Introduction to Latin American Politics PS 151

Introduction to Latin American Politics PS 151

PRELIMINARY SYLLABUS

PS 280 Comparative Legislatures

T/TH 2:50-4:05 Perkins 307

Prof. Scott Morgenstern

660-4350

336 Perkins (also at Latin American Studies, 2114 Campus Dr)

Office Hours MW 9-11

The goal of this class is to move us towards an understanding of the central question of comparative legislative politics: How can a legislature support democratic development? In answering this question we will necessarily discuss how legislatures can be organized to promote development and the factors that support or impede that goal. The course is organized as a graduate seminar, and thus each session will be built around a critical analysis of academic literature. In our discussion we will work to keep a critical eye on the motivation behind the studies, only then looking at the specific questions and methodologies the different authors use. We will frequently use literature on the U.S. Congress to frame our discussions, simply because that literature is so voluminous and influential. In general, however, we will consider the United States as simply one comparative case.

Course Requirements:

The course will be based on extensive discussion and all students will lead several of the class discussions. The student leader for each class will prepare a synthetic essay, usually around 4 to 5 pages, that will frame the discussion. That essay is due by 9:00 AM the morning of the seminar, posted on the blackboard site. All other students should read these essays and post at least three discussion questions to our blackboard site previous to each session. The questions can focus on methodology, a synthesis among the articles, or application of the theory to other cases. One of the students who is not leading the day’s discussion will be responsible for preparing an analytical outline of class readings, based on the format below. These too are due by 9:00 of the day of the class. There is no midterm or final exam, and only a relatively short final paper (around 10 pages). The final paper should be a more extensive review of the literature for one of the topics we discussed in class.

The analytical outline should address the following questions (noting each point).

A) The larger question to which the work is tied (i.e. the justification of the work).

B) The more specific research question that the author(s) address

Is this smaller question a reasonable proxy for the larger question? Is it interesting? Useful?

C) The Hypothesis (and alternative)

Is the hypothesis falsifiable?

D) A review of the data and methodology.

E) Findings. Are they surprising? Counterintuitive? Why are they important?

F) Conclusions and applicability to comparative work. Is the work theoretically interesting for application to other countries?

General Participation includes questions for class, discussion, and attendance / 25%
Synthetic Essays & class leadership / 30%
Critical Outlines / 15%
Final Paper / 30%

Books and other Reading:

Please order from Amazon:

Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: the Electoral Connection. Ch. 1

Cox and McCubbins 1993. Legislative Leviathan

Kiewiet and McCubbins The Logic of Delegation

Other readings will be available on e-reserves, e-journals, the articles section of our Blackboard site, or in the polisci grad lounge.

Th 1/13 / PS Questions; Criticism; literature reviews vs book reports; 200 vs 100 level courses
Tu 1/18 /

Introduction

Why study legislatures?

USAID Report on Strengthening Legislatures

Payne et al: “Politics Matters for Development” Ch 1. of Democracies in Development
Th 1/20 /

