M59 The evolution Of Chinese military doctrine
With the exception of Washington itself, nowhere will the recent changes in US military doctrine be more closely scrutinised than in Beijing (see UK Defence Forum M60 paper July 2001). Acutely aware of the military capabilities of its rivals, a dynamic process of doctrinal evolution has seen the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shift its strategic focus from large-scale territorial defence, to developing the technologies and tactics necessary to conduct rapid, high technology warfare in Asia.
Western military operations in the last decade have provided China with invaluable opportunities to observe the mechanics and pitfalls of fighting a high-tech war, and Beijing has capitalised upon them. The PLA’s inability to compete with the US in conventional military terms has necessitated a more innovative approach in improving its capabilities, but faced with the development of national missile defence systems, Beijing now faces a further set of challenges. In attempting to usurp the US in Asia and expand its sphere of influence can it continue to stay one step ahead of its regional hegemonic rivals?
The 17.7 per cent increase in Beijing’s defence spending announced in March represents its biggest expansion in real terms for two decades and reflects concern over the Bush administration’s military support for Taiwan. While other major nations were reducing their defence budgets in the post-Cold War environment, China was rapidly increasing its own.
In the 1980’s research into the high-tech warfare was stimulated by the Falklands conflict, operations in the the Bekaa Valley and air strikes on Libya, although this received only tepid support from central government. The gradual movement away from Mao’s revolutionary doctrine through Deng’s era of modernisation into Jiang’s high tech era has loosened the ideological constraints placed upon military reform. In doing so it has enabled doctrine to adapt in line with changes in China’s national priorities and the wider security environment, alongside the evolving concept of war itself.
The process of change is a precarious one. In relying upon the support of the Chinese military establishment to secure their grip on power, the leadership must balance the influence of more hawkish elements of the PLA against the realities of the strategic and political environment. Furthermore, as the reach of communist ideology is increasingly diluted in China, the need for central government to legitimate its control could manifest itself in the emergence of a more rampant form of nationalism. In this respect, domestic concerns remain critical in influencing military doctrine.
The acute awareness of historical humiliations continues to shape Beijing’s perception of the strategic landscape. American leadership in the Gulf War served to highlight the perceived danger that, in the absence of the Soviet Union to act as a counter balance, the US would seek to establish itself as the sole superpower. Moreover, in circumventing the UN Security Council through Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, US actions were widely seen in China as a clear indication of Washington’s shift towards unilateral militarism.
The precedent that NATO’s actions in Kosovo set, with military intervention on humanitarian grounds within the territory of a sovereign state, radically raised concerns in Beijing over the future scope of its actions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and in bringing about the unification of Taiwan. The bombing of the PRC’s embassy in Belgrade further reinforced the point; an act interpreted in Beijing as implying that China was a tertiary power and that their reaction to the incident would be of limited consequence.
Both the Gulf War and Operation Allied Force nevertheless provided Beijing with opportunities to analyse and internalise the characteristics of alternative military strategies. Operations in the Persian Gulf impressed upon the PLA the importance of airpower and the need to rationalise its army and make it more technologically sophisticated and professional. Indeed the defeat of a land army by airpower in Kosovo’s no contact war, without incurring any allied fatalities, demonstrated a degree of sophistication that has compelled the Chinese to rethink their tactical concepts.
As Beijing continues to advance towards acquiring cutting edge military technology and move from platform to network-centred warfare, it faces the problem of bridging the transitional gap. In this respect, in selected areas, the PRC has benefited from being able to ‘bypass’ the intermediate stages already endured by more advanced Western powers. Moreover, Beijing has benefited from demonstrations of the critical vulnerabilities of those defences; the reliance of NATO upon GPS and satellite communications technology during the Gulf War was one such example.
China’s technological inferiority has led to an increasing tendency towards asymmetrical warfare strategies that can be used to attack the dependency of adversaries upon electronic and support systems (the development of parasitic satellites for example and the increasing incidence of cyber warfare). The strategy is aligned with the PLA’s continued adherence to the doctrine of active defence; taking a pre-emptive strike to engage a technologically more advanced enemy whilst avoiding a major head-on confrontation.
Conventionally speaking, although China’s ambitions of achieving a blue water capability are still far from being realised, creeping progress in naval modernisation has enabled Beijing to alter its maritime strategy from coastal defence to one of limited regional force projection. The erection of permanent military installations in the disputed Spratly Islands, and the increasing number of intrusions by Chinese vessels conducting naval operations in the Sea of Japan all point to the PRC’s growing military assertiveness.
Unable to counter an expression of Amerian military might in Asia head on, Beijing’s policy of courting smaller nations in the South Pacific potentially will enable China to extend its military reach. In the event of a conflict with the US, the use of anti-ship missiles deployable on these islands would seriously disrupt trade and supply lines, along key shipping routes for the US.
Beijing’s description of Sino-Taiwanese relations as “complicated and grim”, in a recent defence white paper, and the Bush administration’s pledge to defend Taipei in the event of offensive action, signal a potential upward shift in tensions. In this respect, it is possible to identify motivations above the desire for gaining greater technological know-how in the recent detention of the downed US EP-3E surveillance aircraft. The incident has provided the PRC with the opportunity to issue a strong message to the US and the wider international community vis-à-vis its standing as a strategic competitor for influence within Asia.
Together, China’s increasingly sophisticated weaponry and Russia’s decline is enabling Beijing to pursue its regional ambitions. Expansionism is unlikely to develop in the more traditional sense, but rather revolves around what the PRC regards as its territorial right, namely Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The shift in doctrine to a more assertive role in the region is motivated as much by the need to counter the equally new strategic freedom and emerging capabilities of its neighbours as the desire to challenge Washington’s hegemonic influence. In this respect, Beijing currently finds itself in a predicament. With the US seeking to strengthen its military alliances in Asia, should the PRC continue on its present course of seeking to establish regional hegemony? Or will the competition for influence push China into a strategic alliance with India?
The growing relationship between Beijing and Rangoon could ultimately provide China with access to the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal and has raised Indian concerns that China is pursuing a policy of encirclement. However, with the potential for a warming of US/Indian relations and Japan’s military aspirations stirring, Beijing may be forced to rethink its strategic priorities.
The continuing evolution of Chinese military doctrine will be influenced by a number of fundamental developments, not least of which includes the need for a relatively peaceful international environment to foster the economic development required for China to finance its military modernisation. In the event of an economic downturn the possibility that China will become more, not less aggressive, to transform domestic dissatisfaction into nationalist fervour, cannot be discounted. Developments in Russia, Korea, India and Japan, but above all the US, will shape China’s future military requirements. Notwithstanding its current deficiencies, a resurgent China would constitute a formidable foe.
Disclaimer
The views of the author are his/her own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate view on the opinions expressed therein. The Forum exists to enable politicians, industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others with an interest in defence and security issues to exchange information and views on the future needs of Britain’s defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profit company.
June 2001
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