Michigan 7 Week Seniorsiraq Pmcs Aff Paper 1

Michigan 7 Week SeniorsIraq PMCs Aff Paper 1

PMCS Aff Final Version Paper

1AC

iraq stability advantage

hegemony advantage

human rights advantage

international law advantage

***Uniqueness***

withdrawal date useless

pmcs use high

at: withdrawal means pmcs leave

***Human Rights Advantage***

pmcs commit human right violations

***International Law Advantage***

exclusion of pmcs undermine ilaw

compliance key

current regulations fail

***Iraq Stability Advantage***

Iraq is on the brink

relations high

international perception key

population support key

coin effectiveness key

multilat coalitions

withdrawal key

relations key

PMCs crush relations with Iraq

pmcs kill gov’t legitimacy

iraq instability kills heg

iraq instability kills econ

iraq instability leads to civil war

relations solve terrorism

iraqi forces would fill in

***Hegemony Advantage***

credibility

anti-americanism

military readiness

war-fighting

military adventurism

***PMC Bad***

retention

authors biased

***Add Ons***

2AC democracy

xtn. democracy

CMR

***AT: offcase***

at: topicality—its

at: generic disad

at: pmc business disad

at: spending disad

at: regulations counterplan

regulations cp links to politics

at: meja solves

at: change mercenary definition counterplan

***International Law Good***

international law inevitable

laundry list

city busting module

war on terror module

root cause of terrorism module

ext. ilaw key to terror

human rights module

hegemony module

genocide module

warming/prolif

democracy

at: states won’t abide

at: kills judicial independence

at: alien tort statutes

1AC

PLAN: The United States federal government should phase out the use of its private military forces in Iraq.

iraq stability advantage

Advantage __ is Iraq stability

Private military contractors commit acts of violence that undermine US credibility, breeds counterinsurgencies and anti-Americanism.

Schulman 10(Daniel, Mother Jones' Washington-based news editor, “Are Contractors Undermining US War Efforts?”) January 21, 2010

The CRS report also states pretty plainly that the conduct of security contractors has damaged the US mission in Afghanistan and Iraq: Abuses committed by contractors, including contractors working for other U.S. agencies, can also strengthen anti-American insurgents. There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated byDOD contractors in such incidents as the summary shooting by a private security contractor of an Afghan who was handcuffed, the shooting of Iraqi civilians, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. (It should be noted that there have also been reports of military personnel abusing and otherwise mistreating local nationals, including the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison. CRS has not conducted an analysis to determine whether the incidence of abuses is higher among contractors than it is among military personnel.) Many of the high-profile reports of PSCs shooting local nationals or otherwise acting irresponsibly were committed by contractors working for the Department of State. Some of these incidents include the reported shooting of Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy employees, the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians at a Baghdad traffic circle in Nisoor Square by Blackwater employees, and the recent controversy over the behavior of security contractors from Armour Group who were hired to protect the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. Of the six incidents listed above, five were committed by U.S. companies and U.S. nationals. According to many analysts, these events have in fact undermined the U.S. mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. An Iraqi Interior Ministry official, discussing the behavior of private security contractors, said “Iraqis do not know them as Blackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans.” One senior military officer reportedly stated that the actions of armed PSCs “can turn an entire district against us.” Some analysts also contend that PSCs can be a direct threat to the legitimacy of the local government. These analysts argue that if counter-insurgency operations are a competition for legitimacy but the government is allowing armed contractors to operate in the country without the contractors being held accountable for their actions, then the government itself can be viewed as not legitimate in the eyes of the local population. These analysts point to the recent court decision dismissing the case against former Blackwater employees as a case in point where the legitimacy of the U.S. and local government is being undermined by the actions of PSCs. The perception that DOD and other government agencies are deploying PSCs who abuse and mistreat people can fan anti-American sentiment and strengthen insurgents, even when no abuses are taking place. There have been reports of an anti-American campaign in Pakistan, where stories are circulating of U.S. private security contractors running amok and armed Americans harassing and terrifying residents. U.S. efforts can also be undermined when DOD has ties with groups that kill civilians or government officials, even if the perpetrators were not working for DOD when the killings took place. In June 2009, the provincial police chief of Kandahar, Afghanistan, was killed by a group that worked as a private security contractor for DOD. Despite the role contractors may have played in setting back US efforts, don't expect the US to end its reliance on them anytime soon. According to CRS, "Many analysts and government officials believe that DOD would be unable to execute its mission without PSCs." The same is surely true of the other agencies working in Iraq and Afghanistan.

iraq stability advantage

Iraq is falling apart and turning away from democracy now.

