual distance between internal and external EU features.
2.1. Global challenges and hybrid threats: far from war, closed to permanent risks.
Question asked above implies a single answer inside a variety of multiple choices. First of all, events occurred in a globalized world involves every part of it, also far from the origin of the event. A deep political tension inside a State or between two of them, or an internal conflict, or a financial crisis as well as political instability on a regional basis, nothing can be considered far away enough to avoid spillover elsewere. Western countries are now aware that far events shouldn’t be underestimated and neglected, as they spread like wild fire. Moreover, ignored crisis deteriorate, and actions eventually taken are often doomed to failure as it’s too late to find out even a temporary solution – and later to start negotiations or open up for a mediation. So, globalization is used to broaden risks and dangers. If challenges are potentially always on a large scale, a national plan either to prevent or to react is useless and postpone the problem solving time. Indeed, when States started to stipulate international agreements in order to create IO’s, they did it just because aware of their single weakness face to contemporary problems, needs and emergencies. Therefore, the globalized community urges for collective reactions on a multilateral basis.
Secondly, current threats to States are totally different from before, and it means that possible replies have to be changed. Linking the first assertion – every critical event is global and not national anymore – to the second one – threats to Stated have radically changed – a different approach have to be met and it has to converge into a ‘strategy’. It could may be sound bizarre that the ban of use of force and, consequently, of transnational war as provided by post Second World War international law, make many countries – or single regions of them – burn for years or decades because of never-ending internal conflicts, lotsof victims, land destruction and long lasting humanitarian emergencies and global situation seriously worsened by hybrid threats spreading. They concern the whole international community, but Western countries above all: a recent Joint Communication of European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy[3]states that “(h)ybrid threats aim to exploit a country’s vulnerabilities and often seek to undermine fundamental democratic values and liberties.” [4] and “(i)nsofar as countering hybrid threats relates to national security and defence and the maintenance of law and order, the primary responsibility lies with Member States, as most national vulnerabilities are country- specific. However, many EU Member States face common threats, which can also target cross-border networks or infrastructures. Such threats can be addressed more effectively with a coordinated response at EU level by using EU policies and instruments, to build on European solidarity, mutual assistance and the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty ” [5]. To be stressed is the leading role of Art. 21 of the Treaty on European Union [6] and its reference to democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and respect of United Nations principles as well as international law. The Joint Communication – by which EC and HR play their right of initiative in EU external action –provides for several actions to be taken by all relevant stakeholders – EU institutions and agencies, States – to tackle hybrid threats, so connecting to NATO agenda in countering them and enhance EU-NATO cooperation in the area. The document chooses an holistic approach, referring to any space (land, sea, outer space, cyberspace) and infrastructures (energy, transport) and it aims to exploit existing policies strategic to achieve European security and recalling European Agenda on Security[7], European Defence Action Plan[8], the upcoming EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy – delivered in June 2016: Shared Vision, A Common Action: a Stronger Europe[9], a result of a strong and broad European engagement.
The Joint Framework depicted by EC and HR focuses on several elements: improving awareness; building resilience; preventing, responding to crisis and recovering. EU key policies are apparent: it should be increased States’ awareness on hybrid threats in order to push them to strengthening resistance against risks: “resilience is the capacity to withstand stress and recover, strengthened from challenges” [10]. The latest elements of the Framework are strictly related to European cooperation with third countries, enhancing dialogue on security matter and building resilience on the nexus between security and development; moreover, the revised European Neighbourhood Policy should broaden the security dimension [11] and it should be helpful in building resilience. As far as concern preventing, responding and recovering from hybrid threats, the Joint Framework proposes to examine how Art. 222 TFEU Solidarity Clause[12] and Art. 42, § 7 TEU could be applied if serious hybrid attacks occur.
2.2. The European Agenda on Security and the European Agenda on Migration.
Beyond any attempt to envisage a single European approach to borders management and external action for all sectors, and to nullify the internal/external dualism, as both levels are to the same extent concerned by current challenges, thesingle strategy emerges from EU institutions’ daily work. If migration and security are crucial items compelling for decisive EU policies on borders, and if migration is one of the two most serious threats perceived by EU citizens - being terrorism the other one – it’s just meaningful the adoption of the agendas above in the same period [13]. First of all, it should be noticed that migration is a border management issue only in its explosive and terminal dimension; indeed, flux of migrants should be intercepted before reaching European external borders and, as far as concern migration in the Mediterranean sea, only an integrated system of rescue service and asylum rules, paired to the most recent EU provision on migrants location, can meet the challenge. Migration becomes a matter of security insofar as it brings a huge chaos on borders: to migrants, borders are bridges; to many EU citizens, borders are the chance – the urgent need?– to build on walls to guarantee security. The two Agendas come together as they are complementary, at least for goals to be achieved. They both remark the central role of human rights, and Agenda on Security states five key principles in future actions [14], giving emphasis on single dimension of security and irrelevance of internal/external perspective: “Security threats are not confined by the borders of the EU. EU internal security and global security are mutually depended and interlinked. The EU response must therefore be comprehensive and based on a coherent set of actions combining the internal and external dimensions, to further reinforce links between Justice and Home affairs and Common Security and Defence Policy.” [15]. Agenda on Migration doesn’t define ‘migration’ as a threat, of course, but envisages the serious challenge it represents at European external borders and urges to reinforcing its asylum policy as far as concern regular migrants, at the same time recalling its effort to eradicate irregular migration [16]. From the Agenda, a ‘relocation and resettlement system’ has been defined and it’s currently on implementation[17]. Therefore, EU strongly reaffirms its duty to protect as a ground for asylum policy, but firmly struggling irregular migration either attempting to stop it before reaching EU borders, and returning irregular migrants back as soon as possible according to a repatriation mechanism. On the contrary, regular migration has to be dealt both allowing a proper migrants’ settlement – integration is hoped for, but so far it can’t be pursued on a general scale, either because of cultural barriers and of Member States financial shortage[18] – and fostering an institutionalised dialogue, and action plans, with third countries, first of all those of migrants’ nationality, aiming to remove factors pushing to migration. Promoting development is a key issue in Agenda on Migration as well that on Security, as development reduces factors incidence on leaving, so decreasing migration. Both Agendas provide for a framework to be implemented by further steps involving any European actor, either public and private, and by key priorities and pillars converging on clear actions. The Agendas are strictly intertwined, linked by the same need to countering any kind of threats, hybrid ones included; dealing both with risks and challenges occurring inside Europe as well as outside, they claim for a ‘strategy’ that has to be single and definitely global. The internal/external dichotomy belongs to international community features not existing any more, and States are becoming aware of these changes. Hybrid threats hold an hybrid peace: the Balkans and Ukraine give some examples of hybrid peace; in Libya and Syria hybrid or new wars; in Democratic Republic of Congo and the Horn of Africa, war and hybrid peace alternate[19].
Three priorities in Agenda on Security: 1) a strong EU response to terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters; 2) action against serious and organised cross-border crime, involved on trafficking in human beings, trade in firearms, drug smuggling, financial, economic and environmental crime; c) strengthening of Digital Single Market and hindering cybercrime, as an ever-growing threat to citizen’s fundamental rights and to the economy [20] : “Cybersecurity is the first line of defence against cybercrime” [21].