Domestic and International Dimensions of the Yasukuni Shrine Controversy

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DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE YASUKUNI SHRINE CONTROVERSY

Ria Shibata

SophiaUniversity

Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine for many years has been at the center of international controversy and the source of dire tension with Japan’s Asian neighbors. The heart of the problem is the fact that those honored and worshipped there include 14 convicted Class-A war criminals including Prime Minister Tojo Hideki (1884-1948). Every year, public and private debates surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine intensify in the lead up to August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II. The repeated visits of several of Japan’s Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni shrine, especially those in recent years by Koizumi Jun’ichiro (1942--),have strainedJapan’s diplomatic ties with China and Korea. Although Koizumi’s motives were never clarified, he repeatedly claimed that the visits were “a matter of the heart” (kokoro no mondai), and a domestic affair that foreign countries should not concern themselves with.

This paper examines the domestic and international dimensions of the Yasukuni controversy. First, the paper examines the constitutionalissue of Yasukuni and the shrine’sambiguous relationship to the state. This dimension of the shrine’s controversy is the one which is vigorously debated domestically. The objective of this examination is to show how the Yasukuni Shrine has been caught up in the paradox of its legacy—a religious shrine and a state memorial to the war dead, the functions of which have been left intact from before the war, in a country where the separation of Church and State has been established since the end of World War II.

The paper also argues, from an international perspective, the implications and diplomatic ramifications of the enshrinement of Class A war criminals at Yasukuniand the revisionist history and nationalism presented in the Yushukan war memorial museum adjoining the shrine. While Japanese leaders have officially apologized for the country’s actions during World War II, for Japan’s neighbors, the prime ministers’ visits to the shrine are seen as a clear sign of Japan’s lack of contrition and a denial of its war responsibility. An examination of these dimensions shows that the controversy over Yasukuni, whether domestic or international, is a complex issue and the State representatives’ relationship with the shrine cannot simply be defined as a private issue of personal conscience—“a matter of the heart”—for Yasukuni Shrine has become a monument of Japan’s deep rooted division over its interpretation of the past.

Historical Significance of Yasukuni Shrine

Yasukuni Shrine was built in 1869 by order of Japan’s Meiji Emperor as a shrine to glorify the soldiers who died in the Boshin Civil War that overthrew the shogunate and restored the emperor’s regime—the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The Meiji period (1868-1912) was the era of Japan’s modern revolution, which saw the rapid transformation of traditional Japanese social and economic life. As nations of the West expanded their colonial influence in India, China and other parts of Southeast Asia,Japanpoured its energies into catching up with the industrialized West in an effort to protect its national autonomy. (Smith 1998:28)

Japan’s leaders during Meiji felt that creating a strong sense of nationhood was vitally important. For this purpose they co-opted and revived the age-old indigenous Shinto religion to create a uniquely Japanese form of civil religion which would form the basis of a national identity. Shinto is an ancient indigenous religion of Japan involving the worship of “kami,” spiritual beings represented in the forces of nature. The Meiji leaders institutionalized this belief system into what would later be called State Shinto. The emperor was positioned at the center of this new social and religious system as a “divine being” directly descended of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu Omikami and father of all the Japanese people.

During the 1930s, the State Shinto ideology helped justify and glorify the rise of militaristic nationalism in Japan, as the country embarked on its own imperial conquests in Manchuria and China, eventually entering World War II. These acts of aggression were justified as a divine war. Soldiers who died in these wars “received ‘gratitude and respect’ as ‘loyal spirits defending the nation’” (Takahashi 2007a: 164) and it was at Yasukuni Shrine where this ultimate sacrifice was honored, where the soldiers became kami or “noble gods who offered their lives for the sake of Japan.” (

Since its establishment, Yasukuni Shrine has been a national sanctuary to honor the “heroic souls” (eirei) who died fighting the wars for Japan. During the rise of militaristic nationalism, the shrine became a powerful tool and a potent symbol for the militarist government’s spiritual mobilization of its soldiers and the general population to fight for the emperor and prosecute its wars of aggression.

Domestic Controversy: The Constitutionality Issue

Much of the domestic political debate about Yasukuni today centers on the legal status of the shrine within the constitution,and the shrine’s ambiguous relationship to the state. As noted by Deans, “The political controversies over high-level political visits to the Yasukuni Shrine within Japan are rooted in the tension over the Shrine’s ambiguous public and private aspects.” (Deans 2007: 272)

Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, a new constitution drawn up under the Allied occupation established the separation of church and state and made freedom of religion a basic right. The State Shinto ideology was abandoned, although the older Shinto religion and practices of honoring Japan’s tutelary gods has remained a common basis of Japanese cultural life. With the Shinto Directive, the Allied occupation dismantled State Shinto but spared Yasukuni Shrine by re-defining its status as a private religious entity—a shukyo hojin or a “religious juridical person,” like other religious groups, independent from the Japanese government. This decision, however, did not resolve the complexities of Yasukuni’s positioning within the psyches of the Japanese people, since the shrine continued to be regarded as a State Memorial for the War Dead.

