The Dialectical Relationship between Human Rights and the Christian Faith:
A Response to Prof. Laura Palazzani
Kai-man Kwan
I am glad to have the opportunity to read and to respond to Prof. Palazzani’s fine paper on “The Christian-Catholic religious perspective: Human rights, cultural pluralism and bioethics.” It provides a succinct account of how the Christian-Catholic religion provides the foundation for human rights, and how it views the contents of human rights. By and large I agree with Palazzani’s viewpoints. I also find her approach to this matter commendable: “The task of the Christian in today’s complex pluralist society is to make himself heard, to dialogue with the non-believers and different believers, to rationally find the common truth together again, but also to not give up the specificity of his faith, to not stop at a generic Christian inspiration of ethical action, to not forget the divine precepts. The Christian must avoid the temptation of privatising faith and moving publicly at the level of reason alone, but must also socially witness values and the Christian announcement.”
As a respondent, I need to say something different. I find that Palazzani’s paper has articulated why our faith is consonant with the core ideas of human rights but she has not touched upon the tension between the Christian faith and human rights, at least as they are interpreted by the modern secular world. My objective is to provide a fuller picture by also reflecting on the potential contradictions between the Christian faith and the secular, liberal understanding of human rights. This is not meant as a criticism of Palazzani, but rather a supplement to her discussions.
The Tension between Human Rights and the Christian Faith
From the very beginning, the relationship between human rights and the Christian faith is complicated. Let us look at the two foundational documents of modern human rights: the American Declaration of the Rights of Virginia (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), and compare their ideological justifications of human rights. The American one affirms that all men are created equal. It appeals to the imago dei (image of God) to ground the ‘inalienable’ dignity and rights of man. (Even if the faith behind is more deistic than fully Christian, the theistic faith is still unmistakable.) On the other hand, the French document is based more on the rationalism of the Encyclopaedists, which traces back to the Classical humanism of Greece. The human rights are a revelation of Reason (which seems to be the secularized God of the Enlightenment) which the human nature shares and recognizes in himself. This makes human beings transcendent and the freedom is the expression of the transcendent Spirit. Hence this is the basic right of the human being.
These two traditions, an idealistic humanism of Greek origin and the Hebrew–Christian tradition, in fact speak in different terms: creation vs. nature, human brotherhood based on a common Father vs. human brotherhood with a common reason, human being as an object of God’s love in creation and redemption vs. the dignity of a rational autonomous self. However, these two systems interpenetrate one another, and together form the basis for a new understanding of human being. As the idealistic humanism becomes unpopular in the increasingly secular context of rights talk, many philosophers have attempted to provide different secular justifications of human rights. These diverse theories of human rights account for the confusion among theologians’ evaluation of human rights. On the one hand, some perceive them as constructs of liberal humanism which have pagan origins and motives. Others even see human rights as expressions of human rebellion and attempts to secure human autonomy. On the other hand, some claim them as the rightful heirs of the Christian tradition, and genuine expression of the Christian faith. They even passionately commit to the struggle for human rights in practice.
Since the 1970’s, there are clear signs that the Christian churches are moving towards an embrace of human rights. After centuries of resistance to the language of rights, the Catholic Church has come around to adopt it. As Palazzani points out, “The reasons for the initial opposition can be traced back to the interpretation of human rights as one of the ways in which the appeal for liberalisation/liberalism and secularisation was expressed in the modern age, understood as de-Christianisation (meaning secularisation as the anti-clerical negation of God and Christ), by means of the explicit exclusion of a religious and theistic foundation of such rights.”
However, in 1979, John Paul II, in an address to the United Nations, said, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights-with its train of many declarations and conventions on highly important aspects of human rights, in favor of children, of women, of equality between races, and especially the two international covenants on economic, social and cultural rights and on civil and political rights- must remain the basic value in the United Nations organization with which the consciences of its members must be confronted and from which they must draw continual inspiration” (Bakalar, p. 14).
There is also a wide consensus among the Protestants in favour of human rights. In Europe, the mainstream denominations have drafted declarations in support of human rights, often helped by theologians like Jurgen Moltmann (see Miller). The enthusiasm of the World Council of Churches for human rights is unmistakable: “The struggle of Christians for human rights is a fundamental response to Jesus Christ. That Gospel leads us to become ever more active in identifying and rectifying violations of human rights in our societies” (quoted in Norman 1979, p. 32). Prominent evangelicals like John Stott, Ronald Sider, and John Warwick Montgomery also try to reconcile the Biblical faith with human rights.[1]
On the whole I agree with the above development, and regard the defense of core human rights as a Christian imperative. To quote John Paul II again, “Every human person-no matter how vulnerable or helpless, no matter how young or how old, no matter how healthy, handicapped or sick, no matter how useful or productive for society- is a being of inestimable worth created in the image and likeness of God… respect every human person, especially the weakest and most defenseless ones, those as yet unborn” (Bakalar, p. 13).
Nevertheless, I caution against an uncritical and blanket taking on board of the prevailing ideology of human rights. First, there are different and often contradictory formulations of human rights, and proponents of human rights do not speak in one voice. There are also different philosophies of human rights. Some formulation or philosophy of human rights may be more consonant with the Christian faith than others. For example, the current formulations are heavily influenced by liberal humanism which may lead to an undue emphasis on individual rights. Second, some rights considered on their own may be perfectly legitimate but their absolutization may lead to abuses and false representation of reality.
