Federalist Number 70 (Hamilton)

1. According to Hamilton, why do we need a strong Presidency?

2. What is necessary to have a strong president?

3. Why should the President serve a 4-year term?

4. Why should there be no term limits for the President?

5. What are the “competent powers” of the President?

6. What are the formal (Constitutional) and informal (because of the workings of the government or tradition) limits on the power of the President?

Federalist Number 70 (Hamilton) (summary from Classicnotes)

Many people think that a vigorous and strong president is incompatible with a republican form of government. Hamilton, however, does not agree. An energetic and forceful president is essential to good government. National defense, sound administration of the law, and the protection of property rights all depend upon the vitality of the Presidency. In addition, an energetic president best protects liberty when faction, anarchy, and the excessive ambitions of others threaten it. Anyone familiar with Roman history knows that it was often the Roman dictator who prevented the fall of the republic. Sensible men agree that the president should be strong. What, then constitutes strength and energy? What characteristics do we look for? Can sufficient strength in the Presidency be combined with the principles of republican government?

An energetic Executive branch must be characterized by unity, sufficient powers, and a certain degree of secrecy. For these reasons, one Chief Executive is better than two or more. Two people, granted equal power and authority, are bound to differ. Personal ambition can never be totally subdued, and a dual Presidency would be marked by dissension, weakened authority, and the growth of conflicting factions. It is unnecessary and unwise to establish an Executive branch that would make this form of divisiveness possible. Conflict and argument are dangerous in the Executive branch where decisions must be prompt; in the Congress, on the other hand, differences of opinion force discussion and deliberation. This is quite proper in the legislative branch and helps to prevent coercion by majority. The function of the legislature is to pass laws; once a law is passed, effective opposition comes to an end. But the Executive branch is charged with the execution of the laws; a law once passed should be executed promptly. Furthermore, in case of war, when so much depends upon a strong Presidency, divisiveness could destroy the national security.

The same arguments against having two presidents can be made in opposition to an Executive council. In either a plural or council form of Executive faults and defects are more easily concealed, and no person can be held responsible. The American president, unlike the English king, must not be immune from censure, accountability, or punishment. …

Federalists 71 and 72 (Hamilton) (summary, Mr. Davis)

Hamilton argues that the term of the President (4 years) serves two important functions. First, the longer the President serves the more attached to the office he will become, and thus make him more firm in his actions. Second, a longer term will bring stability to the President’s administration and thus the government.

Hamilton argues that the President should be eligible for reelection for five reasons. First, a President who has the chance to be reelected will be more likely to act well (morally, politically, and otherwise) while in office so that he will be returned to power. Second, ambitious men might be tempted to use force to stay in power beyond their allotted term if a limit other than the will of the people were imposed. Third, multiple terms brings experiences of leadership that can be used to the benefit of the nation. Fourth, in times of crisis a mandatory change in administration could be dangerous. Lastly, a limit of terms brings potential instability to the government as different presidents will have different policies, and the change in policy, like too many laws, will benefit some but not all.

Federalists 73, 74, 75, 76, and 77 (Hamilton) (summary, Mr. Davis)

Hamilton discusses the need for the President to have “competent powers” to execute the laws and maintain the system of checks and balances. He notes that one important part of this system is that the President’s pay can be neither raised nor lowered during his term: the Congress can neither buy off the President nor weaken him.

As to his powers, Hamilton begins with the “qualified negative” of the President to the laws of Congress. This veto power is necessary both to maintain checks and balances (without out it he “might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions [laws], or annihilated by a single vote”) and to make bad laws less likely. This veto power is vested in an individual not because the one is more capable than the many, but because Congress is fallible. As to whether the President might not also negate good laws, Hamilton holds the belief (based on the experience of England) that even a powerful Executive will generally defer to the “superior weight and influence” of the Legislature. (end 73)

The President has power as Commander-in-chief because the direction of war necessarily falls to an individual rather than a council. He does NOT have the power to declare war nor to raise and regulate the armed forces, both power are given to the Congress, thus making him weaker than a king. The power to call on the opinions of the heads of the executive departments is “a mere redundancy in the plan” as it is inherent to the role of the executive. The President has the power to pardonfederal crimes, except in cases of impeachment, for two reasons. First, it brings humanity and compassion to an often-cruel criminal code. Second, the President should have the power to pardon treason as a tool to end insurrections more quickly (see Lincoln’s Ten Percent Plan at the end of the Civil War that pardoned all but the top Confederates in an attempt to end the war. The President cannot pardon impeachments because such a power might embolden bad men to violate the laws and the Constitution in the hopes of securing a pardon for their crimes.). (end 74)

Hamilton argues that the Senate’s role in ratifying treaties does not violate the separation of powers because treaties are not normal laws that would fall clearly within the realm of the Legislative, nor is it clearly an Executive role, but rather something in between. The Senate rather than the House should be involved because of the need for a certain degree of secrecy in the negotiations; the smaller number of Senators is more likely to be able to keep these secrets. (end 75)

The President, with the consent and advice of the Senate, must have the power to appoint officials because it will lead to a better administration: the President will get the officials who will best carry out his policies and the Senate will make sure that these people are qualified. (end 76) This system will further maintain the stability of the government because the Senate will be unlikely to confirm a new official to replace a competent one appointed by the previous administration; therefore there will be stability in the make-up of the administration. (This does not hold true of the highest-level Executive branch appointments: Cabinet, etc.) (end 77)