PHI201 REFERENCE AND TRUTH
Lecturer: Niall Connolly (Email: ; Tel: 222 0511)
Office Hours: Mondays 3pm-4pm and Tuesdays 3-4pm.
My office is B06 in the Philosophy Department (45 Victoria Street). Feel free to come along to see me in my office hours about anything to do with the course. If those times aren’t convenient, you can email me to arrange an alternative.
Essential Readings: instead of a course textbook there is a list of Essential Readings, all of which are available online (see below).
MOLE site: you should be automatically registered for this if you are registered for the module; please let me know asap if you don’t yet have access to it. Lecture slides and other information is or will be available there, including this Outline, material for seminars, advice on essays and exams etc. See also the Web Links tab for some helpful links.
Lectures and Seminars
Lectures: Mondays 2-2.50 pm in HI-LT6 and Tuesdays 11-11.50am in AT-LT8.
Seminars: Tuesdays 1-1.50pm and Fridays 10-10.50am in SR116 (Jessop Building).
You need to come to one of the seminar groups: please sign up through MOLE at the beginning of the course.
Seminars start in week 3.
Through MOLE you can find out what the reading is for each seminar. Questions on the readings are also posted to help focus your reading and often to help focus the discussion in seminars.
Brief Course Outline
This module is an introductory course in the Philosophy of Language. The overall focus of the course will be on the notion of meaning. There are different ways of trying to shed light on this crucial notion. The first half of the course will attempt to shed light on the notion of meaning by investigating different accounts of the meanings of three types of linguistic expressions: names (for instance ‘Mel Gibson’, ‘Anna Karenina’), definite descriptions (for instance ‘the inventor of the zip’, ‘the first minister of Scotland’), and indexicals (for instance ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’). The second half of the course will be further divided into two parts. The first part will investigate an influential approach, due to Paul Grice, to understanding what it is for words to have meaning and for people to mean things by their words. The second part will investigate the crazy (on the face of it) view that nobody means anything by anything they say.
Course Assessment
Assessment for this module will consist of two coursework essays (25% each) and an exam (50%).
1.) MID-TERM COURSEWORK: an essay, due in week 6. One paper copy of your essay should be handed in to the Departmental Office together with a plagiarism slip. And you also need to submit an electronic copy through MOLE: upload it through the Assignments link and press the submit button.
The essay must be between 1500 and 2000 words; please include a word count. The topics and questions are given at the end of this Course Outline. Marks will be deducted, in accordance with the department’s policy, for essays handed in after the deadline, i.e. 5% per working day after the deadline. See the departmental information online (under “Assessment”) for further details regarding penalities and extensions etc.
2.) END OF SEMESTER COURSEWORK: an essay, due in week 12. One paper copy of your essay should be handed in to the Departmental Office together with a plagiarism slip. And you also need to submit an electronic copy through MOLE: upload it through the Assignments link and press the submit button.
You should choose a topic from the second set of questions given at the end of this Course Outline. The essay must be between 1500 and 2000 words; please include a word count. Marks will be deducted, in accordance with the department’s policy, for essays handed in after the deadline. See the departmental information online (under “Assessment”) for further details regarding penalties and extensions etc.
3.) THE FINAL EXAM will last 2 hours and you will be required to write two essays chosen from a range of questions covering mainly topics from the second half of the course. The exam will be pre-released, and the questions will be made available sometime during the semester. Further advice on the exam will also be distributed near the end of the semester; and see the departmental website for general advice on approaching exams.
Plagiarism
The following four examples of unfair means are serious academic offences and may result in penalties that could have a lasting effect on a student´s career, both at University and beyond (including possible expulsion from the University).
Plagiarism (either intentional or unintentional) is the stealing of ideas or work of another person (including experts and fellow or former students) and is considered dishonest and unprofessional. Plagiarism may take the form of cutting and pasting, taking or closely paraphrasing ideas, passages, sections, sentences, paragraphs, drawings, graphs and other graphical material from books, articles, internet sites or any other source and submitting them for assessment without appropriate acknowledgement.
Submitting bought or commissioned work (for example from internet sites, essay “banks” or “mills”) is an extremely serious form of plagiarism. This may take the form of buying or commissioning either the whole assignment or part of it and implies a clear intention to deceive the examiners. The University also takes an extremely serious view of any student who sells, offers to sell or passes on their own assignments to other students.