The US Congress in Comparative Perspective

Morgenstern, “Models of Legislative Politics” in Morgenstern and Nacif
Kiewiet, Loewenberg, and Squire, 2002. “The Implications of the Study of the US Congress for Comparative Legislative Research” in Loewenberg, Squire, and Kiewiet, Legislatures : Comparative perspectives on representative Assemblies
Power and Rae “Legislative Diffusion: The US Congress as a Model for New and Old Democracies” (on Website)
Recommended:
Morgenstern, 2002: “Limits on Exporting the US Model” FIU Conference on “Legislative Strengthening?”
Polsby and Schickler “Landmarks in the Study of Congress since 1945” Annual Review of Political Science, 2002 333-67
Carey, Comparative Politics
Tu 1/25 / The Presidentialism vs Parliamentarism Debate
Linz “The Perils of Presidentialism” Journal of Democracy, 1990
Horowitz, “Comparing Democratic Systems” Journal of Democracy, 1990
Mainwaring and Shugart “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal” Comparative Politics. July 1997 (JSTOR)
Recommended:
Shugart and Carey Presidents and Assemblies Chs 1-4
Linz, Juan and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy vol.1 . (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994). Chapter 1 (Linz)
Linz, “The Virtues of Presidentialism” Journal of Democracy
Strom, Kaare. "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-Winning Cabinet Solutions," Comparative Political Studies 17(1984):199-227.
Mainwaring and Shugart Presidentialism in Latin America
Cheibub, José Antonio and Fernando Limongi, 2002. “Democratic Institutions and regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered,” Annual Review of Political Science. 2004?
Stepan and Skach “Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective” in Linz and Valenzuela (also in World Politics, 1993)
Th 1/27 / Comparing and Classifying Legislatures and Executive–Legislative Relations
Shugart and Carey Presidents and Assemblies (TBA)
Cox and Morgenstern, “Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents” Comparative Politics
Mezey Comparative Legislature 1979 <TBA
Recommended:
Blondel Comparative Legislatures 1973
Loewenberg and Patterson 1979 Comparing Legislatures
Kornberg, ed. 1973. Legislatures in Comparative
Kornberg and Musolf, 1970. Legislatures in Developmental Perspective
Close, D. Legislatures and the New Democracies of Latin America
Baaklini, 1992. The Brazilian Legislature and Political System
Morgenstern, nd. “Reinforced Agenda Control”
Tu 2/1 /
Executive Legislative Relations: Comparative Cases
Mustapic, in Morgenstern and Nacif
Siavelis in Morgenstern and Nacif
Tsebelis “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter,” BJPS 1994
Recommended:
Baldez and Carey, 1999. “Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet's Constitution,” AJPS 29-55
Packenham, Robert. 1970. “Legislatures in Political Development.” in Kornberg, Allan and Lloyd D. Musolf. eds. Legislatures in Developmental Perspective. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Agor in Kornberg
Huber Rationalizing Parliament
Jones, “Legislator Behavior and Executive-Legislative Relations in Latin America” LARR, 37,3: 2002
Ames “Approaches to the Study of Institutions in Latin American Politics” LARR, 34,1: 1999.
Th 2/3 / Legislators’ Interests: Reelection, Careers, and other Goals
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: the Electoral Connection. Ch. 1
Aldrich and Rohde, “The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revising the Electoral Connection: in Dodd and Oppenheimer (2001? 2002?)
Strom, Kaare. 1990. “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties” American Journal of Political Science 34: 565-598.
Recommended:
Weyland Studies in Comparative Political Development, “Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics” Spring 2002
C. Bullock. “House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition.” APSR, 1972.
D. Coates and M. Munger. "Win, Lose, or Withdraw: A Categorical Analysis of Career Patterns in the House of Representatives, 1948-1978" Public Choice 83: 91-115.
T. Groseclose and K. Krehbiel. “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks and Strategic Retirements from the 102nd House.” AJPS. (1994).
J. Hibbing, “Contours of the Modern Congressional Career.” APSR, 1991.
D.R. Kiewiet & L. Zeng. “An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions, 1947-1986.” APSR 1993
D. Rohde. “Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition,” AJPS, 1979.
D. Samuels “Progressive Ambition, Federalism, & Pork-Barreling in Brazil” in Morgenstern & Nacif
J. Carey Term Limits and Legislative Representation. CUP 1996
Somit et al, eds. The Victorious Incumbent
Tu 2/8 / Strategies for Obtaining Goals: The Influence of the Electoral System
Carey and Shugart, “Incentives to Cultivate the Personal Vote” Electoral Studies, 1995, 417-39.
Payne et al, Democracies in Development Ch. 5 “Legislative Electoral Systems and Democratic Governability”
Recommended:
Katz, Richard S. 1986. “Intraparty Preference Voting,” in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart(eds) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, pp. 85-103. New York: Agathon Press Inc.
Ames 1987. Political Survival
Rogowski, Ronald. “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions,” International Organization 41(1987):203-23.
Lijphart, Arendt. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994).
Th 2/10 / Country Reports I
Tu 2/15 / Consequences of Electoral Systems and Limits on their Effects
Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, Ch. 2.
Morgenstern, Patterns of Legislative Politics, Ch. 5
Siavelis and Morgenstern “Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America”
Recommended:
Morgenstern and Swindle, “The Local Vote” CPS 2005
Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987. The Personal Vote
M. Gallagher and M. Marsh: Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The SecretGarden of Politics
Rae, 1967. The Political consequences of Electoral Laws
Grofman and Lijphart, 1986. Electoral Laws and their Political consequences
Th 2/17 / Personal Vote and the Nationalization of Elections: Measurements and Comparisons
American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties, 1950, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc. <e-reserves>
Cain, Bruce E., John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina. "The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament." APSR 78(1984):110-125.
Recommended:
Morgenstern and Potthoff: “The Components of Elections” Electoral Studies 2004
Morgenstern and Swindle “The Local Vote” Comparative Political Studies 2005
Chibber and Kollman The Formation of National Party Systems
Stokes, Donald. 1967. “Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces,” In William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.
Katz, Richard. 1973. “The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique,” APSR 67,3: 817-828.
Kawato, Sadafumi. 1987. “Nationalization and Partisan Realignment in Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review 81,4: 1235-1250.
Stokes, Donald. 1965. “A Variance Components Model of Political Effects,” in John M. Claunch, ed., Mathematical Applications in Political Science. Dallas: Arnold Foundation.
Caramani, Daniele. 2000. Elections in Western Europe since 1815: Electoral Results by Constituencies. London: Macmillan Reference.
Jones and Mainwaring, Electoral Studies
Tu 2/22 /
Constituency Service
R. Fenno, 1978, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts Chs. 1, 2, 7
Frears, “The Role of the Député in France,” in Bogdanor, Representatives of the People?
Recommended:
Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. CUP 1987 (see above)
Gibson, Edward L. "The Populist Road to Market Reforms: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina." World Politics 49(1997):339-70.
R. Fenno, “Home Style Revisited,” Typescript.
B. Page, R. Shapiro, P. Gronke, and R. Rosenberg. “Constituency, Party, and Representation in Congress.” PRQ, (1984).
Bowler and Farrell, eds. 2002. Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing
Th 2/24 / Reading Day
Tu 3/1 / The Logic of Delegation
Kiewiet and McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation
Th 3/3 / Agenda Power and Legislative Rules
The organization of democratic legislatures (at Cox website and on blackboard)
Cox 2000. "On the Effects of Legislative Rules." Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:169-192
Cox, Masuyama, And McCubbins 2000. "Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives." Japanese Journal of Political Science 1:1-22.
Aleman and Tsebelis “Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures”
Tu 3/8 / Voting Patterns in the United States
Poole and T. Romer, 1993. “Ideology, Shirking, and Representation.” Public Choice 77: 185-196.
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. “Patterns of Congressional Voting,” American Journal of Political Science 35,1: 228-78.
J. Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, Chs 1-3
Recommended:
M. Collie, “Electoral Patterns and Voting Alignments In the U.S. House, 1886-1986.” LSQ 1989
Richardson and M. Munger, "Shirking, Representation, and Congressional Behavior: Voting on the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act," Public Choice 67(1991): 11-34.
W. Bianco, D. Spence, & J. Wilkerson. “The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress,” AJPS, (1996).
M. Collie, “Universalism & the Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1921-1980.” AJPS, (1988).
J. Campbell, The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections.
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science. 29:357-84.
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.
Th 3/10 / Party Unity and the Concept of Legislative Parties
Cox and McCubbins 1993. Legislative Leviathan
Recommended:
Aldrich Why Parties?
