Don T Believe Anything You Understood If You Can T Put It Into Words Everybody Understands

0.An Invitation

The other day - it was the 90th birthday of the famous physicist and philosopher Carl Friederich von Weizsäcker (*1912) - Weizsäcker’s University friend Edward Teller, one of the most famous scientists in America, said that he and Weizsäcker had tried to formulate a modern version of the ten commandments. One of those rules of Weizsäcker’s was:

‘Don’t believe anything you understood if you can’t put it into words everybody understands.’ (...)

I chose a similar rule when I try to make the following introduction to the relation between philosophy and theology. It is quite a challenge. The german philosopher Martin Heidegger (...) put it this way:

You know a philosopher when you read his introduction to philosophy. (...)

This is certainly true; however, such an expectation tempts philosophers to use a too difficult terminology. To avoid this you have to remember a wise old saying by Plutarch (*about 45 a.c., died before 127):

‘The greatest wisdom is not to appear like a philosopher when you think and to appear playful when you strive for serious goals’. (...)

You need such composure anyway because you can’t teach philosophy. Philosophy happens when you think that you could nearly have invented an idea yourself. There is only something like leading somebody to philosophize. Everybody has to do it herself or himself. Anybody familiar with this subject says that you can only be tempted or seduced to philosophy. The adventure of thinking for yourself is as exciting as falling in love with someone. If that happened due to my lectures and if this had the consequences I hope for then my efforts would be rewarded.

1. How to become involved with philosophy

It has already happened - because we are already involved with philosophy just in this moment. For it is typical of philosophy to ask this question. Why this is so is obvious because of the term ‘philosophy’: ‘Philosophy’ literally means ‘to love wisdom’. A lover is somebody who is looking for something that she or he does not yet have. Plato calls the god Eros the patron of philosophy and thus philosophy something erotic: an urge and desire that puts people on various, sometimes strange paths because they are fascinated by something or somebody, spellbound, so that they risk something and dare to do things others find stupid. ‘Fascinate’ originates from the Latin term ‘fasces’ - which is the same in English - it is something that binds ot chains me. No obstacle is too difficult to overcome to find what a lover is looking for. As a consequence philosophy is not about being clever or gaining special knowledge. It is rather the opposite: Whoever looks for wisdom does it because she or he is lacking wisdom. Philosophy is not knowledge but knowing there is knowledge I don’t have. For this reason philosophy reaches for everything that can be known. It is a knowledge of lack of knowledge that desires to know everything that can be known. This is why its subject is everything that is as long as it is - being. Being can turn somebody in various ways into a philosopher, for example this way:

1.1To Be Amazed

I do something, go somewhere, see something, listen; feel or read something and whatever I sense - I am amazed. I stop doing whatever I am doing. Something of that being I first experienced - a thing or a thought - surprises me. I did not expect to encounter something special in that place or in that situation, I am surprised that something - e.g. a train of thought or a story - took a certain turn: I am amazed. Amazed I acknowledge that something I thought I knew about something or something I expected is not all there is to know or to expect. What I knew about this being is not wrong. But there is more to know. I link this to whatever I have learned first - and at the same time I have to ask whether I already know everything I could know about that certain being. Or is there more hidden knowledge, much more and different from that I know, that I could find, if only I continued searching and asking? Once philsophy has been initiated by some kind of amazement, there is no choice for that person but to ask the essential questions: Where does everything come from? Where does everything go?

This is asking the whole truth about everything being and eventually beyond existing things, which is asking for the whole truth about this reality itself. This is the case because of the nature of questioning: I can only inquire about something if I know a few things about this object. If I knew nothing I could not ask anything: There would not be anything I could relate to and ask questions; I would not know there is anything to question or inquire. Although I ask questions because I know there is something I don’t know, I have to know of the existance of this object itself to start enquiring. If it is true that I need to know something of something which means that I have understood something of this object, then this is also true: I can’t understand just like that, but to recognize always means to recognize something as this very same thing and nothing else, to recognize it just the way it is. However, this is only possible when I am beyond this object while recognizing it. In other words: To recognize something as a limit I nearly have to go beyond it. Otherwise I would not know that there is anything beyond my limits and strictly speaking I would not know anything because you can only know something as a certain object - and to classify something you need to be able to negate this as something else: this is of this kind and no other. The jewish philosopher Baruch de Spinoza (17th century) said the nature of recognition was to classify or identify something by negation (...). To recognize something as that very something, that specific object that is nothing else I have to know that thing that is something other than that thing I already know.