Double submission (or self plagiarism) is resubmitting previously submitted work on one or more occasions (without proper acknowledgement). This may take the form of copying either the whole assignment or part of it. Normally credit will already have been given for this work.
Collusion is where two or more people work together to produce a piece of work, all or part of which is then submitted by each of them as their own individual work. This includes passing on work in any format to another student. Collusion does not occur where students involved in group work are encouraged to work together to produce a single piece of work as part of the assessment process.
Reading List
General:
Miller, Alexander Philosophy of Language
Lycan, William G. Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction
McCulloch, Gregory The Game of the Name
Blackburn, S, Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press, 1984.
Devitt & Sterelny, Language and Reality. Blackwell, 2nd edition, 1999. (1st edition would also be useful.)
Grayling, A.C. An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell, 3rd edition, 1997.
Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Kemp, G, What is this thing called Philosophy of Language. Routledge, 2013
Lycan, W.G, Philosophy of Language. Routledge, 2000.
Morris, M, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press 2007
Soames, S, Reference and Description. Princeton University Press, 2004.
and/or Philosophy of Language, Princeton University Press, 2010.
Stainton, R.J, Philosophical Perspectives on Language. Broadview Press, 1996.
Tanesini, A, Philosophy of Language A-Z. Edinburgh University Press, 2007.
Taylor, K, Truth and Meaning. Blackwell: 1998.
Useful Anthologies
Garfield & Kitely (ed.): Meaning and Truth. Parragon House, 1991
Hale & Wright (ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell, 1997.
Harnish (ed.): Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994.
Ludlow (ed.): Readings in the Philosophy of Language. MIT Press, 1997.
Martinich, (ed.): The Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press, 4th edition, 2001
Lepore & Smith (eds): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Clarendon Press 2006
Topic by Topic
(Essential Readings starred, recommended readings in bold)
Topic 1. Sense and Reference
*Frege, Gottlob: ‘On Sense and Reference’ Translated by Max Black in Philosophical Review 57, 1948. pp.209–230.
(Reprinted in a number of places, including:
Harnish (ed): Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994;
Ludlow (ed.): Readings in the Philosophy of Language. MIT Press, 1997.
Martinich (ed) The Philosophy of Language (fourth edition), 2001 (different translation);
Garfield & Kiteley (ed.): Meaning and Truth. Parragon House, 1991 (different translation)
Michael Beaney (ed) The Frege Reader, Blackwell, 1997. (Published there as “On Sinn and Bedeutung”.)
AW Moore (ed.) Meaning and Reference)
Salmon, Nathan Frege’s Puzzle
Evans, Gareth The Varieties of Reference Chapter 1
Dummett, Michael Frege Philosophy of Language chapter 5
McCulloch, Gregory The Game of the Name esp. chapters 1 and 5
Miller, Alexander Philosophy of Language chapter 1
Beaney, M, Frege: Making Sense. Duckworth, 1996.
Carl, W, Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference. Cambridge University Press 1994.
Jones, EE Constance,“A New Law of Thought”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11, 1911. pp. 166–186
Noonan, H, Frege: A Critical Introduction, Polity Press, 2001.
Textor, M, Frege on Sense and Reference (Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks), Routledge, 2010
Topic 2. Descriptions
*Russell, Bertrand, (1919) ‘Descriptions’ from his Introduction to mathematical philosophy pp.167-180, London, Allen and Unwin
e-offprint through Library
(Reprinted in A.P. Martinich (ed) The Philosophy of Language (fourth edition), 2001;
Ludlow (ed.): Readings in the Philosophy of Language. MIT Press, 1997)
Russell, Bertrand: ‘On Denoting’ in Logic and Knowledge
(http://revueltaredaccion.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/russell_on_denoting.pdf)
- ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’ (http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/RussellKnowAcquaint.pdf)
Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic' (section 2) in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject
*Strawson, PF Strawson: ‘On Referring’ Mind 59 1950 320-44 (reprinted in AW Moore Meaning and Reference, and in Ludlow, Martinich and Garfield & Kiteley.
*Donnellan, Keith Donnellan: ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, The Philosophical Review 77, 1966. pp. 281-304. (also in Martinich, A. P. ed. 1990. The Philosophy of Language, 3 rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.).