Dajani 10 (Jamal Dajani, VP of International News, Series Producer of Mosaic News, Link TV. Huffington Post. Posted: Mar 19, 2010,

With close to 90% of the votes tallied in Iraq's parliamentary elections, the coalition headed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has taken a slim lead over the bloc led by his main challenger, Iyad Allawi. A day ago, it was the latter. Since March 7, Iraqis have been glued to their television screens looking for clues for the direction their seven-year-war ravaged country might be heading in the next few years. Similarly, residents in neighboring countries have been closely monitoring the Iraqi elections through the many satellite television networks operating in the region. After all, elections are not a daily happening in the Arab world, and a number of those countries, such as Jordan and Syria, permitted Iraqi refugees to cast votes in their territories. Meanwhile, one does not have to spend a lot of time watching Iran's Arabic-speaking Al Alam TV or the Saudi-financed Al Arabia TV in order to figure out who are the regional stake holders in the Iraqi elections. At times the Iraqi elections seem to take the shape of a battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as both countries have been overtly and covertly supporting the two heavyweight contenders. Iran supports Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, while Saudi Arabia has been rooting for former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Both al-Maliki and Allawi are Shiites, so why does Saudi Arabia want Allawi to win? Al-Maliki's "cozying up" to Iran has been alarming many Arab countries. The Iraqi Prime Minister, whose Dawa Party is backed by Iran, has been flashing the sectarian card during his election campaign. With more than 500 candidates accused of links with the Ba'ath Party banned from running in the March elections, Al-Maliki's government has been accused of using the hated former regime to intimidate Sunnis in particular and opposition in general. Iyad Allawi, although a Shiite, leads the al-Iraqiyya list, which proposes a secular agenda for the country. Many of its leading members are Sunnis or Arab nationalists who share the goal of bringing Iraq back to its Arab roots. Allawi's campaign ads have been airing on several Arab television stations, some say courtesy of Saudi Arabia. But does this really matter to the average Iraqi citizen? Not according to Kazem al-Dari, an Iraqi social scientist. "What we need is stability," he says. "We've had elections before, we've tried Allawi before and now al-Maliki. Neither one brought stability and security to Iraq." Today marks the seventh anniversary of the start of the Iraq War. In 2003, the architects of the war envisioned that the toppling of Saddam Hussein would lead to the birth of a democratic Iraq. They told us that elections in Iraq would help spread democracy and liberalism across the Middle East, but this could not have been further from the truth. The Middle East is more chaotic than ever, and the vast majority of its citizens are leaning politically towards Islamic theocracy and not liberal democracy. Iraqis are still searching for stability.

There are 3 internal links to stabilization:

First is popular support. PMCs alienate Iraqis.

Wallace 9 (David A. Wallace, Colonel, publication of the Defense Acquisition University, “THE FUTURE USE OF CORPORATE WARRIORS WITH THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: LEGAL, POLICY,AND PRACTICALCONSIDERATIONSAND CONCERNS” July 2009)

A fourth concern regarding the use of private security contractors in future conflicts relates to a mismatch between the work mandated under the government contract and the mission(s) being performed by the U.S. military. For example, a private security company is retained for the purpose of protecting government officials, including military personnel, convoys, and other valuable assets (Singer, 2007, p. 16). To carry out their work under the contract, some private security contractors drive and act aggressively, seal off roads, ram civilian vehicles, toss smoke bombs, fire warning shots, use tear gas, and engage in other “cowboy-like behavior” (Singer, 2007, pp. 5-6). Moreover, some private security contractors may not be the least bit concerned with the second- or third-order effects of their behavior. They are focused on getting their principal or “package” off the “X” and protecting him or her with deadly force, if necessary. Blackwater representatives, for example, boast that no American official under their protection has been killed in Iraq (Mulrine, 2007). That is what they are obligated to do under the agreement with the U.S. Government, and that is how they are evaluated and rewarded (e.g., receiving future contracts). By contrast, in the context of a counterinsurgency, occupation, stability and support operations, or other military engagements in which “winning the hearts and minds of the population” is central to successfully accomplishing the mission, such behavior by agents of the U.S. Government is counterproductive and inflames the populace. In these security environments, arguably, the local population is the critical center of gravity (HQDA, 2006). Accordingly, it is vital for military commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels of force that accomplish the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering. Thus, the use of overpowering and intimidating tactics by private security contractors, who are focusing on their contract obligations at the expense of the greater mission, may alienate civilian populations and ultimately undermine the efforts of the military. To further reinforce this point, in many such operations, the local populace does not distinguish between military and contract personnel. Both are Americans. The conduct of the contractors is imputed to the military (Mulrine, 2007). It is a debatable point whether this problem can be solved by contract. Is it possible to draft a statement of work that balances these competing imperatives and enforces through regular contractor remedies, oversight, and incentives? Alternatively, is there something about private security contractors, per se, which creates this risk? In either case, it is an issue that must be explored when considering the use of private security contractors in the future.

iraq stability advantage

Good will from Iraqis is the ONLY way we can succeed—PMCs make that impossible.