Article 20 of the new Japanese Constitution, which ensured the separation of Religion and State, denied all state support for the Yasukuni Shrine. The War Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izokukai) was particularly forceful in voicing its dissatisfaction that the state would not extend protection to this shrine that honored the soldiers who had sacrificed their lives for the sake of the country. This association with 4.5 million members is a powerful rightist organization and a core constituency for the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The association not only sought financial support for the shrine but also demanded that the representatives of the state, the Prime Minister and the Emperor, attend shrine ceremonies to honor the war dead. (Hardacre 1989:145)

Pressure from the Izokukai association led the LDP to submit bills five times since 1969 attempting to reinstate Yasukuni under state protection as before the war. Each time, the bill was defeated by opposition that saw these attempts as a regression to Japan’s prewar militarism. (Hardacre 1989:147) As recent as 1999, the LDP Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu Nonaka, made a proposal at the 145th regular session of the National Diet about reinstating Yasukuni Shrine under state protection by making it a “special corporation.” The Yasukuni Shrine Bill fueled public debate about war memory and responsibility and was met with strong opposition from Christians, Buddhists and other religious groups and coalitions as a violation of the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and separation of Church and State. (Seraphim 2006: 239)

Unable to legally bring Yasukuni under state protection, rightist factions within the Liberal Democratic Party sought to accomplish de facto state protection by persuading the prime minister, members of the cabinet and the emperor to make “official obeisance visits.” In 1975, Miki Takeo was the first post-war prime minister to offer obeisance at the shrine on 15 August, the anniversary of Japan’s World War II defeat and a powerfully symbolic date. He stressed on the occasion, however, that he did so “as a private person,” that is, not in his capacity as prime minister. (Tanaka 2001) In fact, from 1951 to 1985, nearly all primeministers visited the shrine annually (although not on the August 15 anniversary). While there was an ongoing domestic debate over the constitutional question of separation of Religion and State, these visits by high state officials to the shrine only became a full-blown international issue after 14 Class A war criminals were quietly enshrined by the Yasukuni priests in 1978.

In 1985, when Yasuhiro Nakasonemade a visit to the shrine in his official capacity as the Prime Minister of Japan and offered flowers using public funds, “the subsequent uproar led to an 11-year hiatus in prime minister visits.” (Kingston 2007: 305) The visit led to law suits on the ground of the violation of Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution which guarantees freedom of religion and forbids the statefrom participating in a religious activity, and Article 89 which forbids government support of religious institutions. Furthermore, Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s repeated visits to the shrine between 2002 and 2006 in the face of strong domestic and international protests also provoked several constitutionality-related lawsuits in Japan and “became the most sensitive diplomatic issue between Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul.” (Takahashi 2007b)

The Separation of Church and State in the Japanese Constitution is an explicit clause by which the occupation forces sought to prevent a repeat of the state’s use of religion to mobilize the populace, as it had done with State Shinto. The ensuing arguments pertain to whether visits by representatives of the state are made in a private or official capacity. To dodge the constitutionality issue, Japanese Prime Ministers have usually asserted that their visits were made as “private persons” out of their personal religious convictions, and that they are thus exercising their own religious freedom. “The problem though is distinguishing the intentions from actions in these Prime Minister’s attempts at visiting ’privately’ in what is a very public place.” (Hardacre 1989:144)

Japan’s official stance on the constitutionality of these visits has remained ambiguous. While significant numbers of court cases have been filed concerning the issue of whether visits by the Prime Minister are constitutional, most have resulted in either no decision or rejection of the plaintiffs’ case. (Seaton 2007:176) Significantly, the Fukuoka District Court in 2004 and the Osaka High Court in 2005 ruled that Koizumi’s Yasukuni worship was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, these unconstitutional rulings are the exception, and with the Supreme Court dismissing final appeal in 2006 and avoiding making any constitutional judgment, so far “no clear consensus on the issue has emerged.” (Deans 2007: 272)

The domestic debate on Yasukuni is defined by this unresolved paradox of Yasukuni’s ambiguous role as a religious shrine and a state memorial for the war dead in a country where the division of Religion and State must be respected.