Kripke, Saul ‘Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', (in Martinich, A. P. ed. 1990. The Philosophy of Language, 3 rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press)
McCulloch, Gregory The Game of the Name chapters 2-4
Evans, Gareth The Varieties of Reference Chapter 2, and section 9.3
Neale, Stephen Descriptions chapters 1-3
Miller, Alexander Philosophy of Language chapter 2
See also chapters on descriptions in the various overview texts, e.g., Kemp, Lycan, McCulloch, Taylor and Grayling.
Topic 3. Kripke’s Critique of Descriptivism and the Causal Account of Reference
*Searle: ‘Proper names’ in Mind 67, 1958. pp. 166–173. Reprinted in Ludlow, Martinich and Garfield & Kiteley.
*Kripke, Saul: Kripke: Excerpt from Naming and Necessity from A.P. Martinich (ed) The Philosophy of Language (fourth edition), Oxford University Press, 2001. pp.272–287.
Eoffprint through library
*Devitt and Sterelny: Chapter 4, ‘A causal theory of reference: names’ from Language and Reality (second edition), Blackwell, 1999.
Eoffprint through library
*Putnam, H. ‘Meaning and Reference’ in Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973. pp. 699-711 Reprinted in Martinich.
Putnam, H. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in Harnish and in Putnam’s Mind, Language and Reality, is a longer paper containing ‘Meaning and Reference’ as a part.
Dummett Frege Philosophy of Language Appendix to Chapter 5 (Kripke’s reply is in the Preface to Naming and Necessity)
McCulloch, Gregory The Game of the Name chapters 2-4
Evans, Gareth ‘The Causal Theory of Names’ Some of the discussion in his Varieties of Reference (esp. chapter 3 and chapter 11 is relevant)
Salmon, Nathan, Frege’s Puzzle
Putnam, Hilary, ‘The Meaning of Meaning’ in his Mind, Language and Reality (Philosophical Papers vol. II).
Hughes, Christopher, Names, Necessity and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004).
Ahmed, A: Saul Kripke, Continuum 2007.
See also chapters on names, or on Kripke, in the various overview texts, e.g., Devitt & Sterelny, Kemp, Lycan (Ch. 4), McCulloch and Martin.
Topic 4. Indexicals
*Frege, G. 'The Thought: a logical enquiry’, Mind vol. 65, No. 259 (Jul., 1956), pp. 289-311' ( Reprinted in N. Salmon, and S. Soames, eds., Propositions & Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; also in M. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.)
*Perry, J. 1977. 'Frege on Demonstratives'. Philosophical Review 86: 474-497. Reprinted in P.
Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Kaplan, D. 1979. 'On the Logic of Demonstratives'. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 81-98. Reprinted in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
—. 1977. Demonstratives. Reprinted in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Evans, G. 1981. 'Understanding Demonstratives'. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985; and in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Topic 5. Meaning, Intention and Convention
*Grice, P: ‘Meaning’
in Philosophical Review 66, 1957. pp. 377–388
Reprinted in Martinich and Harnish and in Grice Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, 1989 (chapter 14).
Avramides, Meaning and Mind. MIT Press, 1989 (especially ch.2).
Lewis, D.K: ‘Languages and Language’ in his Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, 1983. pp. 163–188. Reprinted in Martinich.
Eoffprint through library
Gilbert, M: ‘Social convention’ from her book, On Social Facts Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992. pp.315-407,478-492.
Blackburn, S, Spreading the Word, chapter 4, sections 3, 4 and 5
Laurence, S, ‘Convention-based semantics and the development of language’, in Language and Thought, eds. Carruthers and Boucher (CUP).
See also chapters on these topics in the various overview texts, e.g., Lycan, Taylor, Miller, Devitt & Sterelny and Martin (on convention).
Topic 6. Implicature
Grice: ‘Logic and Conversation’ in his Studies in the Ways of Words, Harvard University Press, 1989. pp. 22–40. Reprinted in Martinich.
Eoffprint through library
Davis, W, Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Saul, J “Speaker meaning, what is said, and what is implicated”, Nous 36, 2002. pp. 228-248.
See also Kemp (ch.6), Taylor and Lycan on implicature.
Topic 7. The Indeterminacy of Translation
*Quine, W. V. 1960. Word & Object. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Ch.2.
*—. 1970. 'On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation'. Journal of Philosophy 67: 178-183.
Quine
—. 1990. The Pursuit of Truth. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs.1-3.
—. 1897. 'Indeterminacy of Translation Again'. Journal of Philosophy 84: 5-10.