Singer 7 (Peter W. Singer, The Brookings Institution, “Can’t win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military contractors and Counterinsurgency,” September 2007)

The effort in Iraq is just one theater within a larger effort against extremist forces, in which the “war of ideas” is the critical battleground. The global war on terrorism is not a traditional military conflict made up of set-piece battles, but rather made up of a series of small wars and insurgencies in places ranging from Iraq and Afghanistan to Pakistan and Egypt, where the U.S. must sway a broader population from hostility to support if it ever wants to oust terror cells and shutdown recruiting pipelines. As the newly revised foreword to the famous U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars manual notes, “Small wars are battles of ideas and battles for the perceptions and attitudes of target populations.”31 Within these wars, it is non-kinetic tools (as opposed to fielded weaponry) that make up “…the fire and maneuvers of small wars. They frequently are the main effort simply because of the criticality of the functions they perform.”32 Unfortunately, here again, contractors have proven to be a drag on efforts to explain and justify the already highly unpopular U.S. effort in Iraq. As recently congressional testimony described “Iraqis do not differentiate between armed security contractors and US soldiers. In other words, security contractors are America’s public diplomats– and yet these same contractors are not held to same oversight or standards of accountability as our soldiers. We may try to distance ourselves by the actions of the contractors, thinking they provide convenient temporary manpower whose deaths won’t be marked by a flag draped coffin coming through Dover, but that only plays in the United States. Overseas, where the public opinion really matters in the struggle for minds and will in the insurgency, the contractors are the U.S. and are directly involved in the mission.”33 The Blackwater episode resonated negatively not merely inside Iraq, but throughout the Muslim world.Every single media source led with the episode in the days that followed, focusing in on how the US could hire such “…arrogant trigger-happy guns for hire, mercenaries by any other name.” as UAE based Gulf News put it.34 The Al Jazeera satellite news channel reported on the US hired contractors as “An army that seeks fame, fortune, and thrill, away from all considerations and ethics of military honour….The employees are known for their roughness. They are famous for shooting indiscriminately at vehicles or pedestrians who get close to their convoys.”35 In the leading newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Fahmy Howeydi, one of the most influential commentators in the entire Arab world, compared Blackwater “mercenaries” to al-Qaeda, coming to Iraq’s chaos to seek their fortunes. Even The Daily Star, which is a regional English-language newspaper considered the most moderate voice in the region, wrote how “At least irregular formations like the Mehdi Army [Sadr’s militia] can plausibly claim to be defending their communities. No foreign mercenary can plead similar motivation, so all of them should go.”36 Ironically, the incident occurred at the very same time that Secretary of State Rice was in the region at a conference, hoping to jump start the Arab-Israeli peace process, an effort that many think is key to sucking the poison out of U.S.-Muslim world relations. Instead of a public diplomacy coup for the U.S., the regional press instead focused on what the leading Arabic newspaper al Hayat titled as “Blackwater… Black Conference.” The paper described Rice’s effort as “a meaningless affair, with the exception of Washington’s need to hide the failure of its project in Iraq and the stench of scandals there, which have begun to bother the occupation - the last one being the killing of civilians by the Blackwater mercenaries.37 Indeed, the only newspaper in the region that didn’t blame the U.S. government for actions of the firm was one prominent paper that reported that the whole killing of civilians in Iraq by Blackwater was actually the work of Mossad (again, not really helping the effort either). What is telling about this episode is not merely the reaction in the press, but also how the contractor responded after the news broke. At a time when America’s image was getting pummeled because of its employees’ actions, Blackwater shut down its website and declined all interviews. Then, nearly a day after the episode and with the Arab press roiling, its spokesperson in North Carolina issued a two paragraph statement via email, only targeted at a U.S. audience. It claimed that “The “civilians” reportedly fired upon by Blackwater professionals were in fact armed enemies.”38 The firm then brought its website online, just without even this new statement uploaded, as if nothing had happened. It continued to not to take any press calls. You could however continue to buy Blackwater apparel, ranging from baseball caps to a baby onesie. One could not help but feel sympathy for the public affairs officers at the embassy and the State Department, who as government officials had to continue to do their daily briefings. Left behind on the information war field of battle by Blackwater, the U.S. government officials did their best to explain and defend the company’s actions, while the firm went into ostrich mode.