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Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Agenda for Workshop 2
Brief for the workshop 3
A. Reform principles 5
B. Improved civil-military coordination 6
C. Poverty alleviation programs 6
D. Security reforms 7
E. Mosque reforms 7
F. Madressah integration 7
G. Delivery of justice 7
H. Regulation of electronic media 8
I. Regulation of Afghan refugee camps 8
J. Governance reforms 8
Address of Khalid Aziz Chairman, RIPORT 9
Presentation by Khalid Aziz Chairman, RIPORT 12
Summary of address by the Chief Minister Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 18
Summary of the speech by Norwegian Ambassador Mr. Robert Kvile 20
Annex – 1 List of workshop attendees 21
Annext – 2 Background of RIPORT 23
Annex – 3 Background of NUPI 25
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Introduction
The Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training (RIPORT) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs partnered in the preparation of the current policy report on Swat based on perceptions of the households. These perceptions were gathered through a survey conducted between Feb-April 2010. The result of the survey have since been analyzed and published in a book.
On 28th September, 2010 the findings of the report were presented to a workshop in Islamabad that was presided over by the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (List of attendees is at Annex-1)
The proceedings of the workshop are being shared with government and other partners who are assisting the government of Pakistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in meeting the challenge of conflict in Swat and in other parts of the country.
It is hoped that the proposals contained in this report assists the government in meeting its security responsibilities in a planned and a meaningful manner.
Khalid Aziz
Chairman
(RIPORT)
14th Oct, 2010
Agenda for Workshop
“Swat: The Main Causes of the Breakdown of Governance
And Rise of Militancy”
28th Sep 2010 at 15:00
Schedule
Registration of Participants 14:30 to 15:00
Tilawat 15:00
Presentation of main findings - Khalid Aziz Chairman RIPORT 15:15 to 16:00
Address by Chief Minister Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 16:00 to 16:15
Speech by Ambassador of Norway Mr. Robert Kvile 16:15 to 16:45
Question & answer session presided by Senator Afrsaiab Khattak 17:00 to 17:45
Brief for the workshop
1. This report “Swat: The Main Causes of the Breakdown of Governance and Rise of Militancy,” has been prepared by RIPORT & NUPI. RIPORT is a policy research institute established in 2005 and operates in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. One of the mandates of RIPORT is to study conflict and to make policy reform recommendations.
2. RIPORT conducted the survey to find out the perception of households in Swat to identify the causes that created the crisis of governance in Swat in 2009. This was to be the first step of an exercise that would conclude by preparation of recommendations for the government. In this connection the perceptions regarding the causes and effects of the militant insurgency were gathered from respondents belonging to 384 households. The survey was administered in sixteen villages and three urban wards of Mingora.
3. Prior to the survey elaborate interviews with knowledgeable respondents were conducted to formulate hypothesis in various categories which were subsequently tested through the administration of a questionnaire. They allowed us to view the conflict from different perspectives. The aim was to understand the Swat conflict over a historical perspective and holistically. It is clear that conflicts don’t happen overnight but are the result of multiple causes that may have been germinating over a long period of time.
4. The study examines the interaction of Swat history and its demography with the various issues that arose overtime. At one time Swat was the center of the Hinayana sect of Buddhism and was a regional center of the Himalayan Civilization extending from Tibet to Swat including Kashmir.
5. The 16th century Yusufzai invasion brought new rulers to the valley supplanting the indigenous nobility who were scattered into the surrounding mountains. The study explores the dynamic of marginalization and the role it played in igniting the violence in Swat. The study indicates that poverty in Swat has created vulnerabilities that caused a large number of people to seek redressal of their plight and poverty by joining the terrorists when the opportunity arose from 2006 to 2009.
6. The analysis also examines the role of radical Jihadist intervention that influenced Swat with the arrival of Syed Ahmed from Patna in 1826. Many battles were fought by the people of this region over a period of time. As a result of this influence, Swat has always been reticent to claimants who used the label of Islam and promised justice. It was recognition of this trait that was exploited by religious figures who obtained dominant position in Swat in the early twentieth century. The coming to power in 1917 of Mian Gul Abdul Wadud as the ruler of Swat brought in a religious dynasty into power that ruled Swat till its final merger in Pakistan in 1969.
7. The study finds that lack of a plan to integrate Swat fully into Pakistan may have been the main cause of the unrest in this district. The study also found that Swat was prevented from a complete merger into Pakistan due to different vested interests who played a negative role for small personal gain even after a Supreme Court decision ordering a merger in Feb 1994 was passed.
8. The study is critical of the permissiveness of the MMA government that ruled KP from 2002-2007. It did not confront the religious challengers to the state. The study also found it inexplicable why at the start of the international War on Terror in Nov 2001, President Musharaff weakened the grid-lock of security by abolishing the district administration; it permitted the radicals the freedom to do as they pleased. The study concludes by noting that Pakistan’s drift to intervention of religion into state and law began immediately after the death of the founder of the nation, Quaid e Azam in 1948. Soon afterwards the Objectives Resolution was passed declaring that the management of Pakistan shall be based on principles of Islam. The Islamic tilt reached a peak during the rule of President Zia-ul-Haq from 1977- 88. He shifted Pakistan from a quasi secular status to a religious mindset, the laws were changed secular freedoms were restricted. At the same time Pakistan and the USA organized a Jihad against the USSR thus encouraging even more the growth of this mindset in a region that had a history of living in the midst of Jihad in the 19th century.
9. The present military operation will not succeed unless long lasting reforms take place. In this respect a number of reforms are proposed in this study. Some of the main ones are described briefly under different categories:-
A. Reform principles
These apex reform principles should guide the development of all new programs for Swat:-
· All programs must cater for the very poor and shift the marginalized back into society.