Tu 3/15, Th 3/17 / Spring Break
Tu 3/22 / Party Unity and the Concept of Legislative Parties II: Where’s the Party?
Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rohde 1997. “The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics” Political Science Quarterly. 112:4 1-27.
Krehbiel, Keith 1993. “Where’s the Party?,” British Journal of Political Science 23: 235-66.
Recommended:
H. Weisberg. “Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Behavior,” AJPS, 1979
Wilkerson. “’Killer’ Amendments in Congress.” APSR. (1999).
J. Jenkins and M. Munger, “Two Killer Amendments in 1872: Failures of Expectations, or Failures of Trust?” Typescript.
C. Mouw and M. Mackuen, “The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics,” APSR, (1992).
C. Covington, J.M. Wrighton, and R. Kinney. “A ‘Presidency-Augmented’ Model of Presidential Success on House Roll Call Votes. AJPS, (1995).
J. Cooper, D. Brady, and P. Hurley. “The Electoral Basis of Party Voting.” In L. Maisel and J. Cooper, eds., The Impact of the Electoral Process, 1977 (Sage).
G. Jacobson, “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986,” APSR, 1989.
M. MacKuen, R. Erikson, and J. Stimson, “Macropartisanship.” APSR, (1989).
T. Mann and R. Wolfinger, “Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections,” APSR, 1980.
B. Ames The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil
Th 3/24 /
Party Voting: Comparative Theory and Cases
Ames “Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies” in Morgenstern and Nacif
A. Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000. “Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil. Comparative Politics
Morgenstern, Patterns of Legislative Politics, Ch. 4
Hix, “Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting defection in the European Parliament” World Politics, Jan 2004, p. 194.
Recommended:
M. Collie, “Voting Behavior in Legislatures.” In Loewenberg, Patterson, and Jewell, Handbook of Legislative Research. Harvard Press, 1985.
Özbudun, Ergun. 1970. Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Bowler, Farrell, and Katz Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, Chs. 1-2
G. Cox, 1987, The Efficient Secret Chs. >
Londregan Londregan, John. 2000. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
Londregan, John. 2002. “Appointment, Reelection, and Autonomy in the Senate of Chile” in Morgenstern and Nacif.
Morgenstern, Patterns of Legislative Politics Chs 4-6
Nacif, “Understanding Party Discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies” in Morgenstern and Nacif
Bowler, Farrell, and Katz Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government
Huber, John D. Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France 1996.
Morgenstern, “Organized Factions and Disorganized Parties: Electoral Incentives in Uruguay,” 2001 Party Politics
Mainwaring and Perez Liñan “Party Discipline in the Brazilian constitutional Congress”
Ames, Barry. 1995. "Electoral Strategy Under Open-List Proportional Representation" American Journal of Political Science. (May).
M. Jones, 2002 “Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress” in Morgenstern and Nacif.
Tu 3/29 / Multiparty, Divided, and Coalition Governments: US & Theory
Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination.” Comparative Political Studies 2:198-228.
McCubbins “Government on Lay-Away” in Cox and Kernell The Politics Of Divided Government
Mayhew, Divided We Govern, 1991. Ch. 1 (4) 5, 7
Recommended:
Jacobson The Electoral Origins Of Divided Government
Jacobson, The Politics Of Congressional Elections
Th 3/31 / Multiparty, Divided, and Coalition Governments: Comparative
Tsebelis, George. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Science 25(1995):289-325.
Strom, Kaare. "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-Winning Cabinet Solutions," Comparative Political Studies 17(1984):199-227.
Recommended:
Strom Minority Government and Majority Rule
Tu 4/4 / Coalitions: Parliamentary Theory and Presidential Applications
Laver and Shepsle 1990. “Coalitions and Cabinet Government” APSR 84: 873-90.
Foweraker, 1998. “Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability—Differentiating the Presidential Regimes of Latin America,” British Journal of Political Science, 28: 651-676.
Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2002. “Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil” in Morgenstern and Nacif.
Recommended:
Morgenstern, Patterns of Legislative Politics Ch. 6
Laver and Shepsle Making and Breaking Governments
Altman, David. 2000a. “Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies: Uruguay 1989-1999," Party Politics. 6,3: 259-283.
Riker: 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions
Altman, David. 2000b. “Executive Coalitions in Nine Latin American Multiparty Presidential Democracies," paper prepared for Latin American Studies Association, Miami.