This has other consequences: If the presupposition for questioning is knowledge - if only some - in other words: having recognized something; and recognition implies transcending the recognized object - where are the limits of this transcendence, this anticipation? Or is there no end to it? There must be limits: If there are none, if the inquiring-knowing anticipation went beyond the questioned-known something and beyond that other that we are looking for and beyond the other something of the other something, and so on, then there would be a limitless regression, an infinite regress as philosophers say. In such a regression all questions and recognition dissolves. Questioning-recognizing we would glide from the questioned-known being/object towards the infninite (regress). In this process the desired object is being destroyed.

If knowledge of something is possible at all, then questioning-knowing anticipation must not lead to regression but end somewhere. But where? It cannot be limited by something specific, which is something defined by negation, because it is something limited and finite. There is only one solution: Anticipation must be limited by something infinite, something without end. Our quest for recognition of the whole truth of some being and even for the whole truth about reality is supported by anticipating something infinite, i.e. something that is defined in a way that nothing transcends it.

Have we proven the existance of something infinite by analysing the logic of quest and recognition, starting with amazement? No: We have only shown how to get quite naturally from the basic act of amazement to the ultimate limits of human, finite reason. Thinking of the infinite is its ultimate, greatest possibility(/chance). And you have to think of the infinite if you want to be reasonable when you reflect upon amazement, questioning and recognition. However, the existance of the infinite is not proven. It might exist. On the other hand it is quite possible that our human reason has a structure that it works in the way I described but without a reality that is the object of that recognition. In this case the recognition of certain objects and even questions were illusions. The german philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (19th century) thought this to be true, a philosopher who has greatly influenced present philosophy. In one of his books he writes:

‘...the truths are illusions of which you forget that they are illusions, metaphers that are worn and useless, coins without image that are only metal, no coins any more’(...).

Nietzsche is saying that our mind is so manipulated by illusions that there is no chance to recognize this very fact. Because of its structure it cannot discover truth and reality. Does that mean that we are deceived phoneys when we philosophize? Deceived as long as we do not recognize the deception of reason and in addition phoneys if we - although enlightened by Nietzsche - still keep philosophying? (questioning-recognizing philosophically thinking)

Nietzsche’s thoughts are tricky: He does not have to prove them. It is quite enough to say that reason may be deceived - and reason cannot avoid reflecting this possibility. For many people today this is the ultimate thesis of philsophy - and thus the end of philosophy. And they are not unhappy about this. It is easier in many ways to live and talk if you don’t have to wonder what is ultimately true and real.

1.2 Doubt

However, there is another way how to get from the encounter with reality/being to philosophy: I do something, go someplace, see, listen, feel or read something, and something I sense stopps me. I pause and discontinue doing whatever I am doing. There is something about that thing/being - whether an object or a thought - that seems to be strange, somehow suspicious. Time and again I find out that I am wrong or what others have told me is wrong. Is it not as likely that many things I believe to be true and real are not?

I am not telling you my own thoughts but those of Rene Descartes (...), one of the founders of modern philosophy. He introduces this concept in his so called Meditations on First Philosophy. And if there is reason to doubt everything, is it not possible that God made me that way and wanted me to be like that so that I am deceived about the existance of heaven, earth, objects and even about the existance of my own hands and feet? When do you stop doubting? Is there any limit? To answer these questions Descartes made an experiment: Suppose there is no loving God - Descartes believed in a loving God - but a deceitful evil spirit reigning this world, trying to deceive me in every possible way. What is the result? Descartes:

‘Well, if he deceives me, then you can’t doubt that I am. He may deceive me as much as he can, he can never accomplish that I am not as long as I think that I am. Consequently I realize - after reflecting upon this for some time - that the following sentence is true: ‘I am, I exist’ is necessarily true a often as I say that or think it.’ (...)

Radical doubts and the method of doubt have their limits - according to their own logic: It is the doubting person itself and its existance.

The original version of this train of thought is from St. Augustin (...): ‘When I am wrong or deceived, then I am.’ (...) This means: I can be wrong or deceived in everything. However, I cannot be wrong that it is me who is wrong or deceived. St. Augustin found a basis in the subject itself when searching for God, but Descartes tried to find a reliable/unshakable basis for recognition because traditional foundations of common beliefs - i.e. Christian beliefs - had disappeared (why that had happened and how this had come about will be discussed later on;...). One more question remains: What is the result of this train of thought? At least it is this: during its critical reflection the mind realizes that it is its own basis for reflection. Nietzsche-fans will of course doubt this result because their method is doubting reason/the mind itself - and very often they are successful).