· The focus of investment should be on social protection and targeted safety nets for the very vulnerable. Social protection and funding of social safety nets must receive priority.
· The provincial government needs to mainstream Swat by having Malakand division removed from the ambit of Art:246
· Immediate steps must be taken to restore district administration as it existed prior to Local Government Reform 2001. Suitable changes should also be made in the Police Order 2000.
· A robust communication strategy may be implemented without delay for transforming the mind set.
· Priority of funding must be given to women and female programs in health, education and skill development and education.
· The mainstream political parties should begin a drive for new membership based on the poor and the marginalized. Providing the poor with a political voice will assist in early and long term normalization. If political power devolves to the poor classes they will become empowered to defend their interests politically rather than through violence.
· The government should administer Swat according to the normal laws of the land like the criminal procedure code and the civil code. The enactments that were introduced to please the militants should be retired.
B. Improved civil-military coordination
· One of the major weaknesses noticed is the weak civil-military coordination. It is well known that insurgencies are defeated by a credible civil administration with the support of the military. Thus the priority of civilian control must be accepted.
· Both the military and the civilian administration should have a clear road map with milestones and indicators for the exit of the military. The longer the military stays the more delayed will be normalization however there must be a transition plan where the police is strengthened to provide security.
· The KP government must create a comprehensive district security program in consultation with the military and the police for a phased return to civilian control.
· The issue of detention of militants must be resolved. States have dealt with these issues in two ways. Some countries protect their judicial system and keep the suspects interned in special prisons for a long term. Others process some of the militants legally. A political judgment call will need to be made to suit KP circumstances and essential legislation carried out. Secondly, detainee release policy should be dovetailed into a comprehensive rehabilitation and re-integration program for the militants.
· KP government is advised to launch a comprehensive strategic communication initiative based on a transformative strategy delivered through multiple FM radio stations.
C. Poverty alleviation programs
· The social sector indicators show the downward drift of Swat in infant mortality, calorific intake, adult education, drinking water, sanitation and combating infectious diseases like hepatitis. Investment in programs must be made to lighten these burdens of the people.
· In the presence of land asset mal-distribution income generating programs for the very poor need to be replicated like the 1980’s Swiss Project for small farmers of Kalam
D. Security reforms
· The law and order and criminal investigation oversight functions in Swat should be placed under the district magistrate. Police Order 2000 should be reviewed accordingly.
· A district policing plan should be prepared jointly by the district magistrate and DPO Swat based on the examination of the role played by various drivers of conflict in Swat identified in annex-1
E. Mosque reforms
· Mosques have a profound impact on governance. It is quite strange that mosques have been allowed to be taken over by Afghan and others who challenge the state. This free for all policy is suicidal. The KP government must return the mosque to the community through regulation.
· The proposed regulations should ensure that only locals can become head of mosques; outsiders should be removed.
· Mosque construction and upkeep should be regulated by considering them as community schools.
F. Madressah integration
· Instead of speaking of Madressah reform the government should consider integrating them into its education stream. The introduction of Art 25 A into the Constitution by the 18th Amendment makes primary education compulsory and free. It now provides the government with an opportunity to make the required changes.
G. Delivery of justice
· Disposal of litigation by the courts should be improved
· An alternate dispute resolution system should be instituted
· Learned religious scholars should be provided openings into the adjudication system as assessors, Islamic law experts, consultants etc to create a vested interest of the clergy in the well being of the district
H. Regulation of electronic media
· A provincial electronic media regulatory authority should be created forthwith.
· More FM stations need to be installed with relevant content on the model of Amn (Peace) FM Radio, Mardan
I. Regulation of Afghan refugee camps
· The survey found a nexus between the Afghan refugee camps and insurgency. The location of a camp near a populated area is a sure sign of impending trouble.
· The best option is to encourage the return of Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan
· In case the camps continue then they must be monitored by the district administration and police and not other agencies.
· The KP government should have a high / level committee under the Chief Secretary to decide about camp location and its security administration.
· Under no circumstance should any refugee camp be permitted in Swat or its neighborhood.
J. Governance reforms
· Swat needs to be mainstreamed. The President can order this under Art 247 (2) and (6)
· Administrative reforms re-establishing prior to 12 Oct 1999 district administration model should be undertaken by establishing the executive magistracy, the district magistrate and police.
· A comprehensive re-integration and rehabilitation plan for the militants be undertaken in consort with FATA
· A reform monitoring unit be established in the Chief Secretary’s Office to review the pace and depth of these reforms.
Address of Khalid Aziz Chairman, RIPORT
Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti, Mr. Robert Kvile Ambassador of Norway, Mr. Helge Luras Adviser NUPI, Your Excellencies, Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen.
It gives me immense pleasure to present to you today the major findings of the report on Swat that identified the main causes of the conflict in that valley. There are different ways of looking at the conflict and the present study is an attempt to present a view of the world from the perspective of Swat households. Experience teaches one many lessons and one of the most important I have learnt is that the plain common sense of an ordinary farmer surpasses the intellect of many who consider themselves knowledgeable. In a little while I will present the policy reforms that are based on these perceptions.
RIPORT is a policy research think tank established in KP in 2005 that studies conflict and related public policy. It was formed in 2005. It is working in Swat as a partner with the UNHCR where it provides services in trauma management to those afflicted by violence and terror. One of its mandates is to study the origins of conflict that is the origin of trauma. This study is a preventive intervention so that conflict can be held at bay. It could be replicated to other areas with modifications. Our partner in this work is NUPI the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs who supported us and I want to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who gave a grant to NUPI for this task.