Yasukuni—An International Issue

Many Japanese see Yasukuni Shrine primarily as a domestic issue and, from this perspective, criticisms from outside Japan—the protests and pressure from China and Korea—are seen as undesired meddling in Japan’s internal affairs. This attitude was expressed most starkly inKoizumi’s repeated arguments that his visits were “a matter of the heart,” stemming from his desire to pray for peace so that Japan would never go to war again, and that “every country wants to mourn their war dead, and other countries should not interfere in the way of mourning.” (Kajimoto 2005)

Japan’s Asian neighbors, in particular China and Korea, do not see the Prime Minister’s Yasukuni visits in the same light. For them, the issue is not so much about whether or not these visits contradict the constitutional separation of the state and religionas the message the visits of the Japanese prime ministers send.For Japan’s Asian neighbors, it is an issue of Japan’s“historical consciousness” (rekishi ninshiki) and the interpretation of the past. The visits project a stark message of Japan’s lack of contrition and denial of responsibility for the war. They are seen as a resurgence and provocative stirring of the embers of Japanese nationalism. South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun’s remark to Koizumiin JoonAng Ilbo newspaper makes this point clear: “No matter how you explain your visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, it is understood as justifying Japan’s past [of militaristic aggression] for me and for the people of Korea.” (Wiseman 2005)

At the heart of the diplomatic controversy is the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals worshipped as glorious spirits in the Yasukuni Shrine. It is therefore necessary to understand how these war criminals came to be enshrined at Yasukuni, the underlying ideological motives that led to this act 33 years after the end of war, and what this enshrinement represents from the standpoint of Japan’s interpretation of the past war.

On September 8, 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the United Nations and Allied powers. On the same day, the signing of the new security agreement with the United States allowed Japan to start anew as an independent nation. However, the necessary condition was for Japan to accept the judgment of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, known as the Tokyo Tribunal, which convicted 28 individuals as Class A war criminals.

Hosaka Masayasu, a well known Showa historian, contends that the motivation of the proponents of the later enshrinement of these individuals at Yasukuni was the rejection of the results of the Tokyo Tribunal. Hosaka also reveals that many former military officers of Imperial Japan worked in the War Victims Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the bureau where the information of the war dead was managed. (Hosaka 2007: 205) Furthermore, the leader of the military faction within the Health Ministry was Miyama Yozo, a navy colonel who worked directly under wartime Prime Minister Tojo Hideki. (Mainichi Shimbun Yasukuni Shuzaihan 2007:146) The bureaucrats handed the list of the Class A war criminals to Yasukuni shrine’s governing representatives or Sodaikai, names which included Kaya Okinori, former Finance Minister and a convicted Class A war criminal who was paroled in 1955. (Hosaka 2007: 205) Furthermore, Diet Library’s archival document, “New edition: a collection of Yasukuni shrine problem documents” (Shinpen Yasukuni jinja mondai shiryo shu) made public in 2007, recently revealed that there were frequent meetings between the shrine and the Health Ministry after the war and the active role that the bureaucrats played in driving the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals.

The enshrinement did not take place until 1978 because the Chief priest between 1946-1977, Tsukuba Fujimaro, a pacifist and a former member of the Imperial family, resisted the Health Ministry’s pressure to enshrine the war criminals. After Tsukuba’s sudden death, Matsudaira Nagayoshi, a former Imperial Navy officer, became chief priest, and carried out the enshrinementof the Class A war criminals in 1978. (Wakamiya 2006: 28) It is important to understand Matsudaira’s sentiments, which he clarified in a lecture published later in 1994:

“Even before I became the chief priest of Yasukuni, I have always argued that Japan’s spiritual revival will not be possible unless we reject the Tokyo tribunal which placed the entire blame of war on Japan.” (Shokun: 1994)

The “rekishikan” or historical interpretation of the enshrinement proponents can be summarized as follows: the Pacific war ended with the departure of the American Occupation in 1951. According to the international law, Japan was still in “war time” when the war criminals were executed. The Class A war criminals were technically equivalent to war dead and therefore should be venerated in Yasukuni shrine. (Breen 2007: 11)

Matsudaira et al’s unapologetic, revisionist interpretation of history is similarly expressed in the YushukanWarMuseum on the grounds of Yasukuni Shrine. The following statement conveyed by the museum summarizes Yasukuni’s position on the war: “The Yasukuni Shrine does not regard the conduct of Japan during World War II as an act of aggression but rather matter of self defense and a heroic effort to repel European Imperialism,”“The museum serves to demonstrate what is called the ‘true’ history of Japan.” ( narrative told in the museum praises militarism and is criticized as whitewashing the war atrocities committed by Japan and thereby promoting an overt revisionist message of the Izokukai association and the right wing factions of Japan.

By paying obeisance and patronizing the Yasukuni Shrine, the prime ministers are viewed by Japan’s Asian neighbors as endorsing the shrine’s public position that Japan was not at fault, the Tokyo tribunal should be rejected and “the recent great war was not a war of aggression, but a war of self-defense, in which the very survival of Japan was at stake and which aimed, moreover, at liberating Asia from European and American colonial oppression.” (Takahashi 2007: 112) The head of state’s visits to the shrine therefore send out an alarming message to the Asian neighbors.