Third, although theologians like to talk about a dialogue between human rights and the Christian faith, more often than not the current understanding of human rights is in fact setting the agenda for the theologians rather than the other way round. As Edward Norman points out, the “adoption by the Church leadership, in each successive generation, of the moral and political idealism of the surrounding secular culture” is not uncommon, and there is the danger of adjusting “traditional understandings of religious doctrine in order to represent the canons of contemporary moral seriousness as exactly embodying the spirit of the Gospels.” By embracing the human rights movement, many people have identified the aims of the Church with the goals of western liberalism— “whose transient moral enthusiasms are, in characteristic bourgeois manner, represented as eternal verities. The aims of Human Rights campaigns are being given the authority of laws of God” (Norman 1979, p. 33).[2]
Michael Ignatieff, the Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, also says, “Human rights is misunderstood … if it is seen as a "secular religion." It is not a creed; it is not a metaphysics. To make it so is to turn it into a species of idolatry: humanism worshiping itself. Elevating the moral and metaphysical claims made on behalf of human rights may be intended to increase its universal appeal. In fact, it has the opposite effect, raising doubts among religious and non-Western groups who do not happen to be in need of Western secular creeds” (Ignatieff, p. 53). Since even a secular advocate of human rights like Ignatieff warns us of the danger of human rights as idolatry, how much more should Christian theologians seek to elucidate human rights truly from his faith perspective and to provide a critique of the one-sidedness of some formulations of human rights? In fact, as human rights proliferate and become more and more entrenched in the public realm, there are new signs of tension between human rights claims and faith, e.g. gay rights, abortions rights, and the marginalization of religious liberty.
Especially in Europe, the European Parliament (EU) is very keen in enforcing gay rights, and this comes into conflict with the policy of some states with strong religious heritage. For example, EU’s recommendation to criminalize homophobia in 2006 was a direct reaction to perceived bigotry against homosexual people in Poland and Lithuania.[3] While this resolution was hailed by gay and human rights advocates as a major victory, it was seen as an attack on religious values by others. Aldo Giordano, the secretary-general of the Council of European Bishops’ Conferences, told Vatican Radio, “The declaration shows an aversion for certain values of our tradition, notably religious values. Such resolutions risk delegitimizing the European Parliament. It should be clear that certain subjects, especially those relating to the family, are not within the direct competence of the European Union but are the recognized competence of nations." Giordano also observed: “Sometimes it seems there is the domination (within the European Parliament) of a certain ideology of pluralism which sees everything that exists as something good. There really is lacking a reflection on what is truly human, what is human richness, what is good and evil, what is truth.”
So some human rights claims do seem to clash with some religious values. In fact some human rights advocates still regard the church as the enemy of human rights, and they won’t hesitate to force the church to change by law. Robertson said, “In the twenty-first century the human rights movement will struggle on, against its traditional enemies – armies, churches and states – looking increasingly towards international law to provide a lever against these institutional powers” (Robertson, p. 383).
What are the reasons for this tension? In fact we can get some hints from Palazzani’s paper. For Palazzani, “Christianity offers a strong ethics, or a “maximum” ethics. If the right – in particular human rights – is limited to defending (in a horizontal sense) the coexistence of men through justice, Christianity asks something more (in a vertical and transcendental sense), besides the respect of men also the moral involvement towards one’s neighbour and the eschatological faith in the providential design.” In contrast, human rights represents ““minimum” necessary ethics, the ethics of measure and limit, which leaves to the “maximum” moral, transported by Christian thought, the personal search “beyond” the measure, the active and continuous commitment of the individual in view of the complete and concrete realisation of the respect of human dignity and the responsibility towards others.”
Ideally speaking, this may be the way that ought to be but the advocates for human rights are certainly not contented to appeal to human rights only within the realm of minimum ethics. On the contrary, the number of the items of human rights have been continuously increasing. Moreover, human rights are not only used to guard against the abuse of the government’s power, but are also used to limit the freedom of citizens. This is particularly clear in various kinds of discrimination laws. In the name of anti-discrimination or equality, politically incorrect views have been censored or marginalized. The contents of education, the practice of counsellors, or the culture promoted by the mainstream media are all regulated or guided by what are regarded as human rights. In this way, human rights are used to promote a particular kind of all-pervading culture or life-style, and the society is reshaped comprehensively. This kind of human rights is in fact another kind of comprehensive doctrine (John Rawls’ sense), and is often antithetical to the Christian system of morality. How can they avoid conflicts then?
Palazzani points out that the law “in the measure in which it defends human dignity … is an instrument for salvation.” This may well be one side of the coin of truth. However, from the Christian perspective, when the law enforces immorality in the name of human rights, it may be an instrument for social corruption. This probably is another side of the coin.
Palazzani has a nice exposition of Maritain’s view of human rights. While I also admire Maritain’s work, I can’t help notice that the prominence of the teleological framework in his work will very likely be rejected by the majority of the secular advocates for human rights. For Maritain, “good (duty) is what is in agreement with the ends of nature; evil (prohibited) is what is dissimilar to the ends of nature. The first absolutely general principle is the principle of finality, on the basis of which everybody acts for an end and the end coincides with good; good is what everything leans towards, and evil what distances itself and deviates from the end.” First of all, the language which mentions “good” or “evil” in their singular will make the secularists uncomfortable. They will find the idea of “the ends of nature” unintelligible; they would rather like to talk about various “conceptions of good.” For secular advocates for human rights, what is most important is to let people have (almost) complete freedom to choose their conceptions of good, and then live accordingly. The emphasis on the conformity to objective ends of nature, in their view, will only stifle this kind of freedom. So this is in fact against human rights from their perspective. In short, they will reject a teleological account of human nature.