Altman, David. 1998a. "Cooperation under Multiparty Presidential Regimes: Building and Sustaining Coalitions in Uruguay 1985-1997," paper prepared for Latin American Studies Association, Chicago.
Altman, David. 1998b. "The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies: Building a Rational Choice and Neo-Institutionalist Theory," American Political Science Association, Boston.
Kitschelt et al
Deheza, Grace Ivana. 1997. Gobiernos de Coalición en el Sistema Presidential: America del Sur. Doctoral Thesis, Instituto Universitario Europeo
Th 4/6 / Delegation to and Oversight of the Executive Branch
US & Theory
McCubbins and Schwartz: “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms” American Journal of Political Science 28: 165-79.
Neustadt, Richard E. 1954. “Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance,” American Political Science Review. 48,3:641-671.
West, William F. and Joseph Cooper. 1983. “The Congressional Veto and Administrative Rulemaking,” Political Science Quarterly 98,2: 285-304.
West, William F. and Joseph Cooper, 1989-90. “Legislative Influence v. Presidential Dominance: competing Models of Bureaucratic Control,” Political Science Quarterly 104,4: 581-606.
Recommended:
Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. 1974. The Imperial Presidency Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Lowi, Theodore. 1985. “Presidential Power: Restoring the Balance,” Political Science Quarterly 100,2: 185-213.
Cooper, Joseph. 1983. Postscript on the Congressional Veto: Is There Life after Chadha?” Political Science Quarterly 98,3: 427-29.
Cooper, Joseph and William F. West. 1988. Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules,” Journal of Politics 50,4: 864-895.
Mayer, Kenneth 1999. “Executive Orders and Presidential Power,” Journal of Politics. 61,2:445-466.
Mayer, Kenneth 2001. With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.
Sala, Brian R. 1998. “In Search of the Administrative President: Presidential “Decree” Powers and Policy Implementation in the United States,” in Carey and Shugart.
Carter, John R. and David Schap. 1987. “Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Structure Induced Equilibrium,” Public Choice 52:227-44
Tu 4/11 / Delegation to and Oversight of the Executive Branch
Comparative
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy. vol.5, no.1, pp.55-70.
Morgenstern and Manzetti “Legislative Oversight: Interests and Institutions in the United States and Argentina” forthcoming in Mainwaring and O’Donnell Horizontal Accountability
Carey and Shugart: “Calling out the Tanks or filling out the
Forms” in Presidential Decree Authority
Recommended:
Morgenstern “Reinforced Agenda Control” APSA 2002
Pereira, Carlos, Timothy J. Power, and Lucio Rennó. 2002 “Choose Your Weapon: Under What Conditions do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? APSA Boston.
Ferreira Rubio and Goretti. 1998. “When the President Governs Alone: The Decretazo in Argentina, 1989-93,” in Carey and Shugart.
Th 4/13 / Legislative Organization
North: 1990 “Transaction Cost Theory of Politics” Journal of Theoretical Politics,
B. Weingast and W. Marshall, 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress,” Journal of Political Economy
Recommended:
Nacif, “Understanding Party Discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: The Centralized Party Model” in Morgenstern and Nacif
Buchanan and G. Tullock, Calculus of Consent
Tu 4/18 / Evolution of Institutions: US
Aldrich, Why Parties? Chs. 1-2
N. Polsby(et al.), “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House Representatives,” APSR, (1968): 144-168
Recommended:
Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment
Aldrich on “Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for theories of Congressional Politics”
S. Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule : Partisanship and the Development of Congress
Jones, “Joseph Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the limits of leadership in the House of Representatives” JOP 1968
Th 4/20 / Reading Day
Tu 4/25 /

Evolution of Institutions: Comparative

Cox, 1987. The Efficient Secret—on reserve at the library
Shugart, Matthew Soberg, “The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices.” British Journal of Political Science 28(1998):1-29.
Olson, Dictatorship, Development, and Democracy, APSR 1993, 567-76
Recommended:
Geddes, Barbara. “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 28(1995):239-74.
Gourevitch, Peter. "International Trade," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8(1977):281-313.
Ordeshook, Peter C. “Institutions and Incentives,” Journal of Democracy 6(1995):46-60.
Hough/Olson
Geddes APSR “A Game Theoretic view of Reform”
Bates, Robert and D. Lien. "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government," Politics and Society 14(1), 1985.
Th 4/27 / Paper Reports

Note to create reading days before the book days, cut 1 class of Hinich and Munger and combined the class on voting behavior theory and cases, comparative.