1.3 Talking

Surprisingly the thesis of Augustin and Descartes is supported by contemporary philosophers of Analytic Philosophy. This is done - not only, but mainly - by working with the thoughts of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. You can call it yet another way of drawing somebody into philosophy. Wittgenstein observed: There are two kinds of using the expression ‘I’ (or my), the first I would like to call ‘use of object’ and the second ‘use of subject’. There are examples for the first one. ‘My arm ist broken’, ‘I have grown ten centimetres’, ‘I have got a bump on my forehead’, ‘The wind is blowing my hair about’ (perhaps only my hairs, not Yours).

And now I would like to tell you some examples for the second kind of ‘I/my’: ‘I see So-and-so.’ ‘I hear So-and -so.’ ‘I am trying to lift my arm.’ ‘I think it’s going to rain.’ ‘I’ve got toothache.’ (L.W.) On the surface both kinds of sentences seem to be the same, both have the same structure - and yet they are fundamentally different because of how we know whether they are true. Let’s try a few sentences. Don’t mind weird sentences of analytical philosophers: this is typical of them. They think that by analysing an extreme case you can see the ordinary structure much better. Let’s have a look at some examples:

- Someone enters a room and startles because he looks into a mirror and sees his forehead bleeding. He touches his forehead, cries ‘Oh God, I am bleeding’ - but there is nothing. At that moment he realizes that the bleeding person is his identical twin brother who is wearing the very same cloth, standing where his brother couldn’t see him. If I want to know whether the sentence ‘I am bleeding’ is true, I need to know the identity of that person. In this case the sentence is true if the brother who entered the room had felt blood on his forehead when he touched it: he would have identified himself as the bleeding person. This is the ‘I’ as an object, according to certain philosophical criteria.

- Now I would like to tell you the other example: It is the sentence ‘I’ve got toothache’. The structure is the same as ‘I am bleeding’. However, we know in a very different way whether it is true. I cannot be mistaken about the person when I am saying ‘I have got toothache’ - it can only be me. It is not possible that I know about someone else’s toothache and think it is me. Sentences using ‘I’ as subject are immune to misidentification. Wittgenstein said: You can point out the difference between those categories (KM) this way: In the first case it is necessary that a certain person is identified and you can be mistaken - or rather: the chance of error is anticipated. This means in the second case there is no misidentification.

You can carry out a crosscheck on it: When I am saying ‘I am bleeding’ and someone asks me ‘How do you know?’ I could say: Because I touched my forehead and my hand was bloody’ or just: ‘Look at me.’ However, when I am saying ‘I have got toothache’ and someone asks ‘How do you know?’ I wouldn’t tell him why but I would be angry and tell him not to ask such a stupid question - because there is absolutely no mistake possible. Anybody who honestly says she feels pain cannot be corrected by anybody else. Immunity against misidentification applies also to certain corrigible sentences such as ‘I see a yellow bird outside’. Even if it were a yellow piece of paper or if I was hallucinating - the sentence ‘I see a yellow bird’ would be true and others could not argue with this person. This is also true for all sentences which start with ‘It seems to me that ...’ - only that they can be corrected, unlike ‘I have got toothache’. In the first case we can correct the sentence and reformulate it: ‘I believed I saw a yellow bird’ or ‘It seemed to me like a yellow bird’. However, all these sentences are examples for the use of I as a subject because in these cases I cannot be wrong that I am the person who sees a certain object etc.. This reflection of Wittgenstein and its development by other philosophers is a challenge we cannot rise to right now. Let’s summarize:

We started with amazement that raises questions concerning being, then we discovered limits to the method of doubting, and eventually we found an absolute certain basis when observing everyday language: In the first case it was the thought of the infinite that cannot be transcended because of its definition; in the second case we discovered the sentence ‘I think I am’ that cannot be doubted and is immune to deception, even if everything else is deception. In the third case we discovered certain cases of immunity against misidentification of a subject. We discovered them because we looked closely at the use of everyday language. You can discover great variations of usage. In the sentences mentioned above the subject is the fist person singular which means that I cannot be mistaken that I am talking about myself when I say ‘I’. Is it true that there is some reliable knowledge - however little - that is enough to prove that reason can discover truth?

Fanatic Nietzsche-fans will even now apply their method of doubt. However, having the analysis and consequences of the use of ‘I’ as a subject and object in mind, I would like to reply with a quote by Wittgenstein: ‘It is too great to be a mistake:’ (...) This remark is more than a stopgap. It is made with regard to everyday life, our experience and our quest and recognition of truth. Wittgenstein thinks that because generally speaking we manage life we understand the world around us, form our environment and have strategies, theories and make predictions - so it is very unlikely there is no real knowledge and truth. But if there is truth, then we can and must ask for it. We have to find out everything that is true and stretch the limits